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ABSmCT 
The p o l i t i c a l events of the 1960s and 1970s i n "Celtic B r i t a i n " led to the 
demise of the Anglocentric conventional wisdom which had asserted the 
fundamental homogeneity of the United Kingdom, and ushered i n a new 
orthodoxy which stressed diversity and the t e r r i t o r i a l dimension of the 
state. Ihese events were mirrored to an extent i n Cornwall, with competing 
explanations seeking to interpret "perif^eral protest", but with a more 
comprehensive model emerging to emphasise the complexity of the 
relationship between "centre" and "periphery" i n modem western European 
states, pointing i n particular to the existence of h i s t o r i c a l phases of 
peripherality. 
In an i n i t i a l phase of "Older Peripheralism", Cornwall was isolated 
t e r r i t o r i a l l y and cu l t u r a l l y from the core of the expanding English state, 
conquered and annexed but with an array of constitutionally "acconmodating" 
devices and a multi-faceted Celtic iden t i t y . However, p o l i t i c a l and 
economic change eroded this isolation, creating a new era of "second 
Peripheralism". This phase was marked by a rapid industrialisation which 
brought Cornwall into the forefront of technological innovation but which 
was over-specialised and incomplete, leading i n i t i a l l y to a new, assertive 
sense of identity based upon technological prowess but precipitating i n the 
longer term industrial collapse and a consequent Cornish social, economic 
and p o l i t i c a l paralysis. This paralysis endured from the end of the 
nineteenth century u n t i l after the Second World War, an experience which 
was highly d i s t i n c t i v e when compared to that of England. 
However, this paralysis was at length disturbed, with post-war Regional 
Development policies f a c i l i t a t i n g the construction of a "branch factory" 
economy i n Cornwall and encouraging a process of "counterurbanisation . 
Paradoxically, this socio-economic movement led not to the erosion of 
Cornwall's peripheral status but was i n fact evidence of a "Third 
Peripheralism", with the Cornish economy acquiring features which continued 
to contrast with those of England's core, and with an increasingly 
po l i t i c i s e d "Cornish Revival" injecting an important strand of a n t i -
metropolitanism into Cornish p o l i t i c a l behaviour, with i t s critiques of 
regional policy and demands for renewed constitutional "accommodation". 
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X I -
lOTRODUCTION 
A conventional wisdom emerged i n the post-war era which saw 
the p o l i t i c a l systems of western countries i n general and the United 
Kingdom i n particular as unified, homogeneous and i n several respects 
s t a t i c , not least i n terms of their t e r r i t o r i a l dimensions where a 
supposed overwhelming consensus of opinion i n support of existing 
constitutional structures was assumed to guarantee the i n t e g r i t y of 
existing nation-states. However, this myth of the homogeneous state 
was progressively overturned by (to use Keating's phrase) "...the 
wave of 'peripheral nationalist* movements which, confounding most 
orthodox wisdom, swept through advanced western countries i n the 
1960s and 1970s..."-^ ^ From Quebec to Sardinia, and from Scotland to 
Corsica, peripheral protest "...upset many of the textbook theories 
of p o l i t i c s i n western nations...",^ pointing not to homogeneity but 
to diversity, challenging rather than confirming the t e r r i t o r i a l 
i n t e g r i t y of states. 
As Keating observed, this "...proved an uncomfortable 
experience for scholars and teachers..,",^ most especially i n the 
United Kingdom where they were forced (as E l l i s wrote) to acknowledge 
"...the inadequacy of Anglo-centric presentations of Br i t i s h 
history..."^ which had often stressed unity and homogeneity i n what 
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they had assumed hitherto to be an essentially English state. 
Instead, B r i t i s h scholars were now required to develop a view of the 
B r i t i s h Isles (such as that presented by Kearney^) \^ich emphasised 
the existence and separate experiences of four (at least) nations, 
establishing the importance of diversity within the t e r r i t o r i a l 
dimension of the state. From t h i s emerged detailed comparative 
studies of the p o l i t i c s and history of Ireland (especially Northern 
Ireland), Scotland, and Wales, along with analyses attempting to 
elucidate and explain diversity and peripheral protest i n the United 
Kingdom and i n western countries generally. 
This re-assessment helped redefine the United Kingdom as a 
"nmlti-national" state,^ but i n so doing concentrated academic 
attention upon the more obvious t e r r i t o r i a l issues ( f o r example, the 
Northern Ireland problem, the rise of nationalism i n Scotland and 
Wales). This had often the unfortunate ( i f unintended) effect of 
re s t r i c t i n g the discussion of diversity to a consideration of 
peripheral protest alone, obscuring the fact that nationalist 
a c t i v i t y was but one symptom of a much broader pattern of diversity 
which warranted (but did not always receive) attention i n i t s own 
ri g h t . At the same time, the preoccupation with the more obvious 
issues was at the expense of possibly less pressing, less easily 
identified, perhaps more obscure, problems. There has not, for 
example, been systematic or exhaustive investigation of the North of 
England i n . the t e r r i t o r i a l make-up of the United Kingdom,^ l e t alone 
extensive discussion of the Isle of Man and Channel Islands and their 
relationships with the United Kingdom. 
I n particular, i t i s surprising that Cornwall has received only 
fleeting mention i n otherwise detailed analyses offered by 
commentators such as Birch and A.D. Smith.^ Ostensibly an integral 
(albeit far-flung) part of England, Cornwall has nonetheless 
exhibited many of the facets of diversity i d e n t i f i e d elsewhere i n the 
Iftiited Kingdom, echoing i t s alleged status as part of Britain's 
"Celtic Fringe" and indeed i n v i t i n g comparison with Scotland and 
Wales. This i n turn invites academic inquiry of the type that has 
already been afforded Scotland, Wales and elsewhere. This study, 
then, by addressing the case of Cornwall, serves to f i l l a hitherto 
glaring gap i n the elaboration of diversity within the United 
Kingdom, I t eschews a narrow preoccupation with the surface of 
peripheral or nationalist protest, and takes a broader, h i s t o r i c a l 
perspective i n i t s attempts to describe and explain the condition of 
modem Cornwall and i t s place i n the "multi-national" state. As 
such, t h i s study not only adds to the discussion of diversity within 
the United Kingdom, but also offers an approach which can equally be 
applied to other parts of the United Kingdom and indeed other regions 
of western Europe. 
As intimated above and as discussed i n greater d e t a i l l a t e r , 
Cornwall has attracted only limited attention from scholars anxious 
to investigate the new-found diversity of the United Kingdom. 
Notwithstanding the contributions of Lee and Railings,^ there has 
been a general i f vague and rarely articulated assumption that the 
h i s t o r i c a l experience of Cornwall has been one of continuous erosion 
of ethnic ide n t i t y i n the face of economic exploitation and cxiltural 
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imperialism, a relentless retreat from a "Celtic golden age" of 
economic i n t e g r i t y , t e r r i t o r i a l security, cultural fulfilment, and 
p o l i t i c a l self-determination. In other words, i f Cornwall has 
remained at a l l "different" from England, then this i s a "difference" 
that has endured despite Cornwall's h i s t o r i c a l experience. Eastlake, 
for example, has argued that: 
In each hist o r i c period, economic exploitation and cultural 
alienation succeeded one another, u n t i l the nineteenth century 
when the mining economy of Cornwall became an essential part of 
the English industrial system. The twentieth century offers 
either the prospect of t o t a l incorporation into England, or a 
cultural revival spearheaded by the several small, national and 
cultural organisations which now exist. 
This perspective, however, i s seriously flawed - indeed i t i s 
profoundly wrong. This present study offers an alternative and 
f u l l e r analysis i n \^ch i t i s argued that Cornwall's "difference" 
has endured because of (rather than despite) Cornwall's h i s t o r i c a l 
experience. Drawing upon the framework of "centre" and "periphery" 
developed by Rokkan and Urwin,^^ and, adapting and extending Tarrow's 
typology^^ of "Older" and "Second" Peripheralism (with i t s 
recognition of the central importance of industrial change i n 
perpetuating the peripheral condition), this study contends that i n 
each h i s t o r i c a l period the experience of Cornwall has been highly 
individual when compared to that of the English "centre", or indeed 
other areas of Britain. 
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In particular, t h i s study focuses upon the period of 
industrialisation and de-industrialisation (Tarrow's "Second 
Peripheralism") and the subsequent era of post-war socio-economic 
movement (a "Third Peripheralism"), i n the bel i e f that the effects of 
industrial change were of crucial significance i n determining the 
distinctive social, economic and p o l i t i c a l characteristics of modem 
Cornwall. These accounted for Cornwall's continuing "difference", 
and explained Cornwall's enduring (but changing ) separate id e n t i t y -
based (as i t continues to be) on a range of behaviour at variance 
with that of England. This study, therefore, offers an analysis which 
places Cornwall within the diversity of the "multi-national" state, 
presenting a model i n which recent peripheral protest i s but one 
index of peripheral difference, and where the h i s t o r i c a l experience 
of successive phases of peripherality has served to perpetuate 
separate ident i t y . 
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PART I 
THE MYTH OF THE HOMOGENEOUS STATE 
"The Iftiited Kingdom i s a somewhat untidy state, neither federal nor 
completely unitary, that has no formal constitution and can only be 
understood i n hi s t o r i c a l terms. I t was created i n stages, by the 
expansion of England..." 
Anthony H. Birch, 
Nationalism and National Integration, 
Unwin Hyman, London, 1989, p77. 
"History and p o l i t i c s , however, are rarely so tidy. I t i s the 
incongruity between culture, economics and p o l i t i c s which forms the 
essence of the centre-periphery dimension:.. . i t i s t h i s incongruity 
which constitutes the greatest obstacle both to academic 
categorisation and to governmental resolution of the problems that 
exist". 
Derek W. Urwin, 
"The Price of A Kingdom: Territory, 
Identity and the Centre-Periphery 
Dimension i n Western Europe", i n Yves 
Meny and Vincent Wright, Centre-
Periphery Relations i n Western Europe, 
George Allen and Unwin, London, 1985, 
pl67. 
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CHAPTER 1 
TOWARDS A CENTRE-PERIPHERY MODEL 
Despite the great mass of l i t e r a t u r e alluding, to Cornwall's 
"sense of difference", "separateness" or "Celtic identity",^ attempts 
by scholars to offer a serious explanation of the condition of modem 
Cornwall have been hindered u n t i l very recently by the lack of a 
relevant conceptual framework within which to work. This, i n turn, 
was the resxalt of a conventional wisdom amongst historians and social 
scientists which refused to admit that "separateness" - i n Cornwall, 
or elsewhere i n the United Kingdom - was important enough to warrant 
extensive investigation. Indeed, the accepted view u n t i l 
comparatively recently was that the United Kingdom was a remarkably 
homogeneous state - an almost text-book example of Almond and Verba*s 
"civic culture"^ - such cultural or other diversity as there was 
being of l i t t l e significance i n determining the r e a l i t i e s of social, 
economic or p o l i t i c a l behaviour and events. Such a view saw Cornwall 
as merely a part of a wider "south west", which was i t s e l f a rather 
amorphous region of convenience centred upon Br i s t o l but having no 
particular i d e n t i t y or other attribute to set i t apart from the. rest 
of the country.-^ This, i n turn, reflected an English tendency to 
treat a l l Britain "...as a mere extension of England and 
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Ehglishness..."^, where "...national i d e n t i t y i s f l u i d and imprecise, 
fl o a t i n g between 'Englishness* and 'Britishness* because the centre 
of economic, p o l i t i c a l and ideological power i n Britain i s i n London 
(as so England),"^ 
This concept of the "homogeneous state" was accepted by most 
historians, who frequently saw the history of the United Kingdom 
through English (and then essentially south-east English) eyes,^ 
while social scientists were prepared to present the state as not 
only unitary and centralised but also centre-oriented (and therefore, 
i n their view, homogeneous) i n a l l i t s principal aspects. Blondel, 
for example, could claim i n 1963 that "Britain i s probably the most 
homogeneous of a l l industrial countries".'^ Thirty-five m i l l i o n 
people, he said, lived within the 25 most thickly populated counties 
of England - these represented "...80 per cent of a l l Englishmen and 
two-thirds of the population of the B r i t i s h Isles", and were of 
course the people who really mattered i n the formation of social and 
p o l i t i c a l values. Blondel did admit, however, that there were 
geographical variations i n voting behaviour - so that the south-east 
of England tended to be Conservative, Wales Labour and so on - but 
even this "geographic" factor was seen merely as one strand of a 
broader explanation of the influence of " t r a d i t i o n and environment", 
which was i t s e l f of less importance than considerations such as class 
and trade xanion membership. As recently as 1971, Punnett could add 
that regional factors were less important i n Britain than i n the 
United States, Canada or Germany, although - l i k e Blondel - he too 
had to admit that there were regional variations i n voting behaviour. 
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He noted, for example, that "...Liberal support varies quite markedly 
from region to region, and a l l six seats won by the Liberals i n 1970 
were i n the 'Celtic Fringe* areas of north Scotland, Wales, and 
Cornwall".9 
The views of Blondel, Punnett, and the many other writers who 
shared their conventional wisdom, were essentially Anglocentric and 
focussed upon the concentration of the B r i t i s h population i n England, 
a concentration whose numerical dominance they translated almost 
without question i n t o over-riding p o l i t i c a l importance. Liberal 
Members of Parliament might come exclusively ( i n 1970) from the 
"Celtic Fringe", but what were six MPs when set i n the context of a 
House of Commons consisting of some 630 members? Wales and Scotland 
might demonstrate a greater than average propensity to vote Labour, 
but then the combined representation of those two countries i n the 
Coiiinons was only a l i t t l e over 100. And when Northern Ireland was 
considered at a l l i n the context of " B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s " (and often i t 
was not, despite i t s position as part of the United Kingdom), then i t 
was presented as being quite outside the bounds of B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l 
norms, a special case requiring separate treatment i n isolation from 
what was happening elsewhere i n the Union. 
More recently, however, as Rokkan and Urwin have noted, "...the 
academic landscape has changed considerabley.,.",^^ a change 
precipitated by the events of the late 1960s and 1970s when the 
p o l i t i c s of the "Celtic Fringe" were pushed more fo r c i b l y into the 
forefront of B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s . F i r s t of a l l , Northern Ireland re-
emerged as a major issue after almost f i f t y years at the back of the 
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B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l consciousness, leading to the demise of Storraont, 
the imposition of "Direct Rule", the f a i l u r e of "power-sharing" 
i n i t i a t i v e s , and - more recently - i n 1986 to an "Anglo-Irish 
Agreement" between London and Dublin. The same period also witnessed 
an upsurge i n support for Plaid Cymru (the Welsh nationalists) and 
the Scottish National Party i n their respective countries, with both 
parties building upon by-election successes i n the mid-1960s to the 
point where Plaid Cymru won three Parliamentary seats i n the General 
Election of October 1974 with the Scottish National Party winning 11 
seats and gaining a s t a r t l i n g 30.4 per cent of the Scottish vote. 
In response to the growth of nationalist sentiment i n Wales and 
Scotland, the Labour Government i n 1969 appointed the Crowther (later 
Kilbrandon) Royal Commission on the Constitution. When the 
Commission reported i n 1973, amongst i t s recommendations were 
devolutionary assemblies for Wales and Scotland. Spurred on by the 
nationalist victories of 1974 (and mindful of the need for 
nationalist support i n the Commons), the Labour Government introduced 
B i l l s for Welsh and Scottish devolution. But the legislation passed 
through Parliament with great d i f f i c u l t y , ending i n a referendum i n 
1979 i n which the Welsh rejected their assembly by foxxr-to-one and 
the Scots f a i l e d to endorse their assembly s u f f i c i e n t l y strongly for 
i t to become a r e a l i t y . I n the subsequent General Election, Plaid 
Cjmiru lost one of i t s seats and the Scottish National Party, i n a 
disastrous performance, saw i t s Parliamentary representation reduced 
to two. Nationalist a c t i v i t y continued, however, manifested not only 
i n the behaviour of the two nationalist parties but also i n the much 
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broader attitiides and sentiments that had been moulded i n Scotland 
and W a l e s . B y the late 1980s, i n the aftermath of the nationalist 
by-election victory i n Glasgow Govan i n November 1988, the "Scottish 
question" was once again to the fore i n B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s . 
Although i t was possible for one p o l i t i c a l scientist to write 
i n 1981 that "For the time being, devolution i s a dead issue...",^^ 
the debate concerning the respective roles of central and local 
government continued with what Bulpitt has termed "The t e r r i t o r i a l 
economy of Thatcherism.. .".^ ^ Confrontations with Liverpool and 
Edinburgh, the abolition of the Greater London Council and 
Itetropolitan Coxmty Coimcils, the controversies over the Rate Support 
Grant and "Rate-capping", and the introduction of the Community 
Charge ("Poll Tax") i n Scotland, have a l l served to underline the 
central government's increasing problems i n dealing with i t s local 
counterparts. In the same way, the Thatcher years have also seen a 
growing economic polarization between "North" and "South" i n B r i t a i n . 
Statistics released i n January 1987, for example, suggested that the 
"North" had borne the brunt of the net decline of 1.6 m i l l i o n jobs i n 
the United Kingdom since 1979, the "South" (which accounted for 
nearly half of the population) having suffered from only six per cent 
of this employment d e c l i n e . I n d e e d , John Goddard concluded from 
these figures that "...regional problems strike r i ^ t at the heart of 
the way i n which B r i t a i n i s governed. "^ ^ Not only had x>eripheral 
protest emerged as a part of B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l l i f e , but also 
Regional Development policies - pursued consistently and often with 
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vigour by a l l governments since the War - had f a i l e d i n their aim of 
eradicating regional inequalities within the United Kingdom. 
The concern for the "de-industrialisation" of the "North" had 
been voiced as early as 1977 (at the height of the Devolution debate) 
when an all-party group entitled Campaign for the North was launched. 
As well as drawing attention to the "North-South" economic divide, 
the Campaign attacked what i t saw as an over-centralised United 
Kingdom and called for a Devolutionary Assembly for the North of 
England to complement those then being offered for Wales and 
Scotland. Significantly, the Campaign added that "...England i s 
anything but homogeneous - economically, c u l t u r a l l y or sociologically 
- ..."^^ and that "Even i n h i s t o r i c a l terms, England i s a b i t of a 
myth",^^ the "North" being seen as a peripheral appendage of the core 
or "real" England of the "South". Although i n the 1970s Devolution 
debate many Labour MPs i n the North East had opposed Scottish 
devolution (on the grounds that i t would give Scotland an unfair 
advantage over equally "deprived" parts of England), by the late 
1980s they had reversed their opinion, and were c a l l i n g instead for 
assemblies for both Scotland and the North.^^ 
These developments i n Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, 
along with the emerging "North-South" debate, had several important 
effects. First of a l l - and most obviously - they highlighted the 
shortcomings of the "homogeneous state" theory, and ushered i n a new 
orthodoxy which stressed the diversity of the United Kingdom. 
Commentators became more consciously aware of the p o l i t i c s of the 
"Celtic Fringe", and of disparities and differences within England, 
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leading Rose and others to re-define the United Kingdom as a 
"multinational state" or "multiple complexity". This was 
accompanied by, and indeed was a part of, a broader awareness of the 
significance of the " t e r r i t o r i a l dimension" of the state, a factor 
explored both theoretically and hi s t o r i c a l l y , by Birch, Rose, Bulpitt, 
Keating and o t h e r s . E x a m i n a t i o n of the " t e r r i t o r i a l dimension" of 
the United Kingdom revealed quickly that at no time had there been a 
comprehensive " t e r r i t o r i a l compact" designed to define or even 
j u s t i f y - i n philosophical terms - the geographical nature and extent 
of the state. Instead, the " t e r r i t o r i a l dimension" had developed 
(and i s s t i l l developing) i n an essentially ad hoc manner, i t s lack 
of d e f i n i t i o n ( l e t alone consistency) exacerbated by the non-
existence of a written constitution. This development, i t was 
argued, was connected intimately with the waxing (and waning) of the 
power of the state's core i n southern England, and could be best 
understood i n that l i g h t . 
I n expanding outwards from i t s southern core, the English state 
sought f i r s t to consolidate i t s control of northern England and to 
incorporate Cornwall (though leaving the l a t t e r with several 
distinguishing constitutional idiosyncrasies), moving by Tudor times 
to secure the northern Border against Scotland and to formalise the 
annexation of Wales. The Crowns of England and Scotland were joined 
i n 1601, and i n 1707 the two countries were merged by Act of Union. 
Although presented as the coming together of two equal partners ( i n 
marked contrast to the Anglo-Welsh Act of Union of 1536), the Union 
led to the demise of Scotland's Parliament and to the subordination 
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of many of Scotland's interests to England's - despite the survival 
of many distinctive Scottish i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
The " t e r r i t o r i a l dimension" of the IMited Kingdom was further 
complicated by the relationship with Ireland, as indeed i t continues 
to be. Ireland was brought formally into the Union i n 1801 but i n 
1922 twenty-six counties seceded from the United Kingdom to form the 
sovereign and independent I r i s h Free State (albeit at f i r s t with 
Dominion status), the precursor of today's Republic. Six counties of 
Ulster elected to remain within the United Kingdom under a 
devolutionary arrangement vhlch survived u n t i l "direct rule" was 
imposed i n 1971. In 1986 the Anglo-Irish Agreement gave the 
government of the Republic a limited, consultative input i n t o the 
administration of Northern Ireland, bringing the t o t a l i t y of the 
" t e r r i t o r i a l dimension" of constitutional relationships within these 
islands once more into the forefront of p o l i t i c a l considerations.^^ 
Of course, the nationalist advances i n Scotland and Wales i n the 
1960s and 70s also brought the po s s i b i l i t y of changes to the 
" t e r r i t o r i a l dimension" to the fore, and to an extent those 
po s s i b i l i t i e s remain alive (most especially i n Scotland), whilst 
other factors - such as the ambiguous constitutional status of the 
Isle of Man and the Channel Islands, the existence of Welsh, Scottish 
and Northern Ireland Offices, and the divergence i n local government 
organisation between England and Scotland - point to a continuing 
diversity and uncertainty i n the t e r r i t o r i a l relationships within the 
Bri t i s h Isles. 
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A second consequence of the* developments of the 1960s and 70s 
was the increase i n serious academic attention focussed upon the 
"Fringe" - "Celtic" and otherwise - i n B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s . An 
extensive l i t e r a t u r e emerged to document the events i n Northern 
Ireland,"^-^ with other works seeking to chart and explain the rise of 
nationalism i n Scotland and Wales^^ Butt Philip found, however, that 
nationalism and the effects of national sentiment were not confined 
to any one p o l i t i c a l party i n W a l e s , a conclusion which not only 
emphasised the nationalist element i n Welsh Liberal and Labour 
p o l i t i c s but also pointed to a dist i n c t i v e Welsh p o l i t i c a l culture 
per se. Madgwick was able i n his study of the p o l i t i c s of r u r a l 
Wales to demonstrate the extent to which the Welsh Liberal Party was 
rooted deeply i n Welsh culture, identifying an enduring l i n k between 
Liberalism and "Welshness" which had manifested i t s e l f i n (amongst 
other things) a consistent Liberal support for d e v o l u t i o n . I n 
industrial Wales the Liberal Party had been largely eclipsed by 
Labour. But despite Labour's centralist stance and abandonment of 
i t s early enthusiasm for "Home Rule", the party remained alive to 
Welsh sentiment and was often able to present i t s e l f as the protector 
of specifically Welsh interests and indeed as the champion of 
Socialist Wales against the rule of Tory England. 
A disti n c t i v e p o l i t i c a l culture also became apparent i n 
Scotland, reflected not only i n the Scottish National Party but also 
i n the a c t i v i t i e s of other groups. As i n Wales, the Liberals had 
long been advocates of Scottish devolution, and both Miller and 
Berrington have noted that Scottish Conservatives (when i n 
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Opposition) have on occasions appealed successfully to Scottish 
national sentiment i n attacking the "socialist centralization" of 
Labour Government at Westminster.^^ I t i s Labour, however, which has 
increasingly adopted the role of the voice of c r i t i c i s m of London 
Government, especially after 1979 when there has been a Conservative 
Government i n power at Westminster at a time when a majority of 
Scottish seats are i n Labour's hands. Harvie considers that Scotland 
has experienced " . . . p o l i t i c a l behaviour increasingly at variance with 
the English norm..."^^ and points to " . . . p o l i t i c a l indicators of an 
ever-deeper social and cultural alienation from England".Labour, 
he says, has now been converted to the need for a Scottish assembly 
"...with which to combat de-industrialization and ... anti-socialist 
centralization...",^^ a variant of the theme once offered by Scottish 
Tories! I n a manner anticipated by Keating and Bleiman, the Labour 
Party has argued that the Conservative Government "...lacks a 
Scottish mandate...".^^ 
Just as greater academic attention was devoted to the p o l i t i c a l 
cultures of Wales and Scotland, so closer examination was focussed 
upon the English "fringe" or "periphery".^-^ Once again, disti n c t i v e 
features emerged from th i s new inquiry, highlighting a t e r r i t o r i a l 
d istribution of class - "...the bosses have t r a d i t i o n a l l y been 
ident i f i e d with the centre...",^ and again emphasising the role of 
the Liberals and subsequently of Labour as parties of the periphery. 
Urwin considered that "The Liberal Party may have been almost 
annihilated i n the 1950s, but i t s role as defender of the 'subject-
periphery* was largely taken over by L a b o u r " , a view echoed by 
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Berrington who wrote that "During the middle of the twentieth-century 
the periphery found p o l i t i c a l expression through the medium of the 
Labour Party and, to a lesser extent, through what had become a ti n y 
Liberal P a r t y " . W i t h i n the Labour Party (especially i n areas such 
as the North East of England) this role produced inevitable tensions, 
given the movement's underlying centralist ideology. 
With the discrediting of the "homogeneous state" paradigm, and 
with the new concern to investigate the p o l i t i c a l cultures of both 
the "Celtic" and "English" i)eripheries, came the search for 
theoretical frameworks i n which to explain this newly-apparent 
diversity. The most obviously dist i n c t i v e features of peripheral 
p o l i t i c s , evident from even a cursory glance, were those provided by 
the various nationalist parties. An inevitable reaction, therefore, 
i n the atmosphere of the late 60s and 70s, was to offer existing 
models of nationalism as interpretations of what was hapt>ening i n the 
United Kingdom. One such model was that provided by A.D. Smith i n 
his Theories of Nationalism.^^ 
Building upon Kedourie's celebrated assertion that "Nationalism 
i s a doctrine invented i n Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century",^® and by synthesising the contributions of a remarkably 
diverse number of writers. Smith reviewed and analysed a series of 
theories to achieve his "core doctrine" of nationalism. From this 
"core" emerged the concept of "ethnic nationalism", a form of 
nationalism which Smith argued would arise ( t y p i c a l l y ) i n a European 
nation ^^ch had been incorporated into a greater nation-state or 
indeed divided between several states. I t s aims would be to achieve 
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self-government and to preserve i t s culture. In developing this 
view. Smith considered i t important to understand the emergence of 
what he termed the " s c i e n t i f i c state". This " s c i e n t i f i c state" grew 
from the old "possessive state" (for example, Tudors i n England or 
Bourbons i n France) which, to serve the "political-personal ends" of 
i t s ruler, pursued policies designed to weld together and homogenise 
the various national groups i n the state. Thus Brittany had, for the 
purposes of the "possessive" state, to be incorporated' i n t o France 
whilst England found i t necessary to assimilate i t s "Celtic" 
periphery. 
The "possessive" state developed gradually i n t o the more modem 
"sc i e n t i f i c State", characterised by a drive to secure administrative 
efficiency which necessarily made i t intolerant of regional 
diversity. Moreover, the state was highly centralised, the culture 
of the metropolis or centre becoming the prototype for the whole 
state, and the state i t s e l f demanding a high degree of loyalty from 
i t s citizens i n the implementation of i t s "welfare" policies. One 
effect of thi s was that the in t e l l i g e n t s i a amongst the national 
minorities became "doubly socialised", on the one hand steeped i n i t s 
tradi t i o n a l culture but on the other exposed to the new, powerful 
culture of the " s c i e n t i f i c state", precipitating an acute c r i s i s as a 
result of these two co n f l i c t i n g claims to authority and loyalty. To 
escape this dilemma, an individual might become a " t r a d i t i o n a l i s t " -
rejecting the " s c i e n t i f i c state" and a l l i t s work - or he might 
become an "assimilationalist", abandoning his t r a d i t i o n a l ciiLture i n 
favour of the more cosmopolitan l i f e of the centre. A t h i r d option 
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would be to become "Reformist", seeking to reform the tradi t i o n a l 
culture by reconciling i t to the rationalising demands of the 
"s c i e n t i f i c state". But i n seeking this reconciliation, the 
"reformist" realises that he has i n fact betrayed his traditional 
culture and, joining forces with the disappointed "assimilationist" 
whose aspirations have not been met by the " s c i e n t i f i c state", he 
becomes a "r e v i v a l i s t " encouraging a r e b i r t h of his native culture 
and ushering i n a new era of scholastic interest i n the language, 
li t e r a t u r e and history of his national minority. This i n turn leads 
to p o l i t i c a l demands, and thus "ethnic nationalism" i s bom. 
There were inherent attractions i n Smith's thesis for those 
attempting to explain "Celtic" nationalism, not least for Celtic 
nationalists themselves wishing to rationalise their opposition to 
this newly^efined English " s c i e n t i f i c state", and i t received 
qualified and cautious approval from Tudur Jones i n his examination 
of Welsh nationalism.^^ A more enthusiastic response declared that 
"...with his concept of 'ethnic' nationalism he (Smith) has captured 
perfectly the essence of Celtic nationalism..."^^ Certainly, Smith's 
concepts of the "possessive" and " s c i e n t i f i c " states are of 
considerable importance i n comprehending the conditions i n which the 
Bri t i s h state acquired i t s "fringe" or "periphery". But i n 
postulating the circumstances i n which "ethnic nationalism" i s l i k e l y 
to arise, he pays scant regard to the effect of economic conditions -
a factor stressed by la t e r writers on the subject.^^ Smith has 
retorted that "...they assume too close a l i n k between nationalism 
and economic development...",^^ but i n the truth the issues of 
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industrialisation and de-industrialisation cannot be ignored. More 
importantly, while Smith's framework may indeed help us to understand 
the origins of nationalist movements, i t does not address i t s e l f to 
the more subtle and less self-conscious behavioural "differences" 
observable i n the social and p o l i t i c a l cxiltures of the "periphery". 
As we have seen already, i n both Scotland and Wales the nationalist 
parties are but one part (albeit overtly and obviously) of a broader 
and more complex p o l i t i c a l culture exhibiting "difference" from that 
of England's "core". Nationalism i s therefore but one index of 
"peripheral difference", and i t i s a mistake to assiime otherwise. 
Although s t i l l concerned to explain (amongst other things) the 
rise of nationalist movements i n the United Kingdom i n the 1960s, 
Hechter's study of the "Celtic Fringe" i n the B r i t i s h state was 
careful to examine other manifestations of "difference" - pointing, 
for example, to the Nonconformist and. r e l a t i v e l y anti-Conservative 
nature of both Wales and S c o t l a n d . H e c h t e r ' s principal objective 
was to t r y to explain the persistence i n Wales, Scotland and Ireland 
of an ethnic i d e n t i t y d i s t i n c t from that of England i n what was a 
modernized, highly-industrialised B r i t i s h state. He sought to 
explain the relationship between England - the "national core", as he 
saw i t - the the "Celtic Fringe" (the "periphery") i n the l i g h t of 
two opposing models: the "diffusion" and "internal colonial" 
theories. The "diffusion" theory, argued Hechter, predicted that 
contact between "core" and "periphery" woxild lead inevitably to 
ethnic horaogenization, the id e n t i t y of the "periphery" succumbing 
eventually to that of the "core". By contrast, the "internal 
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colonial" model claimed that contact could heighten ethnic 
differences, leading to ethnic c o n f l i c t (nationalism) as groups i n 
the "periphery" were relegated to i n f e r i o r positions i n what had 
become a cultu r a l division of labour. Industrialisation might 
contribute to a decline i n l i n g u i s t i c differences, but i t certainly 
would not lead to cultxiral assimilation - nor, for that matter, to 
the development of regional economic equality. 
Bnploying a blend of h i s t o r i c a l and sociological analysis, 
Hechter presented a wealth of empirical and s t a t i s t i c a l data to 
support his thesis that i t was the "internal colonial" model which 
was appropriate to the experience of the "Celtic Fringe", concluding 
that the survival of ethnic distinctiveness rested upon the cultural 
division of labour. Again, his theoretical framework was welcomed by 
many observers, not least Celtic nationalists themselves, but i n time 
serious academic objections to his work were voiced. Both Smith and 
Bulpitt have offered critiqxies, but the most sustained objection 
comes from Page.^ Hechter's assumption that "diffusion" leads 
inevitably to homogeneity i s questioned, and Page accuses Hechter of 
misinterpreting both Parsons and Rokkan i n his attempt to suggest the 
l i n k between "diffusion" and homogeneity. Far from suggesting such a 
connection, Rokkan had i n fact emphasised the existence " . . . i n the 
'Celtic Fringe' of Britain...particularly i n Wales, opposition to the 
t e r r i t o r i a l , c u l t u r a l and economic dominance of the English...".^^ 
Page also points to methodological problems i n the "internal 
colonial" model and identifies significant s t a t i s t i c a l errors. He 
questions Hechter's "...assumption that there are no significant 
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regional differences within England",and concludes that Hechter 
has f a i l e d even to offer a satisfactory explanation for the emergence 
of Scottish and Welsh nationalism i n the 1960s and 70s. Bulpitt has 
echoed Page's cr i t i c i s m of Hechter's "...free and easy attitude to 
the location of the Centre", but also argues that Hechter has not 
succeeded i n his attempt to l i f t the "internal colonial" model from 
i t s Latin American origins and place i t upon the experience of the 
Bri t i s h Isles: 
...his book i s not really about internal colonialism at a l l . 
His real concern i s to attack the diffusion theory of national 
development via the presentation of data which points to the 
persistence of peripheral sectionalism. With this general 
thesis (although not a l l the details) i s i t hard to disagree. 
But i t i s not an internal colonialism thesis. 
In other words, Hechter has merely demonstrated (albeit 
unsatisfactorily) the survival of diversity and regional 
distinctiveness within these islands - he has not provided an 
explanation for i t . ^ ^ 
Despite these shortcomings, Hechter's analysis was useful i n 
that i t indicated the importance of regional economic inequalities -
a consideration presented by Nairn i n his highly polemical discussion 
as the "uneven diffusion" of industrial capitalism from England^^ -
and talked not only of a nationalist response to English domination 
but also of a specific relationship between "centre" and "periphery". 
Although s t i l l lacking clear definitions (the "centre" was more or 
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less synonymous with "England", and "periphery" was the "Celtic 
Fringe"), this suggested a framework for further contemplation. 
Berrington, for example, iden t i f i e d the south-east of England as the 
"centre" of the B r i t i s h state and reflected that. 
I n the nineteenth century United Kingdom the old Celtic 
t e r r i t o r i e s of Ireland, Scotland and Wales were obvious 
peripheries. South-west Bigland i s sometimes treated as a 
peripheral t e r r i t o r y and the status of northern England, whose 
p o l i t i c a l evolution during the nineteenth century had much i n 
common with the mainland peripheries of Celtic B r i t a i n , i s 
uncertain. 
Within th i s paradigm of "centre-periphery" relationships, some 
commentators have attempted a structural analysis of the United 
Kingdom. Bul p i t t , for example, presents an ingenious case i n which 
he argues ( i n contrast to most commentators) that the creation of the 
United Kingdom was not "inevitable". Rather, i t was the reluctant 
solution to problems faced by English politicians "at court" (the 
"Centre"). Consequently, the post-Union structure of t e r r i t o r i a l 
government was not designed to be innovative and the "centre" re l i e d 
upon a system of rather static indirect rule - through the assistance 
of local collaborative e l i t e s (such as the Anglo-Irish Protestants or 
the Scottish land-owning class) - to manage the expanded "periphery"-
The social and p o l i t i c a l modernisation experienced i n the period 
1870-1926, argues Bulpitt, had a conservative impact on t e r r i t o r i a l 
p o l i t i c s i n the United Kingdom, and between 1926 and 1960 they were 
characterised by a "Dual Polity" i n which national (or "high") and 
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local (or "low") p o l i t i c s were largely divorced from one another. 
Contacts between "Centre" and "periphery" were essentially 
bureaucratic and depoliticised u n t i l the 1960s when the "Dual Polity" 
was disturbed, f i r s t by Northern Ireland, then by the Devolution 
Debate, and more recently by clashes between central and local 
government. The erosion or the "Dual Polity" posed severe problems, 
for "...the English have never taken the Union seriously...exhibiting 
a strong distaste for positive peripheral government...(and) 
increasingly xmwilling to treat t e r r i t o r i a l p o l i t i c s seriously". 
As Bulpitt concludes,.this i s a central feature of the relationship 
between centre and periphery: "...these matters have posed an awkward 
dilemma for the Centre: how to run a t e r r i t o r i a l Union not taken 
seriously by this peculiar dominant section". 
Thus a t t i t u d i n a l and structural problems become part of the 
centre-periphery relationship, complementing the ethnic 
distinctiveness and economic inequalities stressed by Hechter or the 
"ethnic nationalist" response described by Smith, and sioggesting the 
need for a framework even more wide ranging than those considered so 
far. For the centre-periphery relationship i s a l l these things and 
more, the particular characteristics of a periphery a subtle blend of 
the myriad influences of i t s h i s t o r i c a l experience. As early as 1971 
Kohr, i n a volume f u l l of rhetorical questions and picturesque 
analogies, had advanced his "Law of Peripheral Neglect" i n explaining 
Welsh economic conditions, pointing to "...the impoverishing effect 
suffered by every peripheral economy serving a centre outside i t s 
natural confines...".^^ However, a more comprehensive analysis of 
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the centre-periphery relationship, with an attempt at a f u l l e r 
explanation and the construction of a wider framework, was only 
achieved with the fusion of the work undertaken by Rokkan and Urwin, 
Recognising the shortcomings of narrow and mono-causal explanations 
of peripheral protest or regional diversity, . they argued fo r "...a 
broader approach which stresses the dichotomy between centre and 
periphery, seeking to place ethnic variations i n a general framework 
of geopolitical location, economic strength and access to the l o c i of 
decision-making,"^^ with Urwin adding that: 
...the whole problem of t e r r i t o r y and id e n t i t y , of the centre-
periphery dimension, goes far beyond a consideration only of 
ethnicity or the sudden rise of a nationalist party...a more 
rigorous, systematic, h i s t o r i c a l and comparative perspective i s 
necessary i f we are to disentangle what i s a complex mosaic. 
Rokkan and Urwin note that the recent developments i n the 
periphery i n the United Kingdom are mirrored i n similar developments 
elsewhere i n Western Europe, and that a l l Western European states are 
to a degree "multi-ethnic" and possess, therefore, the potential for 
regional or nationalist protest. They concede that an explanation 
for those recent developments can be sought i n a model which 
emphasises that the continuing internationalization of transactions 
and economies has led to a c r i s i s i n centre-periphery relations. The 
centre has found i t s e l f with decreasing resources under i t s exclusive 
control at precisely the same time that the periphery has demanded 
greater resources from the centre i n the form of welfare, education 
and regional aid. The centre cannot deliver the goods, and so the 
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periphery protests. However, Rokkan and Urwin argue that such a 
model sheds no l i g h t upon the ori g i n of centre and periphery i n the 
f i r s t place, and that i t does not explain the great variation i n 
stra i n between centre and periphery to be encountered i n different 
parts of Western Europe. To begin with, ethnic tensions within 
states can be detected long before those "recent developments" which 
caught the eye of social scientists i n the late 60s and 70s 
(indicating that a broader h i s t o r i c a l perspective i s indeed 
required), and the degree of regional restiveness varies considerably 
from place to place: Scotland, Corsica and the Basque Country may 
have witnessed an upsurge i n protest, but Scleswig, Alsace and 
Bavaria have become much quieter. 
The key to greater understanding, i n s i s t Rokkan and Urwin, l i e s 
i n the realisation that there i s a symbiotic relationship between 
centre and periphery, that one cannot successfully analyse the one 
without examining the other. They begin by seeking broad definitions 
of centre and periphery. A "centre" i s defined as a, 
...privileged location within a t e r r i t o r y where key 
military/administrative, economic and cultural resource-holders 
most frequently meet; with established arenas for 
deliberations, negotiations and decision-making; where people 
convene for r i t u a l ceremonies of affirmation of i d e n t i t y ; with 
monuments that symbolize this i d e n t i t y ; with the largest 
proportion of the economically active population engaged i n the 
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processing and communication of information and instructions 
over long distances. 
In such a "centre", therefore, one would fi n d parliaments, government 
ministries and m i l i t a r y headqxjarters. There would be the trading 
head-offices of banks, corporations, insurance groups, trade unions, 
and stock exchanges, together with cultural centres - such as 
museums, theatres, universities, and archbishoprics - and the centres 
of COTimunications such as r a i l and a i r , radio and television. The 
combined effect would be to give the centre p o l i t i c a l control, 
economic dominance, and the means to promote cultural 
standardization, within the state. 
-« 
By contrast, 
...a periphery i s dependent, controlling at best only i t s own 
resources and more exposed to fluctuations in* long-distance 
markets; i s isolated from a l l other regions except the central 
one; and contributes l i t t l e to the flow of commamication within 
the t e r r i t o r y , with a marginal culture that i s fragmented and 
parochial...".5^ 
"DTUS the periphery may be dependent on the centre, not only i n 
economic terms, but also for p o l i t i c a l decision-making and for 
cultural standardization. I t i s also different from the centre - i n 
cul t u r a l , economic or p o l i t i c a l terms - and i s situated some distance 
from the centre, so that transactions are fraught with costs and 
d i f f i c u l t i e s . Within the periphery, both the masses and e l i t e s 
experience uncertainty, ambivalence and division. They are part of 
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the system and yet are i n many respects marginal to i t , they are 
aware of a separate i d e n t i t y but are constantly exposed to the 
standardizing agencies of the centre. Even Rokkan and Urwin admit 
that i n practice the degree of dependency of periphery upon centre 
w i l l so vary from one instance to another, as w i l l the nature of that 
dependency ( i e whether i t i s primarily p o l i t i c a l , economic, or 
cultural).58 
I n matching these definitions of centre and periphery to the 
re a l i t i e s of state structures, Rokkan and Urwin identify 
"monocephalic" and "polycephalic" states- the former characterised by 
the marked dominance of one centre, the l a t t e r exhibiting a more even 
and widespread diffusion of "central" features across the t e r r i t o r y 
with perhaps a chain of d i s t i n c t centres with their own ins t i t u t i o n s 
and e l i t e s . These two types, i n turn, can be matched to the 
processes of state-building. Some states have arisen out of a 
pursuit of "centralizing strategies", where dynastic expansion has 
established the t e r r i t o r i a l extent of the state - this Rokkan and 
Urvin style " t e r r i t o r i a l space" which they equate with the 
"monocephalic" form. Other states, however, exhibit a "federalizing 
accommodation" and have emerged where local groups have come together 
for mutual economic and p o l i t i c a l defence but i n so doing have 
negotiated a "covenant" to guarantee their individual rights, 
interests and identities - this i s styled "membership space" and 
equates with the "polycephalic" form. 
In practice, the states of Western Europe form many shades of 
"grey" between these two extremes, reflected i n state structures 
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ranging from the unitary to the organically federal. I t i s at this 
point i n the analysis, argue Rokkan and Urwin, that we must "...go 
back i n history, to the crucial phases i n centre formation and the 
attempts to build territory-wide identities"."^^ They achieve this by 
setting a comparative overview of the t e r r i t o r i a l structures of 
Western Europe, examining i t s centres and analysing i t s peripheries, 
i n particular the l a t t e r s ' economic conditions, cultural 
distinctiveness, p o l i t i c a l l i f e , and propensity to mobilization. As 
well as noting that some states exhibit " t e r r i t o r i a l space" and 
others "membership space", with consequent variations i n structure 
and degrees of toleration/accommodation of peripheries (and hence 
varying levels of peripheral mobilization and protest), Rokkan and 
Urwin ide n t i f y the creation "...of a number of subject peripheries i n 
the Celtic-Atlantic West..."^^ - the Celtic lands along with the 
Basque country, western Norway, the Orkneys, Shetland, Faeroes, and 
Iceland, the f i r s t of four sets of groupings upon an East-West 
gradient i n Western Europe. 
Their typology also deals specifically with the United Kingdom, 
claiming for the state a " t e r r i t o r i a l space" less extreme than that 
of France (or I t a l y ) but nevertheless noting a significant degree of 
peripheral protest. The state i s shown as having been 
"accommodating" to Northern Ireland, less so to Scotland and Wales, 
and much less so to Cornwall. Urwin stresses the significance of 
geography - i n particular the familiar "highland"-"lowland" dichotomy 
- i n moulding the history of the United Kingdom and ensuring that the 
centre would be located i n London and i t s "lowland" hinterland, with 
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the "highland" north and west relegated to peripheral status. In 
examining the development of the state, Urwin notes f i r s t the 
creation of the "Inner Centre" of London and the south-east. There 
i s then an "Outer Centre", consisting of Wessex, East Anglia, and the 
Midlands. The periphery i s similarly divided, with an "Inner 
Periphery" of Cornwall, Wales and northern Ehgland, and an "Outer 
Periphery" of Scotland and Ireland. 
Significantly, Urwin's discussion of centre-periphery relations 
i n the United Kingdom notes the importance of industrialisation i n 
perpetuating the nature of the relationship. He writes that 
industrialisation "...confirmed and redefined the United Kingdom as a 
strongly monocephalic s t a t e . . . w i t h " the peripheries suffering the 
deleterious effects of incomplete or over-specialized 
industrialisation: "Contemporary regional economic problems are the 
consequence of an economic specialization compounded after 1918 by 
far-reaching structural industrial change".^-^ The importance of 
industrialisation i n the centre-periphery relationship was also 
recognised by Tarrow.^ He examined centre-periphery relations by 
analysing the contacts between local and national levels of 
government ( i n France and I t a l y ) , an essentially i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
perspective. But i n offering critiques of other approaches to the 
problem, he attacked those "diffusionists" who did not acknowledge 
the essential modernity of the duality between centre and periphery 
i n advanced societies such as those which he had examined: Tarrow 
insisted that i n addition to the "Older Peripheralism" of t e r r i t o r i a l 
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and cultural isolation there was, i n the era of industrialisation, a 
"Second Peripheralism" of economic and social raarginality.^^ 
Although Tarrow f a i l e d to develop t h i s analysis, his 
dist i n c t i o n between two periods of peripherality ("Older 
Peripheralism" and "Second Peripheralism") was profound, and worthy 
of closer attention. In essence, Tarrow admitted (albeit by 
implication) the antiquity of the peripheral condition, acknowledging 
the early emergence of peripheral t e r r i t o r i e s as the result of the 
processes of state-building within the medieval and Renaissance eras. 
This, the period of "Older Peripheralism", was characterised by the 
t e r r i t o r i a l and cu l t u r a l isolation of the periphery. Geographically 
remote from the centre, with a degree of p o l i t i c a l or constitutional 
"accommodation" to reconcile i t s e l f to ultimate external control and 
to formalise and secure the suzerainty (or sovereignty) of the 
centre, a periphery was to a considerable degree t e r r i t o r i a l l y 
insiiLated from the centre. To this was added peripheral distinctions 
i n language, r e l i g i o n , habit and perhaps socio-economic organisation, 
creating a cultural divide from the centre as significant as that of 
t e r r i t o r y . 
However, as Tarrow intimated, th i s t e r r i t o r i a l and cultural 
isolation was at length distiirbed by the new forces of 
industrialisation within the state, with an increase i n 
communications and economic transactions between centre and 
periphery, and with a new-found economic (and possibly strategic) 
importance of the periphery to the centre. This period Tarrow dubbed 
"Second Peripheralism". I t s significance was that although i t s 
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emergence heralded the demise of many of the attributes of "Older 
Peripheralism" (for example, an erosion of the mechanics of 
"accommodation", or a decline of the indigenous language), i t s new 
industrial order had not eradicated the condition of peripherality 
i t s e l f . On the contrary, argued Tarrow, the experience of 
industrialisation had brought i n i t s wake economic and social 
marginality. Although Tarrow did not elaborate upon i t s 
characteristics, i t i s not d i f f i c u l t to develop his analysis and to 
argue that such marginality arose from the imperfect or over-
specialised industrialisation of the periphery (a l a Urwin), and was 
manifested i n a lack of industrial d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n , early industrial 
collapse, and consequent de-industrialisation, emigration, and 
depopulation. Thus the peripheral condition was perpetuated, albeit 
i n a s t r i k i n g l y different form to that which had existed hitherto. 
Despite Tarrow*s f a i l u r e to develop his concept of "Older" and 
"Second Peripheralism", i t s value l i e s i n i t s recognition that 
peripherality i s a dynamic condition and w i l l a l t e r over time i n 
response to changes i n the nature of the centre-periphery 
relationship. That i s not to say that there w i l l not be constants of 
peripherality, most obviously geographical location and physical 
distance from the centre, or that elements of one period w i l l not 
survive into and indeed influence the characteristics of the next. 
But i t i s possible to postulate a model of phases of peripherality, 
i n which peripherality i t s e l f i s constant but where i t s principal 
determining and consequent characteristics a l t e r radically from one 
phase or period to the next. Such a model i s inevitably multi-
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dimensional, with an array of c u l t u r a l , social, economic, p o l i t i c a l , 
constitutional and other variables, and explains how i t i s that a 
peripheral t e r r i t o r y w i l l retain i t s separate (though changing) 
iden t i t y over time despite the often traumatic experience of movement 
from one phase to another. I t contrasts with the uni-linear 
explanation offered by Hechter (where the survival of ethnic 
distinctiveness i s basically the result of a "ciiLtural division of 
labour"), and negates the "single variable" models advanced by 
academic observers such as Eastlake or popular commentators l i k e 
Berresford E l l i s (where, for example, cultural decline/survival i s 
seen as the determining quality of the peripheral condition). 
In short, a model of phases of peripherality - involving 
"Older", "Second" and perhaps subsequent "Peripheralisms" 
demonstrates that a peripheral t e r r i t o r y remains di s t i n c t ( i n social, 
economic, p o l i t i c a l or other terms) from the centre because of rather 
than despite i t s h i s t o r i c a l experience. This, of course, can be 
tested by examining the h i s t o r i c a l experience of a particular 
periphery. I n the context of this study, the model provides 
precisely the kind of framework which i s required for an analysis of 
the condition of modem Cornwall, a framework that has been lacking 
hitherto. Having shown that the developments of the 1960s and 70s i n 
the United Kingdom led to the demise of the "homogenous state" 
paradigm and i t s replacement by a new orthodoxy stressing regional 
diversity, and having discussed those explanations \jhich arose to 
account for those developments, i t i s now possible to address the 
case of Cornwall i t s e l f . The experience of Cornwall, indeed, can 
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only be understood against the wider background of diversity and 
centre-periphery relationships within the United Kingdom as a whole. 
That said, i t offers an ideal case study i n which to demonstrate the 
h i s t o r i c a l v a l i d i t y of Tarrow's "Older" and "Second Peripheralism" 
and the resultant model of phases of peripherality. In particvilar, 
i t i s possible to give detailed consideration to the movement from 
"Older" to "Second Peripheralism", from t e r r i t o r i a l and cultural 
isolation to economic and social marginalisation, and also to argue -
i n further refinement of Rokkan, Urwin, and Tarrow - that recent 
peripheral protest i n Cornwall i s one symptom of movement towards a 
further or "Third" period of "Peripheralism". 
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CHAPTER 2 
TOWARDS A CORNISH EXPLANATION 
The myth of the "homogeneous state" ensured that, u n t i l 
recently, Cornwall was rarely ( i f ever) afforded proper attention in 
her own right by historians and social scientists examining the 
nature of the United Kingdom. Even amongst those most likely to be 
predisposed towards a more sensitive appreciation of Cornwall's 
status and identity, there was evidence of confusion and uncertainty 
- perhaps even a l i t t l e muddled thinking. Pelling, for example, was 
clear that "In Cornwall, as i n Wales, a Celtic language survived 
unt i l modem times",^ and yet - almost i n the same breath - he was 
prepared to consider Cornwall as merely a part of a wider south-west 
and argue that "Devon and Cornwall form a distinctive region of 
Ekigland". He added (as i f to admit his own confusion) that the 
south-west was a region "...which challenges comparison with Wales 
rather than with any other region of the country to which i t 
belongs".^ This insistence that Cornwall - although apparently 
"Celtic" - be considered an integral part of an English south-west 
led to similarly imprecise statements elsewhere, such as Waller's 
view that "...the South West has been regarded as an important part 
of the Liberal 'Celtic fringe'"^ and Berrington's rather vague belief 
42 -
that "South West England i s sometimes treated as a peripheral 
territory...".^ Punnett, for a l l his adherence to the "homogeneous 
state", was seemingly prepared to admit that Cornwall was part of a 
"Celtic Fringe",^ and Madgwick's confusion was exhibited in his 
persistent use of the phrase "South-West England" when i t would have 
been more accurate to employ "Cornwall". He wrote, for example, that 
"The 'Celtic fringe' has long figured in accounts of politics... 
Scotland, Wales and South-West England are indeed peripheral in a 
highly-centralised,. London-focussed society; and they are Celtic by 
historical origins".^ Cornwall, then, was placed rather perversely 
i n a position where the relatively few academic observers to comment 
on the Cornish scene were prepared to describe Cornwall as "Celtic" 
and yet at the same time present her as part of a wider south west 
Eiigland. 
However, just as events i n Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
in the 1960s and 1970s were to question the "homogeneous state" and 
lead to a new emphasis upon "diversity", so parallel events - albeit 
more modest and on a smaller scale - i n Cornwall over the same 
decades were to draw the Cornish situation more sharply into focus. 
The emergence of Cornish nationalism as a cultural and political 
phenomenon w i l l be discussed later, but here i t is important to note 
that Mebyon Kemow - Cornwall's principal nationalist organisation -
was founded in 1951 and became increasingly active during precisely 
the same period that Plaid Cyraru and the Scottish National party were 
growing in stature and support. Mebyon Kemow (Sons of Cornwall) was 
at f i r s t modest in i t s aspirations, styling i t s e l f as a pressure 
- 43 -
group (with no intention at f i r s t to contest Parliamentary seats) and 
arguing for a limited form of devolutionary self-government which 
would require only"..,the re-organisation of the United Kingdom, not 
the dissolution or lessening of i t " . ^ The movement declared i t s 
sympathy with Cornish language and cultural groups, asserted 
Cornwall's identity as a Celtic nation, and won a certain credibility 
through i t s vigorous (but ultimately unsuccessful) campaign for a 
Cornish university. Popular support was also forthcoming as a result 
of Mebyon Kemow's opposition to the "Overspill" plan i n the late 
1960s i n which Londoners were to be re-housed in Cornwall,^ and the 
movement played a prominent role i n Cornwall's defeat of that aspect 
of Local Government re-organisation which had envisaged the creation 
of a "Tamarside" county i n which part of south-east Cornwall would 
have been lost to a new authority based in Plymouth. 
By the late 1960s, Mebyon Kemow was exhibiting an air of 
confidence and optimism, expressed throxigh the pages of i t s journal 
Cornish Nation - "Cornwall's First Truly National Newspaper", as i t s 
banner headlines proclaimed - f i r s t published i n November 1968.^^ 
The range of contributors to the paper revealed the degree of 
respect, i f not support, that Mebyon Keimow had come to command in 
the Cornish conmunity. Daphne du Maurier, the well-known novelist, 
declared herself"...an associate member of Mebyon Kemow...",^ ^ Dr 
A.L. Rowse - Cornish author and Fellow of A l l Souls - emphasised that 
"There is a wonderful opportunity for Cornish Nation and an important 
job to do",^^ and Alderman K.G. Foster, then Chairman of Cornwall 
County Council, assured readers that "Although I am not a member of 
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Mebyon Kemow..,Any effort or movement to keep our entity and 
maintain our vi a b i l i t y would always have ray s u p p o r t " . I n a 
subsequent issue. Miss Du Maurier went on to express her belief that 
"A form of self-government for Cornwall with legislative 
powers...is...possible within ten years...a united Cornwall able to 
run i t s own affairs with minimum direction from London yet remaining 
part of the UK and loyal to the Crown". 
In pursuit of i t s pressure-group role, Mebyon Kemow approached 
local MPs. Harold Hayman, the veteran Labour MP for Falmouth-
Camborne, declared his support for the movement, and two Liberal MPs 
- John Pardoe in North Cornwall and Peter Bessell at Bodmin -
actually joined Mebyon Kemow and declared their commitment to 
Cornish self-government. John Nott, the Conservative Member for St 
Ives, later expressed his broad approval of Mebyon Kemow policies, 
and David Mudd - who was to become Conservative MP for Falmouth-
Cambome at the 1970 General Election - joined the movement.By 
this time, however, Mebyon Kemow was already moving towards a more 
party-political and overtly nationalist position, and - taking i t s 
cue from the by-election successes of Plaid Cymru and the Scottish 
National Party - announced during 1969 that i t was to contest 
forthcoming Parliamentary Elections. The f i r s t target was Falmouth-
Cambome, where Mebyon Kemow claimed to have more than a thousand 
members, but i n the 1970 General Election the Mebyon Kemow candidate 
(Richard Jenkin) secures less than a thousand votes and the seat was 
won by David Mudd (albeit a member of Mebyon Kemow!).^^ 
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The move from pressure-group to p o l i t i c a l party led to a number 
of internal dissensions within Mebyon Kemow, leading f i r s t of a l l to 
a break-away but short-lived Cornish National Party and later to the 
siioilarly-naraed but more permanent Cornish Nationalist Party, and 
causing the movement to falter i n the developnent of a Parliamentary 
Election strategy. In the two elections of 1974 Mebyon Kemow failed 
to contest Falmouth-Camborne, although a candidate - James Whetter -
. did contest Truro constituency on both occasion. In the f i r s t 
election Mebyon Kemow achieved over 800 votes, seen as comparable to 
the 1970 result i n Falmouth-Cambome, but i n the October election Dr 
Whetter *s vote slumped to a l i t t l e more than 200 as nationalist 
voters switched their allegiance to the successful and manifestly 
pro-Comish Liberal candidate, David Penhaligon. Dr Whetter achieved 
a similar result i n Truro when he stood as the Cornish Nationalist 
Party candidate i n 1979, but during that year Mebyon Kemow made 
something of an electoral "come-back", not only winning a combined 
vote of over 4000 i n the three seats i t contested i n the General 
Election but also achieving "10,000 Twice" - an aggregate of 10,000 
votes i n the Local Elections, and 10,000 votes for i t s candidate 
(Richard Jenkin) i n the European Election (a resiiLt which represented 
an impressive 10 per cent of the Cornish component of the electorate 
in the Cornwall and Plymouth European Parliamentary Consistuency). .^ ^ 
Since 1979, nationalist party activity in Cornwall - rather 
like that i n Wales and, u n t i l of late, Scotland - appears to have 
receded. But, again as i n Wales and Scotland, the events of the 
1960s and 70s have had an effect on Cornish l i f e and politics, and 
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have led observers to re-assess their interpretations of Cornish 
social and poli t i c a l culture. Compared to the re-assessment which 
accompanied the developnents in Wales and Scotland (and Northern 
Ireland), the new perspectives on Cornwall are modest, muted and 
incomplete. Nevertheless, they exist and form the basis from which a 
more general explanation of the Cornish experience may be developed. 
The Kilbrandon Commission on the Constitution certainly took 
note of Cornish events, accepting a lengthy submission from Mebyon 
Kemow as part of i t s evidence and later recommending - in the same 
report that advocated devolution for Wales and Scotland - that 
greater use be made of the t i t l e "Duchy of Comwall" (instead of 
"County") to emphasise Cornwall's distinct status and identity. 
Kilbrandon's recaimendation also emphasised Cornwall's place i n the 
new concern with the " t e r r i t o r i a l dimension" of the United Kingdom, 
reminding observers that Cornwall's t e r r i t o r i a l identity did not 
derive from the old Saxon heptarchy (as an ordinary English shire's 
might) but rather from an ancient Celtic survival which had been 
formalised into the "Duchy" in Medieval times when the "Principality" 
of Wales (with which i t was linked) was also created.The concern 
to explore and explain the constitutional significance of the Duchy 
status has continued apace (the Cowethas Flamank research group 
issued a report of the subject during 1986^^), and equal energy has 
been devoted to the discussion of Stannary Law and the extent to 
which the degree of constitutional independence afforded to Comwall 
in Medieval times by the Stannary Parliament and system s t i l l 
applies. This debate has attracted many popular enthusiasts,^^ but 
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Pennington adds an academic opinion when he notes that i n certain 
respects the Stannary Parliament "...had legislative powers...which 
equalled those of the national Parliament at Westminster..."^^ and 
that "...stannary law is s t i l l formally a part of the law of 
England",23 
A further consequence of the events of the 1960s and 70s i n 
Cornwall was the new-found appreciation of the extent to which the 
Liberal Party was associated with a distinctly Cornish poli t i c a l 
culture (here once again echoing the experience in Wales and 
Scotland). Although perpetuating the erroneous eq\iation of 
"Cornwall" with "South West England", Madgwick noted that "In 
Scotland, Wales and South West England, the distinctive nature of 
Celtic politics has been expressed to some extent i n nationalism, but 
most notably i n support for the Liberal P a r t y " . S i m i l a r l y , 
fiogdanor noted i n his study of Liberal Party politics that during the 
1950s the Liberals had "...two areas of local strength (Cornwall and 
rural Wales) where the party contested a majority of constituencies 
even i n 1951 and 1955",leading the Liberal Party a decade later to 
respond to "...the demand for self-government...growing in Wales and 
Scotland, and to a lesser degree i n Cornwall. The Liberal Party was 
sympathetic to these movements...".^ ^ Certainly, of a l l those 
Cornish MPs to join or support Mebyon Kemow, John Pardoe 
(especially) and Peter Bessell were those who spoke most consistently 
and sympathetically in favour of Mebyon Kemow policies, and Paul 
Tyler - briefly Liberal MP for Bodmin in 1974 - added his support for 
Cornish devolution and, during the European Election campaign of 
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1989, for the creation of a Cornwall-only European Parliamentary 
Constituency. Of course, the unique relationship between the Liberal 
Party and Cornwall, and the importance of Cornish ethnicity in 
determining i t , was emphasised by the emergence, popularity and 
enormous success of David Penhaligon in Truro constituency. 
Like Pardoe and Bessell before him, Penhaligon supported Mebyon 
Kemow as a means of demonstrating his commitment to Cornish issues. 
But he also brought Cornish issues to the fore i n the Liberal Party 
in Comwall, and at times brought them to the attention of 
Parliament. He spoke i n favour of a Cornish Assembly during the 
debate on Devolution, he championed the cause of the Cornish, miners 
at the time of the t i n crisis, and in the European Assembly 
(Constituencies) debate in December 1978 he vigorously opposed the 
creation of a European Parliamentary Constituency which merged 
Comwall with Plymouth. He declared that Comwall was not part of 
England, that Pl3miouth had expansionary designs upon south-east 
Comwall, and that the proposed creation of a Comwall and Plymouth 
constituency made 
...this a sad day for Comwall. I t is the f i r s t time in any 
election that the boundary of Comwall, which i s sacrosanct and 
important, has been ignored. The boundary has been denied by 
what many people in Cornwall see as a London-based 
Parliament... . Comwall is a celtic area...the Celts of 
Cornwall regard this as a sad day i n their history, for i t i s 
the day when their boundary was ignored and denied. 
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Following his tragic death in December 1986, Penhaligon was described 
in the Telegraph as "...a reforming radical i i i the best traditions of 
the West Country: something of a Cornish nationalist, with a healthy 
scepticism of London-based politicians...".^^ Jo Grimond considered 
that Penhaligon's "...politics were f i r s t of a l l Cornish...",^*^ while 
David Owen thought him "... the personification of the 
Comishman...".^^ The Guardian decided that he had been the "Voice 
of Cornwall".^2 
With Penhaligon setting the pace, i t was d i f f i c u l t for other 
personalities and parties to demonstrate their own "Comishness", but 
Penhaligon had forced his opponents to address themselves to Cornish 
issues. In Falmouth-Cambome, David Mudd found i t necessary to 
"distance" himself from the Conservative Government at the height of 
the t i n crisis, while i n South-East Cornwall the local Conservative 
MP (Robert Hicks) adopted a more subtle and long-term process of 
"distancing" to demonstrate both his own "liberal" disposition within 
the party and his particular concern for Cornwall.''^ Even the Labour 
Party, which had hitherto not embraced Cornish issues to any great 
degree, adopted for i t s candidate in the Truro by-election of 1987 a 
Cornish-speaking, former Mebyon kemow supporter (John King). In the 
1987 General Election the Labour candidate for South-East Cornwall, 
Paul Clarke, decided to concentrate part of his local campaign upon 
his opposition to the processes turning Cornwall into a "Cornish 
Disneyland".^ "Comishness", then, was increasingly a quality which 
politicians i n Comwall had to acquire and project i f they were to be 
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judged credible by the Cornish electorate; further evidence of a 
distinct and active Cornish poli t i c a l culture. 
As the events of the 1960s and 70s began to unfold, and as the 
attributes of Cornish poli t i c a l culture became more clearly 
observable, so certain social and p o l i t i c a l commentators became aware 
that Comwall was indeed "different". As early as 1964 Moorhouse 
argued that Comwall was very different to England - historically, 
socially, economically - and that there were real signs, not only of 
"difference" but also of discontent: 
For a l l their lobbying of MPs ...the men of Mebyon Kemow do not 
appear so far to have made much impact. The English temptation 
is to dismiss them as a lot of cranks; and truly some of the 
postures they adopt invite ridicule. The cold fact i s , 
however, that where a home-rule movement arises, at the bottom 
of i t is generally to be found some very real grievance. 
Though the activities of Mebyon Kemow may be inflated out of 
a l l proportion, and though they take themselves a sigjbt too 
seriously, i t would be a very stupid Englishman who didn't 
recognise that this extravaganza expresses a fundamental 
resentment shared by many Comishmen outside the movement. 
Thayer, i n his admittedly unsatisfactory survey of the British 
political "fringe" i n 1965, devoted half a chapter to the activities 
of Mebyon Kemow, describing i t s membership (then thought to number 
some 200) as "...well-educated and articulate..."^^ with "...the 
latent support of many other Cornish people...".By 1983 Waller 
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was able to offer a more penetrating insight into the distinctive 
qualities of Cornish politics, drawing attention, for example, to the 
importance of "personality" (as i n the cases of Mudd or Penhaligon) 
and to the polit i c a l significance of Cornwall's "...reputation for 
distrusting the English and the English parties"^^ and of the 
"...strong Nonconformist and rural radical vote, and ...distrust of 
'Ehglish' Toryism..."-^^ Thus, although Mebyon Kemow and i t s 
nationalist stance were the most obvious signs of "difference" i n 
Cornish politics, i t was becoming apparent that the distinctive 
Cornish po l i t i c a l culture was both more broad-based and more deep-
seated - involving a strongly Cornish influence in the other parties 
(particularly the Liberals), and exhibiting the effects of other 
influences such as Nonconformity and a residual rural radicalism (the 
latter, of course, an echo of Madgwick's assessment of rural Wales). 
With this new appreciation that Comwall was perhaps 
"different" i n a way that Scotland and Wales were, and with observers 
pointing to both an embryonic nationalist movement and to a wider but 
very distinct Cornish po l i t i c a l culture, came the search for 
theoretical frameworks in which to offer explanations of these 
phenomena. As noted in Chapter 1, there was already under way a 
parallel search for explanations of the very similar phenomena that 
had been observed i n other nations and regions of the United Kingdom, 
and so i t was not surprising that those seeking explanations of the 
Cornish experience should "borrow" models being applied at that time 
elsewhere. Again, given the atmosphere of the late 60s and 70s and 
the pre-occupation with the advances of the various Celtic 
- 52 
nationalist parties, i t was not surprising that existing models of 
nationalism were offered as interpretations of what was happening i n 
Comwall as-well as i n other parts of the United Kingdom. 
Berresford Elli s offered a straightforward nationalist 
interpretation. He argued that despite centuries of anglicisation, 
Comwall retained a residxial Celtic identity which lingered long 
enough to be re-generated by the "Celtic Revival" (literary and 
otherwise) of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
leading to the rebirth of the Cornish language and - with the advent 
of mass politics and popular education - to the eventual emergence of 
pol i t i c a l nationalism ("...a re-awakening of Cornish nationhood").^^ 
He did not, however, explain what processes may have lain behind 
these series of events, and his simplistic view of the Cornish 
identity revolving around the twin concerns of language and 
nationalist politics was so selective, superficial and narrow as to 
be almost unrecognisable - l e t alone unacceptable - to serious 
students of Cornish Studies. He was content to merely express wonder 
at "...the truly astonishing rebirth of this nation"^^ and to comment 
that "The rise of this p o l i t i c a l national consciousness had been a 
remarkable achievement, after i t had long been considered that 
Comwall had been totally assimilated into the English ethos."^^ 
Surprisingly, this approach was echoed at an academic level i n 
Eastlake's discussion, which failed to note ( l e t alone explain) the 
real extent of "difference" i n modem Cornwall and observed rather 
oddly that Comwall faces "...either the prospect of total 
incorporation into England.. ."^ ,^ or a national revival led by 
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Cornish ciiltiaral and p o l i t i c a l nationalists. Clearly, a more 
sophisticated and rigorous model was required i f a satisfactory 
explanation was to be achieved, and one early attempt at. a solution 
was the application of Smith's concept of "ethnic nationalism" to the 
Cornish case. I n t h i s , Cornwall was seen as having f a l l e n under the 
centralising influences of the English "possessive" and " s c i e n t i f i c " 
states: 
...the major Cornish cialtural c r i s i s occurred as a result of 
the homogenising policies of the Tudor 'possessive' State, The 
two Cornish rebellions of 1497 were largely a reaction to 
central government interference and the 'Great Prayer Book 
Rebellion' of 1549 was basically a protest against the 
introduction of the English language into Cornish services. 
Failure to get the Prayer Book and Bible translated into 
Cornish meant that the language was put into swift decline...^ 
This cultxiral c r i s i s led, i n turn, to the "double socialisation" of 
the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a , to emergence of the " t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s " , 
"assimilationalists", "reformists", and ultimately " r e v i v a l i s t s " , 
producing a Cornish "ethnic nationalism" which aimed to gain a state 
and preserve a culture - "...this i s the base on which i t s ideology 
i s f o u n d e d " . A s an explanation of Cornish nationalism, this had 
much that was attractive, but i t shared the short-comings of Smith's 
original thesis (see Chapter 1) and presented a view of Cornish 
history which a l l but ignored the crucial phases of industrialisation 
and de-industrialisation, as well as f a i l i n g to discuss the wider 
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manifestations of "difference" i n Cornish social and p o l i t i c a l 
culture. 
Hechter, of course, attempted a broader examination of Celtic 
nationalism, but - notwithstanding the general criticisms of his 
model and methodology - his comments on the Cornish situation were 
essentially unsatisfactory. He considered that "...there has never 
been a detailed study of the anglicization of C o rnwall",and went 
on to argue that the "internal colonial" model was v a l i d for the 
entire "Celtic Fringe" "...with the p a r t i a l exception of Cornwall". 
This qualification was due, he said, to the fact that, 
...the Celtic region of Cornwall became largely assimilated to 
English culture by the raid-seventeenth century. I t was not 
u n t i l the seventeenth century that the English state began to 
seriously implement policies of cultural intolerance i n the 
peripheral regions. Thus the relative weakness of Celtic 
ethnicity i n nineteenth and twentieth century Cornwall i s due, 
i n part, to the fact that the integration of t h i s region into 
the English economy had occurred prior to 16CX).^ ® 
Cornwall, then, according to Hechter, was apparently straddled 
uncomfortably across both his "internal colonial" and "diffusion" 
models, a view which came i n for strong c r i t i c i s m within Cornwall 
i t s e l f and which revealed Hechter's sketchy knowledge of Cornish 
history. Critics complained, for example, that - contrary to 
Hechter's belief - policies of cultural intolerance were i n operation 
i n Cornwall as early as the f i f t e e n t h and sixteenth centuries: 
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"•..the homogenising and centralising policies of the Tudor State 
were by their very nature anti-Celtic and intolerant of regional 
diversity. The two Cornish rebellions of 1497 and the Western Rising 
of 1549 can be seen as reactions to th i s intolerance...".^^ Again, 
contrary to Hechter's assertions , i t was also argued that after 1600 
the Cornish economy became noticeably less diversified and even less 
integrated with that of England, as t i n (and later copper) mining 
became more and more important. Indeed, this lack of d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n 
and integration was seen as a major cause of the "Great Migration" 
from Cornwall i n the nineteenth century. 
Despite Hechter's i n a b i l i t y to address himself successfully to 
the case of Cornwall, his "internal colonial" model was seen by 
Deacon as a useful tool i n seeking an explanation f o r the condition 
of modem Cornwall. Ignoring Hechter's ambivalent description of the 
Cornish experience, Deacon took his cue from Hechter's analysis of 
Wales, Scotland and Ireland, pointing to "...the stubborn persistence 
of a Cornish i d e n t i t y . Integrating factors have been so powerful 
that, by rights, a separate Cornish i d e n t i t y should have been 
obliterated long ago".^^ Like Hechter, Deacon took t h i s to be 
evidence against the application of a "diffusion" model and argued 
instead that there was i n Cornwall a "...pattern of resistance to 
assimilation..."^^ which could be explained within the context of the 
"internal colonial" model. In attempting the application of the 
model to Cornwall, Deacon highlighted Cornwall's "economic dualism", 
arguing that the Cornish economy - l i k e other "internal colonial" or 
"peripheral" economies - was dependent on an external market and was 
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based on the primary factor, pri n c i p a l l y extractive and agricxiltural. 
Sixteen per cent of Cornwall's workforce was employed i n agriciilture 
and mining i n 1971, he said, compared with just over f i v e per cent i n 
B r i t a i n as a whole, while the fact that only 15 per cent of the 
Cornish workforce was engaged i n manufacturing (compared with 34 per 
cent i n Britain) " . . . i l l u s t r a t e s the lack of secondary industry i n 
C o r n w a l l " . M i n i n g companies treated Cornwall i n a "neo-colonial" 
manner, the development of the Cornish transport system was directed 
specifically at f a c i l i t a t i n g Cornish penetration of external markets, 
while Cornwall had been r e l a t i v e l y disadvantaged i n mean income frcm 
as long ago as 1851. Iftiemployment was always consistently higher i n 
Cornwall than the United Kingdom average. 
Deacon also i d e n t i f i e d a Cornish "cultural division of labour", 
with Cornish people experiencing discrimination (the strength of 
Nonconformity reflected "...alienation from the oiltxire of the core 
society...",^^ part of the "psychology of discrimination..."^^) and 
the Cornish economy - much of i t "branch factory" i n nature - being 
controlled form outside. More importantly, there was a 
"...superimposition of cultxiral divisions on class division...",^^ 
with Cornish people f a i l i n g to f i l l "top jobs" i n Cornwall and being 
clustered generally at the lower end of the occupational/eraplojmient 
and housing markets. Better homes and better jobs, implied Deacon, 
were normally i n the hands of immigrants from outside Cornwall, 
Despite this seemingly enthusiastic application of the model to 
Cornwall, Deacon stopped short of a t o t a l l y u n c r i t i c a l embrace of 
Hechter's "internal colonialism". Hechter argued that ethnic 
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c o n f l i c t would arise from an "internal colonial" situation, but 
Deacon admitted that whilst there was a widespread sense of Cornish 
patriotism, the nationalist movement i t s e l f was quite small and had 
to date f a i l e d to achieve ethnic p o l i t i c a l mobilisation. I n an 
apparent return to a "di f f u s i o n i s t " stance. Deacon explained that 
"...because of h i s t o r i c a l factors..."^^ there were few symbols of 
Cornish nationhood, with the Cornish people experiencing a great deal 
of confusion about their i d e n t i t y : "Many people can quite happily 
define themselves as both Cornish Md English".^® This had lead (as 
a "dif f u s i o n i s t " might argue) to a "...weakness of Cornish 
ethnicity...".^^ Deacon also recognised that Hechter's model could 
not explain the recent extensive immigration in t o Cornwall (Hechter 
considered that i n an "...impoverished and c u l t u r a l l y alien region 
there i s l i t t l e incentive f o r members of the core group to migrate 
there i n force"^^), although he did argue that this immigration had 
led not to an accelerated "diffusion" but to a heightening of the 
"cultural division of labour" and to an "...informal social 
'apartheid'...".^^ I n other areas, Deacon considered that "Factual 
evidence can be contradictory",^^ c i t i n g the example of Cornish 
voting behaviour, where the rise of Penhaligon i n Truro ("...based on 
a strongly ethnic appeal, and atypical of the English 
experience..."^^) contrasted with the situation elsewhere i n Cornwall 
where the traditional anti-Conservative stance had been - he 
contended - largely eroded by 1983, reflecting perhaps (he said) a 
weakening of the Cornish i d e n t i t y or the weight of a Tory immigrant 
vote 
- 58 
Deacon concluded that the "internal colonial" model was "...a 
useful starting p o i n t . . . " ^ for an explanation of the relationship 
between the Cornish "periphery" and the English "core", especially as 
i t highlighted the importance of economic disadvantage within that 
relationship. I t i s d i f f i c u l t to claim any more for Hechter, 
because, even leaving aside the general critiques of his model, his 
own doubts about the Cornish situation (although ill-informed, as 
they were) were rather re-inforced by Deacon's caution and 
reservations. The "internal colonial" model f a i l s to explain the 
many paradoxes apparent within the Cornish situation, and i t i s not 
enough to imply that Cornwall i s somehow poised between the "internal 
colonial" and "diffusion" models. Indeed, the Cornish experience 
deserves an explanation which i s capable of application without 
qualification, reservation or apology. 
The work of Lee and Railings provided a refreshing corrective 
to the "nationalist" interpretations of the Cornish experience, 
taking their analysis beyond a concern for "ethnic nationalism" to 
t r y to i d e n t i f y a much broader manifestation of "difference" i n 
C o r n w a l l . I n marked contrast to those who saw Cornwall as part of a 
wider South-West England, they considered that " . . . i t i s Cornwall 
alone that i s Celtic and i t i s Cornwall which - even on the briefest 
acquaintance - seems very different h i s t o r i c a l l y , economically, 
socially and p o l i t i c a l l y from both Devon and the rest of the South 
West."^^ This "difference" had led, they argued, to "...the formation 
of an identifiable Cornish p o l i t i c a l culture...",^^ socio-economic 
differences i n particular having had "...a residual significance i n 
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terms of contemporary Cornish p o l i t i c s " . T h e y pointed to the 
social and p o l i t i c a l effects of the unusually small size of Cornish 
farms (the average i s only 28 acres), most of which were held on 
tenant leases form the Duchy of Cornwall or from independent 
proprietors, noting that there were few landowners equivalent to the 
Ehglish squire i n terms of status or function. They noted, too, the 
social and p o l i t i c a l effects of Nonconformity - which had lent 
Cornwall a very di s t i n c t i v e brand of Liberal radicalism - and 
considered that the "Celtic Revival" .had fostered a strong Cornish 
sentiment which "...has had an important impact on the Cornish style 
of p o l i t i c s through i t s contribution to an apparently widespread 
sense of 'difference' and 'separateness»".Significantly, they 
considered that "...the h i s t o r i c a l and cultural distinctiveness of 
Cornwall has been eroded less by the pressures of the late twentieth 
century than one might e x p e c t " , a n d went on to argue that i n 
Cornish p o l i t i c s there was "...a r e l a t i v e l y strong sense of Cornish 
iden t i t y or Cornish consciousness, and a growing sense of a n t i -
metropolitanism". 
This sense of id e n t i t y had had an effect, argued Lee, not only 
on Mebyon Kemow and the other nationalists but upon the whole range 
of Cornish p o l i t i c s . The nationalists themselves had influenced the 
attitudes of other parties ("...their ineffectual intervention i n 
parliamentary elections should not be taken as an indicator of their 
effect on the Cornish p o l i t i c a l scene"^^), and one measure of the 
distinctiveness of Cornish p o l i t i c s was the fact that the Liberal 
vote i n Cornwall since the Second World War had been 15 per cent 
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higjier than the UK average, while the Labour vote was 15 per cent 
lower. As Lee enquired rhetorically. 
Given that the population i s largely working class and 
economically disadvantaged - why has Labour conspicuously 
fail e d to make headway i n the Cornish constituencies? Given 
that an increasing proportion of the electorate i s either s e l f -
employed or r e t i r e d 'immigrants', why have the Conservatives 
not benefited more i n electoral terms?^^ 
In answer to th i s and the more general questions concerning 
Cornwall's sense of "difference" and the distinctiveness of Cornish 
p o l i t i c s , Lee and Railings i d e n t i f i e d two key (but interconnected) 
factors - the retarded "nationalisation" of Cornish p o l i t i c s , and the 
"peripheral" status of Cornwall. Using the concept f i r s t developed 
by Johnston to explain the reluctance and d i f f i c u l t y with which the 
constituency of Norfolk South West^^ was brought i n t o the mainstream 
of English p o l i t i c s after 1945, Lee and Railings claimed that i n 
Cornwall ' there was also a deep-seated resistance to the 
"nationalisation" of local p o l i t i c s : anti-metropolitanism and an 
independent cioltural background "...together have served to hinder 
the nationalisation of Cornish p o l i t i c s i n the twentieth century". 
This i n turn was linked to the effects of Cornwall's "peripheral" 
status, with Lee exclaiming that. 
The history of Cornwall as one of England's peripheral areas i s 
re l a t i v e l y l i t t l e known, as i s the fact that i t i s the only 
part of England to have given rise to and sustained a 
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nationalist/autonomist movement that has been neither spurious 
nor ephemeral. 
Together, Lee and Railings considered that twentieth century Cornwall 
was "...almost a classic peripheral region, given that no significant 
industrial development replaced the mining i n d u s t r y . . . " , a 
peripherality reflected i n low earnings, low levels of unionisation 
of the workforce, high unemployment, and continuing emigration of 
younger age groups. Perceptively, Lee noted the importance of 
imperfect industrialisation and subsequent deindustrialisation i n 
perpetuating Cornwall's peripheral status, and considered that 
Cornwall was "...Britain's f i r s t decayed ind u s t r i a l area".^® 
T^ ie value of Lee's and Railings' contributions lay i n their 
detailed observations of the Cornish p o l i t i c a l scene, which indicated 
that nationalist a c t i v i t y was but one part of a much wider Cornish 
p o l i t i c a l culture i n \rfiich the behaviour of Cornwall was often 
significantly different from that elsewhere. Their awareness that 
the perpetuation of peripherality into the twentieth century was 
somehow a function of ind u s t r i a l change was also important, for 
inevitably i t encouraged further analysis of the Cornish experience 
within a centre-periphery model which would stress the significance 
of industrialisation and deindustrialisation. Indeed, Lee and 
Railings alluded to the concept of "Second Peripheralism" postulated 
by Tarrow, but fa i l e d to develop i t as an explanation,^^ 
Another observer of the Cornish scene to c i t e the v a l i d i t y of 
Tarrow'3 view was Wight, although h is principal concern was to 
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characterise the Cornish problem as being one of " t e r r i t o r y versus 
function" i n regional development. Wight i d e n t i f i e d a reigning 
paradigpi of development "from above" i n which central governments 
pursued regional development policies, from a purely "functional" 
point of view, taking l i t t l e account of the particular i d e n t i t i e s of 
the regions and using local governments merely as i n f e r i o r agencies 
to assist i n the implementation of these policies. This "functional" 
approach migjit well trigger " t e r r i t o r i a l " response i n the regions 
with the emergence of "...the opposition of various, t e r r i t o r i a l l y -
based, interest groups to a' range of o f f i c i a l , functionalljr-
conceived, develojpment i n i t i a t i v e s or strategies".80 According to 
Wight this was the crux of the Cornish situation: "A Celtic nation 
and a county of England, Cornwall appears to the centre of a struggle 
between the forces of t e r r i t o r y and f u n c t i o n " . T h e Cornwall County 
Council i t s e l f was powerless to adequately represent Cornwall's 
particular t e r r i t o r i a l needs and demands, being an integral part of 
the centralist paradigm and l i t t l e more than an agency f o r central 
government. Wight added that "...Cornish p o l i t i c a l distinctiveness 
has been of v i r t u a l l y no consequence f o r , o f f i c i a l regional 
development i n i t i a t i v e sponsored by the central s t a t e " , a n d 
iden t i f i e d a response to this "functional" approach i n the form of an 
alliance of interest groups - "...conservationists, i n d u s t r i a l i s t s 
and nationalists (who) have i n common a desire to establish more 
effective regional control over regional development, the region i n 
question being Cornwall". 
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This, then, was Wight's interpretation of the events of the 
1960s and 70s i n Cornwall - a " t e r r i t o r i a l " response to the 
increasing, "functional" interference of the central government which 
had declared "assisted area" status for Cornwall, at the same time 
submerging Cornwall i n a broader South West Development Area 
administered from Plymouth. As a case-study of one particular cause 
of dissent within Cornwall, Wight's analysis was clearly of value, 
but as a general explanation of the Cornish experience i t lacked the 
wide-ranging social, economic, p o l i t i c a l and - above a l l - h i s t o r i c a l 
perspectives which Rokkan and Urwin had shown to be so necessary to 
the satisfactory examination of the centre-periphery relationship. 
I m p l i c i t i n W i t t ' s analysis, of course, was the existence of a 
centre-periphery relationship, and i n this he shared common ground 
along with Lee, Railings and Deacon. A l l agreed that an explanation 
of the Cornish situation was to be found within that relationship, 
although each offered a d i f f e r i n g and specific perspective. As 
before ( i n Chapter 1), the observer i s drawn to the conclusion that 
what i s required i s an all-embracing model of the centre-periphery 
relationship, and again one i s drawn to the framework presented by 
Rokkan and Urwin, and to Tarrow's observations on periods or phases 
of peripherality. 
Rokkan and Urwin, i t w i l l be remembered, offered a model which 
provided an overview of the t e r r i t o r i a l structures of Western Europe, 
describing the emergence of centres and peripheries, and identifying 
a number of subject peripheries i n the Celtic-Atlantic West.^ The 
United Kingdom was one of the t e r r i t o r i a l structures examined, being 
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categorised as a strongly "monocephalic" state ( i e with one dominant 
centre) exhibiting " t e r r i t o r i a l space" (having arisen out of the 
pursuit of centralizing strategies). Geo-historical reasons had led 
to the centre being located i n London and i t s "lowland" hinterland, 
while the "highland" zone - part of the Celtic-Atlantic West - became 
the state's periphery. This periphery, i n turn, coxiLd be sub-divided 
into an "Inner Periphery" and an "Outer Periphery", the "Inner 
Periphery" canprising Wales, Cornwall and northern England - the 
f i r s t peripheral t e r r i t o r i e s to have been annexed by the state's 
centre. Cornwall, then, emerges as an integral part of Rokkan and 
Urwin's grand analysis. I t i s part of the subject peripheries of the 
Celtic-Atlantic West, i t exists within the monocephalic United 
Kingdom, and i s part of the "Inner Periphery" of the "highland" zone. 
I t has, however, been only barely "accommodated" by the centre, which 
has allowed few trappings or symbols of t e r r i t o r i a l i d e n t i t y to 
survive into modem times. 
I t follows from Rokkan and Urwin's analysis that Cornwall's 
peripherality i s essentially a geo-political fact. Given that the 
United Kingdom i s a highly-centralised monocephalic state with i t s 
centre located i n London and environs, and given that Cornwall (from 
the perspective of the centre) i s a remote, sea-girt peninsula at the 
south-western extremity of B r i t a i n , then there i s a certain 
i n e v i t a b i l i t y about Cornwall's peripheral status - unless, of course, 
the d i s t r i b u t i o n of p o l i t i c a l power within the United Kingdom (or the 
European Coimiunity, perhaps) was to change dramatically, or i t i t 
were somehow possible to a l t e r Cornwall's geographic position (a re-
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distribution of p o l i t i c a l power i n north-western Europe migjit re-
define Cornwall's position as "central" i n the Celtic Sea). 
From such an analysis, therefore, emerge certain "constants of 
peripherality": geographical location and geological construction, 
together with fundamental characteristics of the centre-periphery 
relationship \ ^ c h might endure through the ages. But of overriding 
importance i n explaining the perpetuation of peripherality, and thus 
of continuing diversity and distinctiveness i n the face of change, i s 
an appreciation of the changing nature of the centre-periphery 
relationship i t s e l f over time. As noted i n Chapter 1, Urwin stressed 
the effects of industrialisation and de-industrialisation i n not only 
perpetuating but also altering the nature of the relationship, and 
Tarrow advanced the concept of "Older Peripheralism" (with i t s 
t e r r i t o r i a l and cultural isolation) and "Second Peripheralism" 
(marked by economic and social marginalisation) to demonstrate that 
peripherality was indeed a dynamic c o n d i t i o n . T h i s can i n turn be 
defined and developed to provide a model which stresses the movement 
of peripheral t e r r i t o r i e s from one h i s t o r i c a l phase or period to the 
next, from "Older" to "Second" and perhaps other "Peripheralisms" 
thereafter, i n the manner described i n Chapter 1. 
In attempting here a Cornish adaptation of Tarrow's view and 
the adoption of such a model to explain Cornwall's h i s t o r i c a l 
experience, emphasis i s placed upon the crucial movement to "Second 
Peripheralism", which occurred as a result of the rapid but 
incomplete and over-specialised (and ultimately fleeting) nature of 
industrialisation which affected Cornwall i n the eighteenth and 
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nineteenth centuries - a process that plucked Cornwall from her 
insular "Older Peripheralism", thrust her b r i e f l y into the world 
limelight of technological and economic advance, and then dropped her 
into the mature manifestations of "Second Peripheralism" as her 
mining industry collapsed and her population emigrated. This 
approach, indeed, has been anticipated already by those who have 
sought descriptions and explanations of Cornwall's experience of de-
indxistrialisation. Building upon Havinden's introductory work®^ i n 
the f i e l d , Lewis saw that the problem of de-industrialisation was 
linked to the issue of peripherality, and suggested that the study of 
de-industrialisation was linked to the issue of peripherality, and 
suggested that the study of de-industrialisation i n Cornwall (and the 
"South West") should not only elucidate the process i t s e l f but also 
consider "...how the economy and society of the region adapted to i t s 
changing economic structure."^^ This would necessitate an 
examination of emigration patterns, of changing employment patterns, 
of fluctuating wage rates, of the movement of in d u s t r i a l c a p i t a l , and 
the emergence of new economic a c t i v i t y such as tourism. I t would 
also, Lewis argued, mean an investigation of broader issues such as 
the effects on local p o l i t i c a l culture and social structure. 
This study addresses i t s e l f to many of the concerns raised by 
Lewis, arguing that the experience of "Second Peripheralism" wrought 
profound changes i n Cornwall, but changes nevertheless which served 
to perpetuate Cornwall's peripheral condition and her continuing 
cultural, social, economic and p o l i t i c a l "difference" from the 
centre. I n addressing i t s e l f to the post-war experience, t h i s study 
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admits a further movement i n peripherality, noting an emergence from 
the "paralysis" that had characterised the matured manifestations of 
"Second Periphalism", t h i s new movement evidenced, for example, i n 
widespread immigration into Cornwall from outside, i n changing 
economic structures, and i n the rise of peripheral protest. This 
movement provides evidence which i s at f i r s t glance co n f l i c t i n g , 
confusing, paradoxical: the face of Cornwall has altered to an extent 
that - as Wigjit observed - "Whereas the imminent 'destruction' of 
Cornwall i s a prime issue f o r a concerned Comishman, to informed 
outsiders the chief impression i s the stubborn persistence ' of 
Comishness i n the face of anglicising influences."^^ The resolution 
of this paradox l i e s , as i s argued i n considerable d e t a i l i n the 
l a t t e r chapters of this study, i n the recognition that t h i s recent 
movement i s i n fact evidence of the emergence of a "Third" phase or 
period of "Peripheralism". This has indeed propelled Cornwall from 
i t s erstwhile "paralysis", but presents not "destruction" or even 
"anglicisation" but instead a further perpetuation of the peripheral 
condition, with dist i n c t i v e social, economic and p o l i t i c a l features 
which continue to mark Cornwall o f f from the English centre. 
Cornwall, then, continues to be "different" - because of, rather than 
despite, her h i s t o r i c a l experience. 
In conclusion, then, i t can be seen that, although the myth of 
the "homogeneous state" had served to retard serious consideration of 
the Cornish situation, the events of the 1960s and 70s i n Scotland, 
Wales and elsewhere were to an extent mirrored i n Cornwall. This 
caused academic observers to r e f l e c t anew upon the condition of 
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modem Cornwall, leading to a general opinion that there was an 
id e n t i f i a b l y "different" social and p o l i t i c a l culture which required 
further examination and explanation. This led, i n turn, to the 
application of various models (some "borrowed" from the Scottish and 
Welsh experience) to explain what had happened i n Cornwall. Although 
none of the resulting explanations was comprehensive, most pointed to 
a relationship between an Ekiglish "centre" and a Cornish "periphery", 
a relationship which f i t t e d neatly into the more general centre-
periphery model devised by Rokkan and Urwin. Cornwall, indeed, 
emerged as an integral part of the RokkanAlrwin analysis, and this 
study accepts their general explanation of the processes of state-
building i n Western Europe and the United Kingdom. In particular, i t 
acknowledges the key impact of ind u s t r i a l change i n perpetuating the 
peripheral condition, employing the model of phases of peripherality 
developed from Tarrow, and explaining Cornwall's movement from 
"Older" to "Second" and now "Third Peripheralism". In achieving this 
the intention and method has been to provide a broad h i s t o r i c a l 
perspective, i n the manner advocated by Rokkan and Urwin, 
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PART I I 
FIRST PERIPHERALISM - OF TERRITORIAL AND CULTURAL ISOLATION 
"Of a l l Cornwall, Duke am I , 
As was also my Father. 
A great lord i n the country. 
From the Land's End to the 
Tamar" 
Me yv due i n a l l Kemow 
Indella ytho ov thays. 
Hag vhel arluth i n pov 
A tamer the pen an 
vlays." 
"Bewnans Meriasek (The L i f e of St Meriasek)", 1504 
l^pstf^^^^""^' Camborne Plav. Dyllansow Truran,' Redruth, 
"We are i n a very wild place which no human being ever v i s i t s , in the 
midst of a most barbarous race, so different in language and custom 
from the Londoners and the rest of England that they are as 
unintelligible to these l a s t as to the Venetians". 
The Venetian Ambassador to Castile, when in Cornwall, 1506. 
(A.L. Rowse, Tudor Cornwall, Jonathan Cape, London, 1941, pl l 7 . ) 
"Cornwall, as an entire state, hath at divers times enjoyed sundry 
t i t l e s : of a kingdom, principality, duchy, and earldom.,.". 
Richard Carew of Antony, 1602. 
(F.E, Halliday [ed.], Richard Carew, The Survey of Cornwall, Melrose, London, 1953, pl51.) 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE CELTIC DUCHY 
In placing Cornwall within the diversity of the "multi-
national" United Kingdom, and i n assessing the experience of modem 
Cornwall, i t i s necessary - as has been argued - to examine the 
significance of ind u s t r i a l change i n perpetuating the peripheral 
condition. But equally, i t i s important to explain the emergence of 
the peripheral condition i n the f i r s t place, elucidating the 
circvmistances i n which the period of "Older Peripheralism" was 
established and describing the features of i t s " t e r r i t o r i a l and 
cultural isolation". As noted ea r l i e r , this "Older Peripheralism" 
arose form the state-building a c t i v i t i e s of the centre, resulting i n 
the p o l i t i c a l incorporation of the periphery within the state but 
leaving i t (the periphery) to a considerable degree insulated from 
the state's centre. This insulation was partly a function of 
geographical distance, but i t was also a result of the p o l i t i c a l or 
constitutional "accommodation" afforded the periphery i n order to 
reconcile i t s incorporation i n the state and to secure within the 
periphery the authority of the centre. This insulation was then 
heightened by peripheral distinctions i n language, r e l i g i o n , and 
other social or socio-economic attributes which served to emphasise 
the cultural dichotomy between centre and periphery. 
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Within what was to become the United Kingdom, the expansion and 
state-building a c t i v i t i e s of the English centre were lengthy and 
complex, observable even before the tenth century when Athelstan was 
hailed as "The very celebrated King who by the Grace of God ruled a l l 
England, which prior to hira many Kings shared between them"^ and 
"First King of the English to subdue a l l the nations within 
B r i t a i n . . . " ^ These a c t i v i t i e s were later to involve formal 
annexation (as i n the case of Wales), or the use of force and terror 
(such as the "harrying of the North" carried out by William I and 
again much later by Henry V I I I ) , or a complicated blend of conquest, 
colonisation and treaty (as per Ireland), or even constitutional 
devices to lure t e r r i t o r i e s otherwise too strong to succumb to 
incorporation (the Unions with Scotland). But i n each instance 
incorporation was accompanied by mechanisms of "acccnnraodation" - from 
the essentially symbolic Principality of Wales, through localised 
instruments of central influence such as the Council of the North or 
(much l a t e r ) the Vice-Ro3ralty of Ireland, to the very real autonomy 
afforded Scottish i n s t i t u t i o n s . ^ Similarly, incorporation did not 
lead to cultural homogeneity. Not only did existing cultural 
distinctions endure within the peripheries, most obviously i n the 
Celtic-speaking t e r r i t o r i e s , but "accommodation" i t s e l f could on 
occasions heigjiten c u l t u r a l difference (for example, i n the emergence 
of Presb5rterianism as the Established Church of Scotland). 
To return to the focxis of this study, an analysis of Cornwall's 
"Older Peripheralism" should, therefore, address a number of 
significant issues. F i r s t of a l l , the characteristics of thi s "Older 
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Peripheralism" must be defined - how was i t that Cornwall came to be 
a peripheral appendage to the centre of the English State, to what 
extent was Cornwall "accommodated" by this State (and what were the 
effects of such "accommodation"), and to what extent was t h i s Cornish 
periphery culturally, d i s t i n c t from the centre ( i n practical terms, 
Celtic rather than English)? But also, having established the nature 
of this "Older Peripheralism", i t i s equally important for the 
pxirposes of this study to examine the dynamics of change which 
threatened Cornwall * s " t e r r i t o r i a l and cultural i s o l a t i o n " (the 
impact of Tudor centralism, the increasing strategic importance of 
Cornwall, the emerging economic patterns) and created the conditions 
out of which Cornwall's "Second Peripheralism" arose. In t h i s , the 
"constants of peripherality" - established i n the "Older 
Peripheralism" and handed on to the "Second" - must also be 
identified. 
Cornwall i s a natural and self-contained geographic u n i t , 
bounded on three sides by the sea and on the fourth almost entirely 
cut o f f .by the River Tamar, and thi s has f a c i l i t a t e d - indeed, almost 
predisposed Cornwall towards - the creation within these bounds of 
distinc t t e r r i t o r i a l and cultural units. In Roman times, for 
example, i t seems l i k e l y that Cornwall ("Comubia") formed an 
administrative sub-division ("pagus") of the south western region or 
canton of Dumnohia, the lands west of the Tamar occupied by a tribe 
known as the Comovii.^ Following the departure of the Legions, the 
precise status of Cornwall i s more d i f f i c u l t to estimate or define. 
A Romano-British kingdom of Dumnonia arose from the old canton, 
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extending roughly from Cornwall and Devon through to the western 
fringes of Somerset and Dorset,^ and Cornwall emerged as i t s 
heartland as the Anglo-Saxons (the English) advanced ever-deeper in t o 
the south western peninsxila. But at the same time as the English 
pressed ever-westwards, so Dark Age Cornwall became ever more closely 
drawn into the world of the Celtic Church. Again, geography played 
i t s role - ensuring that Cornwall would be touched by English 
influence at a much lat e r date than the eastern d i s t r i c t s of 
Dumnonia, and placing Cornwall geographically i n a central position 
i n the Celtic world with Brittany lying to the south and Wales and 
Ireland to the north and north-west. Communication between the 
Celtic lands was by sea, and Cornwall became an important la n d f a l l 
for seafarers, traders, and above a l l the "Saints" - the holy men of 
the Celtic Church - as they moved back and fo r t h between Brittany and 
Wales or Ireland, and as the medieval pilgrimage routes to Santiago 
de Corapestella i n Galicia (with i t s Celtic influence) were 
established.^ 
But l i t t l e by l i t t l e the English did come to impinge upon the 
l i f e of Cornwall, and so i n the period spanning from the f i f t h to the 
tenth centuries we see two significant but opposing and contradictory 
forces shaping the i d e n t i t y and destiny of Cornwall - the influence 
of the Celtic world (and particularly i t s Chxirch) of which i t was a 
part, and the influence of the English as they established themselves 
i n the south west. Both influences were complex, and i t i s a mistake 
to oversimplify them and their effects upon Cornwall. I t i s easy, 
for example, to portray the "Age of Saints" as the golden age of 
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:ommon Celtic culture, with the Celtic peoples drawn together i n a c< 
unity, sharing a common purpose and sense of i d e n t i t y - a model for 
present-day Celtic nationalists.^ The r e a l i t y was rather different. 
Although the missionary zeal of the Celtic Church, diffusing 
outwards from i t s core i n Ireland, did provide some sense of purpose 
and develop aspects of an inter-Celtic culture, i t did not lead to a 
p o l i t i c a l sense of unity, nor did i t have any p o l i t i c a l aspirations. 
Equally, the Celtic world was divided by language - the I r i s h , Scots 
and Manx speaking increasingly divergent dialects of Goidelic 
(Gaelic), and the Cornish, Welsh and Bretons speaking forms of 
Brythonic (British) from which their individual languages would 
eventually emerge. The precise relationship between the various 
Celtic lands was also complex. There i s evidence of considerable 
I r i s h colonisation i n Cornwall during this period, but i t seems 
possible that the I r i s h came as "invaders", putting pressure upon the 
indigenous Cornish population, some of which may have sought refuge 
abroad by migrating to Brittany. Indeed, the early li n k s between 
Cornwall and Brittany are especially complex, l i n g u i s t i c and other 
evidence pointing to perhaps a succession of migratory waves from 
south west Britain to Brittany during this period. Some of these 
migrants may have been from South Wales, but others were from 
Cornwall (reflecting even older links between Cornwall and Brittany) 
and from the area that i s now Devon - the refugees from the l a t t e r 
perhaps fleeing i n the face of the English advance, leaAring the land 
r e l a t i v e l y depopulated and accounting for the almost t o t a l lack of 
Celtic placenames i n modem Devon.® 
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The advance of the English was equally as complex as the 
relationships i n the Celtic world. I t i s tempting to portray i t as a 
relentless westerly thrust, with Celtic Dumnonia perpetually i n 
retreat from the time of the Battle of Durham Down (near B r i s t o l ) i n 
577 (which drove an English wedge between the Celts of Wales and the 
south west) u n t i l Athelstan established the Tamar as the boundary 
between Celt and West Saxon i n 936. Notwithstanding the semi-
legendary exploits of the Celtic folk-hero, Arthur, the evidence 
suggests a tortuous and drawn-out English penetration of Dumnonia, 
with considerable Celtic resistance. "At the beginning of the 
seventh century", argues Hoskins, "the Celtic kingdom of Duranonia was 
i n f u l l existence and unimpaired control of south-west B r i t a i n " . ^ 
The English advance in t o Dorset had already ground to a halt and only 
i n eastern Somerset were they making any progress. Thereafter, the 
English advance was two-pronged and made greater headway, the 
Somerset men pushing i n t o North Devon and those i n Dorset penetrating 
into East and South Devon, with the Exe becoming their border with 
the Dumnonians by 661. But large pockets of Celtic farmers remained 
rel a t i v e l y untouched i n North Devon and especially i n Dorset, and the 
English conquest of the south west must be seen as a very piecemeal 
process, requiring centuries of consolidation.^^ 
By 682 the English had i n a l l probability reached the River 
Tamar, and placename evidence suggests that they may have already 
crossed into that part of North Cornwall lyi n g above the River 
Ottery. The Ottery, indeed, became an ethnic and l i n g u i s t i c border 
of considerable importance, with h i l l - f o r t s such as Warbstow Bury 
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perhaps creating some sort of Dark Age "raaginot l i n e " along i t s 
course. An even cursory glance at an Ordnance Survey map of the 
d i s t r i c t shows that to the south of the Ottery the names are 
overwhelmingly Celtic - Tremaine, Hendra, T r e v i l l i o n , and so on -
while to the north they are English (or hybrid Celtic-English) and 
reminiscent of those found i n North Devon: Canworthy, Pattacott, 
B i l l a c o t t . To the north west, the l i n g u i s t i c border twists beyond 
the Ottery to pa r a l l e l the present-day A39 road towards Poundstock 
and the sea.^^ 
By the end of the seventh century, then, the kingdom of 
Dumnonia had been pushed back in t o what i s modem Cornwall, with 
English settlement already s p i l l i n g over into i t s northern-most t i p . 
By 710, when they fought against Geraint, the Cornish king of \ ^ t 
was l e f t of Duranonia, the English f e l t strong enough to probe beyond 
the Tamar, leading to limited English settlement between the Tamar 
and the Lynher. But Cornwall remained independent, with i t s own l i n e 
of chieftain-kings, and of course i t s Celtic Church, opposing the 
campaigns of the kings of Wessex u n t i l at least 815 when Egbert 
harried Cornwall from east to west i n response to a Cornish attack 
across the Tamar. I n 838 Egbert f i n a l l y defeated the Cornish at the 
great battle of Kingston Down, near Callington i n East Cornwall, 
although local native kings continued to exercise authority i n 
western parts of Cornwall. 
The eventual subjugation of Cornwall was l e f t to Athelstan over 
ninety years l a t e r , a momentous event which not only fixed the Tamar 
as the boundary between the Cornish and the West Saxons, but also led 
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to the eviction of the remaining Celtic population i n Exeter (and 
perhaps the rest of Devon). I t i s under Athelstan, then, that we see 
the conscious and " o f f i c i a l " creation of modem Cornwall, clearly 
delineated by i t s eastern border which set the l i m i t s of the "West 
Welsh" as clearly as did the Wye for the "North W e l s h " . A t h e l s t a n 
was also noteworthy for his achievement i n \miting the various 
kingdoms of England under one rule (his own), and for establishing 
his suzerciinty over kings i n Wales and Scotland. Athelstan's reign, 
then, was a significant milestone i n the creation of the English 
State and i t s relations with i t s Celtic neighboxars. 
For Cornwall, the importance of Athelstan's actions cannot be 
stressed too greatly. Not only had Athelstan established Cornwall as 
a geo-political u n i t , but also he had established i t as the t e r r i t o r y 
of the "West Welsh" (the Cornish Celts) and defined i t s relationship 
with England. I n short, Cornwall was f i r m l y annexed to England and 
yet was not part of i t , either ethnically or i n terms of t e r r i t o r i a l 
absorption, Cornwall was not independent, and yet i t s existence was 
a p o l i t i c a l fact - albeit i t s status determined according to English 
rather than Cornish terms. Cornwall, indeed, had emerged as a 
" s a t e l l i t e " of the English State, subjected but s t i l l regarded as a 
security threat (as evidenced by the decision to place the Cornish 
shore of the Tamar estuary d i r e c t l y i n the hands of the English king 
eind consider i t a part of Devon) and as " a l i e n " . O n maps, Cornwall 
was to appear as "West Wales" for years to come.^^ 
Cornwall's "Older Peripheralism" grew d i r e c t l y from Athelstan's 
settlement. The raids and counter-raids across the Tamar became a 
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thing of the past as Cornwall settled into i t s " t e r r i t o r i a l and 
cultural isolation", i t s t e r r i t o r i a l existence at last guaranteed and 
i t s status as a "refuge" for the "West Welsh" assured. This, of 
course, represented a degree of "accommodation" by the English State 
- a recognition that the Tamar marked the bomdary between two 
peoples, and should remain so - and this was accepted at the Norman 
Conquest, the Domesday Book ( f o r example) noting the Tamar border 
without q u e s t i o n . A t h e l s t a n ' s attempts at "accommodation" were 
also reflected i n his creation of a Cornish See, centred on St 
Germans, with Conan the Comishman as i t s f i r s t Bishop, although 
Cornwall was to lose i t s independent diocesan status as early as 
1050.^6 
Other foms of "accommodation" had greater longevity, however, 
and came into their own i n the Medieval period as government 
administration became more complex and sophisticated. Specifically, 
t h i s "acconraodation" centred upon the twin i n s t i t u t i o n s of the Duchy 
and the Stannaries, which together gave Cornwall a unique 
relationship with the Crown and afforded a special constitutional 
i d e n t i t y . "Gie Duchy grew out of the ear l i e r Earldom of Cornwall, 
which was i n i t s e l f a singular i n s t i t u t i o n and was probably created 
as an "accommodating" successor of the earlier l i n e of Cornish 
k i n g s . C e r t a i n l y , at the time of the Norman Conquest i n 1066 the 
Earldom was held by one Cadoc (or Condor), a native Comishman, and 
i t was to him that the Cornish owed their f i r s t loyalty - the King of 
England holding no land d i r e c t l y i n Cornwall, i n marked contrast to 
the situation i n English counties where i t was usual for the King to 
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hold t e r r i t o r i a l possessions. The imposition of Norman feudalism, of 
course, changed the nature of land holding, and the victorious 
William of Normandy lost l i t t l e time i n replacing Cadoc with Robert, 
Count of Mbrtain, as Earl of Cornwall, Thereafter, Cornwall was 
granted to a succession of Earls who were, i n practice, the King's 
"favourites"; i n the absence of an Earl, Cornwall was held by the 
King as a d i s t i n c t e n t i t y . The Earldom (and subsequent Duchy) was 
associated from earliest times with Tintagel, the s i t e chosen for the 
construction of a castle and linked (by Geoffrey of Monmouth^^) with 
the Arthurian t r a d i t i o n , reflecting perhaps an ear l i e r significance 
of Tintagel as a seat of power - at once a means of a"accommodation" 
and a method of confirming the "legitimacy" of Ehglish and Norman 
rule i n Cornwall. 
The Duchy of Cornwall was created out of the Earldom i n March 
1337 by Edward I I I for the maintenance of his seven year-old son. 
Edward I I I was conscious that he was building the Duchy upon an 
ancient t r a d i t i o n , announcing that he was advancing "...our most dear 
f i r s t begotten Edward...to be Duke of Cornwall, over which awhile ago 
Dukes for a long time successively presided as chief r u l e r s " . A 
succession of Charters during 1337 and 1338 defined the 
constitutional status of the Duchy and set the power and privileges 
of the Duke. Today, when i t i s possible to point to the d i s t i n c t and 
quite separate a c t i v i t i e s of the County of Cornwall (which 
administers local govemment) and the Duchy of Cornwall (an 
essentially commercial organisation which manages the Duke's land 
holdings i n Cornwall and elsewhere), i t i s ctistomary to emphasise the 
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difference between the County and the Duchy, In the fourteenth 
century there was no such disti n c t i o n , the Duchy i t s e l f - as late as 
1855 - describing the status conferred by the Medieval Charters: 
...the three Duchy Charters are sufficient i n themselves to 
vest i n the Dukes of Cornwall, not only the government of 
Cornwall, but the entire t e r r i t o r i a l dominion i n and over the 
county which had previously been invested i n the Crown...not 
only a l l the t e r r i t o r i a l possessions of the Crown i n Cornwall, 
but every prerogative r i g h t and source of revenue...".^^ 
Henry V's Parliament i n 1422 affirmed that "...the County of 
Cornwall should always remain as a Duchy to the eldest sons of the 
Kings of England..., and - i n assessing the extent of the Duchy's 
rule i n Cornwall - Pearse has argued that, 
Iftider the ancient earldom Cornwall had been to a considerable 
extent independent, enjoying privileges i n the shape of a 
measure of autonomy and freedom from direct interference by the 
central government i n many of i t s a f f a i r s . This sense of 
autonomy and separateness was now strengthened. From 1337, 
when Prince Edward was seven years old, u n t i l he died i n 1376 
the only forms of government known to Cornwall were, at f i r s t , 
that of his household and, lat e r , of his council. 
Julian Cornwall agrees that, 
A Celtic survival not yet assimilated into the English nation, 
Cornwall also possessed a unique i n s t i t u t i o n which again helped 
to foster the i l l u s i o n of autonomy, namely the Duchy, the 
- 85 -
b i r t h r i g h t of the King's eldest son. The administrative 
structure of the Duchy constituted i n effect a miniature 
government complete with a hierarchy of o f f i c i a l s . . . .^ ^ 
This remained true throughout the Medieval period, and Mary Coate has 
noted that even i n seventeenth century Cornwall, on the eve of the 
C i v i l War, the Duke's "...prerogative was hardly distinguishable from 
that of the C r o w n " . A s the Duchy i t s e l f explained, "...from 
earliest times Cornwall was d i s t i n c t from the Kingdom of England, and 
under separate government..."^^ so that "...the Duke was quasi-
sovereign within his Duchy". 
As a vehicle of "accommodation" the Duchy was highly 
successful. Although, as A.L. Rowse has noted, "Something of the 
status of conquest remained",the Duchy created an aura of semi-
independence and was regarded as having antecedents which stretched 
back into the mists of time. I n t h i s , as i n so many other respects, 
the Duchy mirrored the Principality of Wales, which had been created 
i n 1307 and was an attempt by the English Crown at an "accommodation" 
of the Welsh. I t was no co-incidence that the Prince of Wales was 
also the Duke of Cornwall (and that t h i s personage was no less than 
the heir to the Throne) and a constitutional l i n k was thus created 
between Cornwall and Wales, so "That Cornwall, l i k e Wales, was at the 
time of the Conquest, and was subsequently treated i n many respects, 
as di s t i n c t from England". 
Quite apart from enhancing Cornwall's sense of constitutional 
separateness, the Duchy exercised a strong influence over Cornish 
society and economy, often with results that served to mark even 
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further the differences between the Cornish experience and that which 
obtained east of the Tamar. As Hatcher wrote of the Duchy of 
Cornwall i n the Middle Ages, "Much of what i s significant.. .provides 
a contrast with the general experience of English medieval 
31 
history". And i t would be an error to underestimate the a l l -
pervading influence of the Duchy - i n addition to the 17 Duchy manors 
(mostly i n East Cornwall) owned d i r e c t l y by the Duchy, the castles of 
Launceston, Trematon, Tintagel, and Restormal, along with the 
boroughs of Launceston, Lostwithiel, Tintagel, Helston, Camelford, 
Grampound, Liskeard and Saltash, were under the control of the Duke, 
as were the shrievalty and havenership of Cornwall, the county and 
hundred courts, feodary, and the entire Stannary organisation. In 
addition, the Cornish were obliged to f u l f i l "...the host of duties 
stemming from the Duke's position as a great feudal lord"."^^ A l l of 
this was administered with considerable efficiency from the Duchy 
capital of Lostwithiel. 
The 17 Duchy manors (later increased to several dozen) were 
managed i n a manner that "...differed so markedly from the structure 
of manors i n other p a r t s . t . " , ^ ^ that they had l i t t l e i n common with 
the classic English manor. Indeed, Hatcher has gone so far as to 
suggest that this peculiarly Cornish system ought not re a l l y to be 
called "manorial" at a l l . ^ ^ There was, for example, no exploitation 
of demesnes, the absence of demesne farming meaning that lands were 
entirely i n the hands of Duchy tenants. Equally sig n i f i c a n t l y , there 
was no trace of the open-field, strip-system of agriculture (so 
typical of English manors) on any of the Duchy properties - a 
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reflection of the Cornish form of land settlement that the Duchy had 
inherited, as was the fact that population settlement tended to be 
scattered i n small hamlets rather than grouped i n "nucleated" 
villages as was often the case east of the Tamar. 
Most importantly, the Duchy operated a system of tenancy quite 
different from the normal English pattern. Instead of the familiar 
categories of "free, v i l l e i n , or cottar", the Duchy operated 
tenancies that were "free, conventionary, or v i l l e i n " . Most of the 
Duchy land, i n fac t , was held i n conventionary tenure. This was not 
the classic hereditary (and bonded) security of tenure with attendant 
rents and obligations, but instead a seven year lease at a free 
market rent with only negligible services but no renewal as a r i g h t . 
Those tenants who were "free" had very few obligations, and only a 
minority of tenants were v i l l e i n s bound to their land. Moreover, the 
number of v i l l e i n s declined (although, i r o n i c a l l y , villeinships 
survived i n Cornwall longer than most other parts!) for the Duchy 
pursued a policy of not renewing them when for variotas reasons they 
had lapsed. The result of a l l this was that, i n Medieval Cornwall, a 
class of independent and potentially mobile peasants was created, a 
precursor of the independently-minded small tenant farmer which came 
to characterise Cornwall i n later centuries, and indeed \^ch i s 
s t i l l much i n evidence t o d a y . A n d , just as the Duchy created the 
independent small farmer, so i t served to i n h i b i t the emergence of a 
strong and i n f l u e n t i a l (and potentially r i v a l ) local gentry (ie a 
local e l i t e ) - a major factor i n shaping the economic, social and 
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p o l i t i c a l future of Cornwall, a fact noted by observers as diverse as 
Henderson and Rowse, Felling and Cornwall. 
Although the ultimate economic effect of the Duchy may have 
been to drain o f f much of the surplus wealth of a land already short 
of resources, the i n i t i a l impetus provided by the Duchy was for the 
diversification of economic a c t i v i t y i n Cornwall. By the f i f t e e n t h 
century i t featured shipping (a f a i r proportion of Cornish exports 
were carried by Comishmen i n Cornish ships), fishing, shipbuilding, 
qxiarrying, and t e x t i l e manufacture, a l l of which stimulated 
agriculture by providing a market for i t . But even at that date t i n 
raining was emerging as a central feature of the Cornish economy, the 
relative mobility of the Cornish population f a c i l i t a t i n g i t s 
development, a hint of the overwhelmingly important role that mining 
would come to acquire i n future centuries. 
The importance of mining was also reflected i n the power of the 
Stannaries, which - l i k e the Duchy (under whose j u r i s d i c t i o n they 
f e l l ) - emerged i n the Medieval period as a device by which the Crown 
was able to "accommodate" Cornwall. I t appears that the Stannaries 
grew out of a body of ancient customary rights and privileges enjoyed 
by the tinners of Cornwall and Devon, similar to the "free mining" 
statixs enjoyed by miners i n areas as diverse as the Mendip H i l l s , the 
Forest of Dean, Derbyshire, Alston Moor, France, the Low Countries, 
and Germany. Pennington considers that Stannary law evolved from 
three sources - Cornish Anglo-Saxon, and Norman - with "Coinrush 
customary law...being kept alive from generation to generation...".^® 
But the Stannary system, as i t developed i n the Middle Ages, went 
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much further than mere "free mining" to provide Cornwall with what 
Rowe has said "...might almost be termed t e r r i t o r i a l semi-
independence...",^^ the Stannary Parliament operating i n a manner 
that (as Lewis wrote) "...scarcely differed from that at the House of 
Commons..."^ ^ at Westminster. 
The Crown*s direct interest i n the Stannaries was as a result 
of " t i n coinage", the tax payable to the King on smelted t i n , which 
was probably f i r s t imposed as early as the late eleventh century. 
Consequently, when the Duchy of Cornwall was created i n 1337, i t was 
only natural that the Stannaries should become part of i t s structure. 
The f i r s t attempt at describing the status and administration of the 
Stannaries came i n 1198, and th i s was followed i n 1201 by the f i r s t 
Charter of the Stannaries which arose from the "...desire of the 
Cornish tinners to be separated from those of Devon..."^^ (there was 
already a tr a d i t i o n a l d i s t i n c t i o n , and perhaps h o s t i l i t y , between the 
two) and the economic desire to see the scope of the Stannaries 
extended. The Charter also established the four d i s t r i c t s - or 
"Stannaries" - i n which Stannary Law might operate: Foweymore (modem 
Bodmin Moor), Blackmore (the Hensbarrow Downs about St Austell), 
Tywamhaile (the area around Truro and St Agnes), and Penwith-and-
Kerrier i n the far west. There was, however, no attempt at defining 
where the bouiKiaries of these Stannaries might be, and - as was 
sometimes argued - almost the whole of Cornwall was metaliferous and 
l i k e l y to be subject to the attention of miners, and so the 
ju r i s d i c t i o n of the Stannaries could i f needs be be extended to 
encompass a l l Cornwall. 
- 90 -
In 1305 Edward I , i n two separate Charters (one for Cornwall, 
and one for Devon), defined the privileges enjoyed by the tinners. 
Most important of these was that tinners were not to be hailed before 
the ordinary courts (except for the most serious charges) but were to 
be t r i e d i n Stannary Courts (irrespective of whether the suit was to 
do with mining) before a jury consisting of tinners ( f or a mining 
s u i t ) or h a l f tinners and half "foreigners" (non-miners) for a non-
mining s u i t . The Charters also offered a l i b e r a l interpretation of 
the right of "bounding", under which a tinner might establish a t i n 
"bound"on certain types of land, and gave the tinner exemptions from 
local taxation and imposts. 
Like the Duchy tenancies, one effect of the Stannary Charters 
was to create a class of independent workers, l i v i n g and working 
according to their own rules, answerable only to their own kind, and 
jealous of their rights and privileges. I t was not surprising, then, 
when the Cornish tinners took exception to the attempts by Prince 
Arthur (the Duke of Cornwall) i n 1495 - the year before Cornwall rose 
i n f u l l and open rebellion - to enforce s t r i c t e r rules governing the 
recording of t i n bounds and blowing (smelting) houses and the marking 
of t i n ingots. As Pennington noted, "...such rules appealed l i t t l e 
to the conservative and independent Cornish s p i r i t " , a n d they were 
largely ignored, being no doubt a source of further outrage i n the 
deteriorating climate \^ch led to the Cornish Rebellion of 1497. In 
a move which perhaps further provoked the Cornish, Henry punished the 
tinners for disregarding Prince Arthur's rules by suspending the 
Stannaries. 
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Henry V I I *s lenient treatment of the Cornish rebels i n 1497 has 
often given r i s e to comment, and i n the l i g h t of this leniency i t i s 
interesting to consider his Charter of Pardon of 1508. This Charter 
restored the Cornish Stannaries (on the payment of a fine of 
£1,100!), but also created new, widespread powers affecting both the 
privileges of the tinners and the legisl a t i v e capacity of the 
Stannary Convocation or Parliament.^ These seem curioiisly at odds 
with the general Tudor concern to centralise government and di l u t e 
local usages, and, coming so soon after the hiatus of 1497, can be 
seen as renewed attempts to seek the "accommodation" of Cornwall, 
hinting at a resentful and potentially s t i l l - r e b e l l i o u s Cornwall i n 
urgent need of pacification. 
I n restoring and enhancing the rights of the Cornish tinners, 
the Charter of Pardon of 1508 extended the de f i n i t i o n of "tinner" 
(and hence the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Stannaries and Stannary Law) to 
include almost anyone connected i n some way or another with the t i n • 
trade - not only those involved with the extractive process i t s e l f , 
but also the owners of blowing-houses, the purchasers of black or 
white t i n , gentlemen t i n bounders, and so on. The Stannary 
parliament of 1588 was to extend the d e f i n i t i o n s t i l l further, to 
include groups such as carpenters, smiths, c o l l i e r s and other 
artisans with tin-trading connections, a d e f i n i t i o n upheld 
consistently by later Parliaments.^^ 
The restoration and enhancement of the tinners* rights \ras 
accompanied by an extension of the Stannary Parliament's legislative 
powers, lending the Cornish Convocation much greater authority than 
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that enjoyed by i t s Devon e q u i v a l e n t . T h e Charter of 1508 made 
provision for the nomination of 24 "Stannators" (who would comprise 
the body of the Parliament or Convocation), the Mayors and Councils 
of Lostwithiel, Truro, Launceston, and Helston nominating six 
Stannators each. The Parliament thus constituted was given, amongst 
other things, the r i g h t to allow or disallow "...any statute, act, 
ordinance, provision, re s t r a i n t , or proclamation.. .made by the King, 
his heirs, successors, or the Prince of Wales, Duke of Cornwall, or 
their Council...to the prejudice of any tinner, or other person 
having to do with black or white t i n " . ^ ^ I t was this r i g h t of veto 
which gave the Parliament i t s ultimate power, and provided that aura 
of semi-independence noted by Rowe and other observers. 
The "accommodation" afforded Medieval Cornwall by the Duchy and 
the Stannaries was reflected, as Jenner noted, i n the use of the 
phrase "Anglia et Comubia" (much l i k e the modem "England and, 
Wales") i n Government doc\mients - a recognition of Cornwall's 
di s t i n c t status.^® But "accommodation" went further than mere 
recognition, for i t also led to the perpetuation - indeed, 
enhancement - of those attributes which continued to set Cornwall 
apart. In the absence of any native Cornish peerage, the Duchy 
assumed a d i s t i n c t and important p o l i t i c a l role, leading (for 
example) to the extraordinary situation whereby Ducal influence had 
helped to provide Cornwall with no less than 42 Members of Parliament 
by the end of the reign of Elizabeth I . ^ ^ More importantly, as we 
have seen, there were significant effects at the societal level, 
leading to the creation of the classes of independent tenant farmers 
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and tinners which were to have such an important influence upon the 
developing character of Cornwall. Tlie independence of the Cornish 
tinner, f o r example, led d i r e c t l y to the emergence of the "tr i b u t e " 
and "tutwork" forms of employment i n which part of the 
entrepreneurial function was performed by the miner himself - the 
miner bidding for the area or "pitch" he was to work, providing his 
own equipment and materials, and being paid according to the value of 
the ore won ("tribute") or the amount of ground mined ("tutwork"). 
And as mining grew i n importance i n the Cornish economy, so i t s 
status as "lead industry" lent i t s practices and attitudes an 
authority which commanded respect and often imitation throughout 
Cornwall, an influence of considerable importance i n shaping the 
socio-economic characteristics of modem Comwall.^^ 
"Accommodation" helped reconcile Cornwall to her relationship 
with the English State, i n a manner typical of emerging centre-
periphery relationships, but of equal importance to Cornwall, her 
id e n t i t y , and her peripheral status was the degree to which she 
remained "Celtic" (and thus "un-English") i n culture and outlook. 
The Athelstan settlement, with the f i x i n g of the Tamar border and the 
creation of a Cornish see, had meant that Cornwall would not be 
subjected to the same processes of colonisation and assimilation that 
had led to the anglicisation of the rest of South West Bri t a i n , 
Instead her population was l e f t r e l a t i v e l y untouched, able to pursue 
i t s existing l i f e - s t y l e r e l a t i v e l y unhampered. One consequence of 
this was that the pattern of settlement remained remarkably 
unchanged, the Cornish l i v i n g i n scattered hamlets ( i n contrast to 
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the Ehglish nucleated village) and their cultivated land remaining 
enclosed from early times (xmlike the English s t r i p system), a 
pattern that i s s t i l l observable today. As Balchin has written. 
This i s the Celtic under-writing. Small settlements of only 
two or three farmhouses and labourers' cottages, carrying 
Celtic names, are common at cross-roads. I n some w i l l be found 
the parish church, but often t h i s stands alone, with only the 
rectory or vicarage nearby. Between the hamlets stretches open 
farmland of mixed pasture and arable, i n which the fi e l d s are 
characteristically small irregular-shaped enclosxires bounded by 
massive granite or slate-walled hedges. Set down i n t h i s 
chequerboard pattern of f i e l d s , at remarkably regular 
intervals, are isolated farmsteads, joined to each other by 
narrow and often tunnel-like lanes where trees and bushes grow 
on the top of monumental hedgebanks. 
This pattern of scattered settlement and early enclosure can be 
seen i n each of the Celtic lands. As Muir has noted, there were 
clear economic reasons for t h i s which, over time, led to a deep 
Celtic distrust of close settlement: 
In the Celtic lands...the population, l i k e the resources, was 
more t h i n l y spread... . Substantial villages were rarely 
found. They did not grow naturally from the t h i n leached soils 
and various attempts to seed the countryside with feudal 
villages scorned the traditions of settlement that were deeply 
rooted i n Celtic societies and were doomed to f a i l u r e . 
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In Cornwall, the "attempts" to create nucleated villages were 
largely confined to the small area of English settlement north of the 
Ottery (where the linguistically-hybrid Kilkhampton i s a good example 
of a nucleated village created around the core of an earlier Celtic 
hamlet) and the strategically-placed centres of English influence 
elsewhere i n Cornwall where the s u f f i x "-ton" i s found added to 
existing Celtic placenames (eg Helston, Callington), and where the 
atypical existence of open-field, s t r i p agriculture may also evidence 
English settlement. For the rest, the Cornish eschewed close 
settlement. Even i n the Middle Ages, when there were strong economic 
motives for the establishment of speculative market towns, "The 
Cornish never took kindly to t o w n - l i f e " . T h o s e towns that did 
exist i n Medieval Cornwall were, as Henderson showed, highly 
a r t i f i c i a l creations which the Cornish did not trust - i n the tax 
assessments of 1327, for example, half the burgesses of Penryn were 
"foreign" ( i e non-Comish), while more than half at Tregony and 
Grarapound were " f o r e i g n e r s " . A s noted ea r l i e r , the Duchy estates -
with their scattered hamlets and complete absence of open f i e l d s -
epitomised the Cornish settlement pattern; and, of course, the 
relative isolation i n which Cornish families lived served to heighten 
their profound sense of independence. Even i n north-eastern 
Cornwall, with i t s Anglo-Saxon placenames, "foreigners" i n the towns 
were often - as i n i n the rest of Cornwall - given surnames such as 
"Anglicus" or "Le Engleys", ie "English".^5 
Medieval Cornwall was also "Celtic" i n that the Cornish 
language continued to be spoken throughout much of the land, the 
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language of the common people but also - before the Reformation - the 
language of ecclesiastical scholarship and the vehicle through which 
the.broader aspects of Celtic culture ( f or example, f o l k tales and 
the Lives of the Saints) were perpetuated. For, despite the loss of 
the Cornish See and the supremacy of Rome, the Church i n Cornwall 
retained much of i t s Celtic ambience. Celtic crosses, reminiscent of 
the I r i s h "High Crosses" with their wheel-heads and i n t r i c a t e tracery 
and "knot" work, were erected at holy places across the land, holy 
wells were venerated and tended, and the cults and r e l i c s of the 
Celtic Saints assumed central roles i n the religioiis l i f e of the 
Cornish. St Piran, as patron of Cornish tinners, was revered across 
Cornwall, Nicholas Roscarrock (the seventeenth century Cornish 
Catholic) noting that on St Piran's Day the Saint's r e l i c s would be 
carried up and down the land, with pilgrims from a l l over Cornwall 
making th e i r way to his shrine i n P e r r a n z a b u l o e . S t Petroc was 
likewise revered, and across Cornwall the Lives were remembered and 
Feasts celebrated of local Saints such as Meriasek, Winwaloe, Uny, 
Paul Aurelian - most of whom were real h i s t o r i c a l figures of usually 
Breton or Welsh, and sometimes I r i s h , o r i g i n . T h e Cornish 
enthusiasm for their Saints and churches reached i t s higji-point i n 
the f i f t e e n t h century, when many churches were r e b u i l t with the 
characteristic three-stage Cornish towers and acquired their 
"...instantly recognisable Cornish i d e n t i t y " . ^ ^ 
Glasney College - a collegiate church, near Penryn - emerged as 
the centre of religious scholarship i n the Cornish language, where, 
i t seems, the "Cornish Ordinalia" (a long mystery cycle of three 
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separate plays) was written circa 1 4 0 0 . W r i t t e n i n Cornish, the 
"Ordinalia" took three days to perform, the normal venue being an 
open-air "plen an gwarry" or playing place. The passion poem "Pascon 
Agan Arluth" (Passion of Our Lord) dates from about the same time, 
and other "miracle plays" designed for out-door performance include 
"Gwreans an Bys" (the Creation of the World) written circa 1530-40 
and "Beunans Meriasek" (the L i f e of Meriasek) of about 1500.^^ 
The sympathetic attitude of the pre-Reformation Church i n 
Cornwall towards the Cornish language has assisted modem scholars i n 
assessing the extent to which the language was spoken i n Medieval 
C o r n w a l l , W h e n Bishop John de Grandisson preached i n the f a r -
westem parish of St Buryan i n 1328 or 29, his sermon had to be 
translated by an interpreter f o r the benefit of the monoglot Cornish. 
And, although i t i s reasonable to assume that English was by that 
time already making significant inroads i n East and North Cornwall, 
i t i s interesting to note that i n 1339 a certain J. Polmarke was 
appointed to preach i n the Cornish language at St Merryn, near 
Padstow. In 1354-55 Grandisson appointed two penitentiaries for 
Cornwall - one i n Truro for those who spoke only Cornish, and one at 
Bodmin i n East Comwall for those who spoke English and Cornish. 
As late as 1538 the Bishop of Exeter decreed that the Epistle or 
Gospel of the day should be read i n Cornish i n those parishes where 
English was not understood,and even i n 1560 i t was directed by the 
Bishop that those who had no English might be taught the Catechism i n 
C o r n i s h . I n d e e d , at Gorran Haven i n mid-Comwall i n 1587 an 
interpreter had to be employed i n a court case because certain local 
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fishermen coiild not speak English, and a few years l a t e r i n 1595 
inhabitants of the neighbouring parish of St Ewe were said to be b i -
lingu a l . ^ ^ In 1542 Andrew Borde described the state of the language 
thus: "In Cornwall i s two speches; the one i s naughty Englyshe, and 
the other Comyshe speche. And there be many men and women the which 
cannot speake one word of Englyshe, but a l l Comyshe".^^ 
The Celtic i d e n t i t y was also perpetuated through Cornwall's 
continuing links with Brittany, which endured as strong as ever u n t i l 
as late as the sixteenth century. Of a l l the Celtic tongues, Cornish 
and Breton are the closest cousins, i n that period mutually 
i n t e l l i g i b l e and giving the monoglot Comishman a much closer feeling 
of a f f i n i t y with his Breton counterpart than with an English-speaker 
of neighbouring D e v o n . L i k e Cornwall, Brittany had survived the 
encroachments of the Norman, French and English states, retaining her 
status as an independent Duchy i m t i l the Treaty of Union with France 
i n 1532 established her as a semi-independent component of the French 
kingdom. A great many of Cornwall's Saints and Feasts were Breton i n 
o r i g i n , and St Michael's Mount had an almost exact counterpart and 
mirror-image i n Mont St Michel (on the marches of Brittany and 
Normandy), the relative geographic positions of Cornwall and Brittany 
allowing considerable two-way movement between the two Duchies for 
the purposes of religious pilgrimage or of trade. Bretons came to 
Cornwall as sailors and fishermen, but many actually settled i n 
Cornwall, creating an even greater sense of partnership and alliance. 
Many of these Breton settlers were to be found i n the western 
d i s t r i c t s where the Cornish language was strongest - St Ives, 
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Towednack, Zennor, Lelant, and Constantine ( i n which parish as late 
as 1558 there were s t i l l nine Breton families resident) - but they 
were also numerous i n the east of Cornwall: at Fowey, Polruan and 
East Looe; i n the Hundreds of Trigg and West Wivel some 79 Bretons 
were registered i n 1552-24.^^ The extent to which these settlers 
were ingrained i n Cornish society i s reflected even today, i n Cornish 
surnames of Breton o r i g i n such as Tangye, Harvey, and Britton.^*^ 
The l i n k s between Cornwall and Brittany were also reflected i n 
their COTimon claims to the Arthxirian cycle, and to the associated 
legends such as those of Mark and Trystan and Isold, with Medieval 
bel i e f i n s i s t i n g that King Arthur was not dead but would come again. 
A fascinating insigiht i n t o the strength of this conviction i s 
provided i n the story of a v i s i t of the canons of Laon to Cornwall i n 
1113. Not only were they shown the supposed sites of Arthurian 
association, but were also involved i n a fracas at Bodmin Priory when 
i t was suggested - much to the annoyance of the Cornish - that Arthur 
might not be a l i v e . T h a t the i r e of the Cornish should be so quick 
to r i s e , and that they might turn so quickly to violent ways, i s 
perhaps surprising - even given the general barbarity of the era, 
heigjitened during periods of upheaval such as the c i v i l war between 
Stephen and Matilda or the later War of the Roses. But there does 
seem to have been, as Rowse has said, a mood of "feudal anarchy" i n 
Medieval Cornwall, reflected i n the records of the Court of Star 
Chamber where the Cornish occupy a surprisingly disproportionate 
place. 
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In curious contrast to the order and efficiency of the Duchy 
administration, but mirroring the strong sense of independence f e l t 
by Cornish f o l k , there does seem so often to have been a general 
disregard for the law, with the Cornish i n a sense "beyond the pale" 
l i k e the feuding society of Gaelic Ireland or the turbulent Highlands 
and Borders of Scotland. The often imi)ecunious lesser-gentry (there 
was no peerage) acted i n their own interests often without r e s t r a i n t , 
the career of the notorious (but no doubt typical) Sir Henry Bodrugan 
at the end of the f i f t e e n t h century providing an insight i n t o the 
feuding and lawlessness of the time, and the Killigrews of Arwenack 
(at Falmouth) turning quite openly to piracy, as did the "Gallants of 
Fowey" and other Cornish sea-faring f o l k - under Elizabeth, t h i s 
excessive behaviour was formalised into privateering and i n t o 
adventuring abroad. Mary Coate sums a l l th i s up rather 
picturesquely, describing "...a definite Cornish personality, 
conservative, with the antagonism to change bred by r a c i a l difference 
and geographical isolation, but qirLckened with a restless and active 
s p i r i t which drove the Comishman to adventure abroad and to 
l i t i g a t i o n and lawlessness at home".^^ But the txirbulence of 
Cornwall (or Ireland or Scotland) was not so much a Celtic t r a i t , as 
a reaction to peripheral status - to being not quite within the law's 
writ - and, i n Cornwall's case, a further manifestation of that 
independent s p i r i t which i n later centuries s t i l l would show i t s e l f 
i n "wrecking" and i n smuggling. 
However, that there was an element of "antagonism" i n Cornish 
behaviour i s l i k e l y , and we have occasional glimpses of the Cornish 
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attitude to outsiders. Writing i n the reign of Elizabeth, Norden 
noted that the Cornish seemed "...to retain a kind of concealed envy 
against the English, whom they yet affect with a kind of desire for 
revenge for their fathers* sakes, by whom their fathers received the 
r e p u l s e " . S i m i l a r l y , Carew - a native Comishraan - wrote i n 1602 
that the Cornish were s t i l l "...fostering a fresh memory of their 
expulsion long ago by the E n g l i s h " , w i t h Mary Coate noting that i n 
the C i v i l War the Cornish ". . . r e c i a l prejudice would be directed 
against the Parliamentarian invaders... (a) primitive i n s t i n c t to 
defend their homes from the * foreigner'". As Carew commented, the 
inquisitive v i s i t o r from across the Tamar woxild often be rebuffed 
with the phrase "Meea navidna Cowza sawsnek"^^ - I w i l l not speak 
English! 
For their part, the English were equally aware that Cornwall 
was a land apart. Hatcher has written that "Cornwall was a remote and 
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somewhat forbidding country to most Englishmen i n the middle ages",'^ 
pointing to the exclamation by Bishop John de Grandisson i n 1327 that 
Cornwall was "...not only the ends of the earth, but the very ends of 
the ends thereof"!^*^ Not many years l a t e r , i n 1342, the Archdeacon 
of Cornwall resigned, confessing himself unable to communicate with 
the Cornish - this was not only a question of language, for "...the 
folk of these parts are quite extraordinary, being of a rebellious 
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temper, and obdurate i n the face of attempts to teach and correct."°^ 
Polydore Vergil, w r i t i n g i n 1543, considered that "Britain i s divided 
into four parts - whereof the one i s inhabited by Englishmen, the 
other of Scots, the t h i r d of Welshmen, and the fourth of Cornish 
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people, "^^ with Hopton adding i n 1616 that "England i s divided into 
three great Provinces, or Countries, and every of them speaking a 
severall and different Language, as Ehglish, Welsh, and 
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Ck>mish...". Sometimes these English perceptions were themselves 
antagonistic, as i n 164A when the besieged Parliamentarian garrison 
i n Plymouth declared that i t was "...eager to be avenged on the 
cvirsed Cornish who are as very heathen as the ignorant Welsh that 
know no r e l i g i o n nor God, but the King i s more than God i n that 
country and Wales''!^ 
Cornwall, then, was considered a d i s t i n c t e n t i t y by both 
Cornish and English, and t h i s was a rational r e f l e c t i o n of what they 
saw around them - a peripheral society appended to the English State. 
This was Cornwall i n i t s "Older Peripheralism" of " t e r r i t o r i a l and 
cultural isolation", which had arisen out of the Athelstan settlement 
that had fixed the Taraar as the Cornish border and set i n motion a 
process of "accommodation" that had led to the creation of the Duchy 
and the Stannary. This "accommodation" afforded a certain aura (and 
indeed r e a l i t y ) of t e r r i t o r i a l semi-independence, and enhanced the 
Comishman's sense of individual independence by preserving the 
ancient pattern of scattered settlement and establishing classes of 
independent tenant farmers and tinners. The isol a t i o n of th i s "Older 
Peripheralism" was heightened by l i n g u i s t i c and cultural difference, 
i n which the Cornish continued to look often towards Brittany rather 
than England, and by the Cornish assumption that they were often 
"beyond the law". A.L. Rowse has summed up the characteristics of 
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this condition with an elegance and accuracy that cannot be bettered. 
Cornwall was, he says, 
..•a homogeneous society of i t s own, defined by language and 
having a conraon heritage underneath, l i k e Brittany or Wales or 
Ireland, reaching back beyond Normans and Saxons, beyond even 
Romans i n these islands, to an antiquity of which i t s people 
were s t i l l dimly conscious. Some memory of a l l this they 
carried i n the legends of their race that haunted them. They 
remembered that they were a conquered people. 
However, peripherality i s a dynamic condition, based upon a 
symbiotic relationship between centre and periphery, and as the 
Ehglish centre developed apace i n the Tudor era with what Rokkan and 
Urwin have termed the emergence of the " t e r r i t o r i a l space" of i t s 
"centralizing strategies", so the "Older Peripheralism" of Cornwall 
came under threat. Again, Rowse has captured and elucidated the 
essence of the experience: 
Prom being a far-away, insignificant comer of the land, sunk 
i n i t s dream of the Celtic past, with i t s own inner l i f e of 
legends and superstitions and fears, i t s memories of Arthur and 
Mark and Tristan, lapped i n rel i g i o n and the cult of the 
saints, i t was forced i n the course of the Elizabethan age into 
the front-line of the great sea-struggle with Spain. Inevitably 
the small backward-looking society struggled against the 
process: the Rebellions of 1497 and 1549 were to Cornwall what 
the '15 and '45 were to the Highlands. 
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Rowse has described Tudor England as then "•••the most taut and 
vigorous national society i n E u r o p e " , a society characterised by 
the twin imperatives of centralism and expansionism. I n a manner 
ide n t i f i e d by both Smith and Rokkan and Urwin, the Tudors moved 
sw i f t l y to strengthen t h e i r personal power and their instruments of 
government. This necessitated a much greater degree of control over 
their subject peripheries - Cornwall, Wales, Ireland, and the North 
and the Borders - a process which involved m i l i t a r y action and 
p o l i t i c a l treaties, but which was also manifested i n more systematic 
taxation and the enforcement and administration of the Reformation. 
Hand-in-hand with centralism went English expansionism, which took 
Tudor England f i r s t to i t s Celtic peripheries and then beyond the 
seas to North America and elsewhere. Rowse has i d e n t i f i e d the Tudor 
attempts at the assimilation of the Celtic fringe as an integral part 
of the expansionist process, pointing to: 
...the expansion of that society, both by the state and by 
individual enterprise, f i r s t into the margin of backward 
societies at home - Cornwall, Wales, the Borders, with the 
sweep of a sickle on the map; int o Ireland, where the process 
involved conquest and colonization; then across the oceans, to 
our f i r s t contacts with Russia, the Canadian North...(and) the 
colonization of North America. 
In practice, however, the attempts at unifica t i o n , uniformity 
and pacification within these isles were only p a r t i a l l y successful, 
and England's foreign policy led her to vulnerable isolation. 
Inevitably, Tudor England came into c o n f l i c t with other European 
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powers, most notably Spain, and here was further reason for 
attempting control i n the Celtic peripheries, which were 
geographically and strategically vulnerable, where lingering 
Catholicism and anti-English sentiment might play into an enemy's 
hands. And geography also dictated that the Celtic West (and most 
especially Cornwall) mvld have a central role to play i n the 
conflicts with Spain and other powers: as points of f i r s t defence 
against potential invaders and as points of f i r s t departure for the 
projection overseas of English power. In the colonization of North 
America, too, the West would be best-placed to assist i n the 
practical process of s e t t l i n g the new lands. 
For Cornwall, the effects of this centralism and expansion were 
traumatic, at f i r s t disturbing and at length destroying that "Older 
Peripheralism" of " t e r r i t o r i a l and cultural i s o l a t i o n " , and laying 
the foundations from which a new form of peripherality would emerge. 
Cornish reaction against increasing intervention i n Cornwall's 
a f f a i r s was evident as early as 1496, when the tinners refused to 
accept new regulations imposed by Prince Arthur - a state of af f a i r s 
serious enough to warrant Henry VII's suspension of the Stannaries, 
which was i n i t s e l f further provocation of the Cornish.®^ I n 1497 
came s t i l l greater provocation, the demand from Henry for taxes to 
finance his war against Scotland. In contrast to the normal 
practices of the f i f t e e n t h century, tax rebates were not to be 
allowed for the poorer d i s t r i c t s (of which Cornwall was one), a move 
which would create hardship and resentment i n Cornwall. But more 
significant was the fact that Cornwall considered i t s e l f to be a 
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special case, the Cornish arguing that a Scottish war was not their 
concern and that the defence of the Border was properly the 
responsibility of the people who lived there, as indeed i t had been 
since time immemorial. Such arguments, however, cut l i t t l e ice with 
King Henry, with his desire to dilut e local usages and privileges. 
So intense was the Cornish sense of outrage, that the people 
rose i n rebellion against the taxation, the Lizard Peninsula i n the 
west finding a strong, popular leader i n the form of Michael Joseph 
"An Gof" ("The Smith") of St Keveme, and the f o l k at Bodmin i n the 
east flocking around Thomas Flamank, a clever and persuasive 
lawyer.^^ Many of the indigenous lesser gentry joined the ranks of 
this impromptu anny of tinners and a g r i c u l t u r a l i s t s , as i t moved 
across the Tamar intent upon demonstrating to Henry that this 
taxation of Cornwall was not only unjust, but i l l e g a l . This f i r s t 
Cornish Rebellion of 1497 proved to be one of the greatest crises of 
Henry VII's reign, the rebel army marching as far as Blackheath - on 
the outskirts of London - before i t s defeat at the hands of the 
King's forces on June 27th of that year. An Gof, Flamank and the 
other leaders were executed, but Henry dealt leniently with the rest 
of the Cornish insurgents, allowing them to return home to Cornwall. 
The Cornish, however, were not yet beaten - the pretender, Perkin 
Warbeck, having heard of the rebellion, made his way to Cornwall 
where he was proclaimed Richard I I I at Bodmin. In the wake of 
Blackheath, Comishmen flocked to his standard, eager for the chance 
of revenge, and once more a Cornish rebel army crossed the Tamar. 
This time, however, i t reached no further than Somerset, where 
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Warbeck lost his nerve, deserting his array and leaving i t to melt 
back across the border. Again, Henry's treatment of the rebels was 
remarkably l i g h t , the King preferring r e t r i b u t i o n i n the form of 
fines (which Cornwall could i l l - a f f o r d ) rather than blood. 
I t i s d i f f i c u l t to gauge the mood of the Cornish i n the 
aftermath of 1A97. They may, to some extent, have sunk back into 
their introspective isolation. But Henry VII's Charter of Pardon of 
1508 hints at a Cornwall s t i l l restless and i n need of appeasement, 
and - having drawn attention to themselves as conservative opponents 
of Tudor centralism - the staunchly Catholic Cornish were id e n t i f i e d 
by the government as a potential source of opposition to the 
Reformation: i n 1539 the Council of the West was established to 
enforce the Reformation and to tighten the government's control of 
the r e g i o n . A l t h o i i g h Cornwall had not joined that essentially 
North Country revolt, the "Pilgrimage of Grace", there were 
Comishmen who were sympathetic to i t s cause - notably one Carpyssack 
of St Keveme who was arrested and probably hanged for expressing his 
beliefs i n 1537 - while Exeter was perpetually afraid of a Cornish 
insurrection.^^ I n 1548 there was a near-rebellion i n Helston, led 
by St Keveme and Constantine men, when the officious and unpopular 
Protestant commissioner, William Body, was murdered by an angry mob 
as he endeavoured to remove "Popish" images from the parish chiirch.^^ 
Cornish opposition to the process of Reformation came to a head 
i n 1549, when the Act of Uniformity of that year determined that the 
new English-language Service should replace the old Latin Service i n 
churches. There were disturbances at Penryn and Marazion i n West 
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Cornwall, and at Bodmin the Cornish Catholics found a leader i n the 
form of Humphrey Arundell of Helland. Discontent turned to open 
rebellion, as the Cornish drew up a p e t i t i o n to the King, declaring 
that the new Service was l i k e "a Christmas game"^^ and that "...we 
w i l l have our old service of Mattins, Mass, Evensong and Procession 
i n Latin as i t was before. And so we the Cornish men (whereof 
certain of us understand no English) u t t e r l y refuse th i s new 
English".Cranmer retorted that there were more people i n Cornwall 
who spoke English than Latin, but he was missing the point, for Latin 
was familiar (although not understood) a l l across Cornwall, whereas 
English was not. In addition, as Carew noted i n 1602, the Creed, the 
Ten Commandments, and other elements had been said i n Cornish since 
time immemorial, something that they feared would be lost with the 
introduction of the English Prayer Book. 
The Cornish rebels crossed into Devon, joining forces with 
those Devonshire men who had also risen against the Prayer Book, and 
l a i d siege to Exeter. But within a month the siege had been 
p a r t i a l l y l i f t e d , and the rebels suffered a stinging defeat at Fenny 
Bridges when confronted by Edward VI's vastly superior army. The 
Cornish fought several rearguard actions as they retreated into 
Cornwall, but the great "Prayer Book Rebellion" was already over. 
This time, i n contrast to 1497, a t e r r i b l e revenge was meted out. 
Arundell and the other leaders were of course executed, but there 
were also hangings up and down Cornwall as retribution was sought. 
Priests implicated i n the rebellion were singled out for particiiLar 
attention. The vicars of Poundstock, Pil l a t o n , Uny Lelant, and 
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Gulval were certainly executed, and amongst those attainted were the 
vicars of St Cleer, St Keveme, St Neot, and St Veep: we notice here 
the considerable geographic spread, the involvement of the clergy 
being by no means confined to the monoglot Cornish-speaking west of 
Cornwall. 
The "Prayer Book Rebellion" of 1549 was a symptom of the 
Cornish reaction to Tudor centralism, but i t was also a catalyst i n 
the process of the erosion of Cornwall's "Older Peripheralism". The 
English Service was indeed introduced, and although some Coimish 
usages were allowed to continxie, the Prayer Book and Bible were never 
translated into Cornish and the language was put into swift decline. 
Likewise, although some Catholic usages lingered on i n the remotest 
parts, the Cornish Catholics soon became a small and persecuted 
minority. A r i f t appeared between Protestant Cornwall and Catholic 
Brittany, made a l l the more apparent now that the English and French 
States were religiously and p o l i t i c a l l y antagonistic towards one 
another. Bretons no longer came to Cornwall to se t t l e , and the age-
old links between the two areas began to disintegrate. The 
Reformation, too, had led to the dissolution of the monasteries, and 
amongst those i n s t i t u t i o n s suppressed was Glasney College, depriving 
Cornwall of an important source of l i t e r a t u r e and learning i n the 
Cornish language. Henry V I I I had promised to make amends by creating 
a new Cornish See at Bodmin or St Germans, but that never came to 
pass, Henry instead spending his money i n the war against France.^^s 
By the seventeenth century the language was retreating into the 
far west, already becoming a curiosity for travellers and scholars. 
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A v i s i t o r to St Just-in-Penwith i n 1667 claimed that he could f i n d 
only one man who could actually write Cornish, although i n 1680 
William Scawen reported that the principal language of the Penwith 
and Lizard peninsulas was s t i l l Cornish. Scawen was the f i r s t of a 
group of Cornish scholars concerned for the future of the language, 
and i n the l a t e seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries there 
emerged i n the Penzance area a group of enthusiasts - Keigwin, 
Gwavas, Tonkin, Pender, the Bosons - working i n Cornish. But their 
efforts did l i t t l e to stem the decline, John Boson wr i t i n g i n 1700 
that Cornish was "...only spoken from Land's End to the Mount and 
towards St Ives, and Redruth and again from Lizard towards Helston 
and Falmouth. "^^ The lesser-gentry had already abandoned the 
language, and as p o l i t i c a l and economic contact with England 
increasedi so i t would f a l l into further disuse. 
As the language declined, so Cornwall became more involved i n 
the confrontation with Spain. Henry V I I I had b u i l t the impressive 
castles of Pendennis (at Falmouth) and St Mawes as a defence against 
marauding Spaniards and Frenchmen, and under Elizabeth the Cornish 
"sea-dogs" were i n the forefront of the Spanish f i g h t and found 
favour at court^^ - Edmund Tremayne as Clerk of the Privy Coxmcil, 
William Killigrew as groom of the Queen's chamber, Henry Killigrew as 
a senior diplomatic envoy. The almost legendary Sir Richard 
Grenville of the "Revenge" was a Comishman, and many Cornish seamen 
were amongst the lieutenants of Hawkins and Drake. In 1583 Cornwall 
played i t s part i n the Armada saga: "In the war with Spain Cornwall 
was i n the front l i n e " , argues Rowse, "...and i n the 1590s the 
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of c o n f l i c t was on her doorstep...".^^ I n July 1595 a force 
Spaniards landed at Mousehole, sacking Penzance and the surrounding 
settlements. At the same time, the Cornish were involved i n the 
expansion outwards to the Americas: John Rashleigh of Fowey 
accompanied Sir Richard Grenville to Virginia i n 1585 (and. later 
fought against the ARmada), Humphrey Gilbert sailed from Cawsand to 
Newfoundland i n 1583, and Anthony Rouse of Hal ton i n East Cornwall 
was amongst the f i r s t to s e t t l e i n America. 
But despite a l l the turbulence and change, elements of this 
"Older Peripheralism" lived on into the seventeenth century - finding 
a f i n a l expression i n the attitudes and events of the C i v i l War i n 
Cornwall. As modem research has shown, the C i v i l War was often 
fought over local grievances rather than the "constitutional 
c r i s i s " , a n d t h i s was especially so f o r Cornwall and the South 
West - geographically separated as they were from the rest of the 
action. As Halliday has said, at times the C i v i l War i n the west 
looked l i k e a private quarrel between Cornwall and Devon, and always 
- as Coate has shown - the local patriotism and conservative but 
independent s p i r i t of the Cornish were v i t a l to the conduct of the 
war i n Cornwall.^^-^ This was apparent at several levels - i n the 
contrast between Royalist Cornwall on the one hand and fie r c e l y 
Puritan Devon and Somerset on the other, i n the devoted attachment of 
the Cornish to their local leaders, i n the behaviour of the Cornish 
Army, and i n the great h o s t i l i t y shown by the Cornish people to the 
"foreign" Parliamentarian Army when i t ventured into Cornwall. 
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Seventeenth century Puritans were quick to point to "Popish" 
tendencies i n Cornwall, but i t i s a mistake to paint too simplistic a 
picture of Cornish religion i n that era. Whilst the Anglican Church 
i n Cornwall may have become deeply conservative (Mass was s t i l l being 
celebrated at St Columb Major as late as 1590), Catholicism had 
declined f o r want of leadership and i n the face of persecution, and 
there was i n fact a growing band of Puritan Comishmen - centred 
mainly around Lord Robartes i n South East Cornwall. P o l i t i c a l l y , the 
Cornish (with their i n f l u e n t i a l 44 MPs at Westminster) were for the 
most part moderate "constitutionalists", but with the outbreak of war 
Cornwall declared for King Charles, the minority of Parliamentarian 
sympathisers taking refuge i n Puritan Plymouth. By way of contrast, 
Devon and Somerset - where Puritanism was much more deeply embedded -
declared for Parliament. 
Reciruiting for a new, Rojralist Cornish Array began i n earnest i n 
October 1642, and from the beginning i t was distinguished by the 
close l i n k s , indeed affection, between men and leaders, and by the 
sense of conmon cause that had emerged. Mary Coate wrote of "...the 
passionate attachment of the Cornish to their own county and their 
own race..."^*^ and explained that "...again and again th i s local 
patriotism, bom of r a c i a l difference and geographical isolation, 
knit together i n a common unity men of d i f f e r i n g p o l i t i c a l and 
religious o p i n i o n s " . S i r B e v i l l Grenville, of Stowe i n North 
Cornwall, emerged as a focal point for these s e n t i m e n t s . A 
moderate "constitutionalist" himself, he brought together the various 
factions, set himself up as a champion of Cornwall, and led the 
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Cornish to victory at the battles of Braddock Down and Stamford H i l l 
i n Cornwall, and out across the Tamar towards B r i s t o l . The "Cornish 
Foot" had already made a name for i t s e l f at Stamford H i l l , and at the 
Battle of Lansdowne - near B r i s t o l - i t again carried the day, but at 
the t e r r i b l e price of the loss of Sir B r e v i l l Grenville i n the f i g h t . 
As Coate remarked, "...the Cornish were stunned by the loss of Sir 
Be v i l l G r e n v i l l e " , a n d , although the "Cornish Foot" distinguished 
i t s e l f again at Roundway Down and at B r i s t o l , things were never the 
same again. Two more of the Cornish leaders, Slanning and Trevanion, 
were k i l l e d at B r i s t o l , and with the capture of the c i t y "...ends the 
history of the Cornish army as a fi g h t i n g force". 
Thereafter, the Cornish were disinclined to cross the Tamar out 
of Cornwall (even i n the heady days of 1643 some had to be bribed to 
cross the r i v e r ) , particularly while Plymouth remained a threat. In 
1644 Sir Richard Grenville attempted to raise new Cornish levies to 
prevent the advance of Essex t h r o u ^ Devon, but they refused to march 
out of Cornwall - even when the King called upon them to attack 
P l y m o u t h . E s s e x , meanwhile had decided to invade Cornwall (the 
export of t i n was paying for the King's munitions, and had to be 
stopped) but he had underestimated the determination of the Cornish 
to defend t h e i r homes. His forces were defeated at Lostwithiel and 
Fowey, Essex himself noting the hatred of the Cornish for the 
Roundheads: "...the country people being violent against us, i f any 
of our scouts or soldiers f a l l into their hands they are more bloody 
than the enemy". 
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In 1645 the King sent his eldest son. Prince Charles, to take 
charge of the deteriorating situation i n the West, but Fairfax's army 
was already marching westwards. Fairfax was at Bodmin by March 1646 
(with the Prince forced to flee overseas) where he noted the strength 
of Cornish sentiment, w r i t i n g that "Prince Charles i s called the Duke 
of Cornwall altogether by the C o r n i s h " . H e was confident of 
victory, however, for Grenville's energies had been "...directed more 
to the saving of Cornwall than to the preservation of the Royalist 
c a u s e " . I n fact, the Royalist forces surrendered at T r e s i l l i a n 
Bridge on 12th March, with Sir John Arundell holding out i n Pendennis 
Castle u n t i l the August. The C i v i l War was over i n Cornwall, with 
the b r i e f exception of a Cornish r i s i n g i n May 16A8 (which was i>ut 
down i n the so-called "Gear Route" near Helston), the intrigues of 
Royalist sympathisers such as the Trelawny family, and the pro-
Royalist mutiny of the Isles of S c i l l y garrison from September 16A8 
to May 1651. 
In the events and attitudes of the C i v i l War i n Cornwall, there 
were many echoes of the passions and motives of 1497 and 1549, not 
least the h o s t i l i t y to interference from outside agencies. But, as 
i n 1549, the effect of the Cornish actions was to redouble the 
eff o r t s of the central government (now firmly i n the hands of the 
Parliamentarians) i n dealing with Cornwall. Cornish representation 
at Westminster was reduced to 12, the Duchy of Cornwall was abolished 
as an administrative u n i t , and a County Committee ran Cornwall, 
mindful that Parliament s t i l l considered that "Cornwall was 
cavileerish enough...".^^^ Again reminiscent of 1549, many of the 
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Cornish clergy were ejected from their livings after the 
Parliamentary victory - from parishes a l l across Cornwall, from areas 
as diverse as St Cleer, Warbstow, St Goran, St Keveme, and St 
Buryan. The Restoration i n 1660, of course, undid much of t h i s , but 
Cornwall's constitutional accommodation did not f u l l y recover from 
the Crorawellian assault. The Duchy of Cornwall did not recover i t s 
old influence and prestige (nor did the Stannaries), and - as with 
the Spanish Wars and the colonisation of the Americas i n the 
Elizabethan age - the C i v i l War and i t s aftermath had pulled Cornwall 
once more into the centre of English national a f f a i r s . 
Interestingly, the Cornish steered well cleeir of the Monmouth 
Rebellion i n 1685, once again showing no inclination to make common 
cause with the Puritan enthusiasts of Devon and Somerset,although 
i n the veiled hi n t i n 1688 that "twenty thousand Comishmen"^^^ might 
rise i n protest at the imprisonment of Sir Jonathan Trelawny, we see 
perhaps a f i n a l spark of that old rebellious isolationism. 
The emergence from isolation, i n particular the new role i n 
colonising America, had also provided new economic opportunities for 
Cornwall (although Whetter considers that Cornwall d i d not make the 
most of the prospects of American trade^^^), opportunities that were 
enhanced by new ideas and new technologies - such as the introduction 
of seine fishing. Despite the p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y and upheavals of 
the seventeenth century, the Cornish economy continxied to develop. 
Sea t r a f f i c increased during th i s period; the populations of fishing 
centres such as St Ives and Mevagissey grew markedly; and there were 
advances i n com production and export, i n cloth manufacture and 
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sheep farming, and a variety of other industries. The rapid 
development of Falmouth Haven led to the exploitation of hitherto 
latent resources - both on land and i n the sea - i n west and central 
Cornwall, and the development of agriculture was not accompanied by 
the distress and dislocation of "enclosure" experienced elsewhere, 
for much of Cornwall was already enclosed. Most notable, as Whetter 
has said, was that Cornwall "...had a near monopoly of both t i n and 
pilchards i n Brita i n , and indeed, i n Western Europe...tin mining and 
pilchard fishing were geared almost entirely to overseas 
markets.,.".'- ° The pilchards went, i r o n i c a l l y enough, to the 
Catholic countries of Europe. But i t was the development of t i n 
mining which would prove to be of the greatest consequence for the 
future of Cornwall. 
As Whetter wrote, by the second half of the seventeenth century 
" . . . t i n mining, i n parts of the centre and west, was monopolising 
resources of labour and capital to a degree not known before". 
Earlier, the Duchy of Cornwall had maintained a tight control over 
the production of t i n - through the Royal prerogative of pre-emption, 
the right of the Crown to purchase a l l metal produced by the tinners 
and to s e l l i t as i t saw f i t . I n practice, pre-emption was normally 
"fanned" out to London pewterers i n contracts which allowed these 
"pre-emptors" to purchase a l l the tinners* metals at a fixed rate, 
normally for a period of seven years. Pre-emption was considered a 
means of preventing the exploitation of the tinners, giving them 
security when times were bad, but i t also militated against the 
tinners when demand for t i n was high and the price of tin-based 
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conmodities rose - here the tinners (unlike the pewterers) did not 
share i n the increased revenue and wealth, a factor which certainly 
helped to retard the development of the t i n industry i n the f i r s t 
h a l f of the seventeenth century. However, the victory of Parliament 
i n the C i v i l War brushed aside the Duchy and i t s administrations, and 
pre-emption was discarded along with a l l the other practices. The 
effect was dramatic, leading to t i n price rises, an expansion of 
output, and the general development of the t i n industry; so much so 
that attempts to introduce pre-emption at the Restoration were doomed 
to f a i l u r e . As Whetter concluded, by the end of the century " . . . t i n 
mining had become the dynamic element i n the economy, the main force 
f o r prosperity - or for depression, as the case might be".^^^ 
Despite the general expansion of the Cornish economy, then, t i n 
had nevertheless emerged as the central, crucial feature of Cornish 
economic a c t i v i t y , a main determinant of prosperity or depression i n 
Cornwall - as i t was to be for the next two centuries or more. 
Copper mining, too, re-emerged i n Cornwall i n the l a t t e r part of the 
seventeenth century, developing at an enormous rate i n the 
eighteenth, and for much of the nineteenth being more iinportant than 
t i n . Together, copper and t i n came to dominate Cornwall, and with 
this domination we see the f i n a l creation of those conditions which 
not only spelled the end of "Older Peripheralism" but ushered i n the 
era of industrialisation and with i t Cornwall's "Second 
Peripheralism". 
To conclude, Cornwall's "Older Peripheralism of t e r r i t o r i a l and 
cultural isolation" had grown out of the Athelstan settlement i n the 
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tenth centiary, which had created the t e r r i t o r i a l unit of Cornwall and 
had allowed i t s "accommodation" - which i n t\im led to the emergence 
of the Duchy and Stannaries, affording a certain degree of 
constitutional independence and enhancing other features of Cornish 
"difference". This Cornwall was Celtic-speaking, looking towards 
Brittany f o r kinship, and psychologically and physically remote from 
Bigland. However, the emergence of the centralism and expansionism 
of Tudor England broke this isolation, a process against which the 
Cornish reacted - i n 1W7, i n 1549, and again i n the C i v i l War - but 
nevertheless proved inexorable, dragging the Cornish i n t o the 
frontline of the wars with Spain and into the colonisation of 
America. The Cornish economy also reacted to these conditions, with 
t i n emerging as a major export commodity and with the t i n industry -
having lost the yoke of pre-emption - assuming i t s dominant position. 
Elements of t h i s "Older Peripheralism" did survive, however, to 
influence the ensuing period. These "constants of peripherality" 
incliided a continuing geographical distance from the centres of 
economic and p o l i t i c a l power (augmented now by distance from the 
centres of coal production), along with vestiges of Cornwall's 
constitutional "accommodation" - the Duchy, Stannaries, and 4A MPs, 
Nor was the Cormsh language yet deceased, and the Cornish sense of 
independence and individualism endured - embedded i n the settlement 
pattern and the landscape, enshrined i n the economic a c t i v i t i e s of 
the small tenant farmers i n an environment a l l but devoid of the 
influence of squire and parson, enshrined too i n the practices of the 
mining industry with i t s "tri b u t e " and "tutwork" systems of 
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employment, and given renewed vigour i n the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centxiries through the rise of Methodism and p o l i t i c a l Liberalism. 
Smuggling and "wrecking", too, were echoes of the independence and 
lawlessness of earlier times. But peripherality i s a dynamic 
condition, and the "Second Peripheralism" that emerged was i n many 
respects s t r i k i n g l y different to that which had gone before, not 
least i n the development of an assertive Cornish i d e n t i t y based upon 
technological advance and industrial prowess. 
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PART I I I 
SECOND PERIPHERALISM - THE IMPACT OF INDUSTRIAL CHANGE 
"Great as are the advantages which this nation i n general enjoys from 
the invention of the steam engine, and the successive improvements 
which i t has received; there i s , perhaps, no place i n particular, 
where those advantages have been greater, or more evident, than i n 
Cornwall. The very existence of i t s deepest, most extensive, and 
most productive mines, i s owing, not merely to the invention of the 
steam engine, but to the state of great perfection to which that 
machine has been brought i n that county...the improvements which the 
engine has, for many years, received, are due to native engineers; 
whose s k i l l and watchful care, maintain i t i n i t s present state, or 
add continually s t i l l further improvements..." 
Thomas Lean, 1839. 
(Thomas Lean, 
On The Steam Engines i n Cornwall, 
facsimile edition, D. Bradford Barton, 
Truro, 1969, p i ) . 
"The Cornish are remarkable for their sanguine temperament, their 
indomitable perseverance, their ardent hope i n adventure, and their 
desire for discovery and novelty; hence their wide dis t r i b u t i o n a l l 
over the world, i n the most remote comers of which they are to be 
found amongst the pioneers; and to this very cause has science to 
boast of so many b r i l l i a n t ornaments who claim Cornwall as their 
birthplace." 
George Henwood, 1859. 
(Roger Burt [ed.] 
Cornwall's Mines and Miners, 
D. Bradford Barton, Truro, 1972, p232). 
"There was a time when Gwennap was alive with the clang of stamps, 
and thousands of tons of copper ore went down the Camon Valley to 
Devoran for shipment; when the Perran and St Agnes d i s t r i c t s were 
busy hives of industry, and East Wheal Rose was a name to conjure by. 
Where are they now?...gone to the limbo of forgotten things." 
West Briton. 8 November 1894 
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CHAPTER 4 
CORNUBIA TRIUMPHANT? 
The condition of "Older Peripheralism", i n which Cornwall had 
been conquered but accommodated - her regional i d e n t i t y tolerated and 
to an extent enhanced - was by degrees eroded, succumbing to the 
centralisation of the Tudor and Crorawellian States and disintegrating 
i n the face of economic and p o l i t i c a l change which saw Cornwall 
assume a newfound strategic importance. These changes, however, wide 
ranging though they were, led not to the integration of Cornwall with 
the English "centre" (to which she had become so suddenly important), 
but rather to new manifestations of peripherality. The growing 
importance of Cornwall as a t i n mining centre (with a near monopoly 
of world production) emphasised her unique attributes and served to 
sharpen the differences between the Cornish and English economies, 
differences that would be further exacerbated by the subsequent 
development of copper and other metaliferous mining i n Cornwall. 
This development was dependent upon technological advance and the 
industrialisation of the Cornish economy, but - for reasons that w i l l 
be discussed - such industrialisation was imperfect and incomplete, 
at once both a product of and a perx>etxiating factor i n Cornwall's 
inherent peripheral status. This, then, was the condition of "Second 
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Peripheralism" - i n which the "constants" of Cornish peripherality, 
increasingly shorn of the "Older" Medieval accommodation, were now 
augmented by a "Second" set of peripheral attributes associated with 
the process of industrialisation. 
Cornwall i n the period 1700 to 1850 does not appear at f i r s t 
glance to have been a region suffering the disadvantages and 
marginalisation of social and economic peripherality. The Cornish 
economy was amongst the f i r s t to in d i i s t r i a l i s e , the early and 
successful application of steam power f a c i l i t a t i n g the development of 
deep raining and achieving for Cornwall a place i n the forefront of 
technological innovation.^ Paradoxically, i t was the expansion of 
copper rather than t i n which gave the i n i t i a l impetus to 
technological advance, the 1680s witnessing the ri s e of several 
important copper-producers i n the environs of Redruth.^ By 1720 some 
6,000 tons of copper ore were being raised i n Cornwall annually, with 
many of the subsequently far-famed mines already well established -
among them Wheal Busy, Roskear, Dolcoath, and Cook's Kitchen. The 
increasing depths of these ventures prompted experimentation with 
steam power (for pumping) and the development of drainage technology, 
the "Great County Adit" being conroenced i n 1748 as the device by 
which Poldice (and ultimately many other mines) coiild be kept 
e f f i c i e n t l y and economically free of water inundation. The discovery 
of extensive copper deposits i n Anglesey i n 1768 threatened 
Cornwall's monopoly, but these were a l l but worked out by the 1790s, 
ushering i n a new period of Cornish expansion. In 1809 a tramway was 
opened, linking the major mines of Scorrier and St Day - Wheal 
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Buller, Wheal Basset, Caharrack, Ting Tang, and others - to Portreath 
on the north coast ( f a c i l i t a t i n g the export of ore), and i n 1824 a 
similar railroad was constructed from the Gwennap mines to the port 
of Devoran on the Fal.^ By then the parish of Gwennap alone was 
responsible for more than a t h i r d of the t o t a l world production of 
copper ore. As Morrison has written, "...mining i n Cornwall was 
technically the most advanced i n the world."^ 
From 1810 onwards the Cornish copper industry began to expand 
i t s horizons, moving out of i t s Gwennap and Camborne-Redruth 
heartland to new areas - eastwards to the d i s t r i c t around St Austell 
Bay (the celebrated mines of Crinnis, Fowey Consols, and Lanescot) 
and westwards to St Just-in-Penwith where Levant was soon established 
as a major producer. And i n 1836 came the spectacular discoveries at 
Caradon H i l l , on the southern fringe of Bodmin Moor, leading to the 
rapid development of the St Cleer mining d i s t r i c t and s h i f t i n g the 
balance of copper production away from west to east Cornwall. 
Further discoveries, i n the neighbourhood of Gunnislake, confirmed 
this s h i f t of importance - and i n 1844 there was a significant 
discovery of copper at what was to become Devon Great Consols. 
Although situated on the Devon bank of the Tamar, Great Consols was 
f u l l y integrated i n t o the Cornish mining industry - worked by Cornish 
methods and indeed employing many Cornish miners - and was considered 
as part of the Cornish scene by contemporary observers. Again, 
technological advances assisted the development of these new areas, 
involving ( f or example) the opening of the Liskeard and Caradon 
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railway i n 1844 and the growth of Tamar r i v e r t r a f f i c associated with 
new quays such as that at Morwellham.^ 
Despite the rapid development of t i n i n the second h a l f of the 
seventeenth century, with i t s important consequences for the nature 
of the Cornish economy, i t was i n the eighteenth century a l e s s 
dynamic influence than copper upon the process of i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n . ^ 
The market was i n c r e a s i n g l y c o ntrolled by merchants and smelters, who 
excercised a retarding influence, and what Barton has termed "the 
f e t t e r s of coinage"^ a l s o served to discourage the expansion of t i n 
production i n the decades before 1838. The East I n d i a Company, 
however, emerged as an important purchaser of Cornish t i n i n the 
l a t t e r part of the eighteenth century, and by 1800 the demand for 
t i n - p l a t e i n the B r i t i s h domestic market was beginning to increase 
rap i d l y . By 1810 a v e r i t a b l e boom was underway, leading to the 
working of Wheal Vor and a s t r i n g of other mines around Helston and 
Marazion and i n other p a r t s of Cornwall, t h i s expansion b e n e f i t t i n g 
from the technological advance that had already attended the r i s e of 
copper. Although t i n was to play second f i d d l e to copper throughout 
most of the nineteenth century, with the d e l e t e r i o u s e f f e c t s of 
S t r a i t s competition being f e l t as e a r l y as 1813, there was 
nonetheless a continuing high demand for t i n - p l a t e . The a b o l i t i o n of 
"coinage" i n 1838 a s s i s t e d the expansion of Cornish t i n mining 
(allowing i t to ride the depression of the 1840s more e a s i l y than i t 
might otherwise have done) and i n the period 1850 to 1864 there was 
vigorous a c t i v i t y as demand surged from the Welsh t i n - p l a t e works and 
as many Cornish mines turned from copper to t i n . Wheal Vor was i n 
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the forefront of t h i s a c t i v i t y , but Dolcoath had assumed a new 
importance as a t i n producer, having turned from copper to t i n as 
early as 1838 on the discovering of r i c h t i n lodes at depth - a 
change that many other Camborne-Redruth mines were to emulate as 
copper became less profitable. A further t i n boom i n 1870-72 
accelerated t h i s process, leading to the r i s e of mines such as \flieal 
Owles, South Frances, and North Levant. 
In the l a t t e r part of the nineteenth century the relative 
position of Cornwall i n the mining world declined considerably, as 
f i r s t copper and then t i n were plunged into c r i s i s , but t i n mining 
did survive (largely as a result of continuing technological 
innovation, such as the introduction of rock d r i l l s and improvements 
i n explosives) while there was some div e r s i f i c a t i o n i n t o arsenic 
mining and, of course, clay quarrying. Indeed, i n the period 1850 to 
1909 Cornwall was s t i l l responsible for half of the t o t a l IMited 
Kingdom non-ferrous metal production, while there were no less than 
1500 separate Cornish mining ventures between 1845 and 1913.^ Lead, 
too, featured i n the production of Cornish minerals, along with 
s i l v e r , zinc, wolfram and smaller quantities of other metals. 
The technological innovation which accompanied Cornwall's 
mining pre-eminence i n the e i ^ t e e n t h and nineteenth centuries not 
only f a c i l i t a t e d rapid industrialisation but led to the emergence of 
Cornwall as a principal centre of engineering expertise. This, i n 
turn, as Barton has shown, was tied inextricably to the development 
of the Cornish beam engine - for pumping, winding, ore-crushing, and 
the operation of man-engines.^ By 1716 at least one Newcomen engine 
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was i n use i n Cornwall (probably at Wheal Vor or neighbouring 
Godolphin Ball) and t h i s was followed by others i n the 1720s^*^ and -
by the 1770s - the more economical Watt engines. (Figs, 1 & 2) 
Watt's determined defence of a l l aspects of his patent lapsed i n 
1800, precipitating i n Cornwall a great era of experimentation. 
Cornish engineers competed with one another i n their attempts to 
perfect the beam engine, and considerable r i v a l r y existed between the 
different mines as they strove to improve the efficiency of their 
engines. This competitive s p i r i t was echoed i n the pages of Lean's 
Engine Reporter, a journal founded i n 1810 to report and record the 
"duty" achieved by the principal engines at work i n Cornwall, "duty" 
being defined as the number of pounds of water raised one foot high 
by the consumption of one bushel of coal.^^ 
Arthur Woolf, a Comish-bom engineer, returned home to 
Cornwall i n 1811 after a period of absence, bringing with him his new 
engine d e s i g n s , a n d i n 1812 the celebrated Richard Trevithick 
successfully introduced his high pressure engine at Wheal Prosper i n 
Gwithian parish. William Sims, yet another Cornish inventor, i n 1816 
introduced numerous improvements to his engines at Wheal Chance, i n 
Gwennap, and at Wheal Hope i n Gwinear parish emerged one of the 
greatest practical engineers of the day, Samuel Grose. The period 
1825 to 1850 witnessed a continuing improvement of the "duty" 
figures, great feats of efficiency being achieved, for example, by 
Grose's 80 inch engine at Wheal Towan i n the early 1830s or by the 
famed "Ale and Cakes" 85 inch engine at United Mines - where i n 1840 
the best "duty" ever reported by Lean was recorded. The 1850s saw 
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rela t i v e dominance of Cornwall. 
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Steam engines b u i l t by 1800, showing the relative 
importance of Cornwall. ^ 
J. Langton and R.J. Morris (eds.), 1986, p77. 
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the pinnacle of the Cornish beam engine's performance, i n terms of 
technical perfection but also i n respect of standards of maintenance 
and the degree of ingenuity demonstrated by Cornish engineers. 
Along with Woolf, Trevithick, Sims and Grose (and the Cornish-adopted 
Homblower family, o r i g i n a l l y from the Midlands) were other well 
known Cornish innovators who achieved B r i t i s h and i n some cases 
international recognition, among them John Hocking, Michael Loam, 
William West, and the incredible Mitchell dynasty whose a c i t v i t i e s 
spanned from the late eighteenth to early twentieth centuries -
almost the entire period of Cornish steam engineering.^^ 
Associated. with the rise of the Cornish beam engine was the 
establishment of numerous Cornish engineering foundries. Many were 
modest a f f a i r s , such as the Charlestown Foundry or Hodge's of St 
Austell, but amongst the giants were Harvey & Co of Hayle and the 
Perran Foundry at Perranarworthal.^^ By 1800 Harvey was already 
employing 50 hands, and the foundry grew rapidly i n the f i r s t h a l f 
the nineteenth century, responding to demand for i t s engines and 
components from both home and abroad, and playing a leading role i n 
the development of Hayle as an industrial port. Perran's hey-day ran 
from 1820 to 1860, with Perran-built engines finding their ways to 
destinations as diverse as the Real del Monte mines i n Mexico, Burra 
Burra and Wallaroo i n South Australia, and Kimberley i n South Africa. 
The international importance of Cornish engineering was also 
demonstrated i n the rise of Holman Brothers of Camborne, which by the 
end of the nineteenth century was exporting pneumatic rock d r i l l s and 
other mining appliances to d i s t r i c t s as far-flung as the silver-lead-
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zinc mines of Broken H i l l i n New South Wales and the goldfields of 
the Rand. Although (despite the eff o r t s of the Cornish Copper Co at 
Hayle^^) there was l i t t l e development of copper smelting i n Cornwall, 
the growth of the Cornish engineering fomdries was also reflected i n 
the success.of local t i n smelting a c t i v i t i e s . Modem smelters, using 
the reverberatory furnace and employing coal as f u e l , gradually 
replaced the ancient, charcoal-fired "blowing-houses", and by 1800 a 
number of smelting houses had been established i n the environs of 
Truro and Penzance, with smaller smelting works scattered across 
other parts of Cornwall. 
Complementary to the process of industrialisation was an 
improvement i n transport and communications. Cornwall's links with 
the rest of the world continued to be by sea, reflected i n the fact 
that the Royal Albert Bridge - and with i t the railway across the 
Tamar - was not opened u n t i l 1859, but the tramways and railroads 
constructed within Cornwall to l i n k the mines with ports and quays 
were amongst the earliest b u i l t i n the United Kingdom. Many of these 
were later amalgamated into the routes of grander railways and 
incorporated i n t o the B r i t i s h network, and indeed between 1809 and 
1908 no less than 350 miles of railway were l a i d . New ports were 
also established - Portreath, Par, Pentewan, Hayle, Newquay, 
Charlestown, Trevaunance, Bude, and others - while long-established 
harbours such as Fowey, Looe and Saltash were equipped for the export 
of minerals and the import of coal, timber and other necessities for 
the mining Indus t r y . 
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A special "breed" of Cornish i n d u s t r i a l i s t emerged during the 
industrial expansion and technological innovation of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, demonstrating a single-mindedness and 
determination which reflected the t r a d i t i o n a l independence of 
Cornishmen i n earlier centuries but which also embraced the "new. 
culture" of industrialisation with great enthusiasm. To the 
distinguished ranks of the mining engineers should be added the names 
of the great entrepreneurial families and individuals who derived 
their wealth from the mineral deposits exploited i n their lands - the 
Bassets of Tehidy (who made so much from Dolcoath), the Fox family of 
Falmouth (associated with Tresavean, North Downs, and United Mines), 
the Lemons, the Williams family - and the Cornish ca p i t a l i s t s who 
took their investments outside of Cornwall: John Vivian who became 
involved i n the Welsh copper-smelting industry, and" William Praed of 
Trevethow - the banker who b u i l t the Grand Junction Canal between 
London and Birmingham. The fame and significance of many of these 
Comishmen, indeed, spread far beyond the confines of Cornwall - Sir 
Humphry Davy (inventor of the "safety lamp", and a President of the 
Royal Society) achieved lasting international stature, while Francis 
Trevithick won prominence as the f i r s t Mechanical Engineer of the 
London and North Western Railway. J.T. Treffry found fame as the 
renowned "King of Mid-Cornwall" for his development of mines, ports 
and mineral railways around St Austell and Fowey, and perhaps the 
greatest of these technocrats was Davies Gilbert - the "Cornish 
philosopher" as he was known throughout Britain i n the early part of 
the nineteenth century.^® As Member of Parliament, President of the 
Royal Society, and chairman of numerous Parliamentary committees. 
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Gilbert used his influence and energy to promote many "improving" 
causes - technical education, the application of steam power, 
agricultural reform, road construction, and Poor Law reform - his 
enthusiasm mirroring the self-confidence and optimism of Cornish 
society at that time. 
But this industrial prowess, the Cornish capacity for invention 
and progress, disguised the \inderl3n.ng characteristics of 
industrialisation i n Cornwall. That great, pervasive constant of 
peripherality - geographical isolation and distance from the seats of 
economic and p o l i t i c a l power - to a considerable degree moulded the 
process of industrialisation, ensuring that i t would be imperfect, 
incomplete and over-specialised, i t s e l f peripheral i n quality. 
Greatest of the geographical constraints placed upon Cornwall was her 
lack of coal deposits - there were coal mines i n Gloucestershire and 
Somerset, but i n the days before r a i l communications these were more 
remote and less accessible than those i n South Wales, which could be 
reached from Cornwall by sea. A trading cycle was thus established 
with South Wales, i n which ships carrying coal for Cornwall returned 
to Welsh ports with copper ore destined for Welsh smelters, a cycle 
which i t s e l f served to retard smelting and other in d u s t r i a l 
d i v e r s i f i c a tion i n Cornwall. As Burt has written. 
The greatest deficiency i n Cornwall's mineral wealth was 
without doubt i t s lack of coal. This proved to be a near f a t a l 
flaw i n terms of the county's general industrialisation and 
long-term economic welfare. The smelting and manufacture of 
i t s metallic minerals was generally forced outside of the 
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region to areas where fuel was p l e n t i f u l and cheap. The 
secondary industries which developed within the coimty related 
only to primary mining and quarrying a c t i v i t y . With the long-
term decline of these a c t i v i t i e s - which now amount only to the 
rump of a t i n mining industry and large-scale quarrying 
confined to the St Austell area - there has been a progressive 
contraction of the industrial base on which to build a new 
future. 
As Rowe observed, the chief characteristics of the Cornish 
copper industry had been established between 1689 and 1740, the most 
significant of which was the dependence upon the South Wales (and, to 
a lesser extent, Bristol ) smelting interests. Even then, says Rowe, 
the Cornish were aware of the danger of exploitation, but the early 
fa i l u r e of an attempt to establish smelting at Polrudden (Pentewan) 
re-emphasised the d i f f i c x i l t i e s of creating a competitive industry i n 
Cornwall.2^ In 1725 the uniquely Cornish "ticketing" system was 
introduced for the sale of copper. "Ticketing" was an echo of the 
long-established "tr i b u t e " system of employment ( i n which a miner 
bid, as i n an auction, for the area of ground he was to work) i n that 
potential purchasers of copper were required to submit "tickets" 
(bids) for the lots i n which they were interested. In an industry 
where the potential purchasers (and hence the^ l i k e l y nature of their 
bids) were a l l well known to one another, "ticketing" tended to have 
the effect of keeping prices down - to the detriment of Cornish 
interests. 
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I r o n i c a l l y , the Cornish had at f i r s t approved of "ticketing" 
( i t reflected the sturdy independence of "tributing") but by 1755 
there was general agreement i n Cornwall that there was an .unjustified 
disparity between the low prices paid for copper ore and the high 
prices asked for manufactured copper goods. In that year the Cornish 
Copper Co smelting works was opened at Hayle; although successful, 
i t s output was ti n y by Welsh standards and did not have a significant 
effect. In 1785 a Cornish Metal Co was set up i n Truro, a marketing 
organisation dedicated to raising the price of copper and dismantling 
the "ticketing" system. I t had l i t t l e success, however, for the 
Anglesey mines had contributed to the problem of low prices through 
over-production, and the Cornish Ifetal Co found i t s a c t i v i t i e s 
confined to managing the orderly closure of some Cornish mines and 
subsequent compensation of adventurers (shareholders). By 1791, 
indeed, the Company i t s e l f wsa dead. Birmingham brass and copper 
manufacturers t r i e d to help the Cornish mines (but also secure their 
control of the industry) by setting up a co-operative arrangement 
involving mining, smelting and manufacturing interests, but i n the 
end the Cornish adopted the old maxim of " i f you can't beat them, 
j o i n them" by penetrating the Welsh smelting industry. In 1803 
Pascoe Grenfell went into partnership with Thomas Williams to open a 
smelting works at Swansea, while John Vivian commenced operations at 
Penclawdd. In 1809 Vivian leased the much larger Hafod works, near 
Landore, while the Morfa works were taken over by the Williams family 
from Scorrier! For the Cornish c a p i t a l i s t s themselves, t h i s strategy 
was a considerable success - but for the broader Cornish economy 
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there was l i t t l e change i n the relationship between mining and 
smelting, and s t i l l l i t t l e scope for divers i f i c a t i o n . ^ ^ 
Another financial and managerial eccentricity bom of Cornish 
isolation and independence was the so-called "cost-book" system, 
which prevailed i n Cornwall's mining industry xmtil the 1890s. Under 
the "cost-book" system, each of the adventurers coming together to 
open a mine would hold a share and contribute accordingly. 
Adventurers' meetings were held regularly (usually at two-monthly 
intervals) at which the mine's progress would be reviewed. I f the 
mine was s t i l l at an embryonic stage, with much developmental work 
s t i l l i n hand, then "calls" could be levied on each shareholder at a 
level determined by the meeting. But i f the mine wsa already 
profitable, then dividends would be declared and paid out. Often, an 
a i l i n g mine would need repeated financial support through a series of 
"calls", a situation which might lead individvial adventurers to their 
own financial embarrassment or even bankruptcy. Shares might be 
subdivided to bring i n additional cash, while an adventurer might be 
forced to relinquish (or s e l l - i f he coxild find a buyer) his share. 
Response to a " c a l l " was obligatory, and an adventurer unable or 
unwilling to pay was l i a b l e to f o r t i t u r e . Although such unlimited 
l i a b i l i t y might lead an individual to rui n , the "cost-book" system 
was nonetheless popular i n Cornwall for i t also held the prospect of 
immense gains for those adventurers who had invested i n profitable 
mines. For example, as Morrison noted, between 1834 and 1845 the 
adventurers of East Pool mine received no less than £32,256 i n 
dividends on an outlay of £640.^^ 
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As an accounting device the "cost-book" was unique. As 
Morrison wrote. 
I t represented a single fund which received a l l income from 
c a l l s , ore sales and other sources, and disbursed a l l cash for 
labour, materials, dividends and - an important point - a l l 
capital expenditure on plant, construction and development. 
Thus capital expenditure appears as an operating cost and was 
financed from c a l l s or p r o f i t s . 
Despite these curious features, the "cost-book" system proved 
f l e x i b l e i n operation and equal to the task of financing even the 
biggest of mines i n the hey-day of Cornish mining: i n the 1830s, for 
example. Consolidated and United involved capital investment of tens 
of thousands of pounds and were amongst the largest enterprises i n 
the world. 
However, the "cost-book" system did have i t s disadvantages. 
The legal requirement that a l l p r o f i t s should be distributed as 
dividends at each adventurers' meeting led to the dispersal of funds 
which might more properly have been re-invested i n the mines. And 
adventurers were often more interested i n short-term p r o f i t 
maximisation than long-term development, leading to dubious practices 
("picking the eyes" out of a mine by plundering i t s best reserves, 
irrespective of market prices or other considerations; or sinking 
crooked - and ultimately i n e f f i c i e n t - shafts to follow lodes so that 
ore might be produced while sinking) and an unwillingness to re-
invest p r o f i t s i n long-term capital-intensive projects. The mine 
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companies themselves were unable to make e f f i c i e n t use of "spare" 
monies by, for example, purchasing shares i n other mining ventures or 
even lending fxmds to earn interest. 
These disadvantages led i n many cases to the long-term 
underdevelopment of many Cornish mines, a situation exacerbated by 
the relations between the indigerieous Cornish adventurers and those 
from outside. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
shares i n Cornish mines were largely i n the hands of individual 
Comishmen (indeed t h i s was s t i l l p a r t i a l l y true as late as 1870, 
when mine ownership was s t i l l vested i n individuals or small groups), 
and there was a general h o s t i l i t y towards outside interests -
capitalists from across the Tamar (with the remarkable exception of 
Norfolk-bom John Taylor, who thoroughly understood mining^^) were 
dismissed as "foreigners" or, more cynically, "the wise men of the 
east". However, the r i s i n g power of the City of London became 
irresistable - Cornish mines needed ever-greater investment, and the 
prospect of vast p r o f i t s tempted the speculators of the metropolis. 
These l a t t e r , however, were wary of the unlimited l i a b i l i t y of the 
"cost-book" and pressed for the adoption of an alternative system of 
limited l i a b i l i t y . This, i n turn, was met with resentment i n 
Cornwall - with the result that the concept of limited l i a b i l i t y was 
opposed west of the Tamar while the "cost-book" was discredited among 
English investors. This had the effect of diverting much-needed City 
capital away from Cornwall to the new mining f i e l d s overseas, 
aggravating the already significant problem of underdevelopment. 
Unhappily, those English capitalists who did take an interest i n 
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Cornwall were often drawn into the net of sharp sharedealing (which 
developed i n the mid nineteenth century) and which helped further to 
bring Cornish mining i n t o disrepute and to widen the r i f t between 
Cornish and "foreign" adventurers.^^ 
Like "ticketing", then, the thoroxighly Cornish "cost-book" 
system did not always operate i n the long-terra interests of the 
Cornish mining industry, especially when that industry was exposed to 
the pressures of outside interests. Cornish adventurers, however, 
seemed only dimly aware of t h i s , with the desire f o r spectacular 
riches ( i n r e a l i t y reserved for only the lucky few) leading them to 
prop up a i l i n g mines for many years i n the hope of s t r i k i n g better 
lodes. A l l too of ten a far-famed but marginal concern was allowed to 
continue for the occasional patches of r i c h ore that i t produced, 
consuming as i t did vast quantities of capital, while a potentially 
more promising but obscure prospect was examined b r i e f l y and then 
abandoned. Burt, indeed, has argued that i t i s probable that the 
overall sale of ore from Cornish mines never did repay the t o t a l 
investment i n the industry, a significant factor i n the explanation 
of the Cornish economy's fa i l u r e to expand or diversify as mining 
became less i m p o r t a n t . R o w e states the case quite p l a i n l y , 
asserting that the Cornish expended their e f f o r t s and finances for 
too long i n shoring-up their mining industry, with the result that 
"...the industrialization of the t e x t i l e manufacturers i n northern 
Bigland l e f t i t too late i n the day to promote spinning, k n i t t i n g , 
and lace-making i n C o r n w a l l " w h i l e the Cornish had tarried with 
their mines, other regions of B r i t a i n (many with the additional 
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advantage of local coal deposits) had already turned their hands to 
new industries, leaving the Cornish with few opportunities of their 
own and with Cornwall's experience of industrialisation cut short -
imperfect and incomplete. 
The Cornish determination to support mining, and the consequent 
reluctance and eventual i n a b i l i t y to diversify into new industries, 
lends a fascinating insight into the psychology and culture of 
Cornish society i n the eighteenth and especially nineteenth 
centuries. The Cornish were aware and intensely proud of their 
minign heritage, their engineers elevated to the level of supermen, 
the reputation and significance of Cornwall's pre-eminence 
acknowledged and understood across the world. Mining became a 
central plank of the Cornish identity, the raison d'etre of Cornwall 
and Comishmen, and the great entrepreneurial families, adventurers, 
practical miners and engineers alike could think of l i t t l e else. 
Mining was Cornwall, and Cornwall was m i n i n g . I n such an 
atmosphere and environment, i t was hardly surprising that the 
society's in s t i t u t i o n s should r e f l e c t t h i s all-encompassing passion 
for mining a f f a i r s . There was, for example, as Burt says, a 
"...distinctive Cornish hue..."-^^ i n the many mutual-improvement and 
educational bodies that had grown up by the 1850s: organisations such 
as the Liskeard I n s t i t u t i o n , the St Austell Literacy Society, the 
Launceston Pilosophical Society, and - of co\arse - the Camborne 
School of Mines i t s e l f . As Burt explained 
The most noticeable "Cornish" sector of the educational system 
were the non-vocational i n s t i t u t i o n s : "Non-vocational" i n the 
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sense that they had no specific commitment to providing 
instruction i n basic lit e r a c y or for any particiilar profession, 
but highly "Cornish" i n that their programs reflected the 
d i s t r i c t ' s consuming interest i n mining a f f a i r s and related 
subjects. 
Within such an educational system Cornish s k i l l s became highly 
specialised but also limited, encouraging the movement of Cornish 
technology into ever more specialist and specific avenues. Although 
advantageous during the years of mining expansion, i t l e f t Cornwall's 
resources of s k i l l e d manpower and technological expertise dangerously 
narrow and unbalanced i n times of decline. The Cornish beam engine 
was a case i n point: i n the hey-dey of the Engine Reporter the 
specialist concentration on the development of the Cornish engine 
seemed a l l to the good, but by the 1850s the engine had reached the 
practical l i m i t of i t s technological refinement, while overseas 
markets such as Australia were already setting up home-grown 
foundries to produce their own engines - to the detriment of the 
Cornish industry. Once again, the Cornish economy was l e f t with 
l i t t l e opportunity for diversification i n the face of industrial 
change. 
A combination of factors, then, geographical and economic but 
also cultural and psychological, served to determine the peripheral 
characteristics of Cornwall' s industrialisation, ensuring that i t 
would indeed be imperfect, incomplete and over-specialised. However, 
» 
the inherent flaws i n the Cornish industrial base were to a degree 
camouflaged by Cornish prominence i n the worlds of mining and 
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engineering. I r o n i c a l l y , the "Great Migration" of Cornish f o l k -
which gained momentum i n the 1830s and ran strongly u n t i l the Great 
War - was hailed i n Cornwall as the pinnacle "of Cornish achievement, 
with the might and glory of Cornwall w r i t large across the world as 
her sons took their vmrivalled expertise to new lands t h i r s t i n g for 
knowledge and l a b o u r . T h e r e a l i t y , of course, was rather different 
- for while the new lands did indeed benefit from Cornish s k i l l s , the 
"Great Migration" was i t s e l f a symptom of Cornwall's predicament and 
the means by which Cornwall was shorn of her most able and energetic 
inhabitants. Nonetheless, the "Great Migration" did create a certain 
Cornish international i d e n t i t y - i n which Cornwall was the hub with 
spokes radiating outwards to North America, South Africa, Australia -
with the Cornish confident and assured i n their status as world 
l e a d e r s . T h i s further enhanced the new pride i n "Comishness" 
which had accompanied the growth of industrial prowess, and which 
found i t s ultimate expression i n the "...astonishing stream of 
Cornish patriotism.. ."^ ^ (as Rowse called i t ) unleashed by the 
creation of the Cornish diocese i n 1877 and the building of Truro 
Cathedral. 
The Cathedral and diocese were i n some respects a renewed 
"accommodation" of Cornwall, a response to the assertive Cornish 
identity bom of industrial modernity, and the developraent of 
prestigious and august bodies such as the Royal Geological Society of 
Cornwall, the Royal Comwall Polytechnic Society, and the Royal 
I n s t i t u t i o n of Comwall, was i n part an expression of the new 
"Comishness". Against this background, the more ancient and already 
- 1A7 -
faltering symbols of "accommodation" - most notably the Duchy and the 
Stannaries - became les s relevant. The Duchy, indeed, was 
increasingly the subject of scorn and c r i t i c i s m i n Cornwall, 
especially i n the early nineteenth century when the retarding effect 
of "coinage" (duty payable to the Duchy) upon the t i n industry was 
much attacked. The West Briton newspaper, often radical and always 
vociferous i n i t s defence of Cornish interests, asked rhetorically: 
"Surely the t i n mines are not to be sacrificed i n order to supply a 
revenue for the Heir Apparent?"-^^ As a result of such criticism, the 
"coinage" arrangements were at f i r s t made more flexible, and then i n 
October 1838 they were abolished altogether. Compensation for the 
loss of "coinage" was s t i l l payable to the Duchy, however, and this 
was augmented by the not inconsiderable income from mines owned 
directly by the Duchy and, more importantly, by the rents and 
royalties from metal mines and quarries on Duchy land. In this way, 
income from Cornish mining provided a large proportion of Duchy 
revenues i n the nineteenth century. But, as Burt has shown, l i t t l e 
of this revenue was re-invested i n Cornwall - the Duchy was ".•.quick 
to extract i t s royalties and taxes but slow to re-invest i n 
infrastructural development; content to take out tens of thousands of 
pounds each year but laggardly i n assisting the wealth-creatinag 
a c t i v i t i e s of entrepreneurs and miners". 
This failure to take a constructive interest i n Cornish mining 
was symptomatic of a wider Ducal indifference to Cornwall. During 
the reigns of George IV and William IV events moved from bad to worse 
so that, as Haslam has written, 
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By the third decade of the nineteenth century the Duchy was 
again at a low point. In retreat on a l l fronts, i t s p o l i t i c a l 
influence i n disrepute, the Duchy's income had long been 
stagnant. The reputation of Prince George Augustus and h i s 
i n a b i l i t y to l i v e within h i s means starkly highlighted the 
shortcomings of the unreformed Duchy. 
In Cornwall and elsewhere the Duchy was seen increasingly as a 
discredited remnant of the ancien regime, a brake on the forces of 
progress and improvement. In response to this feeling Albert, the 
Prince Consort, was appointed Lord Warden of the Stannaries i n 1842 
with a wide ranging brief to investigate and reform the organs of the 
Duchy of Cornwall. He approached the task with his usual energy and 
thoroughness and succeeded i n transforming the Duchy into a highly 
eff i c i e n t managerial unit, the new mechanisms of which were enshrined 
i n the Duchy of Cornwall Management Act of 1863.^^ In so doing, 
however, Prince Albert effectively redefined the Duchy as an 
essentially commercial organisation, to some extent distanced from 
the t e r r i t o r i a l entity of Cornwall and certainly divorced from the 
c i v i l administration of the C o u n t y . T h e Duchy's raison d'etre was 
now commercial rather than constitutional (a change i n emphasis that 
was not opposed i n Cornwall) and i n the Local Government Act of 1888 
Cornwall was defined as a County equal i n status i n every way with 
those of England and Wales, and with no mention of a special 
constitutional position afforded by the Duchy. The estrangement of 
Duchy from County was now complete, and with the r i s e of the Duchy's 
commercial image i t s "accommodating" function a l l but disappeared. 
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Inevitably, the decline, reform and redefinition of the Duchy 
of Cornwall was reflected i n the changing fortunes of the Stannary 
organisation. During the eighteenth century the Stannary system had 
become less important as a means by which Cornwall might be 
"accommodated" by the State but was increasingly significant as a 
vehicle through which the interests of local mining c a p i t a l i s t s could 
be pursued. The extremely broad definition of "tinner" lent by the 
Stannary Legislation had invited the involvement i n Stannary a f f a i r s 
of the entrepreneurial families and adventurers, who i n time came to 
dominate the Convocation (or Stannary Parliament) at the expense of 
the ordinary working m i n e r . T h e s e c a p i t a l i s t Stannators used the 
system to safeguard the peciiLiar attributes of Cornish mining -
"cost-books", "tributing", and a l l the rest - and to strengthen their 
hold on the ind\istry. Not surprisingly, the Stannary system was thus 
supported by most Cornish "notables", both Whig and Tory, i t s 
apologists ranging from the arch-conservative S i r Richard Vyvyan to 
the radical E.W.W. Pendarves.^^ Equally, the Stannary organisation 
was reviled by outside c a p i t a l i s t s who, as Rowe has argued, saw i t as 
part of the fettering traditions of a feudal and archaic pasts, on a 
par with other discredited featxires of the D u c h y . A t f i r s t this 
caused l i t t l e concern i n Cornwall (indeed, i t may even have been 
welcomed - i t kept the "wise men of the east" at bay) but, as outside 
capital was increasingly required and sought, so objections to the 
Stannary system became more significant. The Parliament i t s e l f had 
l a s t met in 1752, and i n the reforming s p i r i t of the Great Reform Act 
of 1832 i t was unlikely that such an apparently archaic 
constitutional idiosyncracy should ever be allowed to convene again. 
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Nevertheless, there was an influential body of Cornish \^higs which 
did indeed press for a revival of the Parliament i n 1835,^-^ while the 
system of Stannary legislation remained vibrant and intact - the l a s t 
case to be tried according to Stannary was heard i n 1896.^^ Be that 
as i t may, however, the Stannary system - as a means of determining 
and controlling the features of the Cornish mining industry - became 
progressively less important during the coxirse of the nineteenth 
century. By 1900 i t was a l l but irrelevant and, l i k e the Duchy 
i t s e l f , had long since ceased to be a meaningful factor of 
constitutional "accommodation", 
* 
Just as the Great Reform Act of 1832 had served to inhibit 
whatever remaining constitutional independence the Stannary 
Parliament might have enjoyed, so i t brought to an end another 
remnant of Cornwall's old "accommodation" - the unique situation i n 
which Cornwall sent 44 MPs to the Westminster Parliament, only one 
fewer than those sent by the entire nation of Scotland! But, as with 
the Stannary system, the nature and function of the 44 MPs had been 
changing long before the impact of 1832. Before the C i v i l War, as 
Coate has shown, the MPs were more or less genuinely "Cornish" - they 
were bom i n Cornwall or were of Cornish descent, they had married 
into Cornish families or held land i n Cornwall - and perceived 
themselves as such.^^ By the end of the seventeenth century this was 
becoming less true (Bishop Trelawny pointed to the increasing number 
of what he called "foreigners" amongst Cornish MPs^^) and, i n 
contrast to the e a r l i e r bands of independent Comishmen, the 
Parliament of 1702-5 contained a docile group of Cornish "Churchmen" 
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supportive of Queen Ann's policies and unlikely to offer i t s own 
opinions, l e t alone dissent. As George Granville wrote approvingly 
at the time, Cornwall "...never sent up an honester set of gentlemen 
than now, for out of the four and forty there are but two 
exceptionable p e r s o n s " , M e n such as Sidney Godolphin (who owned 
Godolphin Ball t i n mine^^ and was Lord Treasurer under Ann) had, with 
the r i s e of t i n , acquired economic and therefore p o l i t i c a l influence, 
f a c i l i t a t i n g their search for "place" i n government. 
This docility (but not the search for "place") disappeared, 
however, as the eighteenth centiary progressed. A feature of the 
Hanoverian era was the Royal propensity for quarrelling - George I 
was at daggers drawn with Prince George, George I I f e l l out with 
Prince Frederick Louis, and a scandalous and embarrassingly public 
r i f t developed between George I I I and Prince George Augustus. The 
Princes, as Dukes of Cornwall, had a reservoir of p o l i t i c a l patronage 
which they could mobilise i n disputes with the Kings. Plumb noted 
that i n the reign of George' I "...the Prince disposed of a 
considerable amount of private patronage - and also, as Duke of 
Cornwall, he could influence a number of parliamentary elections".^^ 
In this way the 44 Cornish MPs became embroiled i n the arguments 
between Sovereign and Heir, and during the reign of George I I I became 
a significant component of the "Opposition" party which grew up 
around Prince George Augustus. Calder has described the a c t i v i t i e s 
of a "Cornish mafia which played a large role i n the p o l i t i c s of. 
Walpole's England...";^*^ and Plumb commented: 
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Nor was the Prince's power negligible. He excercised 
considerable influence over the Parliamentary elections in 
Cornwall, which was h i s Duchy, and, pof course, he could offer 
future prospects to the young. They clustered around him so 
eagerly that Walpole dubbed his party the "Patriot Boys".^^ 
Suck politicking, of course, had l i t t l e to do with the pursuit 
of the real interests of Cornwall, and the 44 MPs could hardly be 
said to be representative of Cornish opinion. For, i n addition to 
the powerful Ducal influence in many Cornish seats, were the 
notorious Cornish ."rotton boroughs" and "pocket boroughs" in- which 
the franchise was severely restricted and votes were bought or sold. 
In the climate of the "Reforming Th i r t i e s " such a system was 
d i f f i c u l t to defend, and Cornish radicals argued that the 44 ^ffs 
"...represented the Cornish no more thatn the man i n the moon...".^^ 
1832 reduced the number of Cornish MPs dra s t i c a l l y to 12, removing 
once and for a l l Cornwall's special representation at Westminster, 
and to some extent increasing the franchise at the same time as 
abolishing the worst excesses of the "rotten" and "pocket" boroughs. 
There was, however, a somewhat ambivalent and paradoxical attitude to 
this reform i n certain areas of Cornish opinion (Davies Gilbert 
expressed misgivings) for, \ ^ l s t reform i t s e l f was welcome, there 
was also a feeling that Cornwall - and to an extent, too, Britain and 
the Dnpire - would be the worse for the loss of so many Cornish MPs. 
In short, the passing of this remnant of "accommodation" was, for 
Cornwall, despite evreything, tinged with a momentary regret. 
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The decline of these old symbols and mechanisms of 
"accommodation" - the Duchy, Stannaries, and 44 MPs - reflected the 
changing nature of Cornish peripherality. . To some extent they were 
replaced by new institutions of "accommodation" - the newly-created 
Cornish diocese of 1877, the County Council set up i n 1888 (which 
recognised, re-affirmed and perpetuated the traditional boundaries 
and t e r r i t o r i a l extent of Cornwall and allowed a measure of s e l f -
government), and perhaps even the widespread deference and respect in 
Britain for Cornish learned societies. But the Cornwall of the era 
of industrialisation was not i n need of widespread "accommodation", 
for i t was confident of i t s status and of the (as i t thought) 
unassailable strength of i t s own "Comishness", based as i t was on 
industrial prowess. The "accommodation" so central to the fabric of 
"Older Peripheralism" had been rendered redundant by the new 
conditions of modernity associated with the r i s e of "Second 
Peripheralism". 
In the same way, this modernity swept aside other facets of 
Cornish society which had survived from e a r l i e r times, and as the 
nineteenth century progressed so Cornwall became les s deserving of 
i t s unflattering reputation as "West Barbary". In the eighteenth 
century Cornwall was s t i l l perceived as a rough and lawless country, 
i t s tinners and farmers notorious for their parochialism, violence 
and h o s t i l i t y to outsiders. Even as late as 1850, according to 
Hamilton Jenkin, miners in the more remote, westerly parts of 
Cornwall - especially the wild d i s t r i c t s of Breage arid Sithney^^ -
could scarcely venture outside their own parishes for fear of being 
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assulted, while local r i v a l r i e s such as those between Camborne and 
Redruth or Padstow and Wadebridge would s p i l l over often into violent 
confrontations. Smuggling, too, was at i t s zenith i n the eighteenth 
century - a veritable way of l i f e for the inhabitants of certain 
especially notorious stretches of coast, such as Cawsand Bay and 
Mount's Bay - and "wrecking" reached i t s apogee during the same 
period. IMlike the "commercial organisations" of Dunkirk and 
elsewhere which had dominated smuggling i n the eastern Channel, 
smuggling i n Cornwall was largely a result of individual enterprise, 
relying upon the use of small, individually owned cutters or fishing 
boats and dependent upon personal "contacts" with Brittany and the 
Channel I s l a n d s . " W r e c k i n g " was even les s organised, often no more 
than the almost spontanious reaction of local folk to news that a 
vessel had come to grief on their shores, providing an opportunity 
for spoil and plunder. Both smuggling and "wrecking", however, 
reflected the Comishman's view of the sea (a "harvest-field"^^ \ ^ c h 
offered opportunities for livelihood and support) and h i s capacity 
for individualistic enterprise, as well as h i s readiness to act 
beyond the law. Robert Hunt, writing i n 1871, drew a t e l l i n g i f 
unsavoury pict\ire of l i f e i n Cornwall "...about a hundred years 
since..."^'^ i n his report of "The Faction Fight at Cury Great Tree". 
Impressionistic and perhaps apocryphal, i t nevertheless provides an 
insight into the reputation that Cornwall had acquired: 
A wreck took place near the Lizard, and the Breage-men being 
nearest, were soon upon the spot to appropriate whatever 
flotsam and jetsam might come i n their way. Returning laden 
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with their spoils, they were encountered at the Great Tree by 
the Wendron-men bound on a similar errand, and a fight, as a 
matter of course, ens\ied, which was prolonged t i l l the 
following day. The contest i s said to have been a terrible 
one, each party being armed with staves.. .These fights between 
parishes were so common i n those days that any death occuring 
in the fray was quietly passed over as a thing of course, and 
soon forgotten. 
Likewise, "food r i o t s " were an almost commonplace part of l i f e 
i n eighteenth century Cornwall, seen by both contemporary observers 
and modem scholars i n the same light as smuggling and "wrecking", 
and indeed remaining a significant feature u n t i l at least May 1847 
when hungry and angry miners forced " f a i r prices" for com at 
Callington market and miners and clayworkers looted shops i n St 
Austell, and s t i l l observable at the end of the nineteenth century i n 
the Camborne and Newlyn r i o t s . Hobsbawm and Rude have noted that 
"...Comwall was one of the chief centres of food rioting i n the 
c o u n t r y " a n d that "...the tinners were regarded as almost beyond 
the pale of c i v i l i z a t i o n , " ^ ^ pointing to their widespread outrages i n 
1709, 1727-9, 1748, 1757, 1766, 1773, 1795-9, 1810-13, 1831 and 1847.' 
Paradoxically, however, Comwall (unlike neighbouring Devon and 
Dorset) did not become involved i n the "Captain Swing" disturbances 
which swept southern Britain i n 1830. The Swing outrages occurred i n 
rural areas where population growth had not been accompanied by 
industrialisation, whereas i n Comwall the expansion of mining and 
industry had absorbed the increase i n population. 
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Savagery and smuggling, "wrecking" and r i o t , reflected the 
inheritance from Cornwall's "Older Peripheralism", epitomising both 
the independence of action and frequent lawlessness of the 
individxialistic Cornish. But, l i k e the institutions of 
"accommodation", these features of Cornish l i f e came increasingly 
under attack as the conditions of "Second Peripheralism" took root. 
The most significant of these was Methodism, part of the "new 
ciiLture" of industialisation, which - though strong i n the industrial 
Midlands and North of England - was especially successful i n Wales 
(i n i t s "C a l v i n i s t i c " guise) and Cornwall where local conditions 
favoured i t s growth. The Methodists, of course, advocated an orderly 
and sober l i f e , and " r i o t " as a means of achieving ends (however 
desirable those ends might be) was opposed by Wesley and h i s 
followers. Although Cornish smugglers sought to reconcile their 
traditional pursuit with the demands of their new religion by 
describing the import of contraband as "Free Trade"^^ (something 
liberal-minded Methodists might be expected to support), Wesley 
himself described smuggling as an "abomination".^^ In July 1753, for 
example, he rebuked members of the St Ives Methodist Society for 
endulging i n the practice and warned that they must cease forthwith 
or "...see my face no more".^^ Similarly, the Methodists were 
horrified by the barbarity of "wrecking" and did much to create a new 
attitude of mind in Cornwall i n which the emphasis was on helping 
those i n p e r i l on the sea: "The reforming influence of Wesley and the 
Methodists had i t s effect...and so gradually the Cornish, for 
centuries feared becaxise of their wrecking propensities, began to win 
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a more creditable reputation for the saving of ships and l i v e s i n 
danger around their coasts". 
In this way, the Methodists were able to effect a considerable 
transformation i n Cornish society, "West Barbary" giving way at 
length to "Delectable Duchy", the new Cornwall marked by i t s "God-
fearing" and increasingly " c i v i l i s e d " and "educated" qi i a l i t i e s . The 
Methodists, indeed, played no small role i n the creation and 
promotion of the self-improvement and educational institutions that 
emerged i n nineteenth century Cornwall, the Methodist commitment to 
improvement and self-help permeating so many aspects of Cornish l i f e . 
By 1781, John Wesley, then 78 years of age, could attract a crowd of 
20,000 when he preached at Gwennap Pit; by 1851 only 27 per cent of 
Cornish people remained Anglicans - 60 per cent were Methodists, 
while the rest were mostly Nonconformists of other denominations.^^ 
Even i n 1899, after the creation of the new Cornish diocese, Bishop 
Benson had s t i l l to admit that "The land i s theirs at the moment."^^ 
Paradoxically, althougfi Methodism had served to eradicate many 
of the attributes (albeit unpalatable ones) of Cornish individualism, 
the basic causes and tenets of that individualism remained. These 
were, as argued i n Chapter 3, essentially socio-economic - the lack 
of local gentry or squirearchy, the preponderence of small tenant 
farmers liv i n g i n isolated and scattered settlements, the independent 
tinners with their "tribute" and "tutwork" system of employment. 
Although these features had emerged in the Medieval period they 
survived as "constants of peripherality" into the era of 
industrialisation. Todd, in describing the social conditions of 
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nineteenth century Cornwall, wrote that there were "No great families 
i n the English^^ sense" and that "...differences between social 
groups were never as c l e a r l y marked as elsewhere" the tenant 
farmers i n particular sporting a long tradition of independence as a 
result of the relative weakness of the manorial system i n Cornwall. 
Pelling, too, has noted the significance of these factors i n moulding 
the character of nineteenth century Cornish society, while others 
have shown that the nineteenth century was the great hey-day of the 
"tribute" and "tutwork" system - not only did i t operate i n v i r t u a l l y 
every mine in Cornwall, but also i t was significant abroad i n those 
areas where there had been a major Cornish impact, most notably i n 
California and South A u s t r a l i a . " T r i b u t i n g " and "tutwork" set the 
standard and tone of a independence and individualism amongst the 
working people of Cornwall, i t s influence reflecting the central 
position of mining i n Cornish society and economy. 
The mechanics of "tributing" were quite simple. I t was 
essentially a form of contracting i n which the miner performed part 
of the entrepreneurial function himself. Individual sections of a 
mine ("pitches") were contracted out to individual miners or - more 
commonly - small groups of miners ("pares") as a result of open 
bidding on "survey day". Prior to this bidding, each pitch was 
inspected by a mine agent ("captain") to ascertain the value of the 
ore that i t contained. Each pitch woxild then be offered at 
"captain's prices" - for a r i c h section of ground the "captain's 
price" m i ^ t be as low as a few shi l l i n g s i n the pound, so that for 
each pounds-worth of ore raised the "tributer" or "pare" received 
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only a couple of s h i l l i n g s , but for lower-grade pitches the 
"captain's price" might be considerably higher - an incentive for a 
"tributer" or "pare" to work indifferent ground. I t was unusual, i n 
fact, for tribute pitches to be l e t at "captain's prices" - more 
often there was considerable competitive, downward bidding, between 
r i v a l "pares", especially for attractive sections of ground. A pitch 
was awarded to the lowest bidder, at a figure often well below 
"captain's prices", and the tributers - being i n a sense s e l f -
employed - were also expected to provide their own candles, powder 
and other materials. Tributing was thus something of a gamble. An 
apparently r i c h rection of ground might suddenly f a i l , leaving the 
tributer with l i t t l e remuneration for h i s t o i l , but - equally -
indifferent grotmd might suddenly y i e l d pockets of high-grade ore 
("sturts"), affording a tributer vast earnings during that particular 
"take" or contract period. 
Tributing lent the miner a certain independence and gave him an 
opportunity to profit directly from h i s enterprise, energy and 
expertise. Although one effect of tributing was to set miner against 
miner i n bids for pitches offered to the lowest bidder, the system 
was generally well liked i n the nineteenth century and i t s widespread 
adoption i n Comwall served to enhance the miner's reputation and 
disposition as an "individualist". The effect of "tutwork" was 
identical, although here the contracts were concemed with the amount 
of ground rained rather than the value of ore won - contracts reserved 
usually for the sinking of shafts or driving of levels, and tending 
perhaps to attract the less s k i l l e d or l e s s enterprising miner. 
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The organisation of the fishing industry, too, both reflected 
and encouraged the individualistic strain in Cornish society. In the 
absence of large commercial groups, Cornish fishing was i n the hands 
of small men who owned their vessels or, more typically, of the small 
co-operative companies ("seines") which had emerged: by the beginning 
of the nineteenth century almost every Cornish cove and harbour had 
i t s "seine" - such as the "Trusty" of St Mawes or the "Dolphin" of 
Mevagissey,^^ Uke the tributing "pares", the "seines" might 
encourage co-operation between small groups of workers (often family-
related) who were prepared to pool their resources, but their 
principal effect was to encourage individual enterprise and action. 
This was also an echo of the farming industry i n Cornwall, with i t s 
small-holdings and tenant farmers, and isolated families on their 
isolated farmsteads. 
I t was against this background of individualism and 
independence - i n farming, raining and fishing - that Methodism took 
root i n Cornwall. In the absence of nucleated villages, many folk 
lived isolated from the remote "churchtowns" - physically insulated 
from the influence of Church and Vicar - and with few figures of 
squire-like stature or authority to encourage their conformity. The 
Anglican Church i t s e l f was rather weak i n Cornwall, perhaps never 
having f u l l y recovered from the trauma of 1549, the remoteness from 
the episcopal centre at Exeter making supervision of the often 
lacklustre Cornish incumbants d i f f i c u l t i f not impossible. Felling 
has noted the "...failure of e c c l e s i a s t i c a l adaption that gave a 
special stiimilus to the growth of Nonconformity i n the region", 
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while Pearce has argued that "The Wesleys and their itinerants 
restored heart religion i n Cornwall.. .The Cornish were moved as they 
had not been moved for c e n t u r i e s " . A n d i n the rapidly expanding 
mining towns, with the social problems and poverty associated with 
their burgeoning popiilations, the Methodists found f e r t i l e ground i n 
which to plant their ideas. Their emphasis upon self-help and 
individual improvement provided constructive and practical support, 
while the preoccupation with the "next world" helped to alleviate 
some of the despair i n t h i s . Rule has also identified the simplicity 
of Methodist theology as an important factor i n explaining the 
popularity of the movement i n Cornwall, asserting that the especially 
unsophisticated Bible Christian sect owed much of i t s vigour to the 
superstitious f r a i l t i e s of the Cornish p e o p l e . B e that as i t may, 
Methodism certainly found i t s e l f attuned to Cornish society and 
emerged i n the nineteenth century as a principal strand of the 
Cornish identity, a "popular religion" of enormous power and 
i n f l u e n c e , ( F i g s . 3 and 4.) 
Methodism, of course, was much concerned with the individual 
and h i s betterment, leading to the emergence of a l l manner of 
temperence, educational, l i t e r a r y and "improving" societies, and even 
prompting the development of a rudimentary welfare system ("club and 
doctor" funds) i n the larger mines. Similarly, i t influenced the 
development of a l i b e r a l philanthropy i n nineteenth century Cornwall, 
manifested - for example - in the generosity of emigrant Comishmen 
who had "done well" "up country" or abroad and were moved to make 
substantial charitable contributions to Cornish institutions. J . 
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Passmore Edwards - whose l i b e r a l i t y allowed the construction of 
hospitals, institutes and public l i b r a r i e s throughout Comwall^^ -
was perhpas the greatest of these but there were others, notably S i r 
John Langdon Bonython in South Australia, 
Methodism also displayed an egalitarian strand, reflecting the 
general lack of class consciousness i n Cornwall and pursuing a 
theology which taught compassion, concern for the needy, the equality 
of men before God, a contempt for riches. Although Wesley and his 
early followers were i x ) l i t i c a l l y conservative (they opposed 
expressions of p o l i t i c a l dissent and were hostile to the Chartist 
cause, advocating instead a passive and philosophical acceptance of 
one's lot i n l i f e ) Methodism did become linked with p o l i t i c a l 
radicalism, p o l i t i c a l action seen by many as merely the practical 
extension of their Christian convictions.^^ Although the Wesleyans 
tried to remain independent of p o l i t i c a l debate, other factions 
within the Methodist movement were les s inhibited. Being i n part a 
reaction to what was seen as the staid practices and attitudes of the 
Anglicans, Wesleyan Methodism - once i t had become established and 
"set i n i t s ways" - i t s e l f experienced dissension and reaction, 
resulting i n the formation of various breakaway denominations. The 
story of factionalism and reunion i n Cornwall i s a complicated one, 
but three principal denominations emerged - the "original" Wesleyans, 
the Primitive Methodists, and the Bible Christians. 
The Primitive Methodists had their origins i n the English 
Midlands, and became an essentially working-class movement associated 
with social and p o l i t i c a l radicalism. The "Prims", as they were 
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known, argued that they alone had remained true to the original style 
and teaching of John Wesley and they found a ready appeal i n the 
mining d i s t r i c t s of Cornwall - their chapels springing up i n areas as 
diverse as Redruth and St Cleer. Associated more exclusively with 
Cornwall were the Bible Christians, a denomination founded by William 
Bryant (or 0'Bryan) from Luxulyan and established i n i t i a l l y i n the 
North Cornwall parishes of Launcells and Week St Mary and across the 
Devon border at Shebbear.^^ From there the Bible Christians . spread 
eastwards through the south-western peninsula, but their greatest 
impact was i n Cornwall i t s e l f - i n the mining d i s t r i c t s but also i n 
the countryside. Again, a di s t i n c t working-class identity can be 
discerned, and Shaw has argued that although " P o l i t i c a l l y , Cornish 
Methodists have tended to be L i b e r a l s . . . t h e Bible Christians 
especially "...were radicals of the old Liberal school".° 
Todd notes that by the 1830s .radicalism was becoming a 
force to be contended with i n Cornwall",^ and there was some 
Chartist a c t i v i t y i n the late 30s and 1840s. Lovatt, one of the 
Chartists* leaders, was a Comishman from Newlyn, Bryant noting the 
a c t i v i t i e s of "...radical members of Parliament, dissenting ministers 
and I r i s h and Cornish orators."^^ Most especially, there developed 
an important link between Cornwall and the emerging Liberal Party, 
and between Cornish Methodism and Cornish L i b e r a l i s m . T h i s 
Methodism, with i t s anti-Anglican attitudes, represented a kind of 
social or religious radicalism of some considerable strength (indeed, 
the creation of the Cornish diocese i n 1876 was i n certain respects a 
counter-attack, mounted with almost missionary fervour), and as 
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p o l i t i c a l radicalism emerged so Methodists were attracted to i t s 
ranks. Of the 25 Methodists elected to the f i r s t Cornwall County 
Council i n 1889, 18 were Liberals, three independent Radicals, and 
only four Conservative.^^ In the same way, local Methodist 
organisations i n Cornwall made i t their business to influence 
p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s , as i n June 1908, for example, when the ministers 
and lay representatives of the Kilkhampton Bible Christian Circuit i n 
North Cornwall added their voices to the widespread Liberal and 
Nonconformist opposition to the Conservative Government's Education 
B i l l , a t the same time expressing their h o s t i l i t y to Tory and 
Anglican forces at a more theoretical l e v e l : "The members of our 
churches and congregations prize and stand by the privileges of c i v i l 
and religious liberty won for them by their forefathers at a great 
cost and handed down not simply to enjoy, but to establish and 
extend". 
As Felling observed, Cornish socio-economic conditions i n the 
nineteenth century - "...the strength of Nonconformity, the weakness 
of the large landowners, the generally small scale of farming, and 
the paucity of nucleated v i l l a g e s . . ."^^ would lead one to expect a 
Liberal, "...indeed a Radical, predominance..."^^ i n Cornish 
p o l i t i c s . Certainly, between 1885 and 1910 each of the Cornish 
Parliamentary Constituencies (with the exception of tiny Penryn) 
returned Liberal or Liberal IMionist candidates at every election, 
including by-elections.^^ Often seats were contested not by opposing 
parties but by Liberals of different hues, as i n the "...intense and 
bitter...contest between Whig and Radical i n 1885..."^^ when the 
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radical Independent Liberal, C.A.V. Conybeare, defeated the o f f i c i a l 
Liberal candidate, A. Pendarves Vivian, i n the Camborne constiuency. 
Liberalism was very much i n tune with the individualistic strain i n 
Cornish society, imbued with Benthamite concern for the individual 
and his freedom of action, and Rowse had commented on "...the 
democratic Cornish - monarchy and aristocracy meant l i t t l e to them, 
unlike the more conservative E n g l i s h " . R o w s e , indeed, r e c a l l s that 
i n the early years of this century "In an independent clay village, I 
never heard anyone say S i r to anybody... . The bulk of our people 
lived i n independent v i l l a g e s , l i k e the china clay area, or Redruth 
and Camborne. They are a l l of them democratically inclined, 
everybody equal with everybody else".^^ 
The triumph of Methodism and of Liberalism i n Cornwall seems 
ironic when set against the e a r l i e r Cornish determination to fight 
for the Catholic religion and to eschew the "Good Old Cause" of 
Cromwell and Monmouth. But the paradox can be resolved, for the 
Cornish fighters of 1549 and the C i v i l War were demonstrating a 
regional difference bom of peripherality - as were the Cornish 
Methodists and Liberals of the nineteenth century. The culture of 
these Methodists and Liberals, indeed, owed much to the s p i r i t of 
individualism and independence inherited from those e a r l i e r times, 
although, again paradoxically, i t was also a product of the modernity 
of industrialisation. Methodism and Liberalism were part of the "new 
culture" of industrialism and, although not s p e c i f i c a l l y or 
exclusively Cornish, nonetheless there developed i n Cornwall (as i n 
Wales) a way of l i f e of which they were integral and indispensible 
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components. They were, indeed, a v i t a l aspect of Cornish culture i n 
the era of "Second Peripheralism", reflecting both an inherited 
constant from the "Older Peripheralism" and the particular conditions 
of the new age. 
A similar process was observable i n other features of Cornish 
culture i n the nineteenth century, a reconciliation of elements of 
the "new culture" of industrialism with remnants of ea r l i e r identity. 
The widespread formation of brass and s i l v e r bands, although also 
found i n other regions (most notably the North East of England), was 
associated very much with the mining d i s t r i c t s of Cornwall - as were 
the many male-voice choirs (a phenomenon shared with industrial 
Wales) and the peculiarly Cornish "Cornish Carols" produced by Thomas 
territt and other local c o m p o s e r s . T h e s e musical a c t i v i t i e s were 
preceived as "Cornish" because they were products of the raining 
communities, inextricably entwined i n the sense of "Comishness" 
based upon industrial prowess. This sense of identity generated a 
considerable pride, indeed sometimes a feeling of superiority, i n 
being Cornish, which - although bom of the ei ^ t e e n t h and nineteenth 
centuries - was i n many respects i n keeping with the e a r l i e r Cornish 
identity based upon geographical isolation, p o l i t i c a l accommodation, 
and C e l t i c culture. 
The Cornish language i t s e l f was s t i l l i n decline i n this period 
- Dolly Pentreath, described variously as the l a s t monoglot speaker 
or the l a s t native speaker with a comprehensive knowledge of the 
tongue, died i n 1777, although she was certainly survived by others 
with at least some grasp of the language. John Davey of Boswednack 
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i n the parish of Zennor, who died i n 1891, was reputed to have had a 
considerable understanding of Cornish, and elsewhere odd phrases and 
the a b i l i t y to count i n the language survived u n t i l perhaps as late 
as the 1 9 2 0 s . E s s e n t i a l l y , however, Bannister was correct in his 
assessment when he wrote i n 1871 that "The close of the 18th Century 
witnessed the f i n a l extinction, as a spoken language, of thie old 
Celtic vernacular of C o r n w a l l " . T h e concept of "Cornish 
nationality" did not die, however, and (for example) i n 1875 that 
very phrase was employed by the Moonta Mines Directors i n South 
Australia (a prosaic and sober group of men not given to exaggeration 
or misrepresentation), while the sayings "Cornwall, near England" and 
"into Cornwall, out of England" were in common use.^^ The 
description of a non-Comish person as a "foreigner" continued to be 
standard practice i n Cornwall. 
Observers from east of the Taraar were s t i l l careful to depict 
Cornwall as a land of "difference". Wilkie Collins, the novelist, 
visited Cornwall in the middle of the l a s t century and reminded h i s 
readers that this was, 
...a county where, i t must be remembered, a stranger i s doubly 
a stranger, i n relation to provincial sympathies; where the 
national feeling i s almost entirely merged i n the local 
feeling; where a man speaks of himself as Cornish i n much the 
same way that a Welshman speaks of himself as Welsh. 
Likewise, an issue of the popular Chambers Journal i n 1861 described 
Cornwall as "...one of the most un-English of English 
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c o u n t i e s . . . w h i l e George Kenwood - a frequent contributer to the 
Mining Journal i n the 1850s and an astute observer of the Cornish 
miners and their habits - wrote that Cornish folk were "... 
particularly proud of their parentage, to a degree almost r i v a l l i n g 
that of the Welsh, and refer to King Arthur and Trelawney as demigods 
and patterns of virtue and p a t r i o t i s m " . E v e n at the turn of the 
century, W.H. Hudson, the naturalist, f e l t moved to describe "...the 
remote and most un-English county of Cornwall.. ."^^^ and hinted that 
there were few "...Englishmen i n Cornwall who do not experience that 
antipathy or sense of separation i n mind from the people they l i v e 
with, and are not looked at as f o r e i g n e r s " . I n t e r e s t i n g l y , Hudson 
concluded that "The Cornish people, I take i t , are Celts with l e s s 
alien blood i n their veins than any other branch of their race i n the 
B r i t i s h I s l e s " . 
The Cornish themselves, despite the often disapproving 
influence of Methodism, retained many of their ancient customs and 
superstitions - b e l i e f in the mystical qualities of holy wells, the 
practice of Cornish wrestling and hurling, the Padstow Hobby Horse 
and Helston Furry Dance, the celebration of Midsummer's Eve and St 
Piran's Day, the reverence of Cornish saints and the observance of 
their feasts.•^•^^ The Cornish, sense of identity, often held quite 
unselfconsciously, was perhaps best captvired and expressed in 
Hamilton Jenkin's delightful account of an incident i n a nineteenth 
century dame-school. A pupil, asked to describe Cornwall's 
geographic and p o l i t i c a l status, declared that "...he's kidged to a 
furren country from the top hand".^*^^ This answer was "...heard by 
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was 
the whole school with much approval, including old Peggy (the school 
dame) herself".^^^ The "furren country" to which Cornwall 
"kidged" (joined) was, of course, Ekigland, the pupil's response 
indicative of a developed sense of identity - of the sort so 
noticeable to Collins, Kenwood and other writers - which was 
widespread i n Cornwall. I t was, as argued above, an identity given 
self-confidence and vigoxir - and indeed new content and meaning - by 
Cornwall's supremacy i n the realms of mining and engineering but i t 
had also, as shown here, inherited the lingering remnants and fading 
attributes of an e a r l i e r C e l t i c culture. 
A complex and often paradoxical picture emerges, then, of 
Cornwall and i t s economy and society i n the eighteeenth and 
nineteenth centuries. I t was an era of urgent, rapid change, 
witnessing the swift decline of ancient institutions on the one hand 
and the a r r i v a l of new ideas and technologies on the other, but with 
change tempered and sometimes moulded by conditions suirviving from 
ea r l i e r times. Widespread industrialisation had altered the face of 
Cornwall, thrusting the Cornish economy into the forefront of 
technological advance, and yet that industrialisation was i t s e l f 
imperfect, incomplete, and over-specialised. I t had, however, led to 
the r i s e of a new assertive "Comishness" which perpetuated 
Cornwall's distinct sense of identity, despite the decline i n this 
era of the traditional symbols and mechanisms of "accommodation" such 
as the Duchy and Stannary system. Part of the "new cxilture" of 
industrialism which grew up i n Cornwall was Methodism, a religious 
movement which did much to reform the nature of Cornish society and 
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yet which owned i t s very success to the deeply-rooted independence 
and individualism of the Cornish people. Methodism and individualism 
combined to create a p o l i t i c a l atmosphere i n Cornwall receptive to 
the Liberal Party as i t emerged in the l a s t century, the success of 
Methodism and Liberalism, reflecting not only the triumph of new ideas 
and imperatives but also the enduring impact of older influences, a 
blend also observable i n other facets of Cornish society and culture. 
The explanation for this sometimes bewildering mixtiare of 
processes l i e s , as has been argued, i n the changing nature of Cornish 
peripherality. The demise of Cornwall's "Older Peripheralism" saw 
her emerge from her long-enjoyed isolation, where geo-political 
distance and a separate culture had held her cocooned by an array of 
"accommodating" devices from the influence of the English "centre", 
into a new condition i n whcih she was suddenly of strategic and 
economic importance to the "centre". The decline and ultimate 
destruction of this "Older Peripheralism" was never a speedy or 
straightforward, l e t alone systematic, process - and i t was survived 
by elements of both i t s causes and effects, which were in turn to 
have an important impact i n the following era. But this new era, 
that of "Second Peripheralism", was profoundly different from that 
which had gone before. Worldwide economic importance and a place i n 
the forefront of technology were new phenomena, as was Cornwall's 
recruitment into the ranks of religious dissent, and the new 
standards of " c i v i l i s a t i o n " , "education" and "improvement" saw 
Cornwall's reputation increasingly removed from the image of "West 
Barbary". "Second Peripheralism", however, involved not only the 
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r i s e i n mining and engineering prowess and the attendent changes i n 
society - the subject of this chapter - but also encompassed the 
consequences of Cornwall's imperfect experience of industrialisation. 
A consideration of these consequences, indeed, i s c r u c i a l i n 
elucidating the f u l l extent and nature of "Second Peripheralism", and 
forms the sxibject of the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DECLINE AND DIASPORA 
Tucked away i n the midst of Maxine Berg's moniimental discussion 
of The Age of Manufacturers i s a breathtaking generalisation which 
asserts that i n Cornwall " . . . i n the middle of the nineteenth century 
mining suddenly declined and the region was rapidly transformed into 
a holiday resort"^ I t comes as a surprise that Berg's recent work -
conceived as a major and fresh re-appriasal of the industrial 
revolution, with a fierce insistence that a f u l l understanding of 
industrial change can come only through a "...reconciliation of 
social and economic history...""^ - can dismiss (indeed ignore) the 
complexities of the Cornish experience i n such a g l i b and simplistic 
fashion. I t reflects, however, a psychological response to 
peripherality (Cornwall was a "sideshow" and need not feature i n any 
discussion of mainstream industrial change i n Britain) shared by 
academics and general public alike, and gives no hint of the r e a l i t y 
and extent of the c r i s i s i n nineteenth century Cornwall, This was a 
c r i s i s bom of the imperfect, incomplete and over-specialised 
industrialisation that Cornwall had experienced and which culminated 
i n social and economic marginalisation; the condition of "Second 
Peripheralism". 
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The descent into c r i s i s has been described i n the several 
narrative histories of Cornish mining, i l l u s t r a t i n g the collapse of 
copper and la t e r decline of t i n i n the face of changing economic 
conditions.^ Although the 1850s had witnessed the peak of Cornish 
copper production, (Fig. 5) the warning signs of dangerous days ahead 
were already there for those who cared to see them. The mines were 
becoming ever-deeper (and therefore more costly to work) and many 
were proving increasingly less r i c h at depth, the optimistic 
production figures of the 1850s being i n a sense " a r t i f i c i a l l y " 
boosted by the mines of Caradon and the Tamar Valley whose 
spectacular riches tended to conceal the declining performance of 
their West Cornwall counterparts. Equally important was the 
emergence of overseas competition - from the United States, from 
Chile and Cuba, and from South Australia (Fig. 6). I n each of these 
cases the costs of the production and marketing of copper were lower 
than i n Cornwall, which was dangerous for the Cornish industry when 
copper prices were high and disasterous when they were low. Even 
distant South Australia, where there were important copper 
discoveries i n the 1840s, 1850s and 1860s, could compete successfully 
with the Cornish industry. As the Royal Geological Society of 
Cornwall noted. South Australia was a wool-exporting colony, with the 
effect that, 
...the wool-ships on account of the lightness of the cargo are 
obliged to take i n a large quantity of ballast, and they are 
therefore glad to take the lead and copper ore at a merely 
nominal rate of freight; - at the time i n question about eight 
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Year* - Com. -• ! U K %VK Year Com. U K % U K 
•• .- OreCton) :Orc(lon) Prod Ore(ion) Ore(ton) Prod 
1845 149.834. 184.740 81.11 1880 26.737 52,128 51.29 
1846 132.444- 169.568 78.11 1881 24,510 52,556 46.64 
1847 137.665- 171.104- 80.46 1882 25,641 52.237 49.09 
1848 • 127,226 147,701 86.14 1883 23,250 46,820 49.66 
1849 126,650 146.326 86.55 1884 21,539 42.149 51.10 
1850 134,020. 155,025 86.45 1885 19.734 36.379 54.25 
1851 127.285 150.380 84.64 1886 7.541 18.617 40.51 
1852 139.172 165,593 84.04 1887 3.415 9,359 36.49 
1853 151,507 181.944 83.27 1888 6,838 15.550 43.97 
1854 • 153.297 185.145 82.80 1889 4,959 9.310 53.27 
1855 161,576 207.770 77.77 1890 5.271 12,481 42.23 
1856 163.958. 260,609 62.91 1891 4.039 9.158 44.10 
1857 152.729' 218,689 69.84 1892 2.813 6,265 44.90 
1858^  147.330 226.852 64.95 1893 2,673 5,576 47.94 
1859 : 146,093 236.789 61.70 1894 3.362 5.994 56.09 
1860 145,359 236.696 61.41 1895 5,504 7,791 70.65 
1861. 143.119 231.487 61.83 1896 5,616 9.168 61.26 
1862 141,800 224.171 63.26 1897 4.M0 7,352 56.31 
1863 129,229 210.947 61.26 1898 5.293 9.131 57.97 
1864 127.633 214.604 59.47 1899 5,172 8.319 62.17 
1865 121.253 198.298 61.15 1900 5,926 9.488 62.46 
1866 103.670 180.378 57.47 1901 4.251 6.792 62.59 
1867 88.660 158.544 55.92 1902 4.547 6,112 74.39 
1868 86.722 157,335 55.12 1903 5.351 6.867 77.92 
1869 71.790 129.953 . 55.24 1904 4.433 5.465 81.12 
1870 56,526 106,698 52.98 1905 4.651 7,153 65.02 
1871 46,766 97.129 48.15 ,1906 3.053 7,758 39.35 
1872 41,756 91.893.' 45.44- 1907 2.802 6.792 41.25 
1873 40,285 80,189 50.24 1908 1.556 5.441 28.60 
1874 40.455 78.521 51.52 1909 1,580 3.717 42.51 
1875 39,393 71,528 55.07 . 1910 870 4.178 20.82 
1876 43.016 79,252 54.28 1911 988 3.262 30.29 
1877 39,225 73.141 53.63 1912 590 1.933 30.52 
1878 36.871 56,094 65.73 1913 421 2,732 15.41 
1879 30.371 51,032 59.51 
Total 3.973.751 6.030.155 65.90 
5: Cornwall copper ore. production and i t s share of t o t a l 
UK output 1845 to 1913. 
Source: Roger Burt et a l , Cornish Mines: Metalliferous and 
Associated Minerals 1«4:>-1913. University nf V^^rar-
Kxeter, l9iJ7, p p x l i . 
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1831-40 1841-50 1851-60 1861-70 
UK 
(mainly Cornwall)- 144,000 138,200 142,200 116,300 
Chile 65,000 88,100 214,500 447,400 
Cuba 9,580 56,400 47,500 25,600 
USA - 2,400 37,000 97,000 
South Australia :. - 15,700 35,500 71,008 
Total 325,400 440,900 677,749 1,026,200 
Fig 6: 
Soiirce 
Decennial World Production of Fine Copper ( i n tons) 
John Rowe, Cornwall i n the Age of the Industrial 
Revolution Liverpool University Press, Liverpool. 
1953, p309. 
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or ten shillings per ton. That circumstance was considered as 
bringing their mines, as i t were, actually into Europe, or at 
a l l events as placing them upon equal footing with European 
mines... 
To make matters worse, the Cornish firm of John Williams arranged 
( i r o n i c a l l y enough) for the sale of South Australian copper ore at 
the Swansea ticketings. 
After 1856 there was a marked decline i n the output of Cornish 
copper, culminating i n the great crash of 1866 i n which the industry 
was one of the victims of the financial c r i s i s precipitated by the 
collapse of the Overend-Guemey Bank.^ Richer, shallower and less 
costly overseas mines - l i k e those of Moonta and Wallaroo i n South 
Australia - coxild survive the ensuing period of low copper prices but 
the ancient mines of Cornwall could not. Many famous names - Fowey 
Consols, St Day United - faded from the scene, and by 1871 each one 
of the Gwennap mines was closed. The East Cornwall mines struggled 
on towards the end of the centxiry but to a l l intents and purposes the 
Cornish copper mining industry was at an end. Copper prices did 
revive strongly i n the early part of the twentieth century, but by 
then - with the demise of the old Cornish cost-book system - the 
remnants of the Cornish industry had been f u l l y integrated into the 
international mining economy, with financial control vested very 
strongly i n the City. As Burt has written " B r i t i s h mining capital 
was henceforth determinedly channelled abroad, to the new areas of 
production and the mines of the future rather than the past".^ 
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A number of the old copper-producing mines were able to prolong 
their existence by turning to t i n (which many had fortxaitously struck 
at depth), the t i n industry outliving i t s copper counterpart and 
indeed appearing for a time i n the early 1870s to be the saviour of 
the otherwise f a l t e r i n g Cornish economy (Fig. 7). But from the 1860s 
onwards the t i n industry i n Cornwall was dominated by the t r i p l e 
concerns of cost of production, the market price of t i n , and the 
effect of overseas competition.^ The l a t t e r had been f e l t as early 
as 1815, when t i n from the Malay Straits had started to make an 
impact upon the t i n market, and the abolition by Peel i n 1845 of duty 
on imported t i n brought depression to the Cornish industry. In the 
mid-1860s the price of t i n f e l l as a result of the American C i v i l 
War, the demand for tin-plate having f a l l e n o f f i n the United States, 
and i n the general gloom of 1866 many Cornish t i n mines were also 
abandoned. 
There was something of an upturn i n 1869, however, the revival 
i n t i n prices aided by the c i v i l disturbances i n the Malay States 
which had had the effect of disrupting Straits production (the 
B r i t i s h were forced to intervene m i l i t a r i l y i n the c r i s i s i n 1874), 
and the early 1870s witnessed a considerable t i n mining boom i n 
Cornwall. I t was short-lived, however, the discovery of vast 
deposits of t i n at Mount Bischoff i n the Australian colony of 
Tasmania providing an ominous new source of competition. Even i n 
1873 t i n prices were starting to f a l l , but 1874 was far worse. There 
was panic i n the ranks of mining investors, attempts at wage cuts and 
a return to the "five week month", and the enevitable closure of 
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Year Corn. UK %UK 
Ore(ton) Ore(ton) Prod 
1852 
1853 
1854 
1855 
1856 
1857 
1858 
1859 
1860 
1861 
1862 
1863 
1864 
1865 
1866 
1867 
1868 
1869 
1870 
1871 
1872 
1873 
1874 
1875 
1876 
1877 
1878 
1879 
1880 
1881 
1882 
9,497 
8.587 
8,515 
8,767 
9.107 
9,614 
9.906 
10,069 
10,225 
10,725 
11.638 
13.943 
13,678 
13,868 
13.601 
10.989 
11.530 
13.757 
15.191 
16.759 
13.247 
14.735 
13,633 
13.870 
13,602 
14,071 
15.077 
14,248 
13.344 
12,883 
13.995 
9.674 
8,866 
8,747 
8.947 
9,243 
9,709 
9.960 
10.180 
10.400 
10.963 
11.841 
14.225 
13.985 
14.123 
13.785 
11.067 
11.584 
13.884 
15,235 
16.898 
13.381 
14,838 
13.762 
14,005 
13.649 • 
14.092 
15,124 
14,280 
13.376 
12.898 
14.045 
98.17 
96.85 
97.35 
97.99 
98.53 
99.02 
99.46 
98.91 . 
98.32 
97.83 
98.29 
98.02 
97.80 
98.19 
98.67 
99.30 
99.53 
99.09 
99.71 
99.18 
99.00 
99.31 
99.06 
99.04 
99.66 
99.85 
99.69 
99.78 
99.76 
99.88 
99.64 
Year 
1883 
1884 
1885 
1886 
1887 
1888 
1889 
1890 
I89I 
1892 
1893 
1894 
1895 
1896 
1897 
1898 
1899 
1900 
1901 
1902 
1903 
1904 
1905 
1906 
1907 
1908 
1909 
1910 
1911 
1912 
1913 
Com. UK %UK 
Orc(ton) Ore(ion) Prod 
13,999 
15,091 
14,324 
.14,125 
14,083 
14,282 
13,756 
14.868 
14.444 
14,261 
13,647 
12.880 
10.583 
7.657 
7.120 
7,379 
6,389 
6.793 
7.280 
7,552 
7.354 
6.733 
7.174 
7.115 
6.987 
7.816 
8.166 
7.483 
7.666 
8.065 
8,258 
14,469 
15.117 
14,377 
14,232 
14.189 
14.370 
13,809 
14,911 
14.488 
14,357 
13,699 
12,910 
10.612 
7.663 
7.120 
7.380 
6.392 
6.801 
7,288 
7,560 
7.382 
6,742 
7.201 
7.154 
7.080 
8.008 
8.289 
7.572 
7,746 
8,166 
8,355 
96.75 
99.83 
99.63 
99.25 
99.25 
99.39. 
99.62 
99.71 
99.70 
99.33 
99.62 
99.77 
99.73 
99.92 
100.00 
99.99 
99.95 
99.88 
99.89 
99.89 
99.62 
99.87 
99.63 
99.45 
98.69 
97.60 
98.52 
98.82 
98.97 
98.76 
98.84 
Total 696,001 702,205 99.12 
Fig 7: 
Source: Burt et a l , 1987, p x l i l . 
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mines - no less than 47 i n 1874, 48 i n 1875, and 37 i n 1876. By dint 
of continuing technological innovation, the Cornish t i n industry 
survived the traumas of the 1870s (albeit i n much leaner form) but 
the 1880s - a time of international economic downturn - were no 
better. Straits production doubled between 1887 and 1894, 
"Bimetalism" making Straits t i n increasingly attractive on the world 
market and the development of Malay a l l u v i a l deposits boosting 
supply. Bolivian t i n was also increasingly important, and by 1896 
the Cornish industry was facing extinction with only nine mines i n 
production, somehow struggling on u n t i l the outbreak of war i n 1914 
dealt further blows. 
The decline of copper and t i n mining i n Cornwall was 
accompanied by the f a l l from grace of the Cornish beam engine, which 
had reached i t s zenith i n the 1850s but declined therafter.^ By the 
1860s, as mines began to close, many second-hand engines were offered 
for sale. Some went overseas (although increasingly overseas 
foundries were able to meet local demand) with many more going to 
other mining d i s t r i c t s i n Bri t a i n . The trade i n surplus engines 
became thus an economic a c t i v i t y of considerable importance, 
increasingly more important than the manufacture of new ones, and i n 
the Cornish mines themselves cheap (as opposed to economical) working 
became the order of the day. Engineers were no longer concerned to 
improve their engine's duty but were anxious to reduce overheads and 
running costs. Standards of maintenance and performance f e l l , and 
certain mines became notorious for their antiqxaated engines and 
equipment.^ By the 1890s even the market i n second-hand engines had 
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collapsed. A few found new homes i n china-clay p i t s but the majority 
of Cornish beam engines were broken up for scrap. I n 1895 only seven 
engines were reported i n Lean's Engine Reporter: by 1903 the number 
had f a l l e n to only four and i n 1909 that once august and world 
renowned journal ceased publication altogether. 
The demise of the Cornish beam engine had obvious deleterious 
effects upon the engineering and manufacturing industries i n 
Cornwall, as had the general collapse i n copper and t i n mining - an 
inevitable consequence of the over-specialisation of Cornish 
industry. Not only was there f a l l i n g demand for a l l kinds of goods 
and services, forcing the closure of many establishments, but that 
demand which remained was for increasingly specialist and 
technologically advanced equipment for deploj^ent i n the unequal 
struggle to prevent the t o t a l collapse of the remaining rump of the 
mining industry. That industry, of course, quite apart from the 
problems of overseas competition and international prices, had to 
contend with the pressure upon v i a b i l i t y exerted by the fact that 
Cornish mines were becoming extremely deep and increasingly d i f f i c u l t 
to work, with "payable" resources of ore constantly declining. The 
Cornish experience was exactly i n tune with an explanation, offered 
by an American survey i n the 1930s, of the inherent d i s a b i l i t i e s of 
minign economies: 
...the history of mineral exploitation i s a record of a 
struggle against increasing natural d i f f i c u l t i e s . I t i s 
commonplace that the richer and more accessible of the known 
deposits are attacked f i r s t . As these are exhausted. 
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operations proceed to the poorer and less accessible deposits, 
and the physical conditions become progressively more 
d i f f i c u l t . ^ ^ 
In Cornwall's case, such increasingly d i f f i c u l t conditions were 
matched by ever-more sophisticated technological innovation, and - i n 
a t r u l y paradoxical vicious c i r c l e - as the mining industry became 
progressively less competitive and less viable, so i t demanded more 
and more complex technology. At the same time that the industry 
became ever more economically precarious, i t became increasingly 
advanced and specialised, so that those establishments which had 
survived the general f a l l i n engineering demand found that their 
remaining market was now extremely narrow but also extremely 
advanced. In these conditions, Cornish industry became even more 
specialised than i t had been hitherto, precluding even further the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of industrial d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n . 
As Schraitz has observed, there was i n th i s experience a 
relationship between technological change and capital formation of 
considerable i m p o r t a n c e . B e f o r e the post-1860s decline there had 
been a steady rise i n capital formation i n Cornwall, as mines were 
opened and devleoped, but thereafter there was a steady f a l l as 
properties were abandoned and assets depreciated or stripped. 
Schmitz agrees, however, that the Cornish industry, 
...had to pursue ores of diminishing value to greater depths as 
the nineteenth century progressed. The capital requirements of 
such a mining f i e l d , with limited opportunities for discovery 
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of fresh deposits near surface, would r e f l e c t the need for more 
extensive programmes of exploration and underground development 
to stock up larger quantities of low-grade ores. At the same 
time deeper mining would require more e f f i c i e n t and higher 
capacity pumping equipment; more complex or leaner ores would 
require more advanced and capital-intensive forms of m i l l i n g 
and concentrating equipment at surf ace. 
Schmitz adds that "By the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century technological change i n south-west metal mining was running 
at a significant l e v e l " , e c h o i n g the words of the mining economist 
L.L. Price who wrote of the Cornish industry i n 1891: "Metallic 
mining i s no longer...the hap-hazard pursuit of signs and tokens -
deceptive or otherwise - that i t once was...mere rule of thumb i s 
being replaced by a body of s c i e n t i f i c experience". This 
contrasts, perhaps, with the image of the more ramshackle and run 
down Cornish mines, and yet i t i s certainly true that at the handful 
of larger mines (which constituted the principal part of the industry 
at the end of the century) there were numerous attempts to translate 
s c i e n t i f i c theory into practical engineering - for example, the 
general introduction of compressed a i r d r i l l s i n the 1880s and the 
use of compressed a i r winches. Set against the inexorable decline of 
the industry, this served to perpetuate the sorry cycle of 
diminishing v i a b i l i t y and declining capital formation on the one hand 
and ever more specialised technological change on the other. 
Inevitably, therefore, the f i n a l collapse of Cornish mining would 
leave the Cornish industrial base f a t a l l y exposed and quite unable to 
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marshall i t s higjily specialised attributes to any other form of 
production (Fig 8). And, as Rowe says, the end of the industry i n 
practical terms (*though the Cornish were loathed to accept, l e t 
alone act upon, i t ) had already occurred by the early 1900s: "A long 
h i s t o r i c past, during which many myths and traditions had developed, 
delayed recognition of the fact that, early i n the twentieth century, 
Cornish mining had so drastically-declined that i n r e a l i s t i c economic 
terms i t was only of minor significance".^^ 
The social and economic effects of the decline of mining were 
excacerbated by periods of general depression: most notably the 
"Hungry Forties", the agricultural c r i s i s of the 1870s, and the 
international downturn of the 1880s, Agricultural development had to 
some extent been dependent upon raining development, the increasing 
population i n the mining d i s t r i c t s i n the f i r s t h a l f of the 
nineteenth century stimulating the demand for wheat. Indeed, arable 
farming was s t i l l the dominant feature of Cornish agriculture as late 
as 1840, with an increasing emphasis i n some areas upon the potato. 
Learning from the I r i s h experience, Cornish fanners found that 
potatoes were a useful preparatory crop for barley on heath or bog 
land, and potatoes were of course an important addition to the local 
d i e t . ^ ^ As early as 1801 up to 25 per cent of the cultivated land i n 
the Penwith peninsiila was devoted to potatoes - an important 
contribution to the food supply for the mining d i s t r i c t s of Marazion, 
St Just and St Ives.^^ 
Although Cornish agriculture was i n some respects well-suited 
to the peculiar characteristics of the land - the prevalence of the 
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" o u t f i e l d " system^® ( i n common with other areas of Celtic and 
highland Britain) i n land adjacent to moors and wastral allowed for 
the cultivation of "bonus" crops i n good years without having to 
reduce the area devoted to livestock, and the predominance of ley^ 
rotation^^ farming with i t s temporary grassland made good use of the 
mild, wet climate - the dependent l i n k with mining was dangerous. I t 
was understandable, given the levels of demand, that Cornish farmers 
were tempted to concentrate upon wheat and other arable crops ( i n 
1808 Worgan wrote of Cornish farmers that as "...there i s nothing 
l i k e com sacks for making money, they are very fond of the 
plough..."^*^). But Cornwall, with i t s shallow acidic soils and heavy 
r a i n f a l l was i n fact not well-suited to the cultivation of wheat and 
similar crops, especially when compared to the more suitable soils 
and climate of the Midlands and East Anglia or, indeed, North America 
and South Australia. Cornwall made the best of things by treating 
i t s soils with sea-sand and manures such as seaweed and even rotten 
pilchards ( a l l materials that were near at hand) but. i n the longer 
term the inappropriate concentration upon arable crops would have 
t e l l i n g consequences.^^ 
In the f i r s t place, the rapid expansion of population 
associated with the development of mining had subsided by the 1840s -
that decade witnessing the f i r s t major s t i r r i n g s of the "Great 
Migration" and pointing the way ahead to the second half of the 
century with i t s massive emigration, depopulation and collapse of 
raining. This, of coiirse, removed the principal local demand of 
Cornish wheat at precisely the same time that the repeal of the Com 
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Laws opened the way for the penetration of B r i t i s h markets by 
overseas produce. The North American prairies were s w i f t l y 
developed, and by the early 1850s South Australia had already emerged 
as "The Granary of A u s t r a l i a " . A d d e d to this was the growth of 
central and eastern Eiigland as wheat producers, whose farmers could 
grow com far more e f f i c i e n t l y and economically than their Cornish 
counterparts. Their local market having collapsed, Cornish farmers 
were lonable to compete against these superior producers i n wider 
markets and learned the hard way the shortcomings of their earlier 
policy of dependence upon the mining communities. To take a broader 
perspective, the over-specialisation of Cornish industry forced by 
the overriding dominance of mining had forced a similar over-
specialisation i n Cornish agriculture - and with similar consequences, 
to boot, reinforcing the peripheral nature of the Cornish economy i n 
this era "Second Peripheralism". By the 1850s, indeed, Cornish 
fanning was i n deep depression as a direct result of i t s over-
dependence on com.^^ 
Likewise, the experiment with potatoes had disasterous 
consequences i n the 1840s (the "Hungry Forties") when the dreaded 
potato blight struck i n Cornwall as i t had elsewhere i n the Br i t i s h 
Isles, particularly Ireland and the Scottish Highlands. West 
Cornwall, i n particular, became a sort of microcosm of the I r i s h 
experience, the Cornish crop f a i l i n g i n 1845 and again i n 1846,^^ one 
result being the f i r s t movement en masse of mining (and also 
agricultural) workers to new destinations overseas. Cornish farming 
wsa already of a generally subsistence c h a r a c t e r , w i t h an i n a b i l i t y 
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to produce large surpluses (partly as a result of the inappropriate 
concentration on wheat, and partly because farms were small and the 
standard of management low) and the "Hungry Forties" were therefore 
especially damaging. Although, i n the mining d i s t r i c t s , there did 
emerge certain notable farmers who became "mechanically-minded" as a 
result of the proximity of the mines,economic conditions generally 
procluded mechanisation and technological innovation i n Cornish 
agriculture. This was partly because so many farms were marginal and 
their surpluses so small, but also because the disti n c t i v e 
characteristics of Cornish farming did not lend themselves to the 
introduction of the specialised equipment developed elsewhere. 
Instead, there was a range of r e l a t i v e l y modest innovations of purely 
local application (eg "Cornish ploughs"); d i s t i n c t l y Cornish 
implements for d i s t i n c t l y Cornish forms of agriculture. As Jewell 
has noted, "Adoption of those technical inventions which promoted 
English lowland farming from the early eighteenth century f u l l y 
penetrated only a few d i s t r i c t s inside the Devon b o r d e r " . W e s t of 
the Exe, and most especially west of the Tamar, agriculture remained 
immune from the developments further east, with - as noted above -
the influence of mining further exaggerating the differences between 
fanning i n Cornwall and that which obtained i n the bulk of Ehgland, 
and with the predominant characteristics of "small farming" 
reinforced. 
At length, i n the wake of mining's collapse and the strength of 
competition, Cornish farmers did abandon their reliance upon com. 
As the mining popiiLations emigrated and the mines went into terminal 
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decline, Cornish agriculture began to adapt to the new conditions. 
In particular, the depression years of the 1870s and 1880s resulted 
i n much land i n Cornwall being switched from the production of wheat 
to mixed farming and permanent pasture. There was a move to dairy 
farming and, aided by the a r r i v a l of the railway i n 1859, to 
horticulture i n the Tamar Valley and i n West Cornwall. By 1880 there 
were twice as many cattle on cultivated land i n Cornwall than was the 
average per acre i n England and Wales, and there were eight sheep for 
every seven elsewhere and three pigs for every two,^^ The 1870s, of 
course, had been a time of agricultural depression throughout the 
United Kingdom, Competition from North Ararerican produce had reached 
acute proportions, the situation made worse by a series of poor 
harvests and by outbreaks of swine fever and foot-and-mouth disease. 
The United Kingdom alone, of a l l the major European powers, was 
reluctant - due to i t s ideological commitment to Free Trade - to 
protect i t s agricultural industry, and as a result there were 
declining wages and agrarian poverty thorughout Britain and Ireland. 
A Royal Commission found Cornwall less badly h i t than other parts, 
largely due to the timely movement away from wheat to stock 
f a r m i n g , W e might conclude, therefore, that Cornish farming had at 
last been successful i n recovering from the over-specialised and 
inappropriate concentration upon com, but i t i s nonetheless 
interesting to note that the "new" forms of agriculture that emerged 
served s t i l l to mark Cornwall o f f from the experience east of the 
Tamar, Paradoxically, at the very time that Cornwall was abandoning 
com i n favour of ca t t l e , so lowland England was redoubling i t s 
concentration upon arable farming and i n particular the production of 
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bumper catch when a record 46,000 hogsheads were exported. The 
general pattern, however, was one of gradual decline with the 
pilchards increasingly deserting the inshore waters. By 1872 they 
had disappeared from the entire stretch of coast between Cawsand and 
Mevagissey, leaving the rump of the seining fishery i n the western 
d i s t r i c t s around St Ives and Newlyn.^^ 
Some blame was also attached to the "foreign" d r i f t e r s from the 
southern and eastern coasts of England who were increasingly fishing 
the waters o f f Cornwall and who, i t was claimed, were dispersing the 
pilchard shoals before they had had an opportunity to come inshore. 
Some . Cornish operators converted to the use of the d r i f t e r s 
themselves, but most seining companies were l i t t l e more than 
extended-family co-operatives and lacked the necessary financial 
wherewithal to make the change from seining to d r i f t i n g . With the 
pilchards becoming increasingly unpredictable, many seiners switched 
their attention to mackerel - especially after the a r r i v a l of the 
railway i n 1859 f a c i l i t a t e d the penetration of the London market by 
fresh Cornish f i s h . However, the mackerel were also sought by the 
"foreign" d r i f t e r s and, i n the closing decades of the century, by 
East Coast stream trawlers. These vessels had greater f l e x i b i l i t y , 
range and endurance than their Cornish seining counterparts, and -
ir o n i c a l l y - could also take advantage of the new railway 
connections. The Cornish boats were thus outclassed, the West Briton 
newspaper lamenting i n 1891 that "...this i s probably the f i r s t year 
i n which not a single seine has been put into the water".^^ In fact, 
seining struggled on into the early years of this century but the 
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advantage had been won by the East Coast men and t h e i r superior 
technology, the decline i n Cornish seining reflected i n a consequent 
decline i n Cornish boat and ship building.'^^ 
The Cornish blamed the East Coast men (the "Yorkies", as they 
were known i n Cornwall) for the demise of both pilchards and seining, 
and a h o s t i l i t y gew up between the two groups of fishermen. The 
Cornish rationalised and articulated their resentment by pointing to 
the habitual "Sabbath-breaking" of the East Coast "Yorkies". As the 
West Briton explained i n May 1877, 
The Cornish fishermen suspend work on Sundays, but the east 
country fishermen, who come to St Ives i n the season have no 
such scruples. Last year there was a disturbance, and this 
year the St Ives men have again prevented the others from 
landing at the St Ives pier f i s h caught on Saturday night or 
Sunday. 
Such disturbances continued to characterise the relationship between 
the Cornish and the "Yorkies". The Cornish were aware that the 
fiercely Catholic I r i s h and fiercley Presbyterian Scots had 
successfully prevented "Yorkie Sabbath-breaking" i n their respective 
fisheries, and were determined to do likewise i n Cornish waters. The 
situation came to a head at Newlyn i n May 1896 i n an extraordinary 
paroxysm of violence i n which the Cornish destroyed the catch (some 
100,000 mackerel) landed by the Lowestoft boats. This incident, 
described by Noall and more recently and i n greater d e t a i l by Corin, 
led to serious r i o t i n g and to the deployment by the Government of 
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350 soldiers and no less than three Naval gunboats i n the Mount's Bay 
area.-^^ The situation was smoothed over, but a lingering resentment 
remained - reflecting the continued demise of the Cornish fishing 
f l e e t and the success of the East Coast trawlers. 
The fa i l u r e of the Cornish fishing industry wsa a result of i t s 
over-specialisation upon pilchards and seining and i t s i n a b i l i t y to 
modernise i n the face of new conditions and new competition. The 
reaction of the Cornish fishermen to the "Yorkies" reflected this but 
also afforded an insight into the strength of Cornish individualism 
and identity, as well as the power of Methodism. As such, the 
experience of Cornish fishing was largely i n tune with that of wider 
Cornish society and economy i n this era of "Second Peripheralism" 
and, rather l i k e farming, fishing found i t s e l f i n a state of 
considerable f l u x at precisely the same time that mining was 
undergoing i t s great decline. Thus, l i k e Cornish farming, Cornish 
fishing was i n no position to step into the economic vacuum l e f t by 
mining - indeed, i t could never have been for i t was i t s e l f 
suseptible to the same kind of forces that had brought such 
d i f f i c u l t i e s to the mining industry. Together, the parlous condition 
of the Cornish "staples" - mining, farming and fishing - created a 
pr o f i l e of economic marginalisation which served to mark Cornwall o f f 
i n a most stri k i n g way from the experience elsewhere i n the United 
Kingdom. 
The economic marginalisation that progressively characterised 
Cornwall as the nineteenth century developed was mirrored i n a 
consequent social marginalisation, the most significant feature of 
- 195 -
which was the process known as the "Great Migration" (Fig. 9). A 
f u l l analysis of what was an extremely complex phenomenon has yet to 
be undertaken, but one estimate has suggested that some 230,000 
people l e f t Cornwall during the nineteenth c e n t u r y , w h i l e Todd 
asserts that " I t seems reasonable to suppose that Cornwall lost at 
least one t h i r d of i t s population...".^® Indeed, Baines has 
demonstrated that between 1861 and 1900 Cornwall lost no less than 
10.5 per cent of i t s male population overseas and 7.0 per cent to 
other counties (far and away the greatest percentage loss of any 
county), with a corresponding loss of 5.3 per cent of the female 
population overseas and 7.1 per cent to other counties."^^ (Figs 10.1, 
10.2 and 11) This amounted to some 118,500 people, with Baines 
concluding that, as a percentage of the population, "This i s not as 
high as from the famous regions of Italy...but i t must be remembered 
that mass emigration from I t a l y lasted not much more than twenty 
years. Cornwall was probably an emigration region comparable with 
any i n Europe". 
This picture was complicated by the oft-repeated process of 
emigration, counter-migration, and renewed emigration where 
individuals or even families might leave Cornwall for a dstination 
overseas, return home after a number of years abroad, and then later 
s t i l l migrate again. Equally, this pattern was made a l l the more 
complex by the Cornish "international mobility" that emerged, with 
many Cornish folk (especially the miners) spending their lives 
roaming within and between the continents of the W o r l d . T h e most 
obvious impact upon Cornwall i t s e l f of t h i s "Great Migration" was of 
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Censal 
year 
1801 
1811 
1821 
1831 
1841 
1851' 
1861 
1871 
1881 
189.1 
190l" 
Cornwall 
Total 
'OOO 
192 
221 
261 
301 
342 
356 
.369 
362 
331 
323 
322 
% change 
per year 
+1.35 
+1.70 
+1.44 
+1.28 
40.39 
-K>.38 
-0.19 
-0.25 
-O.Ol 
Somerset 
Total 
•000 
274 
303 
356 
404 
436 
444 
445 
463 
469 
484 
433* 
% change 
per year 
+1.00 
+1.62 
+1.27 
40.76 
40.19 
4O.02 
40.41 
40.12 
40.32 
40.10 
England & Wales 
Total 
•OOO 
8893 
10164 
12000 
13897 
15914 
17928 
20066 
22712 
25974 
29003 
32528 
% change 
per year 
+1,32 
+1.67 
+1,48 
+1.36 
+1.22 
+1.13 
+1,25 
+1.35 
+1.11 
+1.16 
Fig 9: 
Source: 
* Boundary censal d i s t r i c t change 
Population 1801-1901 - Cornwall, compared to a) 
Somerset and b) England and Wales. 
Adrian Lee, "Cornwall: Aspects of Regionalism & 
Nationalism", 1978, Table 1. 
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Fig 10.1 Native emigration from English and Welsh counties (net 
of returns), as a % of t o t a l native population, 1861-
70. 
Fig 10,2 
Source: 
1871-80. 
Dudley Baines, Migration i n a Mature Economy: 
Bnigration and Internal Migration i n England and Wales 
1861-1900. Cambridge University Press. CamhriHpp 
1^ 83, ppl88-189. ^ ' 
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Males Females 
To To other 
overseas counties 
% % 
10.5 7.0 
5.9 12-6 
5.2 11.4 
"5.1 10.7 
3.5 9.6 
•l.S 10.7 
*1.3 11.6 
4.2 8.1 
4.2 9.9 
3.8 8.5 
3.8 10.8 
3.5 12.8 
3.4 11.5 
3.3 6.7 
3.2 8.1 
3.2 13.9 
3.2 10.7 
3.2 9.9 
3.1 11.3 
3.1 10.1 
2.8 8.9 
2.8 8.7 
2.8 9.5 
2.7 11.0 
2.6 12.2 
2.5 9.6 
2.5 12.6 
2.4 11.3 
2.1 9.4 
2.0 11.9 
1.9 Il .S 
l.S •. 9.3 
1.5 9.1 
1.3 11.8 
3.4 9.S 
To To oth 
overseas counti 
% % 
Brecon 5.4 12.2 
Cornwall 5.3 7.1 
Montgomery 3.3 10.6 
Huntingdonshire 2.9 13.8 
Herefordshire 2.8 12.0 
Pembroke 2.S 9.3 
Merioneth 2.4 9.0 
Westmorland 2.4 11.5 
Somerset 2.1 10.1 
Worcestershire 2.1 10.2 
Cumberland 2.0 9.2 
Devon 1.9 7.9 
Radnor 1.9 13.1 
Cardigan l.S 8.S 
Carmarthen 1.8 7.5 
Rutland 1.8 15.4 
Dorset 1.7 11.5 
Shropshire 1.7 11.8 
Buckinghamshire 1.5 12.7 
Northamptonshire • 1.5 9.5 
Flint 1.4 11.7 
Suffolk 1.4 10.1 
Wiltshire 1.3 11.4 
Lincolnshire 1.1 10.1 
Anglesey 1.0 7.8 
Derbyshire I.O 9.5 
O.xfordshire 1.0 12.7 
Bedfordshire 0.9 11.8 
Hertfordshire 0.7 12.S 
Norfolk 0.7 9.4 
Caernar\'on. 0.6 6.8 
Denbigh 0.4 10.6 
Cambridj;oshirc 0.2 12.6 
Berkshire 0 12.9 
All rural counties 1.7 10.2 
Cornwall 
Brecon 
Herefordshire 
Pembroke 
Cumberland 
Montgomery 
Westmorland 
Devon 
Somerset 
Merioneth 
Dorset 
Huntingdonshire 
Cardigan 
Caernar^'on 
Anglesey 
Rutland 
Shropshire 
Worcestershire 
Buckinghamshire 
Wiltshire 
Ormarthen 
Northamptonshire 
Suffolk 
Hint 
Oxfordshire 
Lincolnshire 
Radnor 
Berkshire 
Norfolk 
Cambridgeshire 
Hertfordshire 
Denbigh 
Derbyshire 
Bcdfordsl'.irc 
All rural cuunlics 
Fig 11: Migration by natives of English and Welsh rural 
counties (net of returns), 1861-1900, as a % of the 
t o t a l native population bom i n each county. Rank 
order of eniigration rates. 
Note Migration to Scotland i s included i n 'emigration' 
except i n the case of Cumberland. 
Source: 
Note: 
Baines, 1985, pp232-233. 
Despite i t s in d u s t r i a l p r o f i l e , Cornwall i s designated 
a " r u r a l " area as i t had no contiguous settlements 
with a population of 20,000 or more (Baines, pl45). 
As Baines notes (plA6), "By this d e f i n i t i o n , a l l the 
population of Cornwall lived i n ru r a l areas throughout 
thi s period...It i s important to remember that 'rural' 
i s not the same things as 'agricultural'." He adds 
(pl46), "In addition, most mining villages were not 
part of an urban community...". 
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course the very v i s i b l e depopulation that occurred - the population 
of Breage and Germoe f e l l by 27 per cent between 18A1 and 1851, that 
of Tywardreath by 29 per cent between 1861 and 1871, and that of St 
Just-in-Penwith by 27 per cent between 1871 and 1881. Perranzabuloe 
lost 22 per cent between 1871 and 1881, and St Cleer lost 25 per cent 
of i t s population during the same decade and a further 22 per cent 
between 1891 and 1 9 0 1 . B u t depopulation was only one effect, for 
emigration robbed Cornwall of the more s k i l l e d , more energetic and 
younger elements of i t s inhabitants. Between 1861 and 1900 44.8 per 
cent of the Cornish male population aged 15 to 24 l e f t for overseas, 
with a further 29.7 per cent leaving for other counties. Over the 
same period and i n the same age group, 26.2 per cent of Cornish 
females went overseas while 35.5 per cent went to other counties. 
(Figs 12.1, 12.2 and 13) At the same time something of a "dependency 
culture" was created within Cornwall. Although many Cornish 
emigrants went overseas as "proper colonists" (especially to B r i t i s h 
possessions such as Australia, New Zealand or Canada), taking their 
families with them and se t t l i n g permanently, others (normally males, 
and very often miners) went as individuals on a temporary basis -
leaving behind spouses, children and perhaps other dependent 
r e l a t i v e s . E v e n "proper colonists" might leave dependent relatives 
(elderly parents, perhaps) who, l i k e a l l the other dependents, would 
rely upon the regular receipt at home i n Cornwall of monies sent back 
by their kinfolk abroad. In thi s way, the welfare of large sections 
of the community was dependent upon the support of the Cornish 
overseas. 
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Fig 12.1 Einigration by male natives of English and Welsh counties (net of returns) , 1861-1900 as a % of those 
aged 15-24. 
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Fig 12.2 
Source: 
Dnigration by female natives of English and Welsh 
counties (net of returns), 1861-1900 as a % of those 
aged 15-24. 
Baines, 1985, ppl55-156. 
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Males 
Females 
Cornwall 
Brecon 
Herefordshire 
Pembroke 
Monlgomery 
Westmorland 
Devon 
Somerset 
Merioneth 
Dorset 
Cumberland 
Huntingdonshire 
Caernarvon 
Shropshire 
Worcestershire 
Anglesey 
Wiltshire 
Buckinghamshire 
Rutland 
Cardigan 
Northamptonshire 
Suffolk 
Oxfordshire 
Carmarthen 
Flint 
Lincolnshire 
Berkshire 
Radnor 
Norfolk 
Cambridgeshire 
Denbigh 
Derbyshire 
Bedfordshire 
Hertfordshire 
All rural counties 
To Toother 
overseas counties 
% % 
44.8 29.7 
28.1 60.1 
25.0 55.2 
23.3 48.3 
22.4 50.1 
21.6 57.4 
20.1 38.4 
19.5 46.0 
18.5 41.5 
18.3 51.5 
17.4 47.2 
16.3 59.8 
15.7 32.2 
15.7 51.7 
15.7 48.1 
15.2 38.0 
14.8 47.8 
14.7 53.5 
14.6 63.4 
14.1 53.8 
13.7 43.3 
13.5 45.7 
12.7 58.3 
12.6 40.7 
12.6 52.2 
12.3 46.9 
12.0 55.0 
11.9 60.3 
lO.O 45.6 
9.5 56.8 
8.6 44.0 
7.5 45.3 
6.5 55.9 
5.0 55.7 
16.0 47.1 
Brecon 
Cornwall 
Montgomery 
Huntingdonshire 
Herefordshire 
Pembroke 
Merioneth 
Westmorland 
Worcestershire 
Somerset 
Cumberland 
Devon 
Radnor 
Rutland 
Cardigan 
Dorset 
Carmarthen 
Shropshire 
Anglesey 
Northamptonshire 
Buckinghamshire 
Suffolk 
Wiltshire 
Flint 
Lincolnshire 
Oxfordshire 
Derbyshire 
Bodfordshirc 
Norfolk 
Caornarv'on 
Denbigh 
Cambridgosliirc 
Hertford.';hire 
Dorkshirc 
All riir.^i ct»unlicb 
To Toothc 
overseas countie 
% % 
26.4 5S.7 
26.2 35.5 
16.3 52.4 
14.6 69.4 
14.3 62.0 
13.6 45.5 
12.5 45.5 
12.0 58.1 
11.0 52.5 
10.6 51.9 
10.3 46.9 
9.9 41.9 
9.3 63.6 
9.1 78.2 
9.0 44.0 
8.9 60.2 
8.8 36.4 
8.6 60.1 
7.9 39.5 
7.8 49.2 
7.7 66.5 
7.3 52.1 
6.9 53.9 
6.8 58.8 
5.6 50.8 
5.3 65.5 
3.1 50.3 
4.3 59.7 
3.9 49.8 
2.9 35.3 
10 53.3 
1.0 65.1 
0.-! 66.9 
0.1 63.3 
32.0 
Fig 13 
Note: 
Source: 
Migration by natives of English and Welsh rural 
counties (net of returns), 1861-1900, as a % of those 
aged 15-24. 
Migration to Scotland i s included i n 'emigration* 
except i n the case of Cumberland. 
Baines, 1985, pp230-231. 
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The "Great Migration" i s popularly associated with the 
emigration of Cornish miners, as f i r s t copper and then t i n declined, 
and that this i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i s to a considerable degree correct i s 
evidenced by contemporary newspaper reports such as that i n the West 
Briton i n May 1867 which noted that i n the previous twelve months 
some 7,380 miners had l e f t C o r n w a l l . A n o t h e r , i n the Royal 
Cornwall Gazette, recorded i n January 1868 that "Eight thousand 
miners have recently l e f t Cornwall...",^^ while Bradford Barton has 
written that "The resoundingly Cornish names of these captains 
appended to their reports i n the Mining Journal i n the period from 
1850 to 1880 give chapter and verse..."^^ to thi s migration of 
miners: a Roskrow at Huelva i n Spain; a Holman at the Salisbury Plain 
Mine, Jamaica; a Rickard at Pontgibard i n France's Massif Central; a 
Champion at the St John del Rey Mining Co. i n Brazil, and very many 
more i n Portugal, Angola, I t a l y , Turkey, Algeria, and elsewhere. Not 
a l l Cornish emigrants were miners, however, and amongst the other 
migrating occupations were fishermen who sailed their l i t t l e boats to 
new homes as near as Guernsey or as far as Victoria i n Australia. 
There were Delabole slate men who were able to pursue their 
specialist occupation i n destinations as far removed as the United 
States and South Australia, and Cornish farmers who - with 
considerable experience as arable farmers trying to wrest a l i v i n g 
from marginal country at home - were well suited to the pioneer l i f e 
on the wheat frontiers of North America and South Australia: i n the 
l a t t e r colony, indeed, a major Cornish impact can be discerned i n the 
expansion of the agricultural f r o n t i e r i n the last century.^® In 
areas of Cornish concentation - such as Grass Valley i n California or 
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Moonta i n South Australia - the Cornish settled into a variety of 
occupations. In Grass Valley, for example, where i n the 1880s three 
daily and two weekly newspapers were edited by Comishmen, i t was 
said i n 1884 that "The Comishmen here are not engaged exclusively i n 
mining. The signs over almost a l l the stores bear Cornish names, and 
several of the business men hold responsible positions i n the county 
and State". 
The fortunes of mining, however, largely determined the ebb and 
flow of emigration, refle c t i n g the overwhelming importance of the 
mining industry within Cornwall. This, of course, was the "push" 
element i n the "Great Migration" but equally important were the 
" p u l l " components - principally the various mineral bonanzas 
overseas, but also other considerations such as the planned expansion 
of South Australia's wheat fr o n t i e r i n the 1870s (when a Comishman, 
James Penn Boucaut, was Premier of the colony) or the c i v i l and 
religious l i b e r t y and socio-economic mobility offered by destinations 
such as the United States and South Australia's "Paradise of 
Dissent".Overseas mining companies, of course, were well aware, 
that Cornwall was the centre of mining technological innovation and 
were therefore understandably keen to recruit Cornish miners -
especially the s k i l l e d captains and tributers - to their workings. 
North America, Australia and South Africa emerged as the principal 
destinations of these emigrant Cornish f o l k - but as the pages of the 
West Briton attest^^ - very many found their way to destinations as 
diverse as New Zealand, Cuba, Nicaragua, Brittany and Brazil. 
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Migration associated with economic change i n Cornwall was at 
f i r s t an internal phenomenon, involving i n the early part of the 
nineteenth century a movement of population from the more easterly, 
more agricultural d i s t r i c t s - such as the parish of Poundstock i n 
North Cornwall - to the rapidly expanding copper parishes i n the 
west. I n th i s way, for example, the population of Gwennap rose from 
4,594 i n 1801 to 10,794 i n 1841, and that of Redruth from 4,924 to 
11,504 between 1801 and 1961.^^ This movement was su f f i c i e n t to meet 
the expanding demand for labour, and consequently Cornwall did not 
experience mass immigration from outside (unlike the comparable 
d i s t r i c t of South Wales, where there was an i n f l u x from western 
England and from Ireland), the overwhelmingly "Cornish" nature of the 
population accounting i n part for the homogeneity, cohesion and sense 
of id e n t i t y i n nineteenth century Cornwall where a l l Cornish folk 
were almost l i t e r a l l y cousins, "Cousin Jacks" as they were to be 
known i n mining camps across the world. Later i n the century, this 
geographical movement was reversed, with miners from the western 
d i s t r i c t s moving - often with their families - to the new copper 
mining areas i n the east: to St Austell, to St Cleer and the Caradon 
d i s t r i c t , and to the Tamar Valley around Gunnislake and Calstock, 
some s p i l l i n g across the border to the neighbourhood of Tavistock. 
This was i t s e l f a complex process, involving often a progressively 
eastwards s h i f t by individtaals or whole families from one area to 
another as the various mines rose and f e l l and as new ones were 
discovered (and as china clay quarrying was developed i n mid-
Cornwall) - movement that has been analysed i n some depth by 
Deacon. A considerable proportion of western miners moving to the 
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Caradon d i s t r i c t i n the 1840s were from the Breage area (where the 
population dropped so alarmingly i n that period as a result of local 
t i n mine closuires), this movement to East Cornwall being associated 
therefore with the f i r s t s t i r r i n g s of decline i n the western mines. 
I t was thus migration i n response to the f i r s t hints of the process 
of de-industrialisation that was to characterise Cornwall, and a 
precursor of the imminent mass "Great Migration". 
There had, of course, been some Cornish movement to America i n 
earlier times ( i n the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there had 
been Cornish settlers i n New England and the Old South) and as early 
as 1778 copper miners from Redruth were sent to open up the copper 
deposits along Lake Superior. In 1817 Richard Trevithick was i n 
South America erecting pump engines, and i n 1825 a party of miners 
hired by the Anglo-Mexican Mining Association set out for the New 
W o r l d . T h e s e early emigrants, however, were for the most part 
adventurers anxious to t r y their luck or apply their s k i l l s abroad, 
not driven by economic necessity i n the sense that the later mass 
migrants were. By the 1830s the rate of emigration from Cornwall was 
starting to increase, however, escapees from agrarian poverty i n the 
north-eastern parishes soon complemented by the f i r s t significant 
movement from the western mining parishes during the "Hungry 
Forties". Thereafter, the "Great Migration" continued v i r t u a l l y 
unabated u n t i l the Great War. 
In the 1840s the Real del Monte sil v e r mines i n Mexico were an 
important magent,^^ and i n the same decade Comishmen were employed 
i n the iron mines on the shores of Lake Huron i n Canada. In the 
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United S t a t e s , t h e Wisconsin lead mines attracted many Cornish 
during the 1840s and by 1850 there were perhaps as many as 9,000 
Cornish f o l k i n the d i s t r i c t of Mineral Point. The United States 
aimed to become se l f - s u f f i c i e n t i n copper as well as lead, and i n the 
early IBAOs began a deliberate expansion of the Lake Superior mines, 
Cornish miners flocked to the Lakes from both Wisconsin and Cornwall, 
the Keweenaw peninsula soon earning a reputation as an American 
" L i t t l e Cornwall". I n 18A9 Cornish newspapers were f u l l of news of 
the Califomian gold discoveries and soon Cousin Jacks from a l l over 
Cornwall and North America were clamoiiring to become "Forty-Niners". 
At f i r s t , individual diggers working on their own had easy pickings 
but soon quartz gold was discovered at depth - which required heavy 
capitalisation and the expertise of Cornish miners. Consequently, as 
Rowse has said, " I t i s probable that there are more Cornish people i n 
California than i n any other state i n the Union". 
The f i r s t important discoveries of quartz gold were i n Nevada 
(at f i r s t a county of California, but soon to become a State i n i t s 
own r i g h t ) and by 1870 Grass Valley could boast 1,000 Cornish 
settlers. Rowse has shown that "...Grass Valley and Nevada City 
became predominantly Cornish t o w n s " , w i t h their Cornish Carols and 
pasties and wrestling matches. The discovery of the celebrated 
"Comstock Lode" ensured a continuing Cornish presence i n Nevada i n 
the 1870s and 1880s, but Cornish migrants also found their way to 
other parts of the Union: to Colorado where they were a significant 
part of the population of Gilpin County and the appropriately-named 
Leadville i n the 1880s, and from North Carolina i n the 1850s to Utah 
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i n the 1860s and New Mexico i n the 1870s and Arizona i n the 1880s. 
One especially important area of Cornish concentration was Butte, 
Montana, where many were attracted to the copper mines i n the 1880s. 
I n a l l these mining areas the Cornish were noted, according to the 
contemporary American joiamalist Wells Drury, for their "...religious 
fervour...independence, t h r i f t , geniality, e x c i t a b i l i t y , contempt for 
familiar d a n g e r s H e added, with a hint of admiration, "And 
with what zest they can sing their fellowship song 'One and A l l ' , and 
their old p a t r i o t i c ballad, 'And Shall Trelawny Die'...".^^ 
The Cornish experience i n Australia was similar, their 
principal impact occurring in.the mining d i s t r i c t s and with their 
influence extending to the creation of religious, cultural and social 
patterns reminiscent of those that they had known at home. Although 
there had been some limited transportation and emigration to the 
Penal Colonies from Cornwall, the f i r s t major movement of Cornish 
people to the Antipodes did not occur u n t i l the foundation of South 
Australia i n 1836 (Fig. 14). The discovery of copper - at Kapunda 
and Burra Burra i n the mid-1840s and at Wallaroo and Moonta 
("Australia's L i t t l e Cornwall") i n 1859-60 enticed many to South 
Australia, with further encouragement afforded by the colony's 
l i b e r a l immigration and assisted passage schemes. Indeed, between 
1836 and 1886 as many as 16,000 Cornish settled i n South Australia, 
some 8 per cent of a l l emigrants to the colony. Elsewhere i n 
Australia the Cornish impact was also strong (as evidenced by the 
West Briton's comment i n September 1875 that 10,576 people had l e f t 
Cornwall for Australia during the f i r s t s ix months of that year^^), 
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Assisted Immigrants to South Australia 
by Region of Last Residence within the United Kingd 
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James Jupp (edO, The Encyclopaedia of the Australian 
People, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1988, p41 and p53. 
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the Victorian Gold Rush establishing sizeable Cornish communities i n 
Ballarat and (especially) Bendigo during the 1850s. As i n 
California, the development of deep quartz mining led - i n the 1870s 
- to increased capitalisation i n Victoria and to an era i n which the 
s k i l l e d Cornish hard-rock miners came into t h e i r own. The Cornish 
were similarly ijnportant i n the development of the Broken H i l l 
silver-lead-zinc f i e l d s i n the 1880s, and at the Coolgardie and 
Kalgoorlie gold mines i n Western Australia i n the 1890s. In 
Queensland they mined copper at Peak Downs and gold at Mount Morgan, 
and i n Tasmania i n the 1870s they were a crucial element i n the 
exploitation of the t i n deposits which, i r o n i c a l l y , posed such a 
threat to the Cornish t i n industry. 
In South Africa the f i r s t major Cornish i n f l u x was i n the 
1850s, to the Namaqualand copoper mines i n the northern Cape. Even 
more important was the discovery, i n the mid-1880s, of the Kimberley 
diamond f i e l d s . By 1889 there was a vibrant "Cornish Association" 
active i n the d i s t r i c t , one manifestation of a deep Cornish influence 
that was further enhanced by Cornish involvement i n the Eastern 
Transvaal gold rush i n the 1870s and the celebrated Witwatersrand 
rush i n the mid-1880s, Johannesburg had i t s own "Cousin Jacks* 
Comer", where the Cornish would meet to exchange news from home, and 
the Ferreira Deep was said to be manned almost entirely by old 
Dolcoath miners. In 1895 over 2,000 people l e f t Cornwall for South 
Africa, but the Boer War created a l u l l i n emigration between 1899 
and 1902. Thereafter, there was a resvirgence but i n the years before 
the F i r s t World War there was a growing d i s i l l u s i o n with South 
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Africa, partly as a result of the realisation of the frightening 
extent of the d i s a b i l i t i e s amongst Cornish miners caused by pthisis 
contracted out there and partly because of growing industrial vmreast 
i n the South African m i n e s . B y 1913 there was a steady stream of 
Cornish miners returning home from South Africa but by then - as the 
Cornish Post had remarked i n December 1906 - the situation had 
already existed for many years whereby: 
When the button i s pressed i n Africa, the b e l l rings i n 
Cornwall...a change i n thought and action i n South Africa 
affects the l i t t l e western county which has contributed so much 
of the labour and enterprise to... the land of gold and 
diamonds,^ 
Although the main thrust of the "Great Migration" was overseas, 
i t i s important to note that many emigrant Comishmen found 
employment (and their families, homes) i n other areas of the United 
Kingdom. Many, of course, worked the copper mines of Devon ( i n so 
many respects to be considered an eastwards extension of the Cornish 
industry) but others roamed further a f i e l d - to the silver mines of 
West Somerset and the lead mines of the Mendips, to the c o l l i e r i e s of 
South Wales (where St Just, St Ives and Calstock men were noted at 
work i n 1866), i n the Wicklow Mountains and the south-west of 
Ireland, and i n Scottish coal and iron mines (where 300 Cornish 
miners had gone i n 1866). Many others went to the North of England -
to the Pennines lead mines, to the Lake D i s t r i c t and Fumess metal 
mines, and even to the Settle and Carlisle Railway where i n 1871 they 
were employed to drive the Bleamoor tunnel. In times of 
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unemployment and shortage they could also be induced to assume the 
roles of strike-breakers, as i n 1873 when 900 men l e f t Cornwall to 
make "Burnley a village of Cornish m i n e r s " , w i t h local observers 
noting that "The departures from St Cleer, Pensilva, and Linkinhome 
have been so numerous that there are scores of houses 
tenantless...".^^ Similarly, i n October 1877 over 100 s t r i k e -
breaking miners l e f t Cornwall for the Sunderland coal f i e l d s . 
The vast panorama of the "Great Migration" i s one of the great 
themes of Cornish history, and i n the l a t t e r part of the nineteenth 
century i t dominated Cornish l i f e . Few individuals or i n s t i t u t i o n s 
i n Cornwall were not touched by i t s effects, and the Cornish sense of 
identity expanded to i n s i s t , for example, that " I f you haven't been 
to Moonta, you haven't travelled"^^ or that those bom of Cornish 
parents overseas were equally as "Cornish" as those bom i n Comwall 
i t s e l f - " I f a cat has kittens i n the oven this doesn't make them 
into p a s t i e s " . T h e r e was, indeed, a discemable Cornish 
"international identity" that emerged towards the end of the century, 
one that was voiced i n many parts of the globe through the insistent 
declarations of loyalty to Comwall from "Cornish Associations". such 
as those i n Broken H i l l or the Transvaal, and which was exhibited at 
many levels - most notably i n the press. Not only did newspapers i n 
Comwall carry frequent reports from Cornish communities overseas, 
but those communities themselves carried regular "news from ComwallV 
items i n their papers and also reported the a c t i v i t i e s of the other 
communities. Thus, for example, we f i n d reprinted i n South 
Australian newspapers such as the Wallaroo Times and Yorke' s 
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Peninsula Advertiser articles from the press i n Cornwall reporting 
upon Cornish a c t i v i t i e s i n South Africaf^^ This "international 
id e n t i t y " was, of course, an expansion- of the Cornish sense of 
ident i t y based upon industrial prowess, expressing an extraordinary 
Cornish pride i n the achievement that had f a c i l i t a t e d the mining 
development of America, Australia, South Africa and elsewhere. There 
was also a missionary and evangelical tinge to a l l t h i s , for the 
Cornish were proud not only of their technological contribution to 
the world but also their religious contribution - especially i n the 
f i e l d of Methodism. The Bible Christian Missionary Society, for 
example, was i n no doubt about i t s role i n the "Great Migration" and 
many Cornish Methodists held the view, expressed by John Pearce, that 
i f "...the Great Emigration i s the crown of Cornish accomplishment, 
then John Wesley i s seen to be i t s brightest jewel". 
In. a sense, therefore, the "Great Migration" represented the 
highpoint of Cornish achievement as i t was perceived i n nineteenth 
century Cornwall - a view that was tr a g i c a l l y ironic because i n 
r e a l i t y the "Great Migration" was (as intimated i n Chapter 4) both a 
symptom of and a perpetuating factor i n Cornwall's peripheral 
condition. The imperfect and incomplete nature of Cornish 
industrialisation had led not only to an over-specialised industrial 
base but also to an over-specialised workforce which had no 
alternative but to emigrate and apply i t s s k i l l s anew elsewhere as 
the Cornish economy f e l l into decline. To a considerable degree, 
indeed, the Cornish miners were pawns i n the hands of what had become 
(as Burke has argued^^) an international mining labour market, part 
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of the international mining economy that had emerged i n which market 
forces sped the "Cousin Jacks" from one area to the next as the 
relative fortunes of the different mines and different countries 
waxed and waned. Cornish economic and social marginalisation had, 
quite l i t e r a l l y , world-wide effects, for as mining investment i n 
Cornwall declined and B r i t i s h raining capital was increasingly 
directed overseas, so the Cornish miner was himself correspondingly 
directed abroad. 
Given that Cornish expertise and energy abroad had to a 
considerable extent been responsible f o r the overseas competition i n 
copper, t i n , and even wheat, that had quickened the process of 
industrial decline i n Cornwall, the Cornish pride i n the "Great 
Migration" was a l l the more ironic. And by accelerating th i s decline 
the process of emigration also hastened the emergence of the 
"dependency culture" i n which the continued dispersal of Cornwall's 
miners was seen as advantageous - not only because i t removed 
"surplus" population but because i t provided what was almost an 
informal welfare system for the support of dependents. In 1863 the 
West Briton admitted that the scale of emigration " . . . i s becoming a 
matter of grave consideration...(for)...those who go abroad are the 
very bone and sinew of the country"^^ but went on to declare that: 
I t i s , however, highly gratifying to learn that wherever the 
Cornish miner goes, he i s generally well received, and rarely 
f a i l s not only to benefit himself, but those of his friends 
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remaining at home, by the welcome remittances vMch arrive by 
almost every mail.^^ 
In J\ine 1866 the same newspaper considered that "The unprecedented 
exodus...is relieving us to a very beneficial extent of the surplus 
population of our mining d i s t r i c t s . . . " ^ ^ but with the Royal Cornwall 
Gazette noting eighteen months later that the recent departure of 
8,000 miners had l e f t "...20,000 persons dependent upon their 
energies elsewhere".The theme of dependency became more important 
as the century wore on, and as the in d u s t r i a l base began to contract. 
In January 1879 the West Briton perceived changes i n the nature of 
emigration, with fewer families leaving as "proper colonists" but 
with more individuals departing as itinerent workers i n the world's 
mining f i e l d s . "Thousands of people i n Cornwall are supported..."^^ 
by these emigrants, claimed the newspaper, for the Cornish miner 
"...leaves the women, the children, and the bid people behind - not 
on the parish, be i t said to his honour".^^ By the end of the 
century the situation had become even more stark, the a r r i v a l of the 
"African Mail" a major calendar event i n Camborne-Redruth and the 
other depressed mining d i s t r i c t s . In September 1898, for example, 
the West Briton noted that, 
Saturday morning last saw the a r r i v a l of the African mail - the 
main delivery for the month from Johannesburg, Kimberley &C. 
The heavy mail was promptly dispatched from the post-office, 
and i t was not long before the banks of the town were busy 
cashing drafts. With such an i n f l u x of money into the town a 
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busy Saturday markeC was an assured thing, and so i t turned 
80 out 
As the Cornish mining industry a l l but expired there developed, 
as Richard Dawe has shown i n his valuable study, a relationship 
between Cornwall and South Africa that was almost unique. There was, 
as Rowse observed, "...something very pathetic and moving i n that 
close connection between our Cornish villages and South Africa". 
The Corhubian newspaper i n January 1902 summed up the situation 
succinctly: "We are l i v i n g on South A f r i c a " . I n 1905 i t was 
estimated that there were 7,000 Cornish miners on the Rand, earning 
per annum something l i k e £300 each - i f the cost of l i v i n g accounted 
for perhaps h a l f their wages, then as much as one mi l l i o n pounds per 
year could have been sent home to Cornwall-®"^  Dawe concludes that 
there i s l i t t l e doubt that Cornwall did l i v e o f f the Rand and that 
"The gold industry of South Africa cushioned Cornwall as i t s own t i n 
and copper industries died a slow death, and families i n Cornwall 
certainly benefitted from the high wages earned i n South Africa".®^ 
The Cornwall of the early 1900s, dependent so pathetically upon 
the energy of her emigres i n distant South Africa, was a far cry from 
that vibrant, self-confident, innovative land that existed only a 
half century or so before. But that half century had witnessed the 
v i r t u a l destruction of the mining industry i n Cornwall, involving not 
only closure of the mines themselves but the demise of the financial 
system (the cost book) that had supported i t , along with the creation 
of an integrated international mining economy and laboiar market where 
Bri t i s h capital and Cornish miners were drawn to new destinations 
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abroad. This, indeed, was the direct consequence of the imperfect, 
incomplete and over-specialised industrialisation that Comwall had 
experienced, ushering i n the social and economic marginalisation of 
this era of "Second Peripheral ism" of which the "Great Migration" was 
the most v i s i b l e a t t r i b u t e . And yet the f u l l . characteristics of 
"Second Peripheralism" i n i t s matured manifestations went deeper 
s t i l l , bringing to the Cornish economy and society a -certain 
paraylsis or "fossilization" which would endure u n t i l after the 
Second World War, and which continued to set the Cornish experience 
apart i n a most fundamental way from that elsewhere. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE GREAT PARALYSIS 
The parlous condition of the Cornish economy at the end of the 
nineteenth century, i n particular the collapse of i t s industrial 
base, was - as has been argued - a function of Cornwall's peripheral 
position within the United Kingdom. That same peripherality was to 
ensure that Cornwall would be powerless to react to the new situation 
i n which she found herself. The creation of an international mining 
economy had, through emigration, deprived Cornwall of her native 
expertise and allocated her an i n f e r i o r and generally indifferent 
position i n the international mining labour market. Financial 
control of mining had passed to the City, whose interest was set 
firmly abroad, depriving Cornwall of her last vestiges of local 
control and ensuring that Cornwall would attract l i t t l e mining and 
associated industrial investment. Cornwall was thus not only starved 
of resources - especially expert labour and industrial investment -
but was also denied the means to make amends. At the mercy of the 
internationalised character of the mining industry, and with l i t t l e 
indigenous financial wherewithal, Cornwall experienced an economic 
near-paralysis. This paralysis, indeed, had arisen i n the closing 
decades of the last century and was to characterise the Cornish 
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economy i m t i l after the Second World War. I t was accompanied by an 
attendant paralysis, a "f o s s i l i z a t i o n " i n Cornish society and culture 
and represented the matured manifestation of "Second Peripheralism", 
the inevitable consequence of the imperfect, incomplete and over-
• specialised experience of industrialisation described i n Chapters 4 
and 5. 
This era of Cornish paralysis co-incided, of course, with two 
great international cataclysms - the F i r s t World War, and the "Great 
Depression" of the inter-war years - which affected Cornwall as they 
affected other areas and which served to exacerbate Cornish problems. 
But, despite this shared international experience, the Cornish 
condition remained highly individual. A survey by the University of 
Exeter, published i n 1947 but drawing largely upon the Census fo r 
1931, concluded that the Cornish economy was ".. .highly 
differentiated from that of the country as a whole".^ 
Proportionately higher numbers were engaged i n service industries and 
i n agriculture but, i n remarkable contrast to the situation that had 
obtained less than a century before, there were "...fewer i n 
manufacture and mining".^ Similarly, the population density of 
Cornwall i n 1931 was an average of 234 persons per square mile, while 
for England and Wales as a whole i t was 685. This i n part reflected 
the legacy of the "Great Migration" (since 1861 Cornwall had 
registered a decrease i n population for each decade except that of 
1901-11) and what the survey termed Cornwall • s ".. .unfavourable 
...demographic situation...".^ (Figs 15.1, 15.2) Between 1901 and 
1911, i t was noted, the population of England and Wales had grown by 
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P O P U L A T I O N 
1901-1911 
1911-1921 
1921-1931 
England and Wales 
+ 10.9 
+ 4-9 
+ 5.5 
Devon 
+ 5.7 
+ 1.4 
+ 3.3 
Cornwall 
- 0.1 
+ 1.8 
- 0.9 
Fig 15.1 Decennial change per cent of population 1901-1931 
Administrative Areas 
Cornwall 
Devonshire 
Gloucestershire 
Somersetshire 
Wiltshire 
By Births and Deaths 
+ 2.2 
+ 3.0 
+ 4-6 • 
+ 2.S 
+ 5.5 
By Migration 
- 3.1 
+ 0.3 
- 0.7 
- O.S 
-
Total 
0.9 
3.3 
3- 9 
2.0 
4- 0 
Fig 15.2: 
Source: 
Percentage increase (+) or decrease (-) 1921-1931 
John Murray et a l , Devon and Comw^n • A 
Preliminary Survey, Wheaton, Exeter, 19^7, p6 & p9 
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10.9 per cent. I n that same period, however, Cornwall's population 
had f a l l e n by 0.1 per cent, i n marked contrast even to neighbouring 
Devon where the population had risen by 5.7 per cent. Similarly, 
between 1911 and 1921 the population of England and Wales had risen 
by 4.9 per cent whereas the rise i n Cornwall had been only 1,8 per 
cent, and between 1921 and 1931 the Cornish population had fa l l e n by 
0.9 per cent while the rise for England and Wales had been 5.5 per 
cent. For the remaining years of the inter-war era, the population 
of Cornwall had decreased by 2.5 per cent compared with an increase 
of 3.2 per cent i n Great Br i t a i n as a whole and an increase i n Devon 
of 1.2 per cent. In making i t s comparative judgments, the survey 
emphasised that the demographic problem "...was more serious i n 
Cornwall than i n Devon."^ 
The contrast between Cornwall and Devon on the one hand, and 
between Cornwall and England on the other, was even more apparent i n 
the s t a t i s t i c s for unemployment where Cornwall (despite i t s declining 
population) was especially badly placed (Figs 16.1, 16.2). 
Commenting upon the decade 1929-38, the University's survey concluded 
that: 
Whereas, over the period, Devon's average unemployment 
experience was less severe than that of the country as a whole, 
that of Cornwall was more severe. The annual average 
unemployment i n Devon was but 12.3 per cent, that of Cornwall 
17.7 per cent, and that of England 14.8 per cent. The greatest 
differences between the yearly figures occurred during 1930-33; 
then Devon's average percentage unemployment was 14.4 per cent, 
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Soulli'Western 
Devon. Cornwall. Counties. Iln°land. 
1929 ... 9.1 10.2 S.S 9-5 
1930 ... I I . 6 14.6 I I . 3 15.3 
1931 14-I 23.3 16.2 20.S 
1932 ... 16.3 25.0 1S.3 20.6 
1933 - 15'*^ 23.5 17.3 i S . 6 
1934 13-^ ^ ii*.9 X4.5 15-4 
1935 • • 12.0 17-7 12.S 
i93fi ... I I . 6 16 
1937 ... 8.5 12.9 
^93S ... 9.5 1^.7 S.S 
2 10.9 12.0 
9-7 
r i . S 
Fig 16a: {^3^^*^ persons - unemployment percentages, 1929-
Source 
Redruth 
Devon, Cornwall. 
32.9 
28.4 
22.0 
Haylc 
Camborne 
Bideford 18.6 
Liskeard 
Plvmouth ... 16.3 17-4 
St' Austell ... T = 9 
Penzance 15.6 Barnstaple ... 14.4 
14.3 Ilfracombe ... 
Falmouth ... 
Truro 14.1 I I . 8 E.vmouth 0 6 
Torquay y.o 
9.2 
9.0 
8.9 
7 7 
Newton Abbot 
Exeter 
Tiverton 
Newquay / • / 
7-4 
Fig 16.2: Ministry of Labour areas i n Devon and Cornwall 
Insured persons annual average unemployment 
percentages during 1929-1938 
Murray et a l , 1947, p239 & p242, 
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\jhile that for England was 18.8 per cent, and that of Cornwall 
was 21.6 per cent. As these were the years of world 
depression, Devon escaped more l i g h t l y than the country, but 
Cornwall was affected more acutely. While the general trend of 
the figures i s similar i n each of the three areas, recovery 
after the ending of the depression was both more complete and 
faster i n Devon than i n Cornwall. Indeed, the persistence of 
high unemployment i n Cornwall suggests a post-world war 
depression problem more chronic than i n either England or 
Devon.^ 
This "problem", of course, was the underlying paralysis of the 
Cornish economy: even the awesome and international effects of the 
"Great Depression" could not, as the sxirvey showed, disguise the 
highly individual and long-term nature of the Cornish paralysis. 
In further consideration of the contrasts between Cornwall and 
Devon i n t h i s period, the survey noted that "The contrast between the 
(unemployment) figures for Cornish and Devonian areas i s also marked; 
not only are those i n Cornwall higher i n general than i n Devon, but 
the range between the extremes i s greater".^ I n the decade 1929-38, 
for example, the annual average percentage unemployment i n Newquay 
was as low as 7.4 per cent, reflecting the development of service 
industries there, but contrasting with St Austell (15.8 per cent) and 
liiskeard (17.4 per cent) where the decline i n china clay had 
important effects, and quite unlike the disasterous situation i n the 
old mining and engineering d i s t r i c t s of Redruth (32.9 per cent), 
Camborne (22.0 per cent) and Hayle (28.4 per cent). Acknowledging 
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Cornwall's by now markedly below average performance i n in d u s t r i a l 
production and manufacture, the survey l i s t e d the obvious features of 
Cornwall's geographic-peripherality - the lack of coal (with a note 
that "...by 1931 the p a r t i a l compensation provided by the e l e c t r i c i t y 
g rid system had not f u l l y developed"^), the limited and modest nature 
of local markets and the distance from "...the great markets of the 
o 
country...", the indifferent nature of the local transport and 
communications systems, the paucity of industrial services and 
training, and the fact that "No one industry possessed locational 
advantages pronounced enough to foster large-scale growth, and i n 
consequence the rise of subsidiary industries which might have grown 
around i t was inhibited".^ But the analysis hinted at a deeper 
appreciation of the nature of the Cornish paralysis when i t added 
that "Lastly, deficient industrial enterprise and industrial i n e r t i a 
must not be overlooked".^^ There was, however, no attempt to 
iden t i f y the causes of such deficiency and i n e r t i a . 
A f u l l e r understanding of the nature of Cornwall's industrial 
experience might have led to the conclusion that i n this era of 
paralysis i t was no surprise that the Cornish response was one of 
fatalism and resignation, but always with a blinkered and rather vain 
hope that t i n mining might yet revive and regain i t s old glory. In 
the decades before the Second World War there was certainly a 
reluctance to accept that Cornish mining was now only of marginal 
economic importance - to Cornwall and to Br i t a i n - and one of the 
ironies of the paralysis i s that such energy and resources that there 
were, were channelled into forlorn attempts to revive the mining 
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c o r p s e . A supposed recovery i n the industry i n 1906-7, for 
example, aroused some optimism - particularly with press reports that 
the number of miners employed i n Cornwall had risen to over 8,500 
(although as recently as the mid-1870s three times that number had 
been employed, while i n the hey-day of the mid-nineteenth century the 
figure had been fi v e times as large). The recovery was shortlived, 
however, with the press soon lamenting the high levels of 
unemployment i n the Tamar Valley and recording the disasterous 
effects upon the Truro d i s t r i c t of the closure of Wheal Jane. 
Dolcoath struggled on as the flagship of Cornish mining (sinking i t s 
new 300 fathom-deep Williams' shaft as an act of f a i t h i n the future) 
and with technological developments advocated by the Camborne School 
of Mines being embraced enthusiastically by the very small handful of 
Cornish mines that could afford to apply them.^^ The outbreak of war 
i n 1914 led to renewed demands upon young, trained manpower i n 
Cornwall - those with mining and engineering backgrounds, i n 
particvilar, finding t h e i r way into the Cornwall Fortress Royal 
Engineers and the Royal Navy, and with many others drawn into the 
ranks of the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry. Inevitably, many of 
these were destined never to return. 
Although t i n , as a strategic metal, remained i n demand 
throughout the war, the Government's policy was one where "...the 
13 
Cornish t i n mines had been exploited rather than developed".^"* The 
price of t i n had been pegged at an a r t i f i c i a l l y low lev e l , mainly as 
part of a deal with the U.S.A. to secure strategic supplies of 
copper, and developmental work i n the mines had been neglected at the 
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expense of the short-term policy of "picking they eyes" out to secure 
maximum output from easily accessible deposits. This was against a 
background of constantly r i s i n g wage b i l l s , exacerbated at the end of 
the war by r i s i n g material and coal costs. After 1918, too, the 
demand for t i n declined, leading to a f a l l i n t i n prices. In 1919 
mine owners and labour unions together lobbied the government for 
support, but without p o l i t i c a l muscle and influence their pleas had 
l i t t l e effect: "...assistance was long i n coming, so long that when 
at length loans were advanced to help some Cornish mining concerns to 
modernize themselves, on almost cast-iron security, i t was too late 
to save many mines that had been forced to close down",^^ As Rowe 
adds, "Early i n 1919 talk of a t o t a l cessation of Cornish mining 
became more prevalent...".^^ The railway str i k e i n the September 
brought fresh problems, and i n October the dreadful Levant mine 
disaster seemed to cast a shadow of despair upon the whole industry. 
The abandonment of Wheal Grenville i n the early months of 1920 
heralded what was to be the deepest c r i s i s i n Cornish mining, and 
soon emigration (especially to the gold mines of Canada, which had 
conducted a recruiting campaign i n Cornwall) was once again a feature 
of Cornish l i f e . Rowe recalls that. 
Harrowing tales have been to l d of the distress prevalent i n 
Cornish mining d i s t r i c t s during 1921 and 1922. Relief funds 
were organized, and associated with them was the organization 
of a Miners' Choir which after giving a number of concerts i n 
the less fortunate towns and villages of the home county went 
up-country to London, Bournemouth, Taunton, Cardiff... 
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Further money for r e l i e f came back from Cornish emigrants i n 
Canada, Australia, the Transvaal, and the IMited States. 
Camborne police station was transformed i n t o an emergency 
centre for clothing, and one estimate reckoned that 3,800 fo l k 
had received clothes with a further four thousand s t i l l i n 
need.^6 
Although a b r i e f upturn i n t i n prices warranted some .expansion during 
1926, the crash of the 1930s badly affected Cornish mining (at i t s 
lowest ebb there were only 426 employed i n the industry) and on the 
eve of the Second World War there were but three mines i n operation: 
Geevor, South Crofty, and East Pool and Agar. 
The production of "minor" minerals assisted t h i s lingering 
survival, most notably arsenic which was of importance around the 
turn of the century. Although the large-scale production of arsenic 
came too late to prolong the l i f e of Cornish copper (though several 
former copper mines did survive as arsenic mines) i t nevertheless was 
important i n ensuring the continuation of t i n operations at several 
major t i n m i n e s . O f longer-term significance was the china clay 
industry, not "mining" i n the underground, hard-rock sense that the 
Cornish understood i t but an extractive industry nonetheless and one 
which could harness existing technology within Cornwall. Tentative 
development work by potters from outside Cornwall i n the late 
eighteenth century paved the way for Cornish adventurers to take 
control of the industry i n the 1820s. I t s development was err a t i c , 
however, reflecting poor organistaion and periodic crises of over-
production. Compared to copper and t i n mining i t was never a major 
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emplojrer (even i n 1881 there were no more than 1600 men engaged i n 
i t ) , and of course i t was geographically concentrated upon the 
d i s t r i c t north of St Austell. 
Despite these limitations there was a hope i n the early years 
of this century that the production of china clay and china stone 
might expand to f i l l the vacuum l e f t by the decline of mining proper. 
Indeed, the annual output of china clay between 1900 and 1916 never 
f a i l e d to exceed half a m i l l i o n tons, a peak of over 860,000 tons 
being achieved i n 1912. The First World War had disasterous effects, 
however, as export markets closed. Profits turned to losses, costs 
rose alarmingly, and production i n 1917 was halved. After the war 
the depressed state of the industry was not easily remedied, and i n 
1921 and 1922 there was fea r f u l hardship i n the l i t t l e villages of 
the china clay country. By 1923 the export trade with the United 
States was reviving and the industry almost returned to i t s pre-war 
condition. However, the American slximp of 1929 and the "Great 
Depression" of 1932 precipitated a renewed decline. By the end of 
1932 output had f a l l e n by 40 per cent since 1929 and the price of 
china clay by more than 30 per cent. The clay industry reacted by 
forming a Producers' Federation, which had some success i n dealing 
with the external problems of the industry, and the amalgamations 
which created the large English Clays Levering Pochin & Co Ltd 
allowed for various economies of scale u n t i l the Second World War 
threw the industry once again into turmoil. 
The china clay industry, therefore, was at no time i n a 
position strong enough or stable enough to s t i r Cornwall from i t s 
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economic paralysis. But even with strength and s t a b i l i t y i t i s 
doubtful whether i t could have achieved the industrial renewal and 
diversification that was needed. Although a versatile product with 
an enormous range of industrial and commercial applications, china 
clay received l i t t l e more than i n i t i a l processing i n Cornwall. The 
Cornish industry was essentially extractive, with the applications of 
i t s products being carried out elsewhere i n Britain and overseas. As 
such, i t suffered problems of over-specialisation and under-
diversification i n tune with the general Cornish experience, a 
further manifestation of Cornwall's peripheral and marginalised 
economy and certainly not the type of enterprise from which might 
spring broader renewal and diversity. 
The periods of expansion i n clay output had been f a c i l i t a t e d by 
the development of ports such as Par and Charlestown, but the railway 
had also played a part. The railway had arrived too la t e , however, 
to play a wider role i n industrial development i n Cornwall. By the 
time the Royal Albert Bridge at Saltash was opened i n 1859, linking 
Cornwall by r i a i l with the rest of B r i t a i n , copper was on the eve of 
i t s terminal decline and with the peripheral characteristics of 
Cornwall's industrialisation already firmly and i r r e t r i e v a b l y 
established. The railway brought with i t the "telegraph" and 
improved postal services, as well as encouraging Cornish authorities 
to switch at last from local to Greenwich time, but i t was slow to 
develop both passenger and goods t r a f f i c . David St John Thomas has 
explained that, 
- 226 -
Even today Cornwall i s Britain's most individual county, but 
differences from the 'mainland' are nothing to what they were 
before the opening of the Royal Albert Bridge i n 1859. The 
bridge was supposed to l e t i n the Devil. What i n fact t r i c k l e d 
i n were a l l kinds of national unifying influences - to the true 
Comishman, of course, these were the very Devil. But the 
older order disintegrated only slowly, and i t was largely for 
this reason that the Cornwall Railway was so poor a proposition 
fin a n c i a l l y . For instance, Comishmen were reluctant to accept 
mass-produced Midland goods, while only a few were persuaded to 
venture as far a f i e l d i n their own country as even Plymouth -
though many had gone straight from Cornwall to seek employment 
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i n mines a l l over the world. 
The lacklustre performance of the Cornwall Railway^^ was not at 
a l l the exciting economic consequence of "opening up Cornwall" that 
i t s promoters had anticipated, but Thomas' explanation i s only part 
of the story. At root was the i n a b i l i t y of the Cornish economy to 
escape from the effects of i t s experience of industrialisation, with 
i t s ( i n 1859) impending economic marginalisation and paralysis. The 
railway did create employment i n i t s own ri g h t , of course, and 
elsewhere i t did encourage certain specific economic a c t i v i t i e s : -
spring flowers from the Isles of S c i l l y , broccoli and "new potatoes", 
milk, and of course fresh f i s h , could be transported s w i f t l y to the 
London markets with relative ease. The rates charged by the railway 
for the conveyance of such perishables were habitually c r i t i c i s e d as 
punitive i n Cornwall, however, and the economic a c t i v i t i e s encouraged 
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by the railway were not always i n Cornwall's best interests: as noted 
ear l i e r , penetration of the London markets stimulated "Yorkie" 
competition at the expense of the Cornish fishermen, while the 
creation of new up-country markets f o r the higher-priced varieties of 
f i s h discouraged the catching of the cheaper sorts that had formed 
the staple diet for many Cornish poor.^^ 
Cornish fishing, indeed, participated i n the general paralysis 
of the Cornish economy i n the years after the turn of the century. 
Unable to participate i n the new, vigorotis expansion of the deep-sea 
fisheries of the Arctic and North Sea (partly as a result of 
Cornwall's geographic situation, but also because of the f a i l u r e to 
produce large, deep-sea vessels), the Cornish f l e e t consisted of 
small inshore boats. In the years after 1918 there had been as many 
as 13 f i r s t - c l a s s steam trawlers registered i n the ports of Cornwall 
and Devon. Incredibly, by 1938 the number had dropped to just two, 
of which one had not been employed since 1925. Of the motor fleets, 
the 150 f i r s t - c l a s s vessels of 1919 had reduced to 91 by 1938, with 
the number of sailing boats declining even more alarmingly. The 
.to t a l number of fi r s t - c l a s s vessels of varying types registered i n 
Cornwall and Devon f e l l drastically from 306 i n 1919 to 99 i n 1938. 
This decay was reflected i n the declining weight and value of f i s h 
landed at Cornish ports, the culmination of the much longer period of 
decline consequent upon the industry's structural problems inherited 
from the nineteenth century.^ 
The problems of Cornish agriculture i n th i s period of paralysis 
were less marked than those of fishing or mining or china clay, but 
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there was l i t t l e innovation or advance. Improvements i n grasslands, 
which would have raised the standards of stock, milk and beef cattle 
and sheep, had not occurred, and there were great inadequacies i n 
both buildings and water supplies on many Cornish farms. Many 
farmers were ignorant of good stock management and modem techniques, 
and the small numbers of catt l e per holding on many Cornish farms 
made milk production an uneconomic undertaking. In 1939 of the 
12,881 holdings i n Cornwall no less than 2,116 were sized between one 
and f i v e acres, while only two were i n the range 500 to 700 acres, 
and none was larger than that. To ensure v i a b i l i t y i n such 
conditions, a high standard of farming and a high degree of 
specialisation were seen to be necessary, but both were exhibited 
only rarely on Cornish farms. I n the face of such apparent 
stagnation, the Exeter report hinted darkly that the 
"collectivisation" of Cornish farms might be a solution"^^ 
Farming, then, l i k e the other Cornish staples, experienced the 
economic paralysis that emerged i n the wake of the industrial c r i s i s 
of the nineteenth century. This paralysis was an inevitable function 
of the nineteenth century experience and an integral part of the era 
of "Second Peripheralism". Having reaped the consequences of 
imperfect, incomplete and over-specialised industrialisation, there 
was l i t t l e or no opportunity for the Cornish economy to diversify. 
The railway arrived too late to be of any real value i n th i s respect, 
and instead the period from the end of the century u n t i l the Second 
World War was, for Cornwall, one of paralysis i n which there could be 
no response to the c r i s i s . Mining and fishing continued their sorry 
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d e c l i n e , china c l a y was by i t s very nature unable to o f f e r an 
a l t e r n a t i v e future, and fanning slipped i n t o an indolent stagnation. 
The F i r s t World War, the i n d i f f e r e n t economic conditions generally of 
the 1920s, and the worldwide "Great Depression" of the 1930s, were, 
of course, further economic n a i l s i n the Cornish i n d u s t r i a l c o f f i n . 
An apparent paradox i n a l l t h i s was the emergence of tourism, 
at f i r s t s i g h t the one area of economic a c t i v i t y that d i d h i n t a t 
i n d u s t r i a l renewal and d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n , a t odds - apparently - with 
the general t h e s i s of p a r a l y s i s . C e r t a i n l y , the c l o s i n g years of the 
nineteenth century and the opening decades of the twentieth witnessed 
a vigorous expansion of tourism, associated with the imaginative 
marketing techniques of the Great Western Railway (which had subsumed 
the old Cornwall Railway) and i t s r i v a l , the London and South 
Western. However, a c l o s e r a n a l y s i s of the t o u r i s t phenomenon 
rev e a l s that, f a r from running counter to the general Cornish 
experience, i t was i n f a c t a natural and r a t i o n a l response to the 
process of d e - i n d u s t r i a l i s t a i o n . The developnent of tourism i n 
Cornwall, indeed, was a conscious and c a l c u l a t e d r e a c t i o n , an attempt 
to construct a p o s t - i n d u s t r i a l economy. The railway accepted that 
i t s belated a r r i v a l on the Cornish scene precluded the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
i n d u s t r i a l d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n , and some l o c a l businessmen and l i t e r a t i 
accepted ( a l b e i t r e l u c t a n t l y , perhaps) that Cornwall's i n d u s t r i a l 
decline could not be reversed. Tourism, therefore, was a 
manifestation par excellence of the p e r i p h e r a l condition, an i n t e g r a l 
part of Cornwall's experience i n the era of "Second Peripheralism". 
I t s r i s e heralded not the a r r i v a l of a new i n d u s t r i a l age, but 
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confirmed instead the death throes of e x i s t i n g i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n . 
Tourism, i n b r i e f , represented the makings of a p o s t - i n d u s t r i a l 
economy. 
1889 marked a turning point, coinciding with the Great 
Western's determination to make the most of i t s r e c e n t l y converted 
( i n 1892, from broad gauge) mainline to Cornwall. Passenger t r a f f i c 
increased every year t h e r e a f t e r i n the period up the the Great War, 
and the biggest increase was i n 1904 (68.4 per cent) with the 
introduction of the superbly-named "Cornish R i v i e r a Express" .^^ The 
concept of the Cornish R i v i e r a was a great coup, with i t s 
connotations of palm t r e e s , balminess and Mediterranean sunshine. 
Comparisons were made with the south of France and I t a l y , with Great 
Western posters imploring t o u r i s t s to "See Your Own Country F i r s t " ^ ^ 
but promising i n Cornwall something both continental and foreign. 
L a t e r , p u blications w r i t t e n by the i n i m i t a b l e S.P.B. Mais^® and 
published by the Great Western hinted a t a western land of C e l t i c 
mysticism and romance, w h i l s t even the r a i l w a y ' s locomotives sported 
t a n t a l i s i n g and evocative names: "Tre, Pol and Pen", " C i t y of ?rure", 
"One and A l l " , "Trelawney", " T r e v i t h i c k " , and l a t e r "Tintagel 
Ca s t l e " , " E a r l of Mount Edgcxjmbe" and "County of Cornwall". Branch 
l i n e s took holiday makers to both north and south coasts, to Looe, 
Fowey, Falmouth, St I v e s , Perranporth, Newquay and elsewhere, with 
the " R i v i e r a " on o f f e r not only to the p r i v i l e g e d minority who might 
otherwise holiday i n the r e a l Mediterranean but a l s o to anyone who 
could a f f o r d the p r i c e of a t h i r d c l a s s t i c k e t from Paddington. For 
those unable to afford the s u b s t a n t i a l h o t e l s of Penzance, there were 
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always the s e r v i c e a b l e camping-coaches a t Marazion, The South 
Western Railway ( a f t e r 1922, the Southern), not to be out done, made 
the North Cornwall d i s t r i c t between Bade and Padstow i t s s p e c i a l 
preserve - putting such places as T i n t a g e l and Boscastle on the 
t o u r i s t map, and again appealing to popular sentiment through the 
a l l o c a t i o n of appropriate Arth\irian names f o r the locomotives that 
worked i t s expresses out of Waterloo: "Merlin", "Lyonesse", " I s e u l t " , 
" S i r Cador of Cornwall", " S i r Constantine".^^ Here indeed was the 
curious case of "centre"-based commercial organisations s t r e s s i n g (as 
an economic strategy) the c u l t u r a l d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s (or a t l e a s t t h e i r 
perceived v e r s i o n of i t ) of the periphery! 
I n c r e d i b l y , t h i s propaganda reached i t s apogee i n the 1920s and 
1930s, the image of romantic and carefree holidays c o n t r a s t i n g 
i r o n i c a l l y with the r e a l i t y o f i n d u s t r i a l d e c l i n e and d e r e l i c t i o n , 
continuing emigration and hardship. A remarkable c r e d i b i l i t y gap had 
appeared between the Cornwall of popular fancy and the r e a l i t y of 
socio-economic deprivation, a dichotomy that would continue to dog 
the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of Cornwall i n the future. Tourism did, of 
course, create some employment, contributing to the general switch to 
the s e r v i c e sector which helped, f o r example, to protect c e r t a i n 
areas such as Newquay from the worst ravages of unemployment i n the 
1920s and 1930s. Between 1920 and 1938 there was, indeed, a 
" . . . s t r i k i n g expansion of the t o u r i s t i n d u s t r y " . T h i s was 
r e f l e c t e d i n the r i s e of numbers employed i n ho t e l s , boarding houses 
and laundries i n Cornwall and Devon by 80 per cent, as against 53.9 
per cent f o r England and Wales, and i n f a c t that between 1926 and 
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1939 the number of h o t e l s of a l l kinds increased by 92.9 per cent 
while the number of boarding houses. expanded by no l e s s than 125.2 
per cent. However, although the expansion of tourism was able to 
absorb some of the labour shed from mining, f i s h i n g , and a g r i c u l t u r e , 
much of t h i s new employment was of an inherently short-term and 
seasonal nature: hardly a long-terra or s t a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e to 
i n d u s t r i a l employment. The Exeter survey concluded that 
"...unemployment was more seasonal i n Devon and C o r n w a l l " , c o m p a r e d 
to the country as a whole, and that "Of the two counties, Cornwall's 
unemployment was d i s t i n c t l y more seasonal than that of Devon". 
Between 1929 and 1938 employment i n Cornwall h a b i t u a l l y sank to i t s 
lowest ebb i n January and reached i t s peak i n June, the d i f f e r e n c e 
between the extremes being some 7.2 per cent or about 3,300 persons. 
Nonetheless, tourism was perceived as being a t l e a s t some 
a l t e r n a t i v e to i n d u s t r i a l d e c l i n e , and was accepted by some as an 
appropriate r e a c t i o n to the process o f d e - i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n , a means 
of building within Cornwall some form of p o s t - i n d u s t r i a l economy. 
S i r Arthur Quiller-Coach encouraged debate on t h i s i s s u e i n the pages 
of h i s Cornish magazine and as e a r l y as 1898, a t the very s t a r t of 
t h i s e r a , stated h i s own position quite c l e a r l y : 
On the one hand I see Cornwall impoverished by the e v i l days on 
which mJLning and (to a l e s s e r degree) a g r i c i i l t u r e have f a l l e n . 
I see her population diminishing and her able-bodied sons 
forced to emigrate by the thousand, the ruined engine-house, 
the r o o f l e s s cottage, the cold hearthstone are not cheerful 
s i g h t s to one who would f a i n to see a race so passionately 
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attached to home as ours i s s t i l l drawing vigour from i t s s o i l . 
I n the presence of d e s t i t u t i o n and a c t u a l famine ( f o r i n the 
mining d i s t r i c t i t came even to t h i s , a l i t t l e while ago) one 
i s bound, i f he cares f o r h i s countrymen, to consider any cure 
thoughtfully suggested. 
The suggestion i s that Cornwall should turn her n a t u r a l beauty 
to account, and by making i t more widely known, a t once b e n e f i t 
thousands and honestly e n r i c h h e r s e l f . 
Although he advanced t h i s view with conviction and determination, we 
see i n an afterthought Quiller-Couch's r e s e r v a t i o n or a t l e a s t 
r e s i g n a t i o n : "Well then, since we must c a t e r f or the stranger, l e t us 
do i t w e l l and honestly. Let us respect him and our native land as 
well-.^A 
I n f a c t , the r i s e o f tourism was not so much the c r e a t i o n of a 
new e r a as a consequence of what had gone before, an i n t e g r a l part of 
the economic marginalisation of "second peripheralism" and consistent 
with the p a r a l y s i s of the l a t e nineteenth and twentieth c e n t u r i e s . 
Quiller-Couch, perhaps, r e a l i s e d a t l e a s t some of t h i s i n h i s "heart 
of hearts", but he was determined to r i s e to the challenge of de-
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n . The promotion of tourism was the economic 
response to d e - i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n , but there was an equally powerful 
s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l response. For, j u s t a s d e - i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n had 
l e d to a c e r t a i n economic p a r a l y s i s , so too i t had caused a p a r a l l e l 
and attendent s o c i a l - c u l t u r a l p a r a l y s i s . As d e t a i l e d i n e a r l i e r 
chapters, the f a b r i c of Cornish s o c i e t y and the strength of the 
234 
Cornish i d e n t i t y had i n the e i ^ t e e n t h and nineteenth c e n t u r i e s been 
b u i l t around mining and i t s associated i n d u s t r i a l a c t i v i t i e s . 
Cornwall and mining were inseparable, synonomous almost, every 
s o c i e t a l a c t i v i t y - from r e l i g i o n to education - shot through with 
the m3rriad influence of mining, the a s s e r t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f an 
almost aggressive Cornish sense of i d e n t i t y centred on Cornwall's 
unsurpassed i n d u s t r i a l prowess. When, i n a comparatively short 
period of time, Cornwall was stripped o f that prowess and her mining 
industry almost o b l i t e r a t e d , the e f f e c t s upon Cornish s o c i e t y and i t s 
cu l t u r e were i n e v i t a b l y traumatic. 
I n e f f e c t , economic p a r a l y s i s was r e f l e c t e d i n s o c i a l and 
c u l t u r a l p a r a l y s i s , as the d r i v i n g force of Cornwall's mining-
Methodist c u l t u r e l o s t i t s momentum. As the mines closed, so 
Cornwall's a b l e s t and most a r t i c u l a t e sons and daughters (whose 
s k i l l s had f a c i l i t a t e d i n d u s t r i a l advance, whose leadership q u a l i t i e s 
had made them l o c a l preachers, c l a s s leaders, Sunday school teachers) 
had emigrated, leaving t h e i r communities d i s p i r i t e d and often 
dependent on overseas support, the once vibrant chapels now facing 
d e c l i n i n g attendance and sometimes even closure. As Deacon has put 
i t , "The c l a s s i c a l popular Methodist c u l t u r e began to weaken and the 
debris of a shattered economy became the s i t e of a f o s s i l i s e d c u l t u r e 
as the popular c u l t u r e ceased to change and d e v e l o p " . A t f i r s t the 
Cornish indulged i n self-deception to t r y to s h i e l d themselves from 
the enormity of the s i t u a t i o n i n which they found themselves. The 
"Great Migration" was interpreted, not as a symptom of i n d u s t r i a l 
c o l l a p s e , but as the triumph of Cornish genixis. To be f a i r , i t had 
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created a b r i e f l y s i g n i f i c a n t i n t e r n a t i o n a l Cornish c u l t u r e and had 
provided the Cornish with an. experience very d i f f e r e n t from that of 
t h e i r English, neighbours, thus heightening a sense of "difference", 
but i t was nonetheless an i n t e g r a l part o f the process of de-
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n . The Cornish, too, as described above, were 
loathed to accept that Cornish mining had passed i t s zenith and could 
never regain i t s old glory, c l i n g i n g on to a vain hope that perhaps 
the current impasse was only temporary and that the great days of 
Cornwall would come again. Now and then something of the o l d pride 
and a s s e r t i v e n e s s was rekindled, as i n the heady days of 1908 when 
the triumphant Cornwall Rugby Foot b a l l team went from v i c t o r y to 
v i c t o r y to secure the County Championship, when Camborne, Redruth and 
the other mining d i s t r i c t s b r i e f l y rediscovered t h e i r old passion and 
e x u b e r a n c e . B u t f o r the most part Cornish s o c i e t y sunk i n t o a 
f a t a l i s m and resignation, indeed i n t o a c e r t a i n p a r a l y s i s , mirroring 
the economic i n e r t i a that the Exeter survey was to i d e n t i f y . 
However, j u s t a s a handful of Cornish were prepared to r i s e 
above economic p a r a l y s i s and consciously to advocate a post-
i n d u s t r i a l economy (based upon tourism), so a s i m i l a r (indeed, 
sometimes congruent) minority proposed to abandon s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l 
p a r a l y s i s by a conscious attempt to " r e b u i l d " Cornish c u l t u r e through 
an appeal to Cornwall's p r e - i n d u s t r i a l C e l t i c past. Quiller-Couch 
embraced such an appeal as a d e l i b e r a t e response to the s o c i a l and 
c u l t u r a l consequences of d e - i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n , but the phenomenon was 
most e s p e c i a l l y i d e n t i f i e d with Henry Jenner and the s o - c a l l e d 
"Cornish R e v i v a l i s t s " . However, just as the advocacy of tourism was 
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a delusion ( i n s o f a r as i t was i n r e a l i t y a function of the process of 
i n d u s t r i a l decline rather than an a l t e r n a t i v e to i t ) , so the attempts 
to "rebuild" Cornwall's C e l t i c c u l t u r e must be considered w i t h i n and 
as a part of the s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l c r i s i s that Cornwall was 
experiencing. Indeed, the advocacy of tourism and the "Cornish 
R e v i v a l " a t times went hand-in-hand, t h e i r aims a t c e r t a i n points 
c o i n c i d e n t a l , appealing together to a " C e l t i c c u l t u r e " i n the face o f 
d e - i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n - the one attempting to construct a post-
i n d u s t r i a l economy, the other a p r e - i n d u s t r i a l c u l t u r e ! Both, 
nevertheless, were consequences of the Cornish i n d u s t r i a l experience, 
fu r t h e r matured manifestations of the condition of "Second 
Peripheralism". 
The antecedents of the "Cornish R e v i v a l " can be found i n the 
nineteenth century, most notably i n the person of Robert Stephen 
Hawker, the e c c e n t r i c v i c a r of Morewenstow from 1824 to 1874, whose 
ba l l a d s - often romantic, and sometimes sentimental - r e c a l l e d the 
e a r l i e r days of p r e - i n d u s t r i a l Cornwall: "The Ringers of Launcells 
Tower", " S i r B e v i l - The Gate Song of Stowe", and o f coxirse 
"Trelawny" - "The Song of the Western Men" which became a s o r t of 
u n o f f i c i a l Cornish national anthem. An Anglo-Catholic, Hawker found 
himself out of step with the u t i l i t a r i a n , technological. 
Nonconformist character of nineteenth century Cornwall: "^ -Jho i s there 
to come down with succour? What angel could a r r i v e with duties to 
perform for that large Blaspheming Smithery, once a great Nation, now 
a Forge f o r R a i l w a y s ? " . A n d although "Trelawny" was taken q u i c k l y 
i n t o the h e a r t s of the Cornish people. Hawker's High Church, a n t i -
- 237 -
i n d u s t r i a l sentiments found l i t t l e support and struck few chords i n 
Cornwall at the height of i t s mining and engineering prowess. There 
was a s p i r i t o f " s c i e n t i f i c " antiquarianism i n nineteenth century 
Cornwall but i t was hardly " R e v i v a l i s t " and regarded the remains of 
e a r l i e r times as l i t t l e more than c u r i o s . Davies G i l b e r t , the 
"Cornish Philosopher", was the archetypal Comishman of the 
i n d u s t r i a l age, a great defender of Cornish i n t e r e s t s and 
Indefatigable proponent of Cornish c a u s e s . H e took an antiquarian 
i n t e r e s t i n times past and i n 1826 published a version of the Cornish 
language passion poem "Pascon agan Arluth" (Passion of Our L o r d ) . I n 
h i s introduction to the work, however, G i l b e r t s t r e s s e d that "No one 
more s i n c e r e l y r e j o i c e s than does the e d i t o r of t h i s ancient mystery 
that the Cornish d i a l e c t of the C e l t i c or G a e l i c languages has ceased 
altogether from being used by the inhabitants of Cornwall". 
Cornish, of course, would have been an obstacle to progress and 
advancement, an impediment i n an English-speaking i n d u s t r i a l world, 
an i r r e l e v a n t r e l i c from l e s s enlightened days. Even Matthew Arnold, 
Cornish on h i s mother's s i d e (she was a Penrose from Constantine),^^ 
favoured the decline of C e l t i c languages on such G i l b e r t i a n grounds, 
despite h i s romantic a f f e c t i o n for C e l t i c l i t e r a t u r e and i n s i s t e n c e 
upon i t s i n t r i n s i c value. 
I t was G i l b e r t , therefore, and not Hawker, \jho most a c c u r a t e l y 
expressed the p r e v a i l i n g s o c i a l and economic ideology of nineteenth 
century Cornwall. The e a r l y " R e v i v a l i s t s " and t h e i r precursors such 
as Hawker, then, found themselves out of favour with the robust and 
hard-headed engineers and technocrats of the i n d u s t r i a l age, men who 
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had l i t t l e time f o r whimsical or romantic notions of " C e l t i c 
T w i l i g h t " and had indeed welcomed the demise o f the Cornish language 
as the triximph of progress. This g u l f was important because' i t 
served to heighten the s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l c r i s i s that Cornwall was 
to experience, contributing to the c o n f l i c t and paradoxes that 
produced p a r a l y s i s . For, as Cornwall f e l l i n t o the mode of rapid de-
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n , so the Cornish " i n t e l l i g e n t s i a " - the educated 
middle-classes - found themselves pulled simultaneously i n opposite 
d i r e c t i o n s . On the one hand, a r e f u s a l to accept that the i n d u s t r i a l 
decline was r e a l or permanent demanded continued l o y a l t y to the 
G i l b e r t i a n c u l t u r e of progress, but on the other the evidence of de-
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n that l a y a l l around them gave credence to the 
" R e v i v a l i s t s ' " c a l l s f or return to a p r e - i n d u s t r i a l c u l t u r e and f o r 
the c r e a t i o n of a p o s t - i n d u s t r i a l economy. 
One of the more pertinent i r o n i e s of t h i s s i t u a t i o n was that 
t h i s i d e o l o g i c a l c l a s h ( f o r such i t was) precluded any serious 
a n a l y s i s of the condition i n which Cornwall had found i t s e l f . A 
compromise or accommodation was sought, perhaps, i n the work of A.K. 
Hamilton Jenkin whose "folksy" and sometimes sentimental treatment of 
nineteenth century Cornwall a t l e a s t f i t t e d the romantic mould of the 
" R e v i v a l i s t s " . But when h i s The Cornish Miner^^ was published i n 
1927 the hey-day of Cornish raining was already passed long-since, the 
ruined and i v y - c l a d engine houses already romantic landmarks upon the 
burgeoning t o u r i s t t r a i l . Thus, for the " R e v i v a l i s t s " and those that 
they influenced, nineteenth century Cornwall could a t best be l i t t l e 
more than an i n c r e a s i n g l y romanticized appendage to the grander and 
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more ancient themes that they had chosen to explore. Outside t h e i r 
ranks, of course, there was s t i l l an a l t e r n a t i v e camp which continued 
to nxirture i t s passion f or Cornish mining and engineering.^^ I t s 
devotees were not, however, s o c i a l or economic h i s t o r i a n s attempting 
to explain the experience of Cornish i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n but rather 
p r a c t i c a l men and commercial optimists who lobbied and planned f o r 
t h e i r much-vaunted r e b i r t h of the t i n industry. They had l i t t l e i n 
conmon with the " R e v i v a l i s t s " , but equally they had l i t t l e c apacity 
or i n c l i n a t i o n to understand the r e a l i t y of Cornwall's i n d u s t r i a l 
experience. I n the aftennath of Cornwall's i n d u s t r i a l d e c l i n e , 
therefore, there was no attempt to appreciate the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the 
i n d u s t r i a l period i n Cornwall's h i s t o r y . Those who did not accept 
Cornwall's i n d u s t r i a l decline had, qxiite l o g i c a l l y , no motivation to 
study i t ; the " R e v i v a l i s t s " were not i n t e r e s t e d i n i t anyway and 
looked to p r e - i n d u s t r i a l Cornwall f o r t h e i r i n s p i r a t i o n and for t h e i r 
models for the future. There was a marked f a i l u r e , then, by the 
" R e v i v a l i s t s " to address the problems of modem Cornwall. I n a sense 
they contributed to the very p a r a l y s i s from which they were 
attempting to escape! 
As Berresford E l l i s has noted, the emergence of the "Cornish 
R e v i v a l " shoiiLd a l s o be seen i n the context of what was happening 
e l s e ^ ^ e r e . ^ I n l a t e V i c t o r i a n and Edwardian B r i t a i n there was 
indeed a growing a n t i - i n d u s t r i a l i s m , ^ ^ with which the " R e v i v a l i s t s " 
coudd i d e n t i f y , and i n the same period there was a new romanticism i n 
which the sentimental enthusiasm f or "other-worldly" C e l t i c mysticism 
and the Arthurian c y c l e s aided the " R e v i v a l i s t s ' " cause. More 
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e s p e c i a l l y , the "Cornish R e v i v a l " was part of a wider " C e l t i c 
R e v i v a l " , l e d by outstanding l i t e r a r y f i g u r e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l repute 
such as S i r Walter Scott and ( l a t e r ) William Butler Yeats, and given 
academic expression and c r e d i b i l i t y through the e f f o r t s of C e l t i c i s t s 
such as Professor John Stuart B l a c k i e . ^ ^ There i s no doubt whatever 
that the Cornish " R e v i v a l i s t s " looked to the other C e l t i c lands 
( e s p e c i a l l y Wales and B r i t t a n y ) - f o r i n s p i r a t i o n , f o r reassurance, 
for i n s t i t u t i o n s to copy, f o r models to follow. Equally, the 
emergence of " C e l t i c Studies" as a respectable subject at B r i t i s h and 
Continental u n i v e r s i t i e s afforded the " R e v i v a l i s t s " much 
encouragement. However, i n comparing the Cornish experience with 
that o f the other C e l t i c lands, i t i s important to note that the 
causes, conditions and a s p i r a t i o n s of the "Revivals" i n these lands 
were not i d e n t i c a l . I n I r e l a n d , f o r example, the motivation was 
pr i m a r i l y p o l i t i c a l , strengthening the c u l t u r a l arm of the 
n a t i o n a l i s t m o v e m e n t , w h i l e i n Scotland i t was part of a post-
Union, post-Jacobite attempt a t nation-building: the r e h a b i l i t a t i o n 
of the Highlands and the bridging of the Highland-Lowland gap by the 
crea t i o n of a " C e l t i c Scotland" i d e n t i t y . ^ ^ I n B r i t t a n y i t was a 
r e g i o n a l i s t response (the " F i r s t Bnsav", as i t came to be known) to 
defend the s t i l l - l i v i n g Breton language from the homogenising and 
as s i m i l a t o r y p o l i c i e s of the deterrainately c e n t r a l i s t French 
Government. 
I n Wales, the process of "Revival" was even more complex. As 
i n Cornwall, so i n Wales " I n the sixte e n t h century the native culture 
bound up with Catholicism l a r g e l y disappeared...",^^ to be replaced -
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again as i n Cornwall - with an i n c r e a s i n g l y urbanised, i n d u s t r i a l 
c u l t u r e centred on C a l v i n i s t i c Methodism. However, i t i s a mistake 
to draw too close a p a r a l l e l between the Cornish and Welsh 
experiences i n t h i s period. To begin with, Welsh industry had i n the 
main not y e t experienced the d e - i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n that had already so 
affecte d Cornwall ( r e l a t i v e i n d u s t r i a l decline i n North Wales was 
more than o f f - s e t by the continuing vigour of South Welsh expansion) 
and the Welsh language was s t i l l a strong and e s s e n t i a l feature of 
Welsh l i f e . The Welsh language, indeed, had become an i n t e g r a l part 
of the popular, Methodist 'culture ( i n st a r k contrast to the Cornish 
experience), i t s very s u r v i v a l a springboard from which Welsh 
" R e v i v a l i s t s " i n the nineteenth centtiry could launch t h e i r attempts 
to r e l i n k modem Welsh cu l t u r e with the e a r l i e r c u l t u r e of pre-
i n d u s t r i a l Wales. I n contrast to Cornwall i t was the s u r v i v a l rather 
than death of a language which was an impetus to "Revival", and i t 
was a "Revival" that grew out o f economic and c u l t u r a l vigour r a t h e r 
than economic and c i i L t u r a l p a r a l y s i s . I t was a "Revival", therefore, 
that was more a c c e s s i b l e and more acceptable to the general Welsh 
populace than was the Cornish "Revival" to the Cornish. The Welsh 
"Revival" engendered widespread popular support to an extent that was 
not possible i n Cornwall. I r o n i c a l l y , some of the outward and 
v i s i b l e signs of Welsh "Revival" - e s p e c i a l l y the "invented" 
symbolism of the Gorsedd, the d a f f o d i l , the "national dress", the Red 
Dragon f l a g - were not d i s s i m i l a r from some of the manifestations of 
the Cornish "Revival". I t i s a l s o i n s t r u c t i v e to note that i n the 
middle and l a t t e r p a r t s of the twentieth century (when the Welsh 
i n d u s t r i a l experience has come i n s e v e r a l respects to resemble that 
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of Cornwall) the renewed Welsh "Revival" has - as Dai Smith has 
argued^^ - been as much a r e s u l t of pressure from a "Cymricizing" 
t o u r i s t industry a s from the re-emergence of n a t i o n a l sentiment, with 
Wales busy "reinventing" the past to serve the needs of the present, 
an experience reminiscent of that of Cornwall h a l f a century before. 
I n f u r t h e r contrast to the " R e v i v a l i s t s " i n Wales, who managed 
to address t h e i r a s p i r a t i o n s to the Methodist majority, the "Revival" 
i n Cornwall was from i t s beginning associated with Anglo-Catholic 
sentiment. T h i s , of coxirse, r e f l e c t e d the Hawker inheritance but i t 
was a l s o c o n s i s t e n t with the appeal to p r e - i n d u s t r i a l Cornish c u l t u r e 
which was not only C e l t i c but a l s o C a t h o l i c . The Cornish Rebellion 
of 1549, i n e v i t a b l y , assumed a new s i g n i f i c a n c e i n the eyes of the 
" R e v i v a l i s t " (had i t not been i n defence of both the Cornish language 
and the C a t h o l i c r e l i g i o n ? ) , as did the pre-Re format ion l i n k s with 
Bri t t a n y . Renewed Breton contacts were thus of p a r t i c u l a r importance 
to the " R e v i v a l i s t s " , for they helped to reconstruct Cornwall's pre-
i n d u s t r i a l c u l t u r a l contacts as w e l l as p r a c t i c a l l y a s s i s t i n g the 
mechanics of "Revival". This, i n turn, was further encouragement to 
the Anglo-Catholic strand of the "Revival", for B r i t t a n y had remained • 
l o y a l to the C a t h o l i c f a i t h and was the repository for both the 
material r e l i c s and l i t e r a r y L i v e s of the C e l t i c s a i n t s . B r i t t a n y , 
indeed, had not experienced i n d u s t r i a l development on a s c a l e 
anything l i k e that of Cornwall, and - with i t s continuing devotion to 
• 
the C a t h o l i c f a i t h and the widespread s u r v i v a l of the Breton language 
(so c l o s e i n form to Cornish) - B r i t t a n y appeared f o r the Cornish 
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" R e v i v a l i s t s " the perfect model i n t h e i r quest to r e b u i l d a pre-
i n d u s t r i a l C e l t i c - C a t h o l i c c u l t u r e i n Cornwall. 
The scholarship of Canon Doble rediscovered the m u l t i p l i c i t y of 
Breton-Cornish r e l i g i o u s connections, provoking i n Cornwall a new 
enthusiasm for the L i v e s of the S a i n t s , f o r C e l t i c c r o s s e s and other 
p h y s i c a l remains, and f o r the Medieval Miracle Plays (these i n the 
Cornish language, to boot), an enthusiasm with connotations more 
s i g n i f i c a n t than mere antiquarianism.^^ For some, t h i s enthusiasm 
was an opportunity to awaken Cornwall from a perceived r e l i g i o u s 
p a r a l y s i s ( s u f f e r e d , i t was alleged, by both the Anglican and 
Methodist Churches) that had accompanied the general socio-economic 
p a r a l y s i s o f i n d u s t r i a l d e c l i n e . Bernard Walke, who was Curate a t 
Polruan i n the e a r l y years of t h i s century and who subsequently rose 
to fame as the Anglo-Catholic V i c a r of St H i l a r y , wrote of the 
l a c k l u s t r e churches of the 1920s and 30s: 
There was nothing here to k i n d l e the f a i t h that gave to 
Cornwall so many s a i n t s or to l i g h t again the f i r e that burnt 
so f i e r c e l y i n the day of John Wesley. Only the worship of the 
Mass, where time and space have ceased to be the supreme 
r e a l i t i e s , and where bread and wine have become the Body, Soxil 
and D i v i n i t y o f our Lord and Saviour, to be adored and to be 
offered by man as the a l l - p r e v a i l i n g s a c r i f i c e f o r the s i n s of 
the world, only the Mass could ever hope to win back man to the 
r e a l i t y of God's love.^^ 
- 244 -
The completion of Truro Cathedral (with i t s d e l i b e r a t e Breton 
ambience) had a l s o encouraged the Anglo-Catholic strand of the 
"Cornish R e v i v a l " , and i n the decades before the Second World War the 
Anglo-Catholic movement grew i n i n f l u e n c e . B y 1933 the Anglican 
Church i n Cornwall, f o r example, had accommodated the l i t u r g i c a l 
observance of the p r i n c i p a l C e l t i c , Cornish s a i n t s . I n addition to 
the Breton connection, Walke and others l i k e him were aware of a 
C e l t i c - C a t h o l i c l i n k with I r e l a n d and "...when I r e l a n d l a y under the 
t e r r o r of the Black and Tans...we became involved i n holding meetings 
f o r prayer i n d i f f e r e n t parts of Cornwall on behalf of t h i s 
d i s t r e s s e d c o u n t r y " . I n contrast to the apparent i n d i f f e r e n c e of 
the broader "Cornish R e v i v a l " , the Anglo-Catholic movement did 
demonstrate a concern fo the. condition o f modem Cornwall, with Walke 
and colleagues during the 1920s attempting ( a l b e i t u n s u c c e s s f u l l y ) to 
launch a p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l movement to a l l e v i a t e the d i s t r e s s 
caused by unemployment amongst the t i n miners. 
Paradoxically, the Anglo-Catholic movement was the one part of 
the "Revival" to provoke a c t u a l antipathy and opposition. I n 1929 
one c r i t i c wrote that "The steady r i s e of the Anglo-Catholic movement 
has i n e v i t a b l y tended to harden denominational distinctions".^® I n 
p a r t i c u l a r , i t was objected that "When incense i s burnt i n Truro 
Cathedral and confessions are heard there, and i n many p a r i s h 
churches; when the v a l i d i t y of the sacraments i s made to depend on 
episcopal ordination and a p o s t o l i c succession, then, by i m p l i c a t i o n 
...the Methodists and a l l Free Churchmen are u n c h u r c h e d " . A . K . 
Hamilton Jenkin added that there was "...a d e f i n i t e change i n the 
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doctrine of the Church i t s e l f , and one which has xmhappily caused a 
widening of the r i f t between i t and the chapels".The issue came 
to a head i n 1932 when a Kensitite mob (mainly from outside Cornwall, 
but encouraged from within) raided St Hilary and laid waste to the 
church, smashing i t s candles and pictures and carryxng off i t s 
s t a t u e s . S h o r t l y after, when Bishop W.H. Frere - who had acquired 
a reputation as an "Anglo-Catholic socialist"^^ - l e f t Truro, the Low 
Church J.W. Hunkin (a former Methodist) was sent down as Bishop to 
temper the Anglo-Catholic influence. 
The broader "Cornish Revival" also experienced certain 
di f f i c u l t i e s i n appealing to the mass of Cornish people. To some 
degree this was because many of i t s leaders were "exiles", middle-
class professionals who had been drawn to cities such as Plymouth, 
Bristol and London or emigrants overseas who had become prominent i n 
colonial affairs. Prestigious "Cornish Associations" sprang up 
(London's was formed in 1886, South Australia's in 1890, Kimberley^s 
i n 1889), important vehicles for the "Revivalists'" interpretation of 
Cornish culture. For many "exiles", especially those abroad, the 
view of Cornwall had become evermore affectionate with the passing of 
the years, as the reality of emigration from destitution had become 
an ever dimmer memory. Inevitably, their interpretations of Cornwall 
became increasingly nostalgic and romantic, their concern for 
Cornwall sentimental, with l i t t l e real attempt to understand the 
crisis of modem Cornwall. I f there were calls for financial support 
for the deserving in Cornwall, then of course they would dip their 
hands i n their pockets, but their main concern was for "Cornish 
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evenings" with pasty suppers, humourous dialect recitations, lantern 
slides of Cornish beauty spots and antiquities, and lecttires on 
Cornwall i n the days of old.^^ Whilst a l l of this was very 
interesting, i t could make but l i t t l e contribution to the redemption 
of Cornwall from i t s paralysis. 
In Cornwall i t s e l f the emergence of the "Cornish Revival" i n 
earnest was signalled by the foundation i n 1901 of a movement 
entitled Cowethas Kelto-Kemauk (the Cornish Celtic Society), formed 
by the Cornish language enthuasiasts L,C. Duncombe Jewell (another 
noted Anglo-Catholic) and Henry Jenner, and attracting distinguished 
supporters such as Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch,^^ I t was unashamedly 
romantic i n i t s attitude (Deacon, i n a scathing assessment of the 
early "Revivalists", asserts that "The Cornish Revivalists, more than 
their Celtic colleagues, positively wallowed i n the un-reason of 
Romanticism"^^) and appealed directly to Cornwall's pre-industrial 
culture. The movement's principal aims were to revive Cornish as a 
spoken language and to establish a Cornish Gorsedd on the lines of 
the Welsh Gorsedd (which had been "re-established" i n 1792) and the 
Breton Gorsedd which was being set up i n that year.^^ There were, 
predictably, no corresponding p o l i t i c a l or economic aims (although 
Quiller-Couch had by now made public his views on tourism) and no 
attempt to address the problems of industrial decline. There was, 
however, a concern to acquire the symbols appropriate to the status 
of Celtic nationhood and amongst the movement's innovations was the 
"reintroduction" of the k i l t in Cornwall. Later, the "Revivalists" 
also adopted the black and white cross of St Piran which Davies 
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Gilbert had i n 1838 described as "...formerly the banner of St Perran 
and the standard of Cornwall..."^^ and which indeed had been depicted 
in the "Trevithick Window" i n Westminster Abbey as early as 1888. In 
seeking recognition from the other Celtic countries, Henry Jenner in 
1904 addressed the Celtic Congress on the subject of "Cornwall: A 
Celtic nation"^^ and secured successfully Cornwall's membership of 
the Congress. In the same year Jenner's A Handbook of the Cornish 
Language was p u b l i s h e d . J e n n e r had emerged as the principal 
scholar i n the Cornish language but shortly he was to be joined by 
the equally talented and energetic Robert Morton Nance, who set about 
the full-scale reconstruction of the Cornish language with a new 
"Unified" orthography and grammar. 
Inevitably, the First World War cut short the work of the 
"Revivalists", but after the war Jenner and Nance decided to replace 
the by now defunct Cowethas Kelto-Kemauk with a network of Old 
Cornish Societies. The f i r s t Old Cornwall Society was formed at St 
Ives in 1920 and by 1924 there were enough Societies spread across 
Cornwall for a Federation to be formed, i t s journal Old Cornwall 
appearing for the f i r s t time during 1925. The foimdation of the Old 
Cornwall Societies was a genuine attempt to bring the "Cornish 
Revival" closer to ordinary Cornish people but i t was only partially 
successful in that r e s p e c t . T h e 1920s, of course, had witnessed 
the greatest crisis i n the t i n industry, and although the Old 
Cornwall Societies' appeal to pre-industrial Cornish culture was a 
response to indxistrial decline, their crusade to revive the Cornish 
language seemed hardly relevant amongst the destitution and 
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depression of economic reality. Nonetheless, the number of Societies 
continued to grow, with A.S.D. Smith - a Sussex-bom newcomer to the 
"Revival" - commenting that "An intense local patriotism was at the 
root of the Old Cornwall Movement.• .together with consciousness of 
our a f f i n i t y with the other Celtic nations". 
In 1928 one long-term aim of the "Revivalists" was at last 
realised, the creation of a Cornish Gorsedd, affiliat e d to i t s Welsh 
and Breton sister institutions, a College of Bards who had been each 
admitted to the Gorsedd on account of some outstanding contribution 
to Cornwall. The blue-robed Bards met annually at the Gorsedd to 
conduct their ceremony in the Cornish language, and the Gorsedd tried 
to cultivate an image of academic excellence and Celtic scholarship, 
producing language experts such as the celebrated E.G.R. Hooper. I t 
gained recognition i n Cornwall but slowly, however, and in 1937 one 
newspaper correspondent lamented that " I f we are quite truthful we 
have to admit that the revival of the Gorsedd has scarcely touched 
the lives of the common people in Cornwall".There had been 
occasional breakthroughs, such as at St Cleer Primary School, where 
the headmaster - a Bard - had taught his pupils the Lord's Prayer and 
Creed i n Cornish, but fundamentally the "Revival" had yet to 
pierce the Cornish paralysis. 
In 1933, however, a new "Revivalist" organisation emerged 
entitled Tyr ha Tavas (Land and Language), composed mainly of young 
people and intent upon making a greater impact upon C o r n w a l l . I t 
declared that i t "...stands for the unity of persons of Cornish birth 
or descent who value their Cornish heritage, and who desire to 
- 249 -
maintain the outlook, individualism, culture, and idealism 
characteristic of their race".^^ I t considered that i t s "...primary 
aim i s to serve Cornwall and Cornish People..."^^ and was determined 
"...to show Cornish People what Comishmen have done and what they 
s t i l l can do to help the World".^ ® Tyr ha Tavas also pressured local 
MPs into giving greater consideration to specifically Cornish 
problems, the f i r s t overtly p o l i t i c a l action by the "Revivalists", 
but Tyr ha Tavas was at root not a pol i t i c a l organisation and i t 
failed to address i t s e l f to the crucial socio-economic issues of the 
day. I t produced a magazine entitled Kemow, but i t sold more copies 
outside of Cornwall than w i t h i n . I t s contents were highly 
romantic, in tune with the general thrust of the "Revivalists", and 
bore no relation to the reality of economic despair i n the Cornwall 
of the "Great Depression". Like the broader "Revivalist" movement, 
Tyr ha Tavas was ultimately unable to relate to the broad mass of 
Cornish people and their "fossilizing" Methodist working class 
culture. 
The relative failure of Tjrr ha Tavas i n the years before the 
Second World War reflected the continuing paralysis of Coinaish 
society and economy. ^peals to a pre-industrial past and for a 
post-industrial economy had failed to alter the sitxiation i n any 
fundamental sense. The consequent rise of tourism was a function of 
de-industrialisation rather than an alternative to i t , and the 
"Cornish Revival" had not been successful in l i f t i n g the majority of 
Cornish people from their social and cultural paralysis. The vague 
poli t i c a l posturing of Tyr ha Tavas, however, begs the question: why 
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was greater political action not brought to bear in Cornwall in this 
period? The answer, as we shall see, is that Cornish politics too 
was i n a state of paralysis as a result of i t s experience in this era 
of de-industrialisation, marginalised - like other facets of Cornish 
l i f e - by the condition of "Second Peripheralisra". 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE POLITICS OF PARALYSIS 
In the aftermath of Cornwall's industrial decline, Cornish 
society and economy had sunk into a paralysis, the fundamental 
characteristics of which remained virtually unchanged from the late 
nineteenth century u n t i l the Second World War - despite the creation 
of tourism and the emergence of a "Cornish Revival". This paralysis 
was compounded and complemented by a corresponding political 
inability i n Cornwall to react to the new conditions. This led, on 
the one hand, to the features of Cornish politics becoming 
increasingly "fossilized" and out of step with developments elsewhere 
in Britain and, on the other, to the failure of Cornish politics to 
address the socio-economic problems of the era. I t did, however, 
lend Cornwall an Increasingly distinct p o l i t i c a l culture which, like 
the highly distinctive Cornish economy, served to emphasise the 
differences between Cornwall and England in this era of "Second 
Peripheralism". 
Although her socio-economic problems were indeed highly 
distinctive, Cornwall's status as "just another county" amongst so 
many others served to disguise the distinctions and to dilute, even 
mute, any demands for special and separate attention. Cornwall was 
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long-since shorn, of course, of her ancient vestiges of 
constitutional "accommodation", thus restricting Cornish 
opportunities to employ polit i c a l means to seek redress or encourage 
new initiatives - no 44 MPs to lobby at the heart of Government, no 
politicised Duchy to trade the concerns of Cornwall, no Stannary 
Parliament to act as an institutional forum in which the interests of 
Cornwall might be articulated. As a mere "county", Cornwall's Local 
Government was affected by the distancing (described by Bulpitt) of 
local or "low" politics from the "high" politics of the centre, and 
was similarly restricted by the basic "depoliticisation" of the 
relationship between Local and Central Government in the United 
Kingdom.^ Unlike, for example, the (in 1922) newly-created Province 
of Northern Ireland or, further afield, the State of South Australia 
(which i n 1923 experienced a mining collapse reminiscent of the 
Cornish experience^), Cornwall had no recourse to mechanisms of 
constitutional accommodation i n order to refashion her future. 
This institutional inability to react was complemented by 
Cornwall's increasing poli t i c a l estrangement from the emerging 
pattern of British politics in the twentieth century. Again, this 
estrangement was a function of Cornwall's industrial decline and 
consequent paralysis. Specifically, the great age of Cornish 
industrial prowess already passed, there was l i t t l e incentive or 
opportunity for Cornish politics to realign in terms of the great 
Labour versus Capital (Conservative) divide that was emerging 
elsewhere. In industrial Wales, by way of contrast, which had 
hitherto exhibited many close comparisons with Cornwall, there were 
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as yet few hints of de-industrialisation that might l i e ahead and -
in marked contrast to Cornwall - the industrial Welsh were early 
converts to the new creed of Labour. The South Wales Miners' 
Federation (the "Fed") had made i t s mark before the turn of the 
century, and in 1901 Keir Hardie made history when he was returned as 
Independent Labour MP for Merthyr. In the 1906 "Liberal Landslide" 
Election (when not a single Conservative Member was returned i n 
Wales) Labour secured six Welsh seats as a result of i t s pact with 
the Liberals, and the decades that preceded the Second World War 
witnessed the inexorable replacement of the Liberals by Labour as the 
principal party of Wales. Although this appeared as a natural 
development of Welsh radicalism and served, perhaps, to enhance Welsh 
politi c a l culture through the creation of a thoroughly Welsh Labour 
Party, i t nevertheless did not estrange Welsh politics from that of 
the rest of Britain (there were parallel developments i n Scotland and 
industrial England) and did not prevent prominent Welsh public 
figures (such as Aneurin Bevan) from becoming involved intimately in 
politics at the British level.^ 
The traditional explanation for Cornwall's failure to produce 
i t s own version of the "Fed" and i t s attendent Labour movement has 
rested upon Hamilton Jenkin's (and later Barton's) assessment of the 
impact of individualism.^ In this, the Cornish miner's 
individualistic predisposition was seen as an impediment to any 
collective action (such as trade unionism), a factor compounded by 
the tribute and tutwork system of employment which was not only a 
function of individualism but also an inhibitor of collective action. 
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Tribute and tutwork, indeed, acted to force individual miners or 
groups of miners to compete against each other for pieces of work 
("pitches"), these pitches being allocated to the lowest bidders; 
hardly the kind of industrial environment i n which one might expect 
collective action to arise. However, whilst one must be careful not 
to underestimate the influence of individualism in general and 
tribute and tutwork in particular, i t is important to note that 
critiques of this traditional explanation have emerged, most notably 
from Burke and Deacon.^ 
To begin with, Hamilton Jenkin's implied equation of 
"individualism" with "conservatism" (political or otherwise) does not 
bear closer scrutiny. Cornish individualism was in fact a dynamic 
and progressive force, manifested amongst other things in the Liberal 
Methodist radicalism, that came to dominate nineteenth century 
Cornwall,^ Similarly, Hobsbawra's contention that "Methodism in 
Cornwall produced an atmosphere of resignation and acceptance which 
worked against militancy"^ w i l l not do, for Cornish Methodism - based 
as i t was upon Cornish individualism - was at the heart of the 
Cornish Liberal radicalism which embraced a number of reforming 
campaigns in the last century. The explanation for Cornwall's 
experience (and for i t s divergence from that of Wales) lies 
elsewhere, and is suggested in the important discussion offered by 
Deacon of attempts at combination by Cornish miners i n the 1860s and 
70s. Deacon has argued that 
The historical divergence between Cornish metal miners and 
Welsh coal miners only became marked after the 1866-72 period. 
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While coal mining continued to expand, copper and t i n mining 
entered on a severe protracted slump characterised by large 
scale unemployment and emigration. Such conditions were hardly 
- conducive to the formation of a permanent trade union.^ 
Elsewhere, Deacon has added that 
I f the development of industrial relations and trade unionism 
i s viewed i n a context that admits the experience of the 
Cornish communities overseas, then a very different model of 
the Cornish miner might emerge, one that finds a place for 
collective experience as well as heroic individuals.^ 
In terms of the thesis presented here, the point i s that the 
retardation of trade unionism and a wider Labour movement in Comrall 
was not a specific result of Cornish individualism but rather a 
consequence of rapid de-industrialisation, a conclusion underscored 
by an examination of the collectivist behaviour of Cornish emigrants 
in mining fields overseas that were s t i l l undergoing expansion. 
Cornwall's failure to produce a "Fed" was, therefore, a reflection -
indeed a part - of the social and economic paralysis that emerged 
swiftly in the closing years of the nineteenth century, an integral 
part of the era and process of "Second Peripheralism". Paralysis 
struck at precisely the time when the combination of Cornish miners 
might be expected to have happened (and when the Welsh miners were 
indeed organising), nipping in the bud early Cornish attempts at 
collective action at home but vmable, of course, to inhibit Cornish 
behavioiar overseas. 
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In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, before the 
development of a f u l l y fledged market economy and th eextension of 
the suffrage, popular protest (economic and pol i t i c a l ) in Britain was 
i n the form of the r i o t rather than the strike, Cornwall, indeed, as 
noted i n Chapter A, was especially notorious for i t s propoensity to 
r i o t , with food riots remaining a feature of the Cornish way of l i f e 
u n t i l the middle of the last century. Although a function of Cornish 
"savagery" and an expression of Cornish individualism, often without 
planning or co-ordination between individuals or districts, the riots 
were also i n a sense "collective" - not only physically, in terms of 
the composition of the mobs, but also with regard to the common 
action and psychology of the "crowd". Rule, indeed, has drawn 
parallels between the events of Cornish riots and the activities of 
the French Revolutionary crowds analysed by Rxide.^^ Given that the 
riot was precursor of the strike i n Britain as a whole, i t i s 
instructive to note that while the strike emerged relatively late i n 
Cornwall, the r i o t sxxrvived rather longer than i t did elsewhere -
exhibited, for instaance, i n the Newlyn disturbances of 1896. 
There had, however, been a number of attempts at industrial 
action by Cornish miners before the serious activity of the 1860s and 
1870s. Barton admits that strikes in the Cornish mining industry 
were not as uncommon as was once supposed,and amongst the earliest 
distrubances was a brief strike at Fowey Consols and Lanescot i n 
February 1831 when the miners combined to try to force a rise in 
tribute rates. The strike was broken quickly however, the leaders 
incarcerated in Bodmin Gaol and the men sent back to work, with no 
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attempt or intention on the part of the workers to form a permanent 
miners' trade union. Similarly, there was a b r i e f strike at the 
Consolidated Mines i n Gwennap i n 1842 over working hours and 
conditions of employment, when the men talked f l e e t i n g l y and 
inconclusively of the p o s s i b i l i t y of unionisation, and during the 
18A0s Mining Association delegates from the North of England, vi s i t e d 
Cornwall to encourage sol i d a r i t y with s t r i k i n g Durham miners and to 
discourage potential Cornish blacklegs from travelling North. In 
1853 there was another b r i e f strike at Bosweddan (near St Just-in-
Penwith) over the alleged victimisation of men who had been involved 
i n a food r i o t six years before, leading to more general disturbances 
at the neighbouring mines of Levant, Speam Consols, Speam Moor, and 
Boscean concerning tribute rates. In the same d i s t r i c t , there were 
short and inconcl\isive strikes at Balleswidden i n 1856, 1857 and 
1859-^2 
The f i r s t determined attempt at organised trade unionism 
occurred i n early 1866,^^ at the East Cornwall and Tamar Valley mines 
which had by now surpassed their western counterparts i n terms of 
richness and economic importance. Dissatisfaction with various 
conditions of employment had been voiced i n the mines during 1865, 
and the events of 1866 were precipitated by stri k e action at Wheal 
Trelawney lead mine (near Menheniot) i n January when the miners 
demanded greater remuneration. Thereafter, the flood-gates opened, 
the workers from mines throughout the d i s t r i c t holding meetings at 
liiskeard, Gunnislake, Callington, and Tavistock. Hundreds were 
reported joining a new Mining Association, whose leaders were 
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Methodist local preachers and class leaders. This organisation was 
launched i n February 1866 as the Miners' Mutual Benefit Association, 
i t s constitution surprisingly radical with rules such as those vdiich 
proposed the setting up of workers' committees at the mines to 
determine whether the captains' prices for tribute and tutwork 
bargains were sufficient and what action was to be taken i f they were 
not. 
Deacon has suggested several reasons for this sudden upsurge of 
c o l l e c t i v i s t sentiment i n the d i s t r i c t , pointing to the influence and 
importance of the discussion that had attended Lord Kinnaird's 
Parliamentary B i l l to improve the conditions i n metal mines. The 
competitive s p i r i t i n negotiating tribute and tutwork bargains was 
also less noticeable i n the d i s t r i c t than i n the older, more 
" t r a d i t i o n a l i s t " mines of West Cornwall, with men at many of the 
eastern mines unwilling to engage i n "downward bidding" to secure 
contracts. The copper mines i n the area were, i n addition, 
benefitting from the price rises (albeit temporary) of late 1865, 
with the miners feeling that t h i s increased p r o f i t i b i l i t y should be 
reflected i n increased remimeration. Contacts with representatives 
of s t r i k i n g coal.miners from Newcastle, who had come to Cornwall to 
t r y to prevent the recruitment of blackleg labour, heightened local 
interest i n trade unionism. There was also an atmosphere of 
f l e x i b i l i t y and change, men who had come from the western mines 
having experienced the effects of geographical uprooting and 
distancing from the tr a d i t i o n a l methods of the West. 
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Certainly, the mine employers perceived what was for them a new 
and dangerous phenomenon, acting quickly and i n concert to meet the 
threat• At Drakewalls and other mines i n the Gimnislake area the 
employers took pre-emptive action, "locking-out" Association members. 
Devon Great Consols (near Tavistock) feared an invasion from across 
the Tamar, with 150 soldiers from Plymouth and 131 special constables 
brought i n to protect the mine i f necessary ( i n the event, they were 
not needed). I n the Caradon area, however, i t was the Association 
which took the i n i t i a t i v e . Strikes were declared at East Caradon and 
Marke Valley over insufficient prices for tribute and tutwork 
bargains, and a massive open-air meeting - reputedly attracting some 
foxir to f i v e thousand miners - was held on Caradon H i l l to articulate 
the workers' grievances. By now a clearly-defined, embryonic tmion 
was emerging, i t s ringleaders two prominent local preachers from St 
Cleer. 
The Caradon action received a swift reposte from the employers, 
however, making clear that the more radical claims of the Association 
would never be accepted and ( i n an attempt to seize the i n i t i a t i v e ) 
proposing the foundation of an alternative Association representing 
both employers and employees. The Caradon strikes continued into 
March, nonetheless, but i n the Tamar Valley mines the "lock-out" had 
already been successful i n forcing men to d r i f t back to work under 
the employers* conditions. This signalled the collapse of the 
industrial action and of the Association, and a l i t t l e over three 
weeks after the i n i t i a l Drakewalls "lock-out" the str i k e was over. 
Many had threatened that they would emigrate rather than bow to the 
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employers, and many did just that - taking with them their new 
experiences of unionism and industrial action to destinations as 
diverse as the I s l e of Man, the North of England, and South 
Australia. 
The f a i l u r e of the adventure of 1866 mirrored the fa l t e r i n g 
fledgling steps of the Welsh miners i n their unsuccessful action of 
1863, and was attributable to financial weakness, poor organisation 
and a lack of co-ordination i n the face of the sophisticated 
manoeverings of the employers. More particularly, the miners had 
chosen a poor time for their e f f o r t , for the price of copper was by 
now already dropping, the employers content to weather a period of 
i n a c t i v i t y at their mines and indeed happy to employ the "lock-out" 
weapon. Thereafter, things would not improve, the "Great Crash" of 
1866 heralding the demise of Cornish copper mining, promoting the 
emigration of those very people who had taken the lead i n the events 
of 1866. With the industry now i n swift and terminal decline, and 
with so many of the community's natural leaders increasingly 
scattered abroad, there was l i t t l e opportunity (unlike the Welsh 
experience) for the further development of trade unionism. 
Tin, however, outlived Cornish copper and i n the b r i e f upturn 
o 
i n the fortunes of the t i n industry i n the early 1870s there was a 
correspondingly b r i e f upsurge i n renewed collective action amongst 
the Cornish m i n e r s . T h e early 1870s were a time of economic boom 
i n Britain as a whole, a period of renewed optimism and increased 
expectations which were reflected i n strike action for better pay and 
conditions i n industries throughout the United Kingdom. Cornwall 
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shared i n thi s experience, and as a supposed new era of t i n mining 
prosperity was greeted with exuberance during 1871, so pressure for a 
"better deal" for the miners was exerted. Grievances centred around 
two main issues, the low levels of remuneration ( i t has been argued 
that employers kept t h e i r "captains' prices" a r t i f i c i a l l y low at a 
time when the price of t i n was r i s i n g ) and the infrequent payment of 
wages. Traditionally, Cornish mines operated the system i n which 
workers were paid "one month i n hand", a system which had often 
forced miners to resort to the drawing of "subsist" (an advance on 
wages) to make ends meet. By the early 1870s, however, mines were 
increasingly reluctant to grant "subsist". This created some 
resentment, a grievance heightened by the employers* s t r i c t adherence 
to calendar months i n determining pay periods. This led to "five 
week months" i n which miners would receive no greater remuneration 
than during a shorter, "normal" month. 
In December 1871 "several hundred miners" attended a meeting at 
St Blazey to protest against the "five week month", followed shortly 
by similar meetings i n the Caradon and St Just d i s t r i c t s . During 
that month there came the sudden announcement from Tincroft and Cam 
Brea mines that their "five week month" was to be abolished, an 
example followed speedily i n other mines but which also provoked 
strik e action (most notably at Wheal Basset, i n Illogan) elsewhere 
when employers were tardy i n their consideration of the issue. An 
emergency "County Mine Meeting" was held by the employers to debate 
the question, and as a resxilt the "five week month" was 
systematically abandoned at most Cornish mines during February and 
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March of 1872. At many mines this abolition was accompanied by a 
concessionary agreement on the part of the miners that they would no 
longer observe the trad i t i o n a l "Mazed Monday" holiday after pay 
periods, but i n the St Just d i s t r i c t men at several of the mines 
struck successfully for the retention of "Mazed Monday". The success 
of the miners' action promoted a s p i r i t of confidence, encouraging 
other grievances to be aired elsewhere (such as a stoppage by bal-
maidens and pickey-boys at the Caradon mines i n pursioit of higher 
wages). 
The speed and willingness with which the employers acceded to 
the miners' demands was a reflection of the relative strength of the 
workers' position. The mines could i l l - a f f o r d periods of disruption 
at a time of increasing demand and higher t i n prices, and years of 
emigration had led to a shortage of tributers and tutworkmen - they 
were much i n demand i n the upturn of 1871 and 1872 and a mine could 
not afford to alienate or lose i t s s k i l l e d labour. More subtly, the 
employers were happy to abolish the "fiv e week month" because there 
were alternative means of controlling wages, not least the 
manipulation of "captains' prices". However, the economic climate 
deteriorated rapidly, leading to f a l l i n g t i n prices and the closure 
of mimerous mines i n the decade ahead. By 1873 the workers' strength 
was already eroded (there was an unsuccessful str i k e by sxirface 
workers at Tincroft i n the October), and by early 1874 a number of 
mines had re-introduced the "five week month". A stri k e against re-
introduction at Wheal Jane was defeated, although elsewhere - i n the 
Camborne, Helston and St Just d i s t r i c t s - re-introduction was opposed 
- 267 
with some success. The struggle came to a head at Wheal Basset and 
South Condurrow i n a str i k e where, i n addition to the successful 
defeat of re-introduction, there were movements towards the creation 
of a trade union structure. 
A meeting i n Camborne at the end of March 1874 announced the 
formation of a miners' trade union, the new enthusiasm for unionism 
undoubtably boosted by the events and successes of recent months (and 
also encouraged by v i s i t i n g Burnley coal miners i n late 1873 who had 
come to Cornwall to dissuade blacklegs). However, the successful 
resolution of the "five week month" l e f t the potential trade 
unionists without an immediate cause upon which to focus their 
attention and mobilise their support. Equally, the position of the 
workers became increasingly less advantageous as the fortunes of the 
t i n industry moved from bad to worse. Although there was sporadic 
industrial action i n the 1880s and 1 8 9 0 s , t h e Camborne trade union 
came to nothing, a victim of short-term organisational problems but 
also strangled by the longer-term economic c r i s i s i n Cornish mining. 
Indeed, the workforce i n the Cornish t i n industry was not effectively 
xanionised u n t i l as late as 1917 (under wartime conditions) by which 
time - despite the strategic importance of t i n during the war -
mining was of marginal importance to the Cornish economy, 
geographically restricted to a few specific areas and employing 
re l a t i v e l y few people. As Burke has concluded, "The diminution of 
the Cornish industry during these years was most certainly one 
important factor i n the delayed advent of Trade Union organisation on 
any scale i n Cornwall...".^^ 
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Effective trade unionism came to the mines too late to have any 
djmaraic effect upon the Cornish workforce as a whole. There were 
b r i e f strikes at several t i n mines i n 1918, 1919 and 1920,^^ but even 
i n the re l a t i v e l y significant Transport and General Workers' Union 
strike at South Crofty i n January 1939 (when there. were clashes 
between strikers and police i n Pool) only 234 men out of a t o t a l of 
435 stopped work.^^ Elsewhere i n Cornwall, the only groups of 
workers to experience effective trade unionisation were the 
railwaymen and dock-workers (both of which were parts of larger union 
structures with a long history of organisation) and the china clay 
w o r k e r s , b u t even their e f f o r t s could not prevent the 1926 "General 
Strike" from being l i t t l e more than a damp squib west of the Taraar.^^ 
22 
The experience of the china clay workers i s interesting,^^ for 
i t mirrors that of the miners. Although china clay did not undergo 
the cataclysmic decline of copper and later t i n , the effects of that 
decline were f e l t nonetheless. Just as the clay industry was l e f t as 
the isolated rump of extractive production i n an otherwise de-
industrialising economy, so the clay workers were increasingly 
isolated - both i n d u s t r i a l l y and geographically. Inevitably, 
therefore, the unionisation of the clay workers was retarded. When, 
immediately prior to the Great War, a trade union structure did 
emerge, i t had perforce to operate i n an industrial environment with 
l i t t l e experience of trade unionism. In earlier days, clay workers 
had been numbered i n the ranks of food-rioting miners, and i n the 
early and mid 1870s (during and i n the aftermath of the t i n miners* 
"five week month" strikes) the clay industry had seen some industrial 
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action. In 1876, indeed, a China Clay Workers' Union had been 
formed, but the employers had reacted by attempting to weed out the 
unionists from their p i t s i n order to "...scotch the serpent IMion 
while i t was s t i l l young and week".^^ This, i n turn, provoked a 
br i e f outburst of r i o t and s t r i k e , but the employers remained 
steadfast i n t h e i r refusal to recognise the Union and by the end of 
the decade i t was already a distant and almost forgotten memory. 
Thereafter there was l i t t l e a c t i v i t y u n t i l 1911 when, as part of a 
general upsurge i n trade unionism i n Br i t a i n as a whole, the clay 
workers formed a branch of the Workers' Union. I n July 1912 they 
demanded recognition, along with wage rises, an eight hour day, and 
other improvements i n conditions of employment. With one or two 
notable exceptions, the employers refused to. comply, setting the 
stage for a long and b i t t e r ten week s t r i k e , characterised by 
violence and intimidation and the intervention of r i o t police brought 
i n from Glamorgan and elsewhere. Finally, the s t r i k e collapsed, the 
workers forced back to work through economic necessity, their demands 
s t i l l refused by the employers. 
There was l i t t l e opportunity or likelihood, therefore, for any 
comprehensive and enduring unionisation of the Cornish workforce i n 
the aftermath of the demise of copper and t i n , a situation 
contributing s t i l l further to the general social and economic 
paralysis of Cornwall i n the half-century or more before the Second 
World War. The emergence of tourism could do nothing to a l t e r the 
situation, for i t s workers (many of them casual and seasonal) proved 
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notoriously d i f f i c u l t to organise. The condition also contribued i n 
a most significant way to the parallel p o l i t i c a l paraylsis, retarding 
development or a broader Labour Party and movement and " f o s s i l i z i n g " 
the Liberal Party as the only credible radical alternative to the 
Conservatives i n Cornwall, a position that was being eroded rapidly 
elsewhere i n B r i t a i n . But before proceeding to an examination of 
that " f o s s i l i z a t i o n " , i t i s important to trace the a c t i v i t i e s and 
impact of Cornish workers who emigrated abroad. The willingness and 
a b i l i t y of the Cornish overseas to become involved i n trade unionism 
demonstrates s t i l l further that their f a i l u r e to combine successfxilly 
i n Cornwall was a function of rapid de-industrialisation rather than 
the "inate" individualism of the Comishman. 
In the United States of America, for example, the Cornish 
formed a miners' league at Grass Valley i n 1869 (which led to two 
serious strikes and a long period of i n d u s t r i a l turbulence^^) and 
later at the Butte copper mines and elsewhere the Cornish became - as 
Lingenfelter wrote - "...the leaders of the raining labor movement of 
the West".^^ Amongst their number was Richard F. Trevellick, 
described as "...one of the most important labor leaders i n 
nineteenth century America...".^^ By 1864 he was President of the 
Detroit Trade's Assembly, and i n the 1870s he was busy organising the 
anthracite miners of the East. Rowse considered that "...Trevellick 
must be regarded as the pioneer of the eight-hour day i n the United 
S t a t e s " , n o mean achievement for an individual and a significant 
commentary upon the radical and trade unionist disposition of 
emigrant Comishmen. 
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In South Africa, too, the Cornish emerged as prominent 
personalities i n the developing trade union movement i n the mines.^8 
Tom Matthews from Newlyn, who had mined i n Michigan and at Butte and 
had been President of the Miners' Union of Montana and i n 1892 that 
State's only Labour member of i t s House of Representatives, was a 
central figure i n the establishment of South Africa's Miners' 
Association i n 1902. Perhaps inevitably, the workers' struggle i n 
South Africa became blurred by r a c i a l tensions, f i r s t with the issue 
of Chinese laboiir and then with the thorny question of the 
relationship between black and white miners. The Cornish presented 
themselves as a "labour aristocracy", as supervisors of the modetn 
rock-drills operated by k a f f i r labour. Attempts by the employers at 
modifying this position were met i n 1907 by s t i f f Cornish resistance 
i n a disasterous strike which had the effect of encouraging blackleg 
Afrikaner labour into the mines. The general antipathy towards the 
Cornish strikers, and the corresponding Boer sympathy for the 
blacklegs, was epitomised i n Prime Minister Botha's view that: " I t i s 
time South Africa began to raise her own s k i l l e d workers...in this 
vast, amply r i c h country with i t s array of imported artisans, with i t s 
perpetual stream of postal orders flowing to Cornwall". 
In contrast to the complex ethnic c o n f l i c t of South Africa, the 
situation i n the copper, mines of South Australia was more clearly a 
transplantation and development of the Cornish experience, and i t i s 
i n that colony that we can most successfiilly present the continuing 
growth of Cornish trade unionism i n the period after the general 
collapse of mining i n C o r n w a l l . A s early as 1848 a b r i e f but 
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b i t t e r s t r i k e interrupted production at the mighty Burra Burra, one 
hundred miles north of Adelaide, but i t was 'an incoherent protest, 
hardly the advent of organised labour i n the colony's mines, and did 
not lead to the formation of a miners' association. I n 1864, 
however, almost on the eve of the significant trade union a c t i v i t y i n 
East Cornwall, there was a more t e l l i n g stoppage at South Australia's 
Moonta and Wallaroo copper mines, where effective action by the 
Cornish workers won various concessions from the employers. Ten 
years l a t e r , i n 1874 (again coincident with i n d u s t r i a l unrest i n 
Cornwall's mines), an even more significant s t r i k e at Moonta and 
Wallaroo created a new era of unionism i n which South Australia's 
Cornish miners organised themselves into a cohesive and effective 
Miners' Association. I t s leaders were Methodist class-leaders and 
local preachers - Wesleyans, Primitives, and Bible Christians - and 
the Association formulated a broad policy of prograirane and action, 
ranging from tactics to deal with local i n d u s t r i a l issues to a wider 
p o l i t i c a l view designed to influence the Adelaide Parliament. 
In Cornwall, the industrial action of the 1870s came to 
nothing, as the collapse of t i n eroded both the Cornish mining 
industry and the organisation of i t s workers, but i n South Australia 
the continuing success of the copper mines f a c i l i t a t e d the survival 
and indeed future development of the Cornish unions. Not only was 
trade unionism consolidated at Moonta and Wallaroo, but the Cornish 
influence was exported by migrating South Australian "Cousin Jacks" 
to the goldfields of Victoria and Western Australia and, most 
importantly, to the silver-lead mines of Broken H i l l which were to 
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emerge as one of the greatest centres of organised labour i n the 
continent. As i n Cornwall, the miners at Wallaroo and Moonta 
protested at the "five week month" and, l a t e r , at the abolition of 
"subsist" (an advance of earnings) for the long-term tribute and 
tutwork contracts. The practice of tribute and tutwork at Moonta and 
Wallaroo (and indeed many other Australian metal mines) lends further 
v a l i d i t y to comparisons with Cornwall. I t i s significant that 
tribute and tutwork, with a l l the implied individualism of the 
system, did not act as a long-term i n h i b i t o r of collective action i n 
the South Australian copper mines. Equally, i t i s significant that 
once the South Australian union had reached a matured state of 
development, one of i t s principal objectives was the abolition or at 
least radical restructuring of tribute and tutwork contracting. As 
W.G. Spence, one of the early commentators on Australian trade 
unionism, wrote: 
The Cornish miner i s generally a man who can do his share of 
grumbling, and frequently reckons he knows how to run a mine 
better than the manager, so when Unionism caught on they 
realised that many injustices might have been remedied years 
ago had they been organised and pulled together, instead of 
merely growling as individuals. 
During the 1880s there were periodic protests against tribute 
and tutwork at Moonta and Wallaroo, especially over the "percentage 
retained" system that had replaced "subsist", where a miner could be 
paid a weekly estimate of his l i k e l y earnings over a contract period 
but with a percentage of that amount retained by the company i n case 
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the f u l l estimated earnings were not i n fact realised at the end of 
the contract. When the percentage retained had reached 25 per cent 
the men struck successfully for i t s reduction to 12.5 per cent, and 
various other concessions were won. A major strike against 
contracting i n 1891 ended i n b i t t e r defeat for the miners, however, 
although the employers did promise "substantial modifications" to the 
system i n response to the return to work. There were, indeed, 
numerous adjustments during the 1890s, culminating i n 1903 i n the 
f i n a l abolition of "captains' prices" and their replacement by a 
"sliding scale" (based upon changes i n the price of copper) i n which 
the contractor participated d i r e c t l y i n the company's p r o f i t s . The 
union i t s e l f survived the trauma of 1891, emerging as a central 
feature of the industrial scene at Moonta and Wallaroo and an 
integral part of local community l i f e , i t s myriad influence affecting 
areas as diverse as r e l i g i o n , education and welfare. I t was an 
influence which lasted u n t i l the closure of the copper mines i n 1923, 
and represented the survival and development i n South Australia of a 
Cornish brand of trade unionism whose developrient i n Cornwall had 
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been cut short by the experience of rapid de-industrialisation. 
This Cornish experience of trade union a c t i v i t y overseas, of 
industrial radicalism, was mirrored i n a corresponding p o l i t i c a l 
radicalism. Indeed, i t was natural that p o l i t i c a l action should 
arise as part of a broader Labour movement. Todd notes that Cornish 
Methodist-Liberal radicalism, with i t s strongly i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c 
s t r a i n , was tailor-made for the "American Dream": "...some openly 
talked of Cornwall as a 'land of bondage' and only desired to taste 
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the l i b e r t y that...they presumed existed i n America."^^ As Todd 
remarks, " P o l i t i c a l l y and socially they were already to some extent 
Americans even before their ships l e f t Falmouth".^ In the mining 
camps of North America this radicalism developed i t s c o l l e c t i v i s t 
hue, f i r s t through trade unionism and then through Labour p o l i t i c s as 
men l i k e Tom Matthews stood for Office. Rowse singles out for 
attention the singular career of John Spargo, "...for some years a 
leading figure i n the American Socialist Party...one of the most 
remarkable Comishmen of t h i s century...".^^ Bom i n Stithians i n 
1876, Spargo went to America i n 1901. A Methodist by upbringing, 
Spargo had already earned a reputation as something of a Radical (he 
was a pro-Boer) and i n the United States he found work as a 
journalist and writer, despite his earlier employment as a granite-
cutter. In addition to his p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s , Spargo gained 
recognition as the f i r s t person to write a biography of Karl Marx i n 
Biglish. 
Elsewhere overseas, individual Comishmen made reputations as 
prominent Radicals. In South Africa, William Hosken emerged as an 
i n f l u e n t i a l public figure, a champion of the c i v i l rights of the 
Indian coniminity and chairman of the "European Sympathizers" group 
which mediated between the Satyagrahis and the Government during 
Ghandi's 1908 campaign, while Bishop John Colenso was an 
indefatigable defender of blacks' rigjhts. I n Victoria, John Quick 
from St Ives became a significant Liberal p o l i t i c i a n and a founding 
father of Australian Federation, while i n South Australia James Penn 
Boucaut from Mylor was known for his "democratic sympathies".The 
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early Western Australian Labor movement included such figures as the 
celebrated Captain William Oates from St Just, Captain Samuel 
Mitchell (with a reputation for " . . . l i b e r a l and progressive 
a c t i v i t y . . . " ^ ^ ) , and the " . . . l i b e r a l and democratic..." 
F.C.B. Vosper from St Dominick 
journalist. 
More sig n i f i c a n t l y , the p o l i t i c a l action that grew out of the 
miners' trade unions often bore a Cornish stamp, and i n South 
Australia i n particular the developing Miners* Association spawned a 
parallel United Labor Party. South Australia's f i r s t Labor MP 
(elected to the Adelaide Parliament i n 1891 as the Member for 
Wallaroo) was a Cornish Methodist trade imionist, one Richard Hooper, 
and the State's f i r s t Labor Premier ( i n 1910) was John Verran - from 
Gwennap - who was likewise a Methodist and trade union a c t i v i s t from 
Moonta and Wallaroo. The United Labor Party i t s e l f was a largely 
South Australian phenomenon, fundamentally Nonconformist i n i t s make-
up and outlook and profoundly influenced by the Coimish miners, i n 
many respects d i s t i n c t from the Irish-Catholic influence i n the Labor 
movement i n Victoria and New South Wales. I t s reputation was for 
moderation and pragmatism ("...eminently practical rather than 
eloquently v i s i o n a r y . . . " a s Michael Davitt put i t ) , and with 
chapel-oriented overtones. John Verran himself explained the United 
Labour Party's view of the inevitable and inextricable l i n k between 
relig i o n (Nonconformist, by def i n i t i o n ) and p o l i t i c s : 
Religion i s citizenship, and the relationship between r e l i g i o n 
£ind p o l i t i c s i s very close... . \^ hen we come to justice and 
righteousness and truth.. .religion i s not just a question of 
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going to heaven. I t i s a question of l i v i n g and making the 
world better for having been i n i t . . . .^ ^ 
Within the United Labor Party i n South Australia there were 
obvious echoes of the Liberal Methodist movement i n Cornwall, but the 
ULP claimed a "s o c i a l i s t " i d e n t i t y (despite i t s moderate image) and 
had i t s power base amongst a strong miners' union. These l a t t e r 
features served to distinguish i t from the Liberal Methodist movement 
at hcHne, but rather than a repudiation of or deviation from the 
experience i n Cornwall, the development of the United Labor Party i n 
South Australia represented the maturing of Cornish radicalism i n an 
environment where (unlike Cornwall) mining had survived and trade 
unionism had flourished. I t represented, indeed, a model for what 
might have happened i n Cornwall, had the Cornish experience of trade 
vmionisra not been cut short by rapid de-industrialisation and, 
consequently, the Cornish p o l i t i c a l environment "fossilized". 
Certainly, i n the period before the widespread collapse of 
mining and the ensuing paralysis of Cornish society, the Liberal 
Methodist movement i n Cornwall had been a dynamic, progressive force. 
Although there had been l i t t l e Methodist a c t i v i t y i n Cornwall over 
the Reform B i l l or Chartists, the Cornish Methodists proved heavily 
po l i t i c i s e d on educational issues (they were anti-Anglican, and a n t i -
Tory i n t h i s respect), on Catholic emancipation (which they opposed), 
and on slavery (which emerged as a major Cornish concern).^^ The 
Wesleyans t r i e d to eschew formal party p o l i t i c a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n but 
they did develop after 1832 ^^at Hayden has termed "...a preference 
for the Liberal P a r t y " , w i t h the Primitive Methodists and Bible 
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Christians pursuing the Methodist ideal of the "active c i t i z e n " 
through close association with Uberal p o l i t i c s . Temperence emerged 
as a unifying theme for the various Methodist factions i n Cornwall 
and became, i n turn, a Cornish p o l i t i c a l issue of some importance, 
culminating i n the i l l - s t a r r e d "Cornwall Sunday Closing B i l l " of the 
1880s, I n the 1880 General Election ten Liberals and only three 
Tories were returned for Cornish constituencies, with nine of these 
MPs supporting the temperence movement. As Hayden notes, "...the 
association of teraperence with Liberalism was almost complete"^^ i n 
Cornish p o l i t i c s : "In the last quarter of the century there was a 
clear l i n k between Methodism and the Liberal Party through 
teraperence. A l l the Methodist candidates i n this period i n Cornwall, 
mainly Liberals, were temperence supporters". 
The excitement caused by the industrial unrest of the 1870s had 
a certain - i f temporary - radicalising effect, most notably i n the 
Camborne constituency where i n the General Election of 1885 (the 
f i r s t i n the United Kingdom i n which a majority of the adult male 
population was e n t i t l e d to vote) the o f f i c i a l Liberal candidate, 
Pendarves Vivian, was defeated by the Radical Liberal C.A.V. 
Conybeare ( a l l the other Cornish seats were won by Liberals) v^o 
successfully mobilised many of the "new" votes. Pelling notes that 
the Camborne constituency "...was very Radical..."^^ i n the 1880s, 
but Rowe adds a t e l l i n g insight when he remarks that an important 
contribution towards the Conybeare victory was the encouragement and 
moral support from Cornish miners i n A m e r i c a . A l r e a d y the 
emigration of Cornwall's opinion leaders was having an effect, 
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although increasingly that effect would (as described e a r l i e r ) be 
f e l t abroad i n the mining camps of North America, Australia and 
elsewhere, rather than i n distant Cornwall. As mining further 
declined, with attempts at trade unionism proving a damp squib and 
with s t i l l more of the community's ablest leaders emigrating 
overseas, the radicalising impulse was dulled. In other 
circumstances Conybeare's victory might have heralded a generally 
leftward s h i f t from the Liberal Party, mirroring the experiences of 
South Wales or South Australia, but Cornwall i n the late 1880s and 
1890s was already moving towards paralysis. 
Indeed, the events of those decades suggested a s h i f t i n 
Cornwall away from the Liberal Party, not to the l e f t but rather to 
the r i g h t - to the breakaway Liberal Unionists. I t i s tempting to 
interpret t h i s s h i f t as evidence of the collapse of Cornish 
radicalism (attendent upon the collapse i n Cornish mining), with the 
Liberal toionists becoming rapidly - as Soulsby has argued^® - the 
backbone of a merged Conservative and Unionist Party i n Cornwall. 
Closer analysis, however, reveals a different tale. Whilst 
radicalism of the Conybeare strand did ultimately come to l i t t l e , the 
Liberal-Methodist movement was more enduring and the Cornish 
electorate more anti-Tory than the rise of the Liberal Unionists 
might suggest. The General Election of 1886 proved disasterous for 
the Liberals throughout the United Kingdom, with a net loss of some 
144 seats, as Chamberlain's Liberal Unionists s p l i t from the Liberal 
camp over his opposition to I r i s h Home Rule. The Liberal Unionists 
fared well i n Chamberlain's Birmingjiam, but elsewhere the chief areas 
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of Liberal Unionist success i n 1886 were rural Scotland, a sprinkling 
of English agricultural seats, and Comwall^^ (which was dubbed 
"Chamberlain's Duchy"^^). Significantly, none of these represented 
safe Conservative seats, for despite their Unionist alliance with the 
Liberal Unionists, local Conservative Associations i n safe Tory 
constituencies rarely f e l t the need to nominate Liberal Unionist 
candidates i n order to win seats. I n areas of t r a d i t i o n a l l y weak 
Conservative support, such as Cornwall, however, i t was the Liberal 
IMionists who emerged as the dominant partners and election 
candidates. 
The weakness of real Conservatism i n Cornwall i n thi s period 
was reflected i n the great d i f f i c u l t y experienced by the "grass-
roots" Primrose League i n establishing i t s e l f i n Cornish 
constituencies. Elsewhere i n Br i t a i n i n the 1880s, the Primrose 
League brought a vibrant, popular Conservatism to bear which 
threatened the Liberals even i n their areas of strength. "Only i n 
some r u r a l d i s t r i c t s such as the Scottish Highlands and parts of 
Cornwall and Wales did the p o l i t i c a l culture prove hopelessly hostile 
to the league's form of Conservatism",^^ argues Pugh, and i n Cornwall 
there were but three "Habitations" (league branches) of any strength 
- Bodmin (largely due to the energies of the Earl of Mount Edgcumbe), 
Truro (associated, perhaps, with Anglican revival), and t r a d i t i o n a l l y 
Tory Penryn where the leader or "Ruling Councillor" i n 1887 was a 
woman: "...we may surmise that male Conservatives, regarding the 
county as hopelessly radical, gladly gave the ladies f u l l scope". 
Despite an appeal to Cornish sentiment i n the judicious selection of 
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p a t r i o t i c names for i t s "Habitations" ("Bevil Granville" at Stratton, 
"King Arthur's Round Table" at Camelford, "Tre, Pol and Pen" at 
Sheviok, and the archaic forms "Uskerret" and "Essa" for Liskeard 
and Saltash^^), the Primrose League and with i t the Conservative 
Party experienced severe d i f f i c u l t i e s i n Cornwall, "...arising from 
the strength of Nonconformity, the prevalence of scattered, pastoral 
farms rather than nuclear villages, and the tendency torards small 
farms and comparatively few big landowners".Even i n neighbouring 
Devon and Somerset the League met with greater success, while the 
central southern England region - running from Dorset to Berkshire 
and Gloucestershire to Hampshire - was, with i t s extensive 
aristocratic landownership and rapidly expanding residential areas, 
"...a p i l l a r of Primrose League and Conservative strength". 
In Cornwall, then, the emergent Liberal Unionists were by no 
means a revamped or surrogate local Conservative Party but quite 
genuinely represented Liberalism with a Unionist face. As happened 
i n certain other areas, the desertion en-bloc from Liberals to 
Liberal Unionists i n Cornwall l e f t the Liberal Party depleted and i n 
some parts v i r t u a l l y leaderless.^'^ Three seats f e l l to the Liberal 
Unionists i n 1886, leaving the other three Cornish constituencies i n 
the hands of the Liberals. T3iereafter, the Liberal Unionists 
remained a significant force i n Cornish p o l i t i c s u n t i l the 1906 
"Liberal Landslide" and, indeed, resurfaced i n 1910 as a factor to be 
reckoned with.^^ However, at times the Liberal Unionists i n Cornwall 
were v i r t u a l l y indistinguishable from the Liberals themselves, save 
for their opposition to I r i s h Home Rule, as i n St Ives constituency 
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where the Liberal Unionist MP, T.R. Bolitho, who was elected 
unopposed i n 1892 and again i n 1895, was a well known Radical. 
Ironi c a l l y , his programme included Radical Liberal demands such as 
shorter Parliaments, one man one vote, and the extreme teraperence 
"Direct Veto". A further irony i s that the Liberal who replaced him 
i n 1906 was i n fact also hostile to Home Rule, demonstrating the 
f l u i d i t y of party alignment i n Cornwall and the ideological 
common 
ground of both Liberals and Liberal Unionists i n Cornish p o l i t i c s . 
Elsewhere i n Cornwall there was a fine balance between Liberals 
and Liberal Unionists i n the period 1886-1906. Mid-Cornwall, the 
china clay country, was the strongest Liberal division (as i t i s 
today) but Tiruro "...was on balance more IMionist...",^^ with the 
tin y borough of Penryn and Falmouth uncertain and Bodmin a marginal 
seat. The thoroughly Nonconformist constituency of Launceston was 
more clearly Liberal. In a l l these areas, as Pelling notes, the 
attraction of the Liberal Unionists was not the i r pact with the 
Conservatives (far from i t ) but rather the fact that Cornish Liberal 
Unionists were opposed to I r i s h Home Rule while nonetheless remaining 
genuinely Liberal on domestic and Cornish issues. As Pelling himself 
concluded, "...representatives of the Unionist cause had fought as 
Liberal Unionists rather than as Conservatives; their success 
indicated the persistance of a body of opinion which, while radical 
on domestic questions, was conservative on Imperial matters."^^ The 
general Cornish concern on Imperial policy reflected the Cornish 
stake i n the Bnpire i n terras of the emigrant communities, but the 
specific Cornish h o s t i l i t y to I r i s h Home Rule i s at f i r s t glance a 
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surprise. Notwithstanding the a n t i - I r i s h outburst of the second 
"Camborne Riots" i n 1882,^^ there were no sizeable I r i s h communities 
i n Cornwall and no deep-seated evidence of a n t i - I r i s h sentiment. 
However, just as the Methodists had earlier opposed Catholic 
emancipation, so they feared the r i s i n g star of Popery i n a Home Rule 
Ireland. They feared, especially, for the future of their fellow 
Nonconformists i n a "Rome Rule" Ireland, and the geographic proximity 
of Cornwall made I r i s h Home Rule a strategic issue. Moreover, 
Cornish fishermen feared that a self-governing Ireland would exclude 
thera from I r i s h waters - they were therefore persuaded to vote 
Liberal toionist, despite the fact that "The fishermen.. .were 
regarded as being strongly Radical". 
The rise of the Liberal Unionists i n Cornwall, therefore, 
reflected not the demise of the Liberal Methodist movement but 
actually underscored the p o l i t i c a l importance of Cornish 
Nonconformity and the significance of Cornish issues. Althougji 
Imperial policy was hardly a domestic issue, Cornish perceptions of 
i t were nonetheless disti n c t i v e and highly "local". The apparent 
fl u x of the period 1886 to 1906 i n r e a l i t y disguised a consistency i n 
Cornish p o l i t i c s , with i t s continuing Liberal Methodist momentum and 
relative Conservative weakness. Cornish p o l i t i c s remained radical to 
a point, but s t r i c t l y within the Liberal/Liberal Unionist framework. 
Significantly, where the radical impulse was renewed, i t was - as i n 
the days of Conybeare and his American supporters - a result of 
outside influences. Specifically, i n the General Election of 1900 
(when Cornwall returned three Liberal Unionists and three Liberals), 
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the Camborne constituency once again recorded a swing to the l e f t . 
I n 1895 • Conybeare had lost his seat, for the reasons summarised by 
Pelling: 
...the acute depression i n the t i n and copper industries i n the 
middle 1890s demoralised the miners. Many of them lost the 
vote owing to dependence on poor r e l i e f ; others emigrated; and 
s t i l l more were inclined to l i s t e n to the promises of a wealthy 
tin-merchant, A. Strauss, who, standing as a Liberal Unionist, 
advocated various nostrums including bimetallism, which would 
'tend to raise the price of t i n ' . In an election which turned 
entirely on these local problems, Strauss secured the victory 
i n 1895.^^ 
However, Strauss' novel panaceas f a i l e d to deliver, and i n the 
continuing c r i s i s of the mining industry his local support was eroded 
rapidly. More particxilarly, the Boer War - a p o l i t i c a l issue 
througjiout B r i t a i n , but with a peculiar significance and immediacy 
within Cornwall - emerged as a point of confl i c t i n Camborne. 
Although i t was alleged that Cornish miners had received rough 
treatment at the hands of the Boers i n the T r a n s v a a l , w i t h many 
Cornish Liberal Unionists arguing for a vigorous Imperial policy i n 
South Africa, there were also those who feared that war would dry up 
the flow of financial support to Cornwall. There was therefore a 
vocal anti-war (inevitably dubbed "pro-Boer") faction i n Cornwall, 
and i n the Election of 1900 i t s spokesman, W.S. Caine, defeated 
Strauss. As Dawe has noted, "On the p o l i t i c a l front Cornwall voted 
against the national tide when Liberal Unionist lost to the Liberal 
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Radical, who was a p r o - B o e r " . C a i n e , l i k e Conybeare before him, 
derived support-from emigrant Comishmen, claiming that "...out of 
700 Cornish miners home from South Africa, at least 650 had voted for 
him".^^ Caine was not alone i n his pro-Boer sympathies, others 
including Leonard Courtney - the MP for Bodmin ( i r o n i c a l l y a Liberal 
Unionist) - and J. Passmore Edwards (formerly Liberal MP for 
Salisbury), along with the Comish-bom EMly Hobhouse who drew 
Br i t i s h attention to conditions i n the concentration camps. 
In the early 1900s Liberal Unionist support i n Cornwall was 
further eroded as a result of Nonconformist h o s t i l i t y to the 
Conservatives' Education B i l l , with the Liberal West Briton noting 
the return of some Liberal Unionists to the Liberal f o l d and 
expressing pleasure that "...Unionist Nonconformists have not sunk 
a l l their Nonconformity i n their Unionism".South Africa remained 
a principal p o l i t i c a l issue i n Cornwall, however, perpetuated by the 
"Chinese Slavery" scare. Some 60,(X)0 Chinese workers were to be 
brought i n to South Africa i n the four years after February 1904, i n 
an e f f o r t to restore the production of the mines to pre-war levels, 
but they had a generally depressing effect on wages and conditions 
and were seen by many as unacceptable competitors for mining jobs. 
At f i r s t there was an ambivalent reaction i n Cornwall, for while 
Cornish miners shared i n the general h o s t i l i t y to the Chinese, the 
Cornish economy re l i e d very much upon the restoration and success of 
South African mining. The Mining Journal noted that, 
...contrary to what might generally have been expected i n a 
county which, taken by and wide, i s essentially Liberal not to 
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say Radical, as regards i t s p o l i t i c a l opinions, the proposition 
to employ Chinese labour i n the Transvaal, instead of being 
opposed, i s receiving active support, not only from the local 
Press, but from mining men generally. 
The actual a r r i v a l of the Chinese i n South Africa galvanised 
Cornish opinion however, the fear that Chinese coolies would take 
Cornish jobs (and therefore Cornish wages destined otherwise for 
Cornwall) proving irresistable. This h o s t i l i t y was given a Christian 
and Radical tinge through the argument that the Chinese were to a l l 
intents and purposes being forced into "slavery", the victims of an 
exploitation which coerced them through unfair contracts to work for 
wages far below the economic level that the work demanded. The 
Liberal Party at UK level adopted opposition to "Chinese Slavery" as 
part of i t s p o l i t i c a l programme i n the 1906 General Election 
campaign, and i n Cornwall the issue was seen as more significant than 
many other important questions of the day, such as T a r i f f Reform. 
The Comubian thundered: "Will you vote for a Government that has 
ruined South Africa for the Cornish miner? W i l l you vote f o r Chinese 
labour? I f i t be not a kind of slavery, what i s i t ? " ^ ^ I n the 
ensuing "Liberal Landslide" election the Liberal Unionists (seen as 
supporters of the Government, and therefore of "slavery" - the curse 
which Cornish Methodists had fought to eradicate i n the previous 
century) were trounced i n Cornwall, each Cornish seat returning a 
Liberal m e m b e r . T h e re-assertion of the Liberal Methodist l i n k 
proved crucial i n achieving this result, the West Briton claiming i n 
^ r i l 1906 that i n the St Austell d i s t r i c t "...nearly every 
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Nonconformist chapel i n this constituency was used as a Liberal 
committee room during the last e l e c t i o n " . S i m i l a r l y , the Western 
Morning News noted that at Launceston "The chapel, on the quiet 
roadside or i n the secluded valley, i s the governing factor i n t h i s 
division. I t has been said that i n these l i t t l e Bethels, i s preached 
the Radical shibboleth from January to December".In the Lands End 
peninsula i n 1906, Hudson found that "Fishermen and miners were 
almost to a man on the Liberal side, led by their ministers, who were 
eagerly looking to have their revenge on the Church..."^^ 
The victorious Liberal Goverment did indeed put a stop to 
"Chinese Slavery", and i n the General Election of January 1910 - when 
the Unionists regained many of the r u r a l English seats that they had 
lost i n 1906 - Cornwall remained so l i d l y Liberal, although i n the 
further Election i n the December marginal Bodmin did f a l l to the 
Uberal IMionists.^^ The entire episode from 1885 u n t i l 1910 had 
demonstrated the underlying tenacity of the Liberal Methodist 
equation i n Cornwall, the intervention of the Liberal Unionists 
demonstrating, paradoxically, the powerful p o l i t i c a l strength of 
Cornish Nonconformity. Liberal Unionists, indeed, were i n many 
respects a different breed from their Unionist contemporaries across 
the Tamar, Radical on domestic issues and motivated by specifically 
Cornish considerations. The Liberal Party i t s e l f remained at root 
the party of Cornwall, although increasingly i t s radicalising impulse 
came from Cornish emigrants overseas - the shock when Pendarves 
Vivian lost Camborne i n 1885, and the later influence of South 
African considerations. The s h i f t of the radical influence abroad 
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was, of course, consistent with the broader Cornish experience i n 
this period, reflecting the success of Cornish trade unionism and 
radical p o l i t i c s overseas. 
By 1910, then, the position of Cornwall as part of the "Liberal 
heartland" had been tested and confirmed, i t s Methodist input as 
crucial as ever, but with a local and distin c t i v e style of p o l i t i c s -
i n which Cornish issues could assume great importance - also 
apparent. At the same time, however, the potential for further 
radicalisation of the Cornish electorate at home had diminished with 
the decline of mining, the f a i l u r e of trade unionism, and continviing 
emigration. Cornwall might remain Liberal, but i t s propensity to 
embrace the new cause of Labour was inevitably limited. 
By 1910 a broader picture i n the United Kingdom as a whole was 
apparent i n which, as Blake has said, "...the weakness of the 
Conservative party i n northern England and the 'Celtic fringe' 
becomes clear e nough",The "Tory heartland" was central, southern 
and south-eastern England, with the Liberals (along with the infant 
Labour Party's contribution) dominant i n the North and i n Scotland, 
Wales, and Cornwall. On the eve of the F i r s t World War, therefore, 
B r i t i s h voting behaviour reflected the fundamental p o l i t i c a l and 
economic division between "centre" and "peripheries" - a prelude, 
indeed, to the "North-South" debate of the 1980s. Although Labour 
featured, albeit marginally, i n thi s division, i t was essentially a 
s p l i t between Liberal and Conservative. 
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After 1910 the basic division remained, although i n the period 
to the Second World War the Uberals were progressively replaced by 
Labour as the principal radical alternatives to the Conservatives. 
Christopher Cook has termed t h i s era "The Age of Alignment" i n which 
B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s were transformed in t o a Labour versus Conservative 
c o n t e s t . C o o k argues that between the General Elections of 1922 
and October 1924 the party system changed irrevocably - the f a t a l 
point of Liberal downfall was reached i n 1924, and by 1929 the 
Liberals had slipped too far back to be an effective force, their 
role by now usurped by Labour. Koss adds a further dimension to this 
approach by asserting that after 1918 Nonconformists i n Br i t a i n 
became markedly less p o l i t i c i s e d : they faced declining membership of 
their Churches and d i s i l l u s i o n with the Liberals, i n the process 
losing their cohesion and their bonds with the Liberal Party. Koss 
concludes that by 1935 "...Radical Nonconformity, once a force to be 
reckoned with i n national l i f e , was not dormant but dead",^^ replaced 
by the secular socialism of Labour. 
However, Koss admits that the Liberals were able to retain 
".. .considerable lojralty among Nonconformists of particular 
persuasions i n isolated areas...",^^ one of which was Cornwall. 
Cornwall, indeed, did not experience to the *same degree as elsewhere 
the d i l u t i n g of Nonconformist strength and remained, as Kinnear has 
shown, overtly Nonconformist i n character when contrasted against 
comparable regions of England.®^ Even Devon was noticeably, less 
Nonconformist than Cornwall, the only d i r e c t l y similar areas being 
parts of Durham and Northumberland (Fig. 17). P o l i t i c a l l y , t h i s was 
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Fig 17: 
Source: 
Distribution of Nonconformists in England in 1922 
• I 
Over 2(P4 
12-5-14.9% 
7-5-9-9% 
Under 7-5% 
Distribution of Nonconformists i n 1922, 
i l l u s t r a t i n g the relative strength of Nonconformity 
i n Cornwall compared to other areas. 
Michael Kinnear, The B r i t i s h Voter: An Atlas and 
Survey, Batsford, London, 1981, pl27. 
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reflected i n continuing support for the Liberal Party so that i n 
Cornwall, as Smart has argued, "...the age of alignment was the age 
82 
of consolidation"."'^ Instead of participating i n the new alignment 
of Labour versus Conservative, Cornish p o l i t i c s were consolidated 
into a Liberal against Conservative contest. 
The ambivalence of the Liberal IMionist era having passed, the 
Cornish party system weathered the continuing internal s p l i t s within 
the Liberal Party, producing by the 1930s a clear p o l i t i c a l pattern 
of Liberal-Tory c o n f l i c t . The fortunes of the Labour and 
Conservative Parties i n Cornwall contributed to thi s state of a f f a i r s 
but most significant was the sxirvival of Liberalism. This was linked 
to the surviving strength of Nonconformity, and both Liberalism and 
Nonconformity owed their perpetuation i n Cornwall to the paralysis 
that had a f f l i c t e d Cornish society and economy. I n the absence of 
conditions i n which a secular Labour movement might have arisen, the 
Liberal Methodist movement was "fossilized" as the only viable 
radical alternative to the Conservatives and, indeed, as the "party 
of Cornwall". This " f o s s i l i z a t i o n " was, i n turn, a function of that 
rapid de-industrialisation that had precluded the development of a 
Labour movement and produced a late Labour electoral presence, a 
feature of the condition of "Second Peripheralism". I t also served 
to mark the Cornish experience apart from that that obtained 
elsewhere, further emphasising and accentuating the distinctive 
nature of Cornish p o l i t i c s . 
In the aftermath of the Great War, B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s were 
a f f l i c t e d by much faction-fighting, reflected in Cornwall i n the 1922 
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General Election i n a bewildering result which saw the return to 
Parliament of two "Lloyd George Liberals", one "Asquith Liberal", and 
two Conservatives. In 1923 the Liberals recovered remarkably, 
capturing a l l five Cornish seats. But i n the 1924 General election -
which saw "...the v i r t u a l elimination of the Liberals"^^ at 
Parliamentary le v e l , leaving them with only a handful of seats i n 
rural Wales and northern Scotland - they held only Camborne (where 
their candidate stood as a "cons t i t u t i o n a l i s t " ) , the rest of Cornwall 
f a l l i n g to the Tories. Five years l a t e r , i n 1929, there was a very 
limited Liberal revival i n English r u r a l areas and i n parts of 
Scotland and Wales, but by then the Labour Party was not only 
consolidating i t s earlier successes but also making s t r i k i n g advances 
elsewhere: the "Age of Alignment" had arrived. In Cornwall, however, 
the Liberal recovery was complete, the Party winning a l l f i v e Cornish 
seats, an experience presenting Cornwall as a curious Liberal bastion 
- an anachronism, almost - i n a wider p o l i t i c a l world now dominated 
by Labour-Conservative c o n f l i c t . I n the remaining elections of the 
pre-war era - 1931 and 1935 - the Liberals' position i n Br i t a i n as a 
whole became even more parlous, leaving them with merely a ti n y 
collection of seats i n the remnants of th e i r t r a d i t i o n a l heartlands. 
Cornwall shared i n the general swing to the Conservatives, i n 1931 
producing two Liberals, one National Liberal, and two Conservatives, 
and i n 1935 returning one "Lloyd George Liberal", one National 
Liberal, and three Conservatives.Labour, however, remained of 
only marginal importance i n Cornwall, despite the events elsewhere. 
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The towering figure of Cornish Liberalism i n t h i s period was 
Isaac Foot. Although bom i n Plymouth, Foot id e n t i f i e d with Cornwall 
and Cornish p o l i t i c s , l i v i n g f i r s t at St Cleer and then at 
Callington, and as a Methodist preaching i n many of the l i t t l e 
chapels of East Coimwall. His granddaughter and biographer, Sarah 
Foot, declares that "He was a radical, uncompromising Liberal, a 
staunch Methodist of illuminating f a i t h . . . " ^ ^ and that "Isaac Foot's 
Liberalism and Methodism were closely l i n k e d " . H e represented 
Bodmin for much of the period, monopolising the radical vote (Labour 
did not manage to save i t s deposit i n Bodmin vmtil 1945) and 
perpetuating the issues of classical Cornish Liberalism - such as 
Temperence - u n t i l the eve of the Second World War. As a 
Parliamentarian he won a reputation as an orator of great s k i l l , and 
b r i e f l y i n the 1930s he was Parliamentary Secretary for Mines i n the 
National Goverment. He resigned, however, over his commitment to 
Free Trade, another of the great Liberal themes. To Koss, who has 
stressed the demise of Radical Nonconformity i n the inter-war period, 
Isaac Foot - with his anti-drink, anti-betting, evangelical stance -
appears an anachronistic enigma: "...surely the last of the great 
Nonconformist parliamentary careers".^^ In Cornwall, however, Foot 
was anything but that. He was revered as "Our Isaac" and "Sir 
Isaac", and i t i s said that at Looe even the fishermen's luggers were 
painted i n Liberal colours i n his h o n o u r . O u t of step with the 
broad thrust of B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s but closely attuned to the concerns 
of Cornwall, Isaac Foot personified the "f o s s i l i z a t i o n " of Cornish 
p o l i t i c s i n th i s period of paralysis. 
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Against such vehement championship of tr a d i t i o n a l Cornish 
Liberalism i t was especially d i f f i c u l t for Labour to make headway i n 
Cornish constituencies i n their attempt to pierce the Cornish 
paralysis. A.L. Rowse considers that "The prime task for Labour i n 
Cornwall was to bring home the f u t i l i t y of going on being Liberal". 
Rowse, i n an assessment of the Cornish p o l i t i c a l climate i n the 
1920s, complains of "...backward Cornwall, smothered as i t was i n 
Nonconformist Liberal humbug..." with Cornish Liberalism ".. ,a 
fossilised survival: the p o l i t i c a l expression of Nonconformity".^^ 
In the St Austell area i n particular, "The l i t t l e chapels out i n the 
china-clay d i s t r i c t were v i r t u a l l y Liberal recruiting stations i n my 
time".^^ Rowse, however, as a Labour candidate, carefully nurtured 
the Falmouth-Penryn constituency (preparing the ground for the Labour 
victory i n Falmouth-Camborne i n 1945), i n Labour's debacle of 1931 
keeping Labour's share of the vote steady and i n 1935 putting Labour 
into second place with a very respectable 13,000 votes. The Cornish 
Labour News newspaper attempted to popularise Labour's image lo c a l l y , 
with Jack Donovan - a local trade unionist - mobilising the Falmouth 
dockyard vote.^^ 
Smart notes, too, that by the start of the 1930s Labour - on . 
the evidence of the s t a t i s t i c s - seemed to be making at least some 
headway. In the 1929 General Election, Labour obtained 17 per cent 
of the vote i n St Ives ( f i r s t contested by Labour i n 1918, the very 
f i r s t Labour challenge i n Cornwall), 25 per cent i n Camborne, and 29 
per cent i n Falmouth-Penrjm. As Smart comments, the "...Liberal 
victors i n the Cornish seats must have reflected on how close Labour 
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came to l e t t i n g i n the Conservatives".^^ However, as Smart has also 
argued, i t i s s t a t i s t i c a l l y d i f f i c u l t to make comparisons between the 
results of one election and another (not least because of the 
continually altering size of the electorate) and that, i n the case of 
Cornwall, "...given the increase i n the size of the electorate by 
1929, Labour's regional performance at the end of the decade i n vote 
share terras i s no better than at the beginning". 
But i f Labour was vmable to make significant headway i n 
Cornwall, the Conservatives i n the inter-war period were able to make 
an impression upon Cornish p o l i t i c s i n a way that had not been 
possible before. Whilst the position of the Liberals was not 
challenged seriously i n terms of their status as the radical party of 
Cornwall, their overwhelming superiority and popularity was 
progressively eroded. Notwithstanding the Liberal triumphs of 1923 
and 1929, the Liberal-Conservative c o n f l i c t - as i t developed i n 
Cornwall - did become more f i n e l y balanced. Earlier i n the century 
the contest had been between Liberals and Liberal Unionists, i n some 
respects an academic distinction within Cornwall, but thereafter the 
Conservatives emerged as a genuinely alternative opposition. To some 
extent th i s was f a c i l i t a t e d by an understanding with the National 
Liberal faction, epitomised (as Lee has noted) i n St Ives 
constituency where "...the period since 1918 has seen an unusual 
relationship between Liberals and Conservatives. In 1931 and 1935 
the National Liberal candidate was returned unopposed, and the 
National Liberal/Conservatives.. .candidates have held the seat ever 
s i n c e " . T h i s understanding between the National Liberals and 
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Conservatives reflected a common desire to ensure that a Labour 
candidate was not elected. This, i n turn, reflected the tone of 
Liberal anti-Labour invective i n Cornwall, where Liberal exhortations 
to the electorate not to vote "socia l i s t " but to ensure instead an 
"anti-socialist" result played in t o the hands of the Conservatives. 
Taking up this theme, echoing and indeed absorbing the Liberal cry, 
".•.the Conservatives i n the south west succeeded i n making the 
rhetoric of anti-socialism their own...".^® 
To t h i s was added the rehabilitation of Conservatism i n the 
United Kingdom as a whole under Baldwin. In 1906 the Conservatives 
had lost much of the middle ground of B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s and, as Blake 
has observed, "From 1906 to 1914 they had seemed too often to be the 
party of r i c h men reluctant to pay taxes, of Englishmen determined to 
retain control over the 'Celtic fringe'... . The Conservatives 
seemed to lack c o m p a s s i o n " . U n d e r Baldwin, however, the 
Conservatives seemed to acquire a new awareness of social problems, 
of poverty and unemployment, and the Conservatives - i n offering 
stable government - appeared a reasonable alternative to the "inept" 
Labour Party and " s t r i f e - t o r n " L i b e r a l s . T h e y offered, too, a 
security against the "interfering" and "centralist" policies of 
Labour, an important consideration i n independent and i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c 
Cornwall where Labour aspirations were viewed with suspicion. To 
some extent, therefore, the progress of the Conservatives i n Cornwall 
was a function of h o s t i l i t y towards the Labour Party and i t s 
policies, nonetheless contributing to the situation where Cornish 
p o l i t i c s was essentially a clash between Liberals and Conservatives. 
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Labour had been kept out of Cornish p o l i t i c s , but at the expense of 
increasing Tory importance. 
Of course, i n the atmosphere of paralysis that characterised 
Cornish society i n th i s period one would expect to f i n d neither the 
rise of Labour nor the dynamic advocacy of Liberalism. Instead, the 
already " f o s s i l i z i n g " Liberal Methodist movement was carried along by 
i t s own momentum but without radicalising injections for the future 
(despite the stature of Isaac Foot), the imperative of 
"fossilization" being essentially conservative. Against a background 
of Labour feiilure to i n f i l t r a t e Cornish p o l i t i c s , and of the 
cataclysmic f a i l u r e of the Liberals i n B r i t a i n as a whole, the 
relative success of the Conservatives i n Cornwall i s not at a l l a 
sxirprise. 
However, i t remains the case that the essential c o n f l i c t i n 
Cornish p o l i t i c s i n the 1920s and 1930s was Liberal versus 
Conservative, a state of a f f a i r s which marked the Coimish p o l i t i c a l 
scene as "different" from that which obtained elsewhere but which had 
also the effect of marginalising Cornwall's impact upon Bri t a i n as a 
whole. Divorced from the increasingly dominant Labour-Conservative 
confli c t that had emerged elsewhere, Cornwall was progressively 
unable to influence or participate i n the wider p o l i t i c a l 
environment. As a mere "county" Cornwall had, i n the era of duality 
between "low" provincial p o l i t i c s and "high" p o l i t i c s at the centre, 
only a minor voice i n any case, but th i s minority was accentuated by 
the apparent irrelevance of Cornish p o l i t i c s . For those who sought 
the "Revival" of the Cornish language and Celtic i d e n t i t y , this 
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p o l i t i c a l impotence might have been irksome, but Tyr ha Tavas was 
only marginally p o l i t i c i s e d and the wider "Revivalist" movement was 
i f anything opposed to p o l i t i c a l nationalism. Certainly, Henry 
Jenner had written that, 
...every Comishman knows well enough, proud as he may be of 
belonging to the B r i t i s h Einpire, that he i s no more an 
Englishman than a Caithness man i s , that he has as much r i g h t 
to a separate local patriotism to his l i t t l e motherland...as 
has a Scotsman, an Irishman, a Welshman, or even a Colonial; 
and that he i s as much a Celt and as l i t t l e of an Anglo-Saxon 
as any Gael, Cymro, Manxman or Breton". 
But, l i k e the Liberal Unionists, Jenner was opposed to I r i s h 
Home Rule and the wider p o l i t i c a l expression of Celtic nationalism, a 
report on his address to the Truro Rotary Club i n 1924 noting that: 
After discussing what nationality amounts t o , he said that 
Cornwall, by reason of i t s history, i t s position, and i t s 
indiv i d u a l i t y , had every b i t as much ri g h t to c a l l i t s e l f a 
nation as had Scotland, Wales, and England. I n saying that he 
was not advocating Cornish independence j or even "Cornish Home 
Rule", nor did he wish to translate the I r i s h words Sinn Fein 
into Cornish - their version of them was "One and A l l " , a 
better motto... 
In practice the day to day a c t i v i t i e s of the "Revivalists" had l i t t l e 
bearing upon the conduct of p o l i t i c s i n Coimwall. l-Jhilst Cornish 
p o l i t i c s had, for the reasons discussed above, become increasingly 
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d i s t i n c t from those of Eiigland, there had been no attempt by the 
"Revivalists" to exploit that d i s t i n c t i o n . "Distinctiveness" was not 
yet a cue for p o l i t i c a l action but remained merely a feature of 
Cornwall's p o l i t i c a l " f o s s i l i z a t i o n " , of the paralysis that 
characterised the matured manifestation of "Second Peripheralism". 
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PART IV 
THIRD PERIPHERALISM: THE DYNAMICS OF POST-WAR CHANGE 
"Yes, I migjit well grow t i r e d 
Of slighting flowers a l l day long. 
Of making my song 
Of the mud i n the k i l n , of the wired 
Poles on the clay-dump; but where 
Should I find my personal pulse of prayer 
I f I turned from the broken, scarred 
And unkempt land, the hard 
Contours of dogma, colourless h i l l s ? 
Is there a flower that t h r i l l s 
Like frayed rope? Is there grass 
That cools l i k e gravel, and are there streams 
Which murmur as c l a y - s i l t does that Christ redeems? 
I have not heard of any, so I trace 
The writings on bruised iron and purged clay face:" 
Jack Clemo, from "Sufficiency" i n 
D.M. Thomas (ed.), The Granite 
Kingdom: Poems of Cornwall, 
Bradford Barton, Truro, 1970, 
p27. 
"The v i s i t o r s have come to Cornwall. 'Visitors', 'foreigners' we're 
called by the Cornish. We l i t t e r the c l i f f s with our houses. We 
l i t t e r the c l i f f s with our shacks. When I was a boy a l l this was 
open f i e l d s " . 
John Betjeman, from "One Man's 
County", i n Betjeman's Cornwall, 
John Murray, London, 1984, p20. 
"...Cornwall's present inhabitants, native-bom and newcomers alike, 
might s t i l l manage a wry smile of satisfaction at the opinion of a 
Plymouth correspondent to the Western Morning News that 'we may have 
b u i l t the Tamar Bridge between us but there i s s t i l l something pretty 
odd at the western end of i t ' ! " . 
Ian Soulsby, A History of 
Cornwall, Philliraore, Chichester, 
1986, p l l 4 . 
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CHAPTER 8 
BEYOND THE GOLDEN CIRCLE 
By the eve of the Second World War the f u l l impact of "Second 
Peripheralism" i n i t s matured condition had been f e l t i n Cornwall. A 
lengthy period of all-embracing "paralysis" - which had crucially 
affected the social, economic and p o l i t i c a l p r o f i l e s of Cornwall -
had grown out of the industrial decline of the l a t t e r part of the 
nineteenth century, this de-industrialisation i n i t s e l f the 
inevitable consequence of the early features of "Second 
Peripheralism" which had ensured that Cornwall's industrial 
experience was imperfect, over-specialised and incomplete. Athough 
the advent of "Second Peripheralism" had put paid to many of the 
remnants of Celtic-Catholic Cornwall (including the Cornish language) 
and i t s "Older Peripheralism" of t e r r i t o r i a l and cultural isolation, 
a Cornish sense of ide n t i t y had survived, though based now upon 
industrial prowess and the distinctive qualities of Cornish 
industrialisation. The demise of that prowess had led i n i t i a l l y to 
an enhancement of ide n t i t y , with the "Great Migration" seen as the 
pinnacle of Cornish accomplishment, but. this could hardly be 
sustained i n an era of de-industrialistaion, unemployment and de-
popxalation and ushered i n , therefore, a new period (the period of 
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"paralysis") i n which Cornish pride gave way to Cornish fatalism and 
indifference. Paradoxically, however, despite th i s superficially 
apparent threat to and potential weakening of the Cornish id e n t i t y , 
Cornwall remained stubbornly "different". This was a difference bom 
not from choice but from the vexry peripheral characteristics that 
affected Cornwall. Socially and economically, as the Exeter Survey 
was to show, Cornwall remained s t r i k i n g l y different not only from 
England but even from neighbouring Devon, while Comish p o l i t i c s 
singularly f a i l e d to participate i n the new "alignment" of 
Conservative versus Labour. 
The dynamics of peripherality were the root cause of t h i s 
paradox, of course, for while they ensured that the nature of Comish 
peripherality changed dramatically over time, they also determined a 
continuing and inevitable "difference" between peripheral Comwall 
and the English "core" or "centre". Given the unchanging 
geographical construction of the B r i t i s h Isles and of the 
"monocephalic", " t e r r i t o r i a l space" nature of the centralised B r i t i s h 
State, Comwall remained remote from the centres of p o l i t i c a l and 
economic power. Indeed, with the decline of the mechanisms of 
"accommodation" and the new dominance of the City i n an 
internationalised mining market, that "remoteness" had i n one sense 
actually increased as a result of the experience of "Second 
Peripheralisra". In the same way, there remained "constants of 
peripherality" which served to perpetuate Cornwall's "difference. 
Geographical constraints and the physical (and psychological) 
distances from the "centre" were obvioiis "constants", but more subtly 
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there remained elements of "constancy" inherited not only from the 
early phases of "Second Peripheralism" but even from the era of 
"Older Peripheralism". As shown already, Cornwall remained a land of 
scattered settlements, of small-holdings and of small farmers imrmine 
from the influence of squire or Church, Nonconfonnist i n religious 
leanings and Liberal i n p o l i t i c s . Again, the experience of 
industrialisation had served to enhance these characteristics, with 
the rise of Methodism i n Cornwall and the attendent emergence of 
Liberal popular p o l i t i c s . Despite the trauma of de-
industrialisation, these characteristics survived as markers of 
Cornish "difference" and of a sustained Cornish individualism and 
independence. 
The Second World War, however, did bring some changes to 
Cornwall, disturbing for a time the "paralysis" into which Cornish 
society had sunk, as the nature of the exertion of p o l i t i c a l and 
economic power within the State altered i n response to wartime 
conditions. There was, for example, some immigration, with an inflow 
of evacuees, workers for key occupations, and - especially towards 
the end of the war and i n i t s immediate aftermath - European 
refugees, some of whom were drawn to Cornwall (eg miners) as a result 
of their specialist s k i l l s . In this way, groups of Polish and 
I t a l i a n immigrants, particularly, established themselves i n Cornwall. 
S t a t i s t i c a l l y , however, such immigration was negligible and did not 
represent a significant counter-flow to the underljrlng trend of 
continuing emigration and relative depopulation. Economically, the 
war provided a boost to manufacturing i n Cornwall, especially i n the 
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Truro d i s t r i c t where there were noticeable increases i n shipbuilding, 
engineering, raetalwork, woodwork, and te x t i l e s as a result of war-
induced demand. Loss of jobs i n the china clay industry and i n 
tourism and service industries was to some degree offset by these 
manufacturing increases, and recruitment to the Armed Forces and 
C i v i l Service siphoned-off surplus labour.^ Such effects were 
tranistory, however, and the end of h o s t i l i t i e s i n 1945 led to a 
situation where by 1947 "Certain types of regional production which 
were inaugurated or expanded during the war w i l l have been 
drastically restricted, or closed down".^ There was a hope that the 
newly-expanded t e x t i l e industry might retain some of i t s strength as 
a result of i t s export potential, and a bel i e f that shipbuilding 
would survive at least i n the short-term because of the need to make 
good wartime losses, but this was tempered by the realisation of an 
inevitable contraction i n other areas of manufacture and engineering, 
together with the fact that "Firms evacuated to the region w i l l 
return rather than stay..,".^ Although china clay production was 
able to recover from i t s wartime res t r i c t i o n s , "The prospects for 
employment i n tin-mining are not roseate",^ while i n the hitherto 
busy Truro area "The stoppage of war contracts w i l l appreciably 
c u r t a i l employment".^ I n an economic climate of austerity with 
continued rationing and restraint, an early tourist boom was also 
unlikely. The Exeter Survey considered that particular areas would 
be especially h i t by post-war contraction, and that "One such 
d i s t r i c t i s the Cambome-Redruth-Hayle.. .manifestly i t would be hurt 
by the decay of tin-mining, by contraction i n the export trade of 
mining engineering and reduced a c t i v i t i e s i n text i l e s and other 
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mineral working. Localised unemployment threatens t h e r e . I n 
general, Cornwall i n the aftermath of war suffered a d e b i l i t a t i n g 
combination of a declining countryside and urban decay. 
As the temporary stimulus of wartime conditions began to 
dissipate, then, i t seemed as though Cornwall was destined to return 
to her "paralysis". Commentators (remembering, perhaps, the 
contraction after the Great War) observed with alarm the loss of 
wartime "advantages" and feared that the populace would sink again 
in t o a morass of industrial decay, ru r a l ignorance, and emigration, 
with many areas "...so thinly populated that i t w i l l be impossible to 
maintain any reasonable standard of social l i f e . " ^ The underlying 
characteristics of Cornwall (and of remote North and West Devon) 
seemed peversely unsuited, even opposed to the progressive forces of 
modernisation which sought i n the late 1940s to embark upon the 
construction of a new Br i t a i n . The exasperated tone of the Exeter 
Survey revealed a thinly-disguised contempt for the condition of 
peripherality: 
. . . i n the bleak, lonely areas...where the village nucleus may 
consist merely of an isolated church, with perhaps a few 
cottages; where the parish i s less of a commimity than a 
widespread powdering over the landscape of scattered farms; 
where towns are few and small i n size, distances between them 
great and communications poor - i t i s here that rural 
decadence, materially, mentally and spiritiaally i s seen at i t s 
lowest depths.® 
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"Paralysis" thus interpreted was seen as evidence of a deep Cornish 
malaise, of a fundamental deficiency i n social, cultural and economic 
l i f e i n the periphery: 
The "foreigner" from a northern c i t y who comes i n summer to 
taste, perhaps superficially, of the pleasant, unhurried l i f e 
of Devon and Cornwall, may condemn i t s people for being stupid 
and backward, even while secretly he considers the peaceful, 
picturesque, isolated village as an ideal spot i n which to end 
his days. But l e t him r e t i r e into that village permanently; 
l e t him l i v e there for years, winter and summer, with l i t t l e 
means of leaving i t , and with no contact with urban l i f e - and 
i n time he w i l l begin to understand from within himself that 
strange mentality of people i n remote rural parts.^ 
From thi s perspective, drastic action was needed to rescue 
Cornwall from "paralysis", to allow the Cornish to benefit from post-
war re-construction and the new order of the Welfare State, Here 
agin the Exeter Survey was unequivocal i n i t s views. I t considered 
i t essential that farming "... should be more s c i e n t i f i c a l l y 
organised..."j^^ that "...housing conditions must be improved.. 
and that 
. . . i t i s desirable to establish such industries as w i l l offer 
alternative sources of employment for young people. On the one 
hand, maximum industrial use should be made of a l l local 
products such as milk, meat, f r u i t and vegetables; but, as 
these industries employ mainly unskilled laboxir, a proportion 
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of factories needing more highly-skilled operatives, and which 
are not pre-determined by unavoidable locational controls, 
should be introduced into country towns. A more balanced 
indu s t r i a l structure w i l l provide wider vocational opportunity 
within the region, and w i l l serve to counteract the present 
tendency of those young workers with higher intelligence and 
more venturesome s p i r i t to migrate from the region, and so 
leave behind them a corranunity impoverished not only 
quantitively, but, more importantly, q u a l i t i v e l y . ^ ^ 
The strategy for Cornwall's regeneration, then, i t was argued, 
should be based upon appropriate industrial diversification which 
would both create economic a c t i v i t y i n i t s own right and retard the 
emigration of the younger, more i n t e l l i g e n t population. A l l i e d to 
this was a conviction that an "...onward march of the tourist and 
holiday industry ( i s ) destined..."^-^ which, despite i t s attendant 
problem of "serious seasonal unemployment",^^ would act as an 
important stimulus to Cornwall's economic development. Cornwall's 
"paralysis", then, was seen purely and simply as a matter of 
isolation, of geographical remoteness and the backward, unscientific, 
untutored, materially poor and s p i r i t u a l l y impoverished 
characteristics of the "decadent" Cornish people with their "strange 
mentality". Within this paradigm the antidote for such i l l s was 
equally simplistic (and prejudiced), with a generalised c a l l for new 
industry and an act of f a i t h i n the panacea of tourism. Although 
lacking any developed analysis of the problem of peripherality, such 
a view became quickly the conventional wisdom - not only for those 
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looking at Cornwall from outside (from the "centre") but also for 
those inside who seemed to need l i t t l e convincing of their own 
inadequaties. The tone of Cornwall County Council's own survey of 
Cornish resources and prospects, published i n 1952, was based 
squarely upon such an interpretation.^^ And, i n i t s attempt to 
secure such Cornish regeneration (and based apparently on the be l i e f 
that the best brains had already crossed the Tamar, and that 
invigorating dynamism from outside was a must), the County Council i n 
the 1950s developed the tendency of f i l l i n g i t s key administrative 
posts with candidates from outside Cornwall. The elevation of parts 
of Cornwall to Development Area status by the Government i n 1958, as 
part of i t s broader policy of Regional Development, also mirrored the 
conventional wisdom. 
However, by the early and mid 1960s there was i n r e a l i t y l i t t l e 
improvement to report. Unemployment i n the Camborne-Redruth d i s t r i c t 
was s t i l l consistently two or three times the national average, while 
i n early 1964 the percentage of people without a job i n Falmouth had 
risen to nearly 20 per cent.^^ Moorhouse, i n his study, detected 
l i t t l e evidence of vigour or development, wr i t i n g that "...Bodmin i s 
not much more than a moorland vi l l a g e , Truro i s a dozy l i t t l e 
cathedral town, while the hybrid Redruth-Camborne i s nobody's idea of 
a pulsating heart". His impressions, indeed, reflected those 
expressed i n the Exeter Survey a decade and a half e a r l i e r , and he 
noted similar socio-economic phenomena to that recorded i n the 
earlier report. Between 1952 and 1962 the population of England and 
Wales had gone up by six per cent, and yet ( i n stark contrast) that 
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of Cornwall had risen by a mere 0.07 per cent, while "Between 1951 
and 1962 Camelford, Launceston, Liskeard, and St Germans lost between 
5 and 16 per cent of their populations; Lostwithiel, Padstow, St 
Just, and Penzance between 4 and 13 per cent".^^ Ominously, he added 
that "In the past three years 17 per cent of the people emerging from 
the Cornwall Technical College i n Camborne have gone straight across 
the Tamar i n search of jobs".^^ 
Moorhouse concluded, i n his disarmingly direct j o u r n a l i s t i c 
style, that "Unmistakably Cornwall i s i n a f i x " . ^ ^ There were as yet 
no signs of Cornwall's emergence from her by now deeply-entrenched 
"paralysis", no indications that the plans of 1952 or the post-war 
revival of tourism would indeed rescue Cornwall from her pl i g h t . 
Moorhouse recognised, however, that Cornwall's problems were not 
merely ones of "remoteness" or "backwardness" but reflected a more 
deep-seated problem within the United Kingdom as a whole based on the 
dichotomy between "centre" and "periphery". He was one of the f i r s t 
commentators to describe a "North-South Divide" i n socio-economic 
terms, and he identified an "Other England" which had not 
participated f u l l y i n the post-war advances and consumer boom: 
"...between 1952 and 1960 the London region, with 27 per cent of 
Great Britain's population - not England's - acquired 40 per cent of 
the new jobs created i n B r i t a i n " . C o r n w a l l was f i r m l y excluded 
from this London-oriented "Golden Circle" (as Moorhouse called i t ) 
and th i s accounted, he argued, for i t s parlous socio-economic 
condition. "How many", he asked rhetorically, "are aware that by far 
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and away the highest rate of unemployment i n Ehgland i s not to be 
found i n the North-east or along Merseyside, but i n Comwall?"^^ 
Moorhouse's analysis, then, with i t s emphasis upon the causal 
effects of a "core-periphery" relationship, was i n fact a major 
departure from the conventional wisdom. However, this had l i t t l e 
impact upon Governmental or quasi-official thinking, at least i n the 
short-term, and certainly not i n Cornwall, despite the nationalist 
and regionalist s t i r r i n g s i n far-flung parts of Britain (which would 
lead shortly to the Crowther-Kilbrandon Commission) and the f i r s t 
hints of disquiet i n Ulster. Instead, the recipe for recovery i n 
Cornwall and other parts of peripheral Britain continued to be 
expressed i n conventional terms, with the need to overcome 
"remoteness" and "backwardness" through tourist development and the 
encouragement of industry and commerce by means of a selective 
Regional Developnent policy. Indeed, regional policy was brought to 
the forefront of the p o l i t i c a l agenda i n the 1960s as f i r s t the 
Conservatives and, after 1964, the Labour Government viewed with 
dismay the poor economic performance and indifferent industrial 
growth of the United Kingdom, especially when set against the success 
of Britain's principal overseas competitors. Regional policy was 
seen as one method of improving economic performance i n the United 
Kingdom as a whole, by attempting to bring peripheral B r i t a i n up to 
the same standard as the economically "over-heating" London and the 
South East (Moorhouse's "Golden Circle"). I t was not, i t shoxild be 
noted, a response to any regional disquiet or protest, nor was i t led 
by policy preferences expressed i n the various regions themselves. 
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Instead, i t was essentially a centrally-devised policy, a raacro-
econcnaic approach to a perceived macro-economic problem. 
As Ward has argued, before the Second World War Government 
economic policy reflected l i t t l e interest i n or concern for a 
"regional problem", with State policies, i f anything, actually 
excacerbating uneven development i n the United Kingdom. 
Rearmament, war and new macro-economic policies necessitated new 
approaches, however, and led - as Schonfield^^ has shown - to a 
remarkable p o l i t i c a l concensus where regional policy became an 
a r t i c l e of f a i t h for both Conservatives and Laboiar, regardless of 
their other ideological and policy differences. The fundamental aim 
of such policy was to "...seek to reduce or eliminate disparities 
between different geographical areas i n incomes, ind u s t r i a l growth, 
migration, and, above a l l , unemployment".^^ With th i s i n mind, as 
Cable explained, "The strategy underlying UK regional policy has been 
to i d e n t i f y specific areas reqinring assistance, primarily on the 
basis of above-average unemployment rates. Firms moving to these 
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areas have then been offered various financial incentives...". A 
limited Special Areas Act i n 1934 introduced t h i s notion but the 
policy was not pursued with vigour, commitment or consistency u n t i l 
the various Distribution of Industry Acts since 1945, the Local 
Ehiployment Acts from 1960, the Industrial Act of 1972, and post-war 
Finance Acts. By the early 1980s i t was possible to distinguish 
between four main types of area i d e n t i f i e d for special treatment. 
Broad "Development Areas", usually covering the whole or most of one 
of the "standard regions" of the United Kingdom, were introduced i n 
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1966, while "Special Development Areas" were set up i n 1967 to deal 
with areas where problems were especially acute. "Intermediate 
Areas" emerged i n 1969 as locations where problems were not as 
profoimd as i n "Development Areas" but where, nonetheless, some 
assistance was appropriate. Later, i n 1980, "Enterprise Zones" were 
created - very small d i s t r i c t s of decaying "inner-city" areas. 
Cornwall emerged from this mix as an area attracting 
considerable assistance through regional policy. For the greater 
part of the 19603, 1970s and early 80s, the Falmouth-Camborne 
d i s t r i c t was iden t i f i e d as a "Special Development Area" of acute 
problems, while v i r t u a l l y the whole of the rest of Cornwall was a 
"Development Area". Even after the severe re-assessment of assisted 
areas i n 198A, when many areas lost their, rights to assistance 
altogether, the Kerrier and Penwith D i s t r i c t areas of West Cornwall 
were designated "Development Areas", while south-east and North 
Cornwall were "Intermediate Areas"^® (Fig. 18). This, then, was the 
central Government's reaction to Cornwall's "paralysis" (or at least 
i t s economic features), although - as noted above - i t was a reaction 
prompted by wider macro-economic concerns and not a response to any 
peculiarly id e n t i f i e d features of Cornwall's condition. 
Be that as i t may, there appeared to be positive and measurable 
responses i n Cornwall to the application of these Regional 
Development policies. More than f i f t y new factories were constructed 
i n Cornwall between the end of the war and the mid-1960s, while 
during the 1960s manufacturing employment grew by as much as f i f t y 
per cent-^^ The Wilson Government, i n an echo of the French system 
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Fig 18 
Source: 
"Assisted Areas" i n B r i t a i n . 
John Osmond, The Divided Kingdom. Constable, 
London, 1988, p:>;, u t t e r Martin, Regional Studies, 
Vol 19, No 4, 1985). 
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of centrally-directed regionalism, set up a series of regional 
economic councils based on the "standard regions", one of which was 
the South West Economic Planning council (SWEPC) which was based i n 
Bri s t o l and whose wr i t ran from Gloucestershire to Cornwall. In 1967 
Sl-JEPC published i t s planning document A Region With A Future, i t s 
optimistic tone refl e c t i n g the earlier stance of Cornwall County 
Council i n 1952, but now with the existence of a vigorous Regional 
Development policy to give credence to i t s projections, together with 
an even bolder assessment of the future which foresaw not only 
economic development i n Cornwall but also a significant expansion of 
the Cornish p o p u l a t i o n . P r a c t i c a l evidence of the impact of 
regional policy was manifested i n the appearance of "Advanced Factory 
Units" (whose construction i n Cornwall was made possible by the Local 
Einployment Act of 1960) i n areas as diverse as Camborne and Saltash, 
and after the Industrial Development Act of 1966 new industrial 
estates sprang up i n the disparate parts of Cornwall: by 1984 there 
were no less than 49 such e s t a t e s . S p o o n e r considered this "...a 
minor industrial revolution...", with the expansion i n 
manufacturing jobs matched by a surge i n tou r i s t and service industry 
employment. Between 1961 and 1971 employment i n tourism i n Cornwall 
rose by 3,300 (a rise of 28 per cent), while that i n service 
industries increased by 4,200 (six per cent).^"^ Spooner enthused 
over "This encouraging picture of industrial growth..."^^ and 
concluded that "The changes that are taking place do not appear to be 
temporary, but are creating a genuine long terra transformation of the 
regional economy". 
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There was even optimism i n the t i n mining industry. Despite 
the fears for the industry i n the immediate post-war era, together 
with the closure of East Pool and Agar i n 1956, South Crofty (at 
Camborne) and Geevor (near St Just-in-Penwith) had survived and 
appeared solid, stable concerns i n the 1960s and 70s. An academic 
a r t i c l e on Cornish mining noted that i n 1968 the industry's 
production of 1,540 tons of t i n had saved the United Kingdom about 
£2,200,000 i n foreign exchange, and that a number of firms were 
engaged i n prospecting i n different parts of Cornwall (which led 
subsequently to the opening of the Mount Wellington, Pendarves, and 
more successful Wheal Jane mines), although warning that the support 
afforded by limited tax concessions and the provisions of the 
Industrial Development Act would not be enough to secure widespread 
regeneration of the i n d u s t r y . T h e Cornish Chamber of Mines foresaw 
a great future for the industry, however, explaining i n 1977 that 
"Far from the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of further expansion being exhausted, 
there are more than 20 areas i n Cornwall where there appear to be 
good prospects of making additional discoveries of t i n , tungsten, 
lead, zinc and, possibly, even of copper...".^^ 
The experience of the late 1960s and early 1970s appeared, 
then, to suggest that the massive assistance afforded to peripheral 
Britain through the central Government's Regional Development had 
worked for Cornwall, Moorhouse's analysis seemed hardly relevant 
even less than a decade after the publication of his work, and 
Spooner's assessment pointed to a permanent reversal of Cornwall's 
economic condition, Conrwall's economic "paralysis", i t seemed, was 
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at last broken. However, the apparent success of regional policy i n 
Cornwall had occurred against the background of economic development 
i n the United Kingdom as a whole, with Cornwall sharing i n this new 
growth. When, i n the aftermath of the o i l prices rises after the Yom 
Kippur war, the international and B r i t i s h economies f e l l into deep 
depression, new factors at work i n Cornwall became apparent. Grafton 
and Bolton showed that even i n the expansionist early 1970s, 
employment growth i n Cornwall had not been matched by the reduction 
i n the numbers of xinemployed.^^ Thereafter, the situation had 
deteriorated steadily. A Department of Bnployment report 
Unemployment i n West Cornwall noted i n January 1979 that 
"ttiemployment i n West Cornwall has i n recent years been much higher 
than that experienced i n most other parts of the country. Since 
1974...the problem has w o r s e n e d " . I n Cornwall as a whole there was 
a net decline i n manufacturing jobs between 1976 and 1982, with 4,000 
lost and only 2,000 created. Between 1976 and 1981 there was a 
further loss of 1,000 jobs i n extractive industries, principally 
c h i n a - c l a y . I n 1981 came the symbolic closure of the Rank Radio 
"Advanced Factory Unit" at Pool, near Camborne, the very f i r s t "AFU" 
to have been b u i l t i n Cornwall, and the removal of the concern across 
the Tamar to Plymouth with the loss of Cornish jobs.^^ 
To th i s reversal i n employment and manufacture was added the 
fact that Cornwall had remained an area of extreme low pay. In 1985 
Gregory argued that "Workers i n the South West...are amongst the 
lowest paid i n the country"^^ and that, specifically, "...Cornwall 
tops the low pay table...".^^ Gregory defined "low pay" as anything 
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below £100 per week and went on to show that i n Cornwall no less than 
30 per cent of male manual workers were by this measure "low paid". 
Twenty-three per cent of male non-manuals were also "low paid", as 
were 58 per cent of females i n the same category. No figures were 
available for female manual workers, althougji a figure of 81 per cent 
for Devon (where "low pay" was less of a problem i n a l l other 
categories) was a frightening clue to the extent of the problem i n 
Cornwall. A l l this was against a backgroimd of the fact that, as 
Gregory pointed out, the costs of l i v i n g i n Cornwall and the South 
West are "...second only to those of the South East".^ 
Gregory also showed that more than half of the "low paid" jobs 
were i n the tour i s t and service industries, the two sectors that had 
hitherto experienced considerable growth i n employment. Dunkerley 
and Faerden, also i n 1985, investigated the toxirist industry i n 
Cornwall (and Devort), i n particular examining the problem of seasonal 
• 
employment and unemployment.^^ They introduced the concept of a dual 
labour market with "priinary" and "secondary" sectors. The "primary" 
sector consisted of those with permanent, secure jobs with promotion 
and career prospects, along with favourable conditions of employment. 
The "secondary" sector, by way of contrast, consisted of those under-
priviledged through low wages, low mobility potential, low 
promotional prospects, and lack of s t a b i l i t y of employment. I n the 
tourist industry, employers and managers migjit f a l l into the 
"primary" sector, but a l l too often - argued Dunkerley and Feardon -
their employees belonged to the "secondary", especially those who 
were employed only seasonally. With 13 per cent of the t o t a l 
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employment i n Cornwall i n the summer months occiorring i n tourism, and 
with much of this concentrated i n certain specific "tourist areas", 
the problem of the "secondary" sector was seen as widespread. The 
view that many of these seasonal jobs were taken by temporary 
v i s i t o r s from outside Cornwall was exposed as fallacious, and instead 
i t was shown that such vacancies were more l i k e l y to be taken by 
local people who, i n turn, were mostly women, were skewed towards the 
younger/older age ranges, and had tended to have a long history of 
irregular employment. Dunkerley and Faerdon found low aspirations 
and low expectations amongst such people, a great sense of 
resignation and an indifference to their own pl i g h t . In a b l i s t e r i n g 
critique of the tourist industry, Dunkerley and Faerden concluded 
that. 
There exists a large pool of available labour that can be 
tapped and untapped at w i l l . This labour force i s generally 
w i l l i n g to work for low wages and with minimal security. I t s 
low expectations and low collectivism make for a very malleable 
group who, i f dissatisfied, can easily be replaced by others 
from the pool. What exists i s a p r o f i l e of seasonal workers 
\jho are dependent on this fonn of employment, who have few 
means of escape from their situation, whose resignation to the 
situation derives dir e c t l y from the situation but which, 
equally, leads to them colluding i n their own exploited 
position.^^ 
Such a picture seemed uncannily l i k e the "paralysis " fran 
which Regional Development policies had supposedly rescued Cornwall, 
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hinting that the expansion of the late 1960s and 1970s had been 
perhaps a temporary abberation i n the Cornish experience, prompted by 
external factors such as Government macro-economic policies and the 
general performance of the B r i t i s h economy. However, a more detailed 
analysis emerged to suggest that what had happened i n Cornwall was 
even more profound, and that the experience of the late 1960s and 
early 1970s had been a direct function of Cornwall's peripheral 
status. Far from eroding Cornwall's peripherality, Cornwall's 
experience i n that period was both a function of her status and, 
indeed, a perpetuating influence which served to excacerbate further 
certain peripheral features. Spooner i n the early i970s had hoped 
that "The South West may becoming part of South East England"^^ and 
that "...possibly Devon and Cornwall i s (sic) incorrectly categorised 
as a peripheral area, and i s becoming part of a constantly enlarging 
'central' region of the c o u n t r y " . I n fact, events were to show 
that Cornwall had remained obstinately "different" from the rest of 
the country, and, indeed, - as we shall see - aspects of that 
"difference" had actually been heightened as a result of the 
experiences of the 1960s and 1970s. Spooner's assessment ( l i k e that 
of other observers) may have been coloured by his erroneous 
assijmption that Cornwall together with Devon formed a homogeneous and 
cohesive "South West", throughout which the same conditions and 
experience applied, but his analysis of the Cornish situation wsa 
surprisingly flawed. In contradiction of Spooner's conclusions and 
assumptions, the Plymouth Business School was able to show i n 1989, 
i n i t s assessment of the South West economies, that "The South West 
Region...is regarded as prosperous by UK standards... There are 
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however great disparities within the region and one county i n 
particular, Cornwall, i s one of the most economically depressed i n 
An 
the whole of the UK". ^ Having enthused over the success of B r i s t o l , 
Swindon, Bournemouth, Exeter, and even Plymouth, the assessment added 
that " I t i s impossible to be as confident of the economic prospects 
of Cornwall,"^^ marshalling and displaying an array of "...sufficient 
indicators to show clearly the extent of i n t r a regional 
disparities..."^^ i n which "Cornwall not surprisingly perhaps comes 
last"5^ (eg Figs 19.1-19.A). 
Specifically, the Plymouth Business School was able to produce 
a summary table of 18 major economic indicators i n which, for each 
indicator and overall, the counties of the South West Region were 
ranked i n the order 1 to 7 (Fig 20). As the School noted, the 
further westwards one travels i n South West B r i t a i n the lower the 
levels of prosperity that are encountered. Significantly, however, 
i t was f e l t important to emphasise that, 
...the table masks the extent of the disparities between 
Cornwall and the rest of the region. Typically.. . i t i s not 
just that Cornwall ranks seven for a particular variable but 
that i t comes a very bad seventh. I t should be emphasised, 
therefore, that although Devon scores closer to Cornwall than 
anywhere else i n terms of overall rankings the performance of 
i t s economy i s closer to that of the northern parts of the 
region. 
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Fig 19.1 
Source: 
Average Gross Weekly Earnings: 
Cornwall and South West England 
Regional Trends 23, 1988; and P. Gripiaos et a l The 
South West Economy: Trends and Prospects, Plymouth 
Business School, Plymouth, 1989, p51. 
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Ag For 
F i s h i n g 
Energy & 
Water Supply Manuf S e r v i c e s 
SW 
AV 
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DOR 
GLOUC 
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WILTS 
3.1 
5.5 
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Fig 19.2 
Source: 
Bnployees i n Dnployment by Industry-'-
Cornwall and South West England 
^oln'^^^^o^'^^"'^^ Gripaios et a l , 1989, p58» 
1. Excluding self employed and unemployed 
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Oct % Of Sept 
1983 SW 1988 % SW 
sw 11.3 100 7.4 100 
AV 10.8 83.1 7.5 101.4 COR 15.7 138.9 11.8 159.5 DEV 13.0 115.0 9.0 121.6 DOR 10,8 95.6 5.8 78.4 GLOUC 9.9 87.7 5.9 79.7 SOM 9.3 82.3 6.5 87.8 WILTS 9,8 86.7 5.5 73.3 
Fig 19.3 Unemployment Rate^ 
Cornwall and South West England 
Source: Regional Trends 23, 1988; and P. Gripiaos et a l , 
1989, p60. 
1. _ Unemployment as % of employees and unemployed, 
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Index 
1977 1984 e 1984 
SW 100 100 4467 
AV 110,2 109 4871 
CORN 82.5 82.6 3693 
DEV 94.4 94.8 4233 
DOR 96.2 94.5 4221 
GLOUC 105.8 104 4647 
SOM 98.3 100.2 4475 
WILTS 106.5 110.3 4928 
Fig 19 A Gross Domestic Product per head 
Cornwall and South West England 
Source: Regional Trends 23, 1988; and P. Gripaios et a l , 
1989, p65. 
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% change i n p o p u l a t i o n 
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% change i n c a r owner-
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female " " *' 
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% long term unemployed 
1987 
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A l e v e l 1985/86 
GDP per head 1984 
Net c a p i t a l expenditure 
i n manufacturing 1985 
G r o s s v a l u e added i n 
manufacturing 1985 
Growth of new b u s i n e s s e s 
1979/86 
TOTAL 
O v e r a l l rank 
AV 
7 
KanK 
COR DEV DOR GLOUC SOM WILTS 
56 101 
2 7 
92 
6 
•63 
3 
69 
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6 
3 
4 
4 
75 
5 
JL _ i 
40 
1 
Notes: 
1 = h i g h e s t 
Fig 20. 
Source: 
Summary Table: Major Economic Indicators 
Cornwall and South West England 
P. Gripiaos et a l , 1989, pA7. 
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That Cornwall's economy remained highly differentiated from 
that of Devon and the rest of Britain was noted i n 1988 by Lee, who 
concluded that: 
Cornwall remains an area of high unemployment (Fig 21.1); 
reliant industrially on extractive industries, branch factories 
and small-scale business; with an agricultural structure i n 
which the small tenant farmer i s the norm; and with higji 
proportions of both private and public sector service 
employment. There are high rates of owner-occupation, 
correspondingly low rates of council-house occupation, and the 
county has the lowest average wage-rates i n mainland Britain. 
(Fig 21.2) 
Lee's selection of "branch factories" as a feature of 
importance i n Cornwall's distinctive socio-economic p r o f i l e was 
significant, for i t echoed a more general concern among analysts of 
the real nature of economic change i n Cornwall during the period of 
apparent growth and development. Perry noted that 60 per cent of 
manufacturing growth i n Cornwall i n the 1960s and 70s was of the 
"branch factory" type, where enterprises were merely local branches 
of much larger national or even international companies, component 
parts of wider organisations and reporting to head offices long 
distances away as well as being reliant upon external 
infrastructures. Perry went on to show that a further 50 per cent of 
manufacturing employment i n Cornwall was broxight under outside 
control over the same period, as a result of mergers and takeovers, 
and concluded that by the end of the 1970s a f u l l three-quarters of 
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Source: 
Average gross weekly male earnings, April 1988 
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Cornish manufacturing manpower was controlled frcxn beyond the 
Tamar.^^ Even Holman*s, the former flagship of Cornish mining 
engineering and symbol of Cornwall's lost industrial prowess, f e l l 
victim to this process, becoming part of an international corporation 
and losing i n the process not only jobs but also local control. This 
trend i n the private sector was mirrored i n the public, with the 
demise of many Cornish-controlled u t i l i t i e s and the creation i n their 
stead of "regional" bodies with head offices and managerial jobs 
situated east of the Taraar, Ihe setting up of the Devon and Cornwall 
Constabulary and the South West Water Authority, both with 
headquarters i n Exeter, were perhaps the most notable examples of 
this.56 
The overwhelming importance of the "branch factory" i n 
Cornwall's manufacturing sector meant, as Grafton and Bolton argued, 
that during the 1960s and 1970s employment i n Cornwall became more 
dependent on outside influences (rather than less) and, therefore, 
more dependent upon the economic performance of the "centre" or 
"core".5^ I n times of economic d i f f i c u l t y , i t was the "branch 
factories" which were the f i r s t to be closed or cut by large 
companies. Thus, as R. Payne showed, employment i n new firms opened 
i n Cornwall and Devon i n the two decades before 1971 f e l l by 10 per 
cent i n just one year (1979-80).As Grafton and Bolton concluded, 
"Die decentralisation of branch, often routine processing plants 
to the rural periphery i n search of cheaper land, low^cost, 
poorly unionised and often female labour does not remove the 
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status of the periphery of a dependent, relatively weak 
regional economy. 
This analysis pointed, however, not only to the deleterious 
effects of the "branch factory" phenomenon, but also to the 
particular significance of the specific features of the "branch 
factory" economy - cheaper land, low wages, poorly unionised workers, 
and so on. This, i n turn, echoed the work of Massey and others who 
saw i n the "branch factory" economies of the peripheries a "spatial 
division of labour". According to this view, head offices, top jobs, 
specialist research f a c i l i t i e s , decision-making l o c i , and resource 
allocation and control, were a l l based i n the "centre", with more 
mundane functions dispersed to peripheral areas where average wages 
were lower, where workers were poorly organised and not militant, and 
where aspirations and standards of educational achievement were 
generally of a lower level. This, argued Massey and others, 
represented a **hierarchial organisation of production" (that 
hierarchy being based upon the "spatial division of labour"), with 
the growth of the "branch factory" economy (encouraged as i t was by 
regional policy) representing a transition from regional 
specialisation to the new h i e r a r c h y . H e r e , as several observers 
have noted, Massey - althoiigh addressing her analysis to peripheral 
regions i n general - had caught the essence of the Cornish 
experience. Cornwall was, as has been shown here i n seme d e t a i l , a 
classic case of "regional specialisation" i n i t s period of 
industrialisation.^^ But, with the passing of that indxistrial 
period, such specialisation gave way at length to "the hierarchical 
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organisation of production" of the "branch factory" economy. In 
other words, the specialisation (or over-specialisation) \^ch 
characterised Cornwall's industrial experience i n the era of "Second 
Peripheralism" was replaced liltimately by a new form of 
peripherality, based upon the "branch factory" economy with i t s 
"spatial division of labour" and "hierarchical organisation of 
production". TMs, i n turn, suggests strongly that Regional 
Developnent policy had after a l l disturbed Cornwall from her 
"paralysis", albeit not i n the manner anticipated by the planners. 
As part of a broader examination of peripheralisation and 
industrial change, Barta and Dingsdale compared the impacts of 
changes i n industrial company organisation on selected peripheral 
regions i n Hungary and the Iftiited Kingdom. In seeking a quantative 
definition of economic peripherality, they identified the "economic 
potential surface for the United Kingdom" i n 1984 by subdividing the 
11 "standard regions" to create 19 regions. Economic a c t i v i t y i n 
each of these was approximated by Gross Domestic Product, apportioned 
on the basis of population, while road mileage between major urban 
centres was used as the distance measure. With this information to 
hand, isolines were drawn on the map of the United Kingdom. Isolines 
were calibrated i n percentage points of the higjiest values, and the 
regions classified as "central", "intermediate" or "peripheral" (Fig 
22). According to this analysis. Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales 
and much of South Western Britain and Northern England were 
"peripheral" i n varying degrees. Significantly, those areas 
identified as the most acutely "peripheral" were Northern Ireland 
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Source: 
Economic potential surface for the UK, 198A. 
G.J.R. Linge (ed.,), Peripheralisation anH 
Industrial Change. Groom Helm, London, 1988, pl68, 
- 3 2 8a -
outside the Belfast hinterland, the most northerly far-flung 
Higjilands and Islands of Scotland, and a l l Cornwall west of the 
(roughly) FoweyH^amel li n e . East Cornwall was, by their analysis, 
shown to be marginally less "peripheral" and comparable to west 
Devon, rural west Wales, the Belfast area, and the greater part of 
central Scotland. Barta and Dingsdale noted, too, the significant 
increase i n "branch factories" and external ownership i n what they 
termed euphamistically "The Peripheral Far South West", concluding 
that the apparent increase i n employment, infrastructure and standard 
of living"...has largely been achieved by the extension of a branch-
plant network and not locally based i n i t i a t i v e . . . " ^ ^ while "...the 
demands of the dynamic core have tended to contribute to the decline 
and peripherialisation of other regions".^ 
TMs analysis hinted, too, at an apparently changing nature of 
peripherality ( i n Cornwall as i n other regions), but i t was also a 
direct critique of regional policy. In this Barta and Dingsdale 
reflected existing criticism, such as the Cornwall Industrial 
Development Association's disquiet (expressed as early as 1977^^) 
about the deleterious effects of the "branch factory" economy, and 
Gripaious' comment that "...central and local government should 
change the focus of their location policies towards encouraging 
indigenous p o t e n t i a l " . P e r r y , i n arguing for such indigenous 
a c t i v i t y based upon an internally developed Cornish economic (and 
intellectual) infrastructure, had complained i n 1982 that 
...conventional regional policies, with their obsession for the 
short-term aim of mopping up pools of unemployment whenever and 
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wherever they occur, rarely address themselves to ways of 
enhancing the long-term locational competitiveness of 
peripheral and rural areas. 
More forcefully, Grafton and Bolton concluded that "...regional 
policy has not been successful i n breaking the core-periphery 
structure... . The power relationship central to the core-periphery 
model remains, at a fundamental level, intact". 
By 1982, however, the basis of regional policy was i n i t s e l f 
under review. In i t s attempts to reduce Government expenditure and 
to allow the free play of market forces without Government 
interference, the Thatcher administration re-defined (and therefore 
eroded) those areas qualifying for assistance. The review of 1982 
represented a retreat from the high point of 197A (when two thirds of 
the United Kingdom qualified for aid), and the erosion of 1984 led to 
the d i l u t i o n of support for even the most far-flvmg peripheries, 
including Cornwall. In January 1988 a further review confirmed the 
extent and status of the areas earmarked for assistance i n 1984, but 
ruled that i n future grants for firms relocating i n those areas would 
no longer be automatic but would be subject to scrutiny by the 
Department of Trade and Industry. These alterations were reflected 
i n significant reductions i n Government expenditure on regional aid. 
•Die figure had been halved between 1979 and 1986 (a cut of £1,000 
million) and was halved again by 1989.^^ 
With so much of the increase i n manufacturing employment i n the 
"boom" years being based upon "branch factories" fostered by regional 
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aid, the reduction i n Government expenditure further excacerbated the 
economic malaise of peripheral Brita i n , Cornwall included. In 1988 
Champion and Green, i n a discussion of Local Prosperity and the 
North-South Divide, contrasted "deprived areas" of the United Kingdom 
with "growth areas", identifjring Cornwall as a "deprived area" and 
placing i t i n economic terms within the " N o r t h " ( F i g 23). This 
echoed Gamble's perspective, which argued that the reduction i n 
Government had accelerated industrial decline i n both the "North" and 
"West" of B r i t a i n . t h e notion that Cornwall was somehow i n the 
"North" i n the increasingly significant "North-South" divide and 
debate appeared geographically peverse, but the very nomenclature 
reflected a situation where the real problems of industrial decline 
and unemployment were popularly perceived as those of Merseyside, 
Tyneside, Clydeside and other "northern" regions. In this concern 
Cornwall was often overlooked, partly because of i t s relatively small 
size but also - as Shaw and Williams noted - because the popular 
image of Cornwall i n the "core" or "centre" stressed a perceived high 
quality of l i f e and did not recognise problems of decline and 
unemployment.^^ For Cornwall the real irony, however, was that just 
as regional policy had led to a significant increase i n manufacturing 
employment, so i t was regional policy that was contributing to i t s 
decline. Cornwall's "branch factory" economy had created a veneer, 
an illxision of prosperity during the period of economic "boom" and 
high levels of regional aid, but had displayed i t s seriously 
deleterious features i n the ensuing era of recession and cuts i n 
assistance. 
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Source: 
The North-South divide, as defined by the In s t i t u t e 
for Ehployment Research at Warwick IMiversity. 
John Osmond, The Divided Kingdom, Constable, 
London, 1988,"p5ff: 
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The perception of a h i ^ quality of l i f e and an i l l u s i o n of 
prosperity had also been enhanced by the phenomenon of 
"counterurbanisation" experienced i n Cornwall, where the population 
increased dramatically i n the 1960s, 70s and 80s as a result of 
massive immigration ("in-migration") from across the Tamar^^ (Figs 
24.1, 2A.2, 25). Given the century-long era of emigration and de-
population that had come to epitomise the Cornish experience, this 
population turnaround was both s t a r t l i n g and unexpected. As Perry et 
a l summarised: 
At the beginning of the 1960s, after a hundred years of more or 
less uninterrupted decline, what had Cornwall to offer? Some 
valuable raw materials, almost unique as far as the UK was 
concerned, l i k e t i n and china-clay, together with potential for 
new energy soxirces - wave, wind, tide, geothermal - and a 
climate and terrain suitable for dairy-farming and 
horticulture. A strong sense of identity, a positive attitude 
to industrial redevelopment and a distinctive semi-urban 
settlement pattern with larger labour catchment areas than many 
other rural areas. On the other i t lay at the end of a long 
and narrow peninsula, much farther away i n travel-time and 
travel-cost than the rest of England or Wales, or indeed much 
of Scotland, from the main centres of indxistry and commerce, 
^employment was double the national rate, per capita incomes 
were 30 per cent below and earnings 20 per cent below the 
national level and employment both i n the primary and i n the 
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Total Population Population Change 
Distr ict 
Councils 1951 1961 1971 1981 1951-61 1961-71 1971-81 
Kerr ier 63,187 66,699 70,779 83,010 • 1,512 * 10,080 * 8,231 
Penwiih 52,069 09,813 51,332 55.020 - 2.256 • 1,619 • 0,088 
Carr ick 61,239 63,668 70,057 76,100 • 2.209 • 6,609 * 6,063 
Restormei 58,908 62,163 72,060 79,150 * 3.235 .10.297 . 6,710 
North Cornwall 55,008 52,379 56,089 66,190 - 2,629 • • 0,110 * 9,701 
Caradon 52,837 68,508 56,105 67,900 - 6,329 . 5,637 .13,755 
Total 3^3.2^18 360,990 379,202 027,770 -2,258 08 ,252 '68,528 
Fig 24.2 
Source: 
Cornwall: Population Change by Di s t r i c t 1951-1981 (excluding Isles of S c i l l y ) . 
Census of Population, and Perry et a l , 1986, p49. 
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manufacturing sector was f a l l i n g . On balance i t hardly seemed 
set for rapid expansion. 
And yet, despite this seemingly unpromising picture, Cornwall not 
only experienced the growth of a "branch factory" economy ( i n the 
manner described above) but also attracted a high level of " i n -
migration". Between 1961 and 1981 the population of Cornwall 
increased by an extraordinary 25 per cent, and during the 1970s the 
rate of expansion was twice that of Devon and the rest of the South 
West.^^ To Spooner, this population growth was a function of the new 
economic order, the "in-migration" occurring i n response to the 
creation of jobs i n the manufacturing and other sectors, as indeed 
SWEPC had forecast. As Bolton and Grafton noted, "According to this 
view, the core-periphery structure had been broken. The region could 
no longer be classified as a periphery, but rather had become part of 
the UK core with counterurbanisation the dominant force", 
However, just as Spooner*s assessment of the nature of economic 
change i n Cornwall was mistaken, so his view of the nature of " i n -
migration" and "counterurbanisation" was incorrect. In fact, far 
from removing Cornwall's peripheral characteristics, 
counterurbanisation was - l i k e the creation of a "branch factory" 
economy - both a function of Cornwall's peripheral status and a 
feature of i t s perpetuation. There was, of course, a l i n k of sorts 
between regional policy and counterubanisation (Fig 26). Not only, 
as we shall see, was "in-migration" encouraged by o f f i c i a l policy, 
but the creation of a "branch factory" economy led to a situation in 
which key workers and managers were encouraged into Cornwall from 
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outside. Perry et a l asserted that there was "...strong evidence 
that migrants were taking many of the better jobs...",^^ and i n 1982 
a survey by Nelson and Potter found that over one t h i r d of skilled 
workers i n Cornwall were "in-migrants".^ ® Deacon interpreted this to 
mean that a "cultural division of laboiir" within Cornwall had been 
superimposed upon the "spatial division of labour" identified by 
Massey, further emphasising the impact of peripherality upon the 
indigenoxis Cornish people. 
SWEPC, as an arm of central Government Regional Development 
planning, considered that "in-migration" was a necessary 
accompaniment - indeed a completentary process - to the strategy of 
job creation.®*^  New jobs would attract new workers from outside 
Cornwall, \^ch would i n turn generate further demand for goods and 
services and thus create s t i l l more economic a c t i v i t y . In th i s way, 
i t was argued, a new dynamism could be injected into Cornish society 
and economy, the resultant growth rescuing Cornwall from her 
isolation, backwardness and general "paralysis". SWEPC encouraged 
"Overspill" schemes, i n which the Greater London Council would co-
operate with Cornish authorities i n set t l i n g Londoners i n Cornwall, 
but this approach was resisted strongly by Cornish public opinion 
(see Chapter '9). Instead, the emphasis was changed to encouraging 
voluntary "in-migration", a strategy that was evident i n Cornwall 
County Council's West Cornwall Study i n 1970 and i n the document 
Towards 2001 where Cornwall and Devon County Councils combined to 
make planning projections for the "Plymouth Sub-Region".®^  In 1974 
this approach was re-emphasised i n SWEPC's Settlement Pattern,®^ and 
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by the time Cornwall County Council produced i t s Structure Plan i n 
1980 the view that "in-migration" was an essential component of 
economic and social revival i n Cornwall had become deeply ingrained 
i n the conventional wisdom of planning. The Structure Plan argued 
for a parallel and inter-dependent rise i n both jobs and population, 
and predicted that between 1976 and 1991 the population of Cornwall 
would have risen by some 46,300 people ( i n fact, current projections 
now put this figure at 63,000),^^ 
However, at precisely the same time that the Structure Plan was 
elucidating i t s new-jobs/population-growth strategy, Cornwall's 
newly-created "branch factory" economy was already beginning to 
f a l t e r i n the face of economic recession and woiald soon receive the 
further blow of cut-backs i n Government support through regional 
policy. The rise i n population was accompanied, therefore, not by 
increased job opportunities but by rising unemployment. In i t s First 
Alteration of the Structure Plan, published i n 1988, Cornwall County 
Council was forced to admit that "The underl3ring assumptions of the 
Approved Plan i n relating population growth to employment 
opportunities has not held good".^ And, amidst a storm of protest 
from organisations such as Cornish Alternatives to the Structure Plan 
and the Cornish Social and Economic Research Group (see Chapter 10), 
the First Alteration went on to articulate a revised strategy i n 
which "...the approach.. .is much more based on housing and population 
factors rather than employment f a c t o r s " . I n other words, because 
the creation of enduring employment opportunities had not 
materialised, unlike the growth i n population which had more than 
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f u l f i l l e d the planners' dreams, the First Alteration concerned i t s e l f 
merely with the "accommodation" of population expansion, with the 
hope that this i n i t s e l f would generate new jobs i n the service 
sector. 
The First Alteration, indeed, was tantamoiant to an admission 
that the post-war policy of expansion in Cornwall had been a f a i l u r e , 
despite the clear and consistent articulation of i t s conventional 
wisdoms and policy aims since the Exeter Survey had f i r s t identified 
Cornwall as a "suitable case for treatment", and despite the support 
lent coincidently for much of the era by central Government Regional 
Development, policies. And yet, even i f the policy had been a 
failure, i t could not be denied that i t had changed the economic and 
social face of Cornwall. A "branch factory" economy had been created 
and population turnaround through "in-migration" had led to a process 
of "counterurbanisation" which stood i n stark contrast to the earlier 
Cornish experience of emigraiton. But, as Lee and Gripiaos had 
noted, Cornwall was nonetheless s t i l l d istinctively "different" i n 
socio-economic terras, and with enduring problems such as low pay 
unaddressed or unresolved by the new conditions. Indeed, the 
Cornwall of "branch factories" and "counterurbanisation" was i n 
several respects even more d i s t i n c t l y "different" from that which had 
gone before, setting the Cornish experience widely apart from that of 
most other areas of the United Kingdom. 
As the work of Grafton and Bolton, Barta and Dingsdale, had 
hinted, the experience of Cornwall in the post-war era not only 
confirmed and reflected Cornwall's peripheral status but i n fact 
336 
I)0inted to the emergence of a new mode of peripherality. Ttie 
"paralysis" that had characterised "Second Peripheralism" i n i t s 
matured condition from the l a t t e r part of the nineteenth century 
u n t i l the Second World War and after, had indeed been disturbed by 
"branch factories" and "counterurbanisation". Such disturbance had 
not, however, heralded the end of Cornwall's peripheral status (as 
Spooner had supposed) but ushered i n instead a new era of 
peripherality. I n short, the era of "Second Peripheralism" 
associated with the nature and consequences of Cornwall's experience 
of industrialisation had given way i n the face of new conditions to a 
"Third Peripheralisra" based upon a "branch factory" economy and the 
process of "counterurbanisation". Those new conditions reflected the 
changing dynamics of the centre-periphery relationship, i n peirticular 
the post-war development of cental Government Regional Developnent 
policies. 
The trauma associated with rapid change i n Cornwall was i n 
i t s e l f evidence that "paralysis" had been disturbed and the nature of 
X)eripherality altered radically. At the practical level, the rapid 
expansion i n house prices i n Cornwall during much of the 1980s, and 
particularly during 1987-88, not only reflected movements i n the 
housing market i n the United Kingdom as a whole but was also a 
function of acute demand resulting frcMn "in-migration". 
Consequently, house prices i n Cornwall rose to levels much higher 
than those i n otherwise COTiparable peripheral regions. At the 
beginning of 1988 the average house price i n Cornwall was estimbated 
at £52,000, with this increasing by an average of £29 per day. With 
- 337 
average male earnings then sane 20 per cent below the B r i t i s h average 
(representing about £180 per week, and with females i n Cornwall 
earning an average of only £124), i t was not surprising that the 
estate agents Miller & Co should admit i n December 1987 that local 
f i r s t t i n ^ buyers were "almost getting squeezed out" of the Cornish 
housing market.®^ "In-raigrants", however, many from London and the 
South East where hoxise prices were also buoyant, were undaunted by 
Cornish house price rises and many were able to endulge i n "equity 
stripping" as they moved to what was for them more moderately-priced 
housing i n Cornwall. An advertisement i n Private Eye i n August 1987 
expressed the situation succinctly: "For the price of a poky f l a t or 
a boring serai, you coiiLd move to Cornwall, buy one of these super 
properties AND have a f i s t f u l of change".®^ 
Traimia was also experienced at the intellectual level. In the 
1970s the Cornwall Industrial Development Association and the 
Cornwall Conservation Forum had sounded warnings of what lay ahead,®® 
but i t was not u n t i l as recently as 1986 that Perry et a l 
rationalised and articulated increasing concern about the fate of 
Cornwall 89 Perry undertook a detailed analysis of 
"counterurbanisation", confirming the l i n k between "in-migration" and 
the "branch factory" economy, and acknowledging the impact of both 
local planning and central Government Regional Development policy. 
But he was also able to show that a considerable amount of " i n -
migration" had occurred i n isolation of the stimulus provided by 
regional policy and local planning, explaining i n the process how i t 
was that massive "in-migration" continued even after the onset of 
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recession i n the 1970s. Extraneous f a c t o r s were a l s o at work, he 
argued, most e s p e c i a l l y the increasing desire to seek an improved 
qu a l i t y of l i f e . I n moving to Cornwall, many "in-migrants" were 
de l i b e r a t e l y seeking to escape the pressures and r e s i s t the p u l l of 
London and the South East (or s i m i l a r areas such as Birmingham and 
i t s Midlands hinterland), and were hoping to find a more congenial 
environment and pace of l i f e , considerable numbers p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n 
(and therefore encoiuraging and f a c i l i t a t i n g ) the growth i n service 
and t e r t i a r y employment which had occurred alongside the emergence of 
"branch factory" manufacturing ( F i g 27). Perry detected the 
influence of the "small i s b e a u t i f u l " and "intermediate technology" 
ethos, part of the "decline of the i n d u s t r i a l s p i r i t " noted by Wiener 
which reached i t s apogee i n the 1970s, exhibited i n "...antigrowth 
and antitechnology movements...from environmentalism to h i s t o r i c a l 
preservation to the Campaign for Real Ale...".^^ Associated with 
t h i s , too, were the new attitudes to the "culture of technology" 
i d e n t i f i e d by Pacey, with t h e i r "...humanitarian s t r e s s on need-
oriented values...".^^ Indeed, Perry i d e n t i f i e d traces of a hippy-
culture amongst some of the "in-migrants", e s p e c i a l l y those who came 
to Cornwall i n search of environment rather than jobs and contributed 
to what Perry c a l l e d "imported unemployment". Many r e t i r e e s from 
across the Tamar a l s o sought peace, quiet and what they considered a 
saner way of l i f e . 
Generally, however. Perry found that the "in-migrants" were 
extremely a c t i v e (perhaps s u r p r i s i n g l y so, given t h e i r desire to 
escape the "rate r a c e " ) , often middle-class and middle-aged folk who 
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Fig 27. Cornwall 1951-1981: Sectoral Shifts Within the 
Working Population 
Source: Censuses of Population ; and Perry et a l , 1986, 
p55. 
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"... restore old properties, revive traditional arts and crafts, 
create tourist attractions, modernise school systems and set up 
planning coimiittees for new developments".^^ In analysing the 
stat i s t i c s of population growth i n Cornwall, Perry discovered that 
the 30-39 age group had increased by over 40 per cent between 1971 
and 1981, v ^ i l e the 10-19 group had increased by 30 per cent and the 
70 plus group by 25 per cent oaver the same decade. This was not a 
result of any increase i n b i r t h rate, nor even a result of an arrest 
of emigration ( i n fact, the emigration of indigenous Cornish had 
continued, rising between 1966 and 1977 by one sixth compared with 
the early 60s) but was due overwhelmingly to the effect of " i n -
migration" .^ -^  In examining the geographical distribution of " i n -
migrants" within Cornwall, Perry noted that the Dis t r i c t Council 
areas of Kerrier, Carrick and Restormal had reached their peak 
population growth during the 1960s. Penwith, at the western 
extremity of Cornwall, had not experienced i t s growth u n t i l the 
1970s, and North Cornwall presented an extremely complex picture, 
having remained static for most of the post-war era but suddenly i n 
the period 1976-84 experiencing significant population expansion of a 
magnitude five times that experienced by Penwith over the same 
period. In the Caradon Di s t r i c t of south east Cornwall, the 
population had increased by as much as 25 per cent during the 1970s 
but this also reflected the influence of Plymouth where a process of 
"mini-counterurbanisation" had - following the construction of the 
Tamar Bridge i n 1960 - led many Plymouth commuters to settle i n the 
hinterlands of Saltash, Torpoint, Callington and Liskeard.^^ 
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To further identify the socio-economic characteristics of " i n -
migrants", Perry conducted (by questionnaire) a "West Cornwall Study" 
of the Districts of Penwith, Kerrier, Carrick, and Restormal. In his 
analysis of "in-migrants" he distinguished between "new settlers" and 
"returned migrants" (ie returning Cornish), contrasting both groups 
with "locals". Not surprisingly, he found that i n "attractive" areas 
such as the Lizard, Carbis Bay, and Feock there were many "new 
settlers" and few "locals", whilst i n "unattractive" areas such as St 
Stephen-in-Brannel ( i n the china clay country) the reverse was true. 
Specifically, Perry was able to show that. 
The new settlers, vho made up 43 per cent of our sample, had 
the h i ^ e s t proportion of retirees, of older working-age 
groups, of higjier education categories, of top socio-economic 
occupations and of owner-occupiers. Locals, who accounted for 
44 per cent of the sample, came bottom i n a l l these respects. 
Return migrants, who represented 13 per cent of the sample, 
occupied the middle ground, forming a distinctive category of 
their own rather than sijuply an appendage of either the new 
settlers or the locals.^^ 
The "West Cornwall Study" further emphasised the importance of 
both " p u l l " (attractive environment) and "push" (escape from "rat 
race") factors i n causing "in-migration". For the "returned 
migrants" there was the additional consideration of "coming home", 
which helped to explain why they were more easily assimilated into 
existing conmunities than were the "new settlers". A f i f t h of the 
"new settlers" perceived some conflict with the "locals", perhaps not 
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surprising when a f u l l half of them did not acknowledge any 
distinctive Cornish cultural attributes. Some ten per cent of "new 
settlers" did, however, refer specifically to Cornwall's Celtic roots 
and the Cornish language, althougji Perry concluded that " i ^ r t from a 
small number of Celtic revivalists, most of them repatriates, the 
incomers imported their own culture withthem rather than immersing 
themselves i n local t r a d i t i o n s " . W i t h more than a tinge of regret. 
Perry went on to report that the leisure interests of "in-migrants" 
tended to be ".. .middle-class, middle-brow and cosmopolitan -
classical music, Gilbert and Sullivan, amateur productions of West 
Bid plays, Morris Dancing, v i s i t s to stately h o m e s " . W i t h an a i r 
of resignation he concluded that, 
...the picture that emerges from our study i s of a Cornwall 
swamped by a flood of middle-class, middle-aged, middle-browed 
c i t y dwellers who effectively imposed their standards upon 
local society. Integration and assimilation was a one-way 
process - of "urbanisation" rather than "ruralisation".^^ 
In a further study, i n which he compared counterurbanisation i n 
Cornwall with the population tumaroxand experienced over the same 
period i n the geographically and h i s t o r i c a l l y similar Finistere 
region of western Brittany, Perry retiamed to these concerns. He 
contrasted the condition of Cornwall with what he saw as the happier 
experience of. Finistere, where population tximaround - after decades 
of emigration and depopulation l i k e that of Cornwall - had been 
achieved by stenming the loss of young Bretons and by securing 
economic s t a b i l i t y through internally-generated and self-sustained 
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growth, "In-migration" fran outside Brittany had been less intense, 
and the local culture (including the Breton language) had proved 
better equipped to assimilate newcomers. The French Government had 
i t s e l f proved more responsive to the real needs of peripheral regions 
and had decentralised economic power more successfully. The result 
was. Perry concluded, that: "Instead of the Cornish t r i p a r t i t e 
structure of an English majority ( s i c ) , a large anglicised minority 
and a marginal group of Celtic or Cornish enthusiasts, the Breton 
consciousness of the Finistere population i s l i k e l y to grow 
stronger".^^ 
Empirically, i t was d i f f i c u l t to f a u l t Perry's findings or to 
question his methodology and broad analysis of the phenomenon of 
counterurbanisation. There was, however, an inconsistency i n his 
conclusions. Although his analysis had served to destroy the Spooner 
interpretation of Cornwall's experience, and had shown instead that 
the Cornish condition was highly distinctive and a function of 
peripherality. Perry nonetheless seemed to agree with Spooner*s 
assessment that "The South West may becoming part of South East 
England". In fact, as this chapter has argued, the opposite was the 
case. In some respects the era of the "branch factory" economy and 
of counterurbanisation had hei^tened the peripheral condition of 
Cornwall, breaking the erstwhile "paralysis" and unfolding a new era 
of "Third Peripheralism". Perry, i t seems, had overlooked Grafton 
and Bolton's point that, fundamentally, the centre-periphery power 
relationship had not been broken. Equally, Perry had underestimated 
the enormous influence of peripherality i n creating "difference". 
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This "difference" from the centre or core was the root cause of 
identity i n a l l i t s manifestations, a fact as true i n the "Older 
Peripheralism" of Celtic-Catholic Cornwall i n i t s t e r r i t o r i a l and 
cultural isolation as i n the Cornish industrial experience of "Second 
Peripheralism". Perry may not have l i k e the features of Cornwall's 
difference i n this new era of "Third Peripheralism", but they served 
to perpetuate an identity based on difference which, as w i l l be 
argued i n subsequent chapters, had an important effect upon post-war 
Cornish l i f e , most especially i n the f i e l d of p o l i t i c s . 
Perry's misgivings, however, voiced a wider paradox that had 
emerged i n Cornwall during this period of vigorous post-war change, 
the new era of "Third Peripheralism". To observers outside of 
Cornwall, as Wig^t noted and as the commentaries of Lee and Railings 
evidenced at length, the Cornwall of the late twentieth century was 
s t i l l noticably "different" i n terms of culture, society, economics 
and p o l i t i c s . I n d e e d , such commentaries went further, to express 
a degree of surprise at the apparent strength and continuity of the 
Cornish identity i n the face of post-war change. Interestingly, 
these "outsiders'" perceptions contrasted strongly with the view of 
writers inside Cornwall who, l i k e Perry and Charles Thomas, f e l t that 
Cornwall and Comishness were now under permanent threat as a result 
of the changes that had been wrought. 'Diomas, i n his inaugural 
lecture as Professor of Cornish Studies, considered 
...that Cornwall i s approaching some sort of internal social 
c r i s i s . I t i s increasingly d i f f i c u l t to Cornish. I t i s 
correspondingly important... for those who are Cornish, and 
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presumably value their identity, to stand up and to be 
counted... . I f we do not succeed, this l i t t l e land of ours 
w i l l end up scarcely distinguishable from the Greater London 
Area, with undertones reminiscent of Blackpool or Skegness. 
Paradoxically, i n expressing concern for the demise of the Cornish 
identity, Thomas was i n fact demonstrating i t s survival and, equally 
as importantly, articulating a new feature of the post-war "Third 
Peripheralism": the concept that the Cornish people shoxild resort to 
social and p o l i t i c a l action i n defence of the Cornish identity. 
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CHAPTER 9 
KERNOW RESURGANT? 
The contruction of a "branch factory" economy and the process 
of "counterurbanisation" together had served to propel post-war 
Cornwall from the lengthy period of socio-economic paralysis that i t 
had experienced hitherto i n the l a t t e r phases of "Second 
Peripheralism". They had not, however, dispelled the condition of 
peripherality but had instead ushered i n a new era of "Ih i r d 
Peripheralism" i n which, despite the emergence from paralysis, 
Cornwall remained obstinately and identifiably "different" when 
compared to the English "centre". Despite the hopes of Spooner and 
the fears of Perry, Cornwall had singularly failed to become l i k e 
South East England. Thomas i n 1986, i n apparent surprise at this 
state of af f a i r s , asked "Why i s there s t i l l so much of this un-
Eiiglishness...?",^ and went on to express the view that " . . . i t may 
well be another century more before native Cornish cease to think, 
subconsiously and automatically, i n terms of 'Cornwall' and 
'Ehgland'.. .",^  pointing to "...an Us-and-Them syndrome sharpened by 
distance from central government and, recently, by post-war revivals 
of a Cornish national consciousness movement".^ 
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Thomas' comnents implied a p o l i t i c a l response to the condition 
of peripheral!ty, involving a perception of remoteness from the seat 
of government and the mobilisation of national sentiment, a 
phenomenon that had indeed characterised the post-war period i n 
Cornwall and was i n sharp contrast to the pre-war era i n which the 
"Revival" had been e s s e n t i a l l y a p o l i t i c a l and Cornish p o l i t i c s for 
the most part " f o s s i l i z e d " . "Third Peripheralism", then, had 
witnessed not only an emergence from p a r a l y s i s at the socio-economic 
l e v e l but had seen a l s o an attendent movement i n p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . 
This movement was to some extent a reaction to the new socio-economic 
conditions associated with "Third Peripheralism", but i t was also a 
response to new l e v e l s of sophistication within the Cornish "Revival" 
i t s e l f . I n pre-war Cornwall the "Revival" had la r g e l y disassociated 
i t s e l f from the problems and imperatives of the i n d u s t r i a l era, 
appealing instead to the C e l t i c - C a t h o l i c culture of p r e - i n d u s t r i a l 
Cornwall and s e l e c t i n g an e s s e n t i a l l y romantic image of Cornwall i n 
preference to the r e a l i t y of socio-economic decline. I n the post-war 
era, however, the " R e v i v a l i s t s " proved readier to come to terms with 
Cornwall's more recent past and, consequently, more able to address 
the condition of modem Cornwall, 
The " r e h a b i l i t a t i o n " of i n d u s t r i a l Cornwall i n the estimation 
of the " R e v i v a l i s t s " had been anticipated i n Hamilton Jenkin's The 
Cornish Miner^ i n 1927 but a f t e r 1945, with bal-maidens and beam 
engines already acquiring the romantic glow of history, i t continued 
apace with, for example, the Cornish Engines Preservation Society 
placing i n d u s t r i a l archaeology firmly within the realms of Cornish 
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Studies, and with the appearance of John Rowe's Cornwall i n the Age 
of the Industrial Revolution^ i n 1953 marking the b i r t h of academic 
interest i n Cornwall's industrial era. Thereafter, the theme of 
industrial Cornwall was elaborated at length, most noticably i n the 
many books published (and written) by D. Bradford Barton i n Truro.^ 
In these the significance of Cornwall's industrial era was 
established beyond doubt or dispute, and with this arose an 
appreciation of the inherent "Comishness" of the period. Students 
learnt of the imique qualities of the Cornish beam engine, of the 
ac t i v i t i e s of industrial concerns such as the Cornish Copper Company, 
of the social and religious importance of Methodist publications such 
as the Bible Christian Cornish Banner. In short, there emerged a 
new-fo\md appreciation of the dynamnic nineteenth century Cornish 
identity based upon industrial prowess. "Revivalists" recognised 
that Cornish pumps and Cornish boilers could be placed legitimately 
alongside Celtic crosses and Cornish language miracle plays as 
integral parts of Cornish culture and determinants of Cornish 
identity. And with this recognition came a potential broadening of 
the "Revivalists'" appeal, and of their concern for modem Cornwall. 
This "rehabilitation" was reflected i n Cornish liter a t u r e as a 
whole, leading to detailed histories of the t i n , copper and china-
clay industries, to books on Cornish engineers and engineering, and, 
i n time, to the documentation of the "Great Migration".^ I t became 
clear that the identity of modem Cornwall must rest to some 
considerable degree upon the legacy of th i s industrial era, a c l a r i t y 
which impressed the "Revivalists" but which would also lead 
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commentators to in s i s t that the natxire of modem Cornwall must be 
examined i n a framework which not only acknowledged a dim and distant 
Celtic-Catholic past but which also addressed the issues of 
industrialisation and de-industrialisation. And, despite continuance 
of a popular literature based upon images of a romantic "Vanishing 
Cornwall", th i s "rehabilitation" prompted a new Cornish liter a t u r e 
based upon realism, epitomised i n realms of poetry and f i c t i o n i n the 
works of Jack Clemo (the blind and deaf writer of the clay country) 
and M5rma Combellack and, i n non-fiction, i n the "travel books" of 
Donald Rawe (most notably A Prospect of Cornwall) where details of a 
Celtic past were tempered by consideration of current social, 
o 
economic and ecological issues. 
Die Cornish "Revival", then, developed i n the post-war era as a 
more broadly^based phenomenon, with a potentially wider appeal for 
the broad mass of Cornish people and with a reformed ideology which 
had expanded to acknowledge the significance of Cornwall's industrial 
experience and vhlch now expressed a concern for the condition of 
modem Cornwall. This, i n tum, provoked p o l i t i c a l consequences. 
Exclusive concem for the Celtic-Catholic culture of pre-industrial 
Cornwall was essentially a p o l i t i c a l , but the new-found concem for 
the condition of modem Conrwall inevitably begged questions of a 
p o l i t i c a l nature. Increasingly, therefore, the "Revivalists" 
interpreted their objectives i n p o l i t i c a l terms, with an emerging 
p o l i t i c a l strategy which sought to defend and promote the ethnic 
identity of Cornwall and the Cornish. I n t h i s , of course, the 
Cornish "Revivalists" were mirroring events that were occurring or 
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had already occurred i n Wales and Scotland, i n European regions such 
as Catalonia, Brittany, and Flanders, and increasingly too i n "Third 
World" countries, where - as A.D. Smith has shown - similarly 
politicised elites were leading "ethnic revival".^ 
As a direct result of th i s process, Mebyon Kemow was founded 
i n 1951.^^ Althou^ conceived as a pressure group rather than a 
party, i t was nonetheless overtly p o l i t i c a l i n purpose. The New 
Cornwall magazine explained that Mebyon Kemow existed to foster the 
Cornish identity, to gain for Cornish people a "sqviare deal", and to 
ensure the proper use of Cornish resources for the benefit of Cornish 
people.-^ -^  Qnerging i n the wake of the Scottish Covenant of 1948, 
when hundreds of thousands of Scots had declared their sxipport for a 
Scottish Parliament within the framework of the United Kingdom, 
Mebyon Kemow moved quickly to assert i t s claim that Cornwall too 
12 
should achieve self-government. At a time when the a c t i v i t i e s of 
nationalists i n many parts of the Empire were bringing independence 
to many former colonies and accelerating the transformation to 
Commonwealth, Mebyon Kemow f e l t confident to claim that "...Cornish 
people are no less in t e l l i g e n t than Maltese or Jamaicans and so are 
equally capable of running their own af f a i r s " According to one 
interpretation, "This would be a form of self-government within Great 
Britain - a system that already works well i n the Isle of Man, the 
Channel Isles and Northern I r e l a n d " , w h i l e Mebyon Kemow's own 
literature asserted that i t s principal aim was "To maintain the 
Celtic character of Cornwall and i t s right to self-government i n 
domestic a f f a i r s " , b u t with a qualification that "...Cornwall 
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should have the greatest possible autonomy, while not wishing to 
sever i t s e l f from the United Kingdom. 
In marked contrast to the "Revivalists" of the inter-war 
period, Mebyon Kemow expressed an interest i n economic issues, 
culminating i n the publication i n 1968 of i t s economic strategy What 
Comishmen Can Do.^^ Generally, Mebyon Kemow proposed "To study 
local conditions and attempt to remedy any that may be prejudicial to 
the best interests of Cornwall.. ."^ ^ and, perhaps more 
controversially, i t argued that "...Cornish men and women shoxild have 
preference i n appointments to Cornish jobs, other factors being 
equal".Mebyon Kemow warned that "A Regional government, based on 
Bristol or Pl3miouth w i l l not improve matters for C o r n w a l l " . I n 
other f i e l d s , i t declared i t s support for Cornish language, 
li t e r a t u r e , culture, history and sport, and i n particular for their 
advancement i n schools, and by the late 1960s Mebyon Kemow had 
already prepared numerous policy documents on issues as diverse as 
transport, a university for Cornwall, fishing, local government 
reform, mining, and broadcasting.^^ By 1970 Mebj^n Kemow boasted 21 
branches spread throughout Cornwall, with a t o t a l membership of well 
over 3,000. The Launceston branch alone was one hundred strong, and 
i n the Falmouth-Cambome constituency Mebyon Kemow claimed to have 
some 1,000 members." 
Throughout the 1950s and into the 60s Mebyxm Kemow had 
carefully maintained i t s pressure group, non-party, identity. I t 
successfully manipulated the various p o l i t i c a l parties and actively 
encouraged a policy of "dual membership" i n which Mebyon Kemow 
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a c t i v i s t s could a l s o declare themselves a c t i v e i n p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , 
and v i c e versa. I n t h i s way, the L i b e r a l MPs John Pardoe and Peter 
B e s s e l l and the Conservative David Mudd were able to j o i n Mebyon 
Kemow, while Harold Hayraan (Labour), John Nott (Conservative) and 
David Penhalligon ( L i b e r a l ) were a l l able to express broad support 
for MK p o l i c i e s . R e f l e c t i n g the success of t h i s arrangement, 
Mebyon Kemow did not formally abandon i t s "dual membership" policy 
u n t i l as l a t e as 1976, a number of years a f t e r having recast i t s e l f 
as a p o l i t i c a l p a r t y . T h e pressure group r o l e , however, was 
progressively eroded i n the l a t e 1960s, most e s p e c i a l l y by the 
decision to f i e l d o f f i c i a l Mebyon Kemow candidates i n l o c a l 
e l e c t i o n s . Although the strong Independent t r a d i t i o n i n l o c a l 
govexmment i n Cornwall meant that Mebyon Kemow candidates were 
u n l i k e l y to be involved i n d i r e c t fights with L i b e r a l , Labour or 
Conservative candidates at that time, the decision was nonetheless a 
highly p o l i t i c a l one. In A p r i l 1966 four Mebyon Kemow l o c a l 
e l e c t i o n candidates protested that "Mebyon Kemow i s not., .a 
p o l i t i c a l party. I t represents no sect i o n a l i n t e r e s t s a t a l l 
and...comprises a very respectable cross section of the public", 
but t h i s argument seemed to wear thin when i n the following year an 
o f f i c i a l Mebyon Kemow candidate, Colin Murley, won the St Day seat 
on Comwall County Council with an a n t i - O v e r s p i l l "Keep Comwall 
Cornish" campaign. In 1969 Mebyon Kemow won two further l o c a l 
council seats, with i t s journal Cornish Nation a n t i c i p a t i n g the b i r t h 
of a new era i n which Mebyon Kemow might move more openly onto the 
77 
p o l i t i c a l offensive.^' 
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The " O v e r s p i l l " schemes, as noted i n Chapter 8, heralded the 
emergence of "coxmterurbanisation". Mebyon Kemow*s growth i n 
reaction to " O v e r s p i l l " was therefore a function of the new socio-
econanic conditions of "Third Peripheralism" as we l l as a r e s u l t of 
the new p o l i t i c i s a t i o n of the " R e v i v a l i s t s " . C e r t a i n l y , " O v e r s p i l l " 
proved a successful p o l i t i c a l issue for Mebyon Kemow. I n 1968 i t s 
Bodmin Branch secured 1400 signatures on an a n t i - O v e r s p i l l p e t i t i o n , 
and MK agitation contributed s i g n i f i c a n t l y to the defeat of 
"O v e r s p i l l " schemes at Camborne, Redruth, St Day, and Liskeard.^® 
Coming at a time of important n a t i o n a l i s t advances i n both Scotland 
and Wales, Mebyon Kemow considered that i t s " O v e r s p i l l " successes 
were an indication that i t should follow more c l o s e l y the examples of 
Pl a i d Cymru and the Sc o t t i s h National Party. Accordingly, a t the 
beginning of 1969 Mebyon Kemow announced that i t would f i g j i t the 
Parliamentary seat of Falmouth-Cambome i n the next General 
E l e c t i o n . 
This decision had far-reaching consequences, ranging fron 
Mebyon Kemow's intermittent and desultory intervention i n el e c t i o n s 
at various l e v e l s over s e v e r a l years, to the in e v i t a b l e narrowing of 
i t s support base and the consequent fragmentation of the n a t i o n a l i s t 
movement. I n the f i r s t place, Mebyon Kemow*s intervention i n the 
1970 General E l e c t i o n a t t r a c t e d l e s s than 2,000 votes i n the 
Falmouth-Cambome constituency, although the seat was won for the 
Conservatives by a Mebyon Kemow member, David Mudd. Undeterred, 
Mebyon Kemow per s i s t e d with i t s "vote-catching" a n t i - O v e r s p i l l 
strategy, with Cornish Nation i n March 1971 voicing opposition to the 
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West Cornwall Study and i t s " O v e r s p i l l " connotations.^^ A year l a t e r 
a contributer to the same journal was complaining that although 
" O v e r s p i l l " had been defeated, many people were nonetheless moving to 
Cornwall as private individuals.-^^ Although Cornish Nation had 
c a l l e d for the as s i m i l a t i o n of newcomers into the Cornish way of 
l i f e , by September 1973 i t was hardening i t s l i n e with the view that 
"... the i n f l u x into the land of English people i s giving r i s e to 
considerable a n t i - E n g l i s h f e e l i n g among ordinary Cornish people". 
Mebyon kemow entered the General E l e c t i o n year of 1974, therefore, 
with an image that was more overtly n a t i o n a l i s t than that which had 
existed hitherto and with a message that was increasingly aggressive 
and uncompromising. 
Surprisingly, Mebyon Kemow f a i l e d to c a p i t a l i s e upon i t s 
e a r l i e r inteirvention and apparent latent strength i n Falmouth-
Camborne, and concentrated i t s e f f o r t s instead upon neighbouring 
Truro, a r e f l e c t i o n of i t s fundamental i n a b i l i t y to devise an 
e l e c t o r a l strategy. I n the March E l e c t i o n i t secured 850 votes, but 
i n the October Mebyon Kemow*s vote slumped to 384 as n a t i o n a l i s t 
supporters switched t h e i r support to David Penhaligon. I n contrast 
to t h i s poor performance, the elections of 1974 had witnessed 
spectacialar n a t i o n a l i s t advances i n Scotland and a credible 
n a t i o n a l i s t performance i n Wales. The mid-1970s, therefore, were 
dominated by the "devolution debate" and i n t h i s Mebyon Kemow 
benefited from the apparent new-found c r e d i b i l i t y of C e l t i c 
nationalism. I n the General E l e c t i o n of 1979 Mebyon Kemow contested 
Falmouth-Cambome, St Ives, and Bodmin, with an aggregate vote of 
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4155 (leaving the recently-formed Cornish N a t i o n a l i s t Party to face 
up to the formidable Penhaligon machine i n Truro: CNF won 227 votes). 
With the f a i l u r e of devolution i n Scotland and Wales, however, Mebyon 
Kemow shared too i n the declining fortunes of the n a t i o n a l i s t 
p a r t i e s and, i n the General E l e c t i o n of 1983, was able to achieve 
j u s t over 500 votes apiece i n the constituencies of Falmouth-Camborne 
and St I v e s , Deciding not to oppose Penhaligon again, the CNP moved 
"out of the fr y i n g pan and into the f i r e " as i t s h i f t e d i t s 
attentions to the Tory-Liberal marginal of North Cornwall, where i t 
achieved 364 v o t e s . I n the 1987 General E l e c t i o n neither Mebyon 
Kemow nor the Cornish Nationalist Party f i e l d e d candidates i n any of 
the Cornish constituencies, the f i r s t time since Mebyon Kemow*s 
decision to "go p o l i t i c a l " i n 1969 that the n a t i o n a l i s t cause had not 
been represented. 
"Die f a i l u r e of Mebyon Kemow to make a s i g n i f i c a n t intervention 
i n Parliamentary E l e c t i o n s was p a r t l y a function of e l e c t o r a l appeal 
and c r e d i b i l i t y , exacerbated by i t s f a i l u r e to develop a coherent and 
consistent e l e c t o r a l strategy, a shortcoming not helped by the 
appearance of the Cornish Nationalist Party. The emergence of the 
"Penhaligon factor" and the e l e c t o r a l l y marginal nature of several 
Cornish constituencies were a l s o i n h i b i t i n g f a c t o r s . More generally, 
as Deacon noted: 
When contesting Westminster e l e c t i o n s Cornish n a t i o n a l i s t s 
s u f f e r from the same facto r s as a l l minor p a r t i e s i n the UK. 
An e l e c t o r a l system that p o s i t i v e l y encourages t a c t i c a l voting, 
lack of access to the media, i n p a r t i c u l a r t e l e v i s i o n , the 
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a d v e r s a r i a l s t r u c t u r i n g of General E l e c t i o n campaigns by the 
Press, lack of f i n a n c i a l resources a l l make electioneering an 
u p h i l l task f o r the n a t i o n a l i s t s . ^ 
I n e l e c t i o n s a t other l e v e l s , however, Mebyon Kemow*s 
performance was broadly more successful and rather more consistent. 
A l t h o u ^ the St Day seat on Cornwall County Council was l o s t i n the 
aftermath of the " O v e r s p i l l " campaign, when that p a r t i c u l a r threat 
had apparently been averted, Mebyon Kemow continued to target 
s p e c i f i c County seats. I n 1977, for example, the party contested 
seven County seats (winning an average of 17.06 of the vote) and i n 
1981 i t contested nine seats , with 16.63 per cent of the vote. I n 
1985, a t the nadir of i t s fortimes, Mebyon Kemow managed to contest 
only three County seats although, paradoxically, i t won one of these 
(Colin Lawry i n Penzance South) and came a close second i n another 
( S t Just-in-Penwith, with AO.3 of the vote). I t i s , i n c i d e n t a l l y , 
i n t e r e s t i n g to note here that i n contesting l o c a l e l e c t i o n s under i t s 
own party l a b e l Mebyon Kemow was i n f a c t a s s i s t i n g the erosion of 
the Independent ( i e non-party-party p o l i t i c a l ) t r a d i t i o n i n Cornish 
council p o l i t i c s . Eq\ially, i t should be recognised that a number of 
Councillors elected a t County or D i s t r i c t l e v e l as "Independents" 
were i n fact Mebyon Kemow members or sympathisers.^^ 
At D i s t r i c t l e v e l , Mebyon Kemow contested f i v e seats i n 1976 
(winning one), four i n 1977-78, and a s i g n i f i c a n t 19 ( i e 8.3 per cent 
of a l l seats) i n 1979 when the party achieved an aggregate of 10,421 
votes and secured two se a t s . I n the Penwith D i s t r i c t Council 
e l e c t i o n of May 1982 Mebyon Kemow won Penzance Central and came 
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second i n St Just (where i t forced the SDP-Liberal Alliance into l a s t 
p l a c e ) , and i n a s i m i l a r performance i n 1986 MK held Penzance Central 
and came a very close second i n Penzance East- I n 1983, i n Cornwall 
as a whole, MK contested seven seats of which i t secured one. At 
Parish l e v e l , Mebyon Kemow was s i m i l a r l y i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t during t h i s 
period, securing representation on Parish and Town Councils i n areas 
as diverse as Porthleven, Truro and Liskeard,^^ 
Although hardly more than patchy, Mebyon Kemow's performance 
i n l o c a l council e l e c t i o n s at l e a s t demonstrated a c e r t a i n a b i l i t y to 
develop an e l e c t o r a l strategy at that l e v e l (most notably and 
successftiLly i n Penzance where Colin Lawry proved an able "grass 
roots" p o l i t i c a n and constructed a l o c a l MK power base) and the 
potential to a t t r a c t sizeable e l e c t o r a l support i n p a r t i c u l a r 
geographic areas where MK had been able to develop a l o c a l 
organisation. This potential to mobilise support under c e r t a i n 
circumstances was demonstrated most convincingly, however, i n the 
European Parliamentary E l e c t i o n of 1979. I n 1978 (as we s h a l l see i n 
Chapter 10) Cornish l o c a l government bodies and many other 
organisations had voiced opposition to the proposed Cornwall and 
Plymouth European Parliamentary Constituency, demanding instead a 
Cornwall-only Constituency- When these objections were overruled 
there was considerable d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n within Comwall, manifested, 
for example, i n support for the Mebyon Kemow candidate (Richard 
Jenkin) i n the European E l e c t i o n . As Butler and Marquand noted i n 
the i r survey of the el e c t i o n , "A notable minor party vote was Mebyon 
Kemow's 5.9 per cent i n Comwall and Plymouth.. .".^^ I n f a c t , MK's 
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10,205 votes represented some ten per cent of the vote i n Cornwall 
(assuming, as Butler and Marquand put i t , that "...a Cornish 
n a t i o n a l i s t had no appeal i n Plymouth..."^®), a r e s u l t that compared 
more than favourably with the performance of Pla i d Cymm i n the 
predominantly English-speaking parts of Wales (eg 7.9 per cent i n 
Wales South and 7.3 per cent i n Wales South East) and le d Cornish 
Nation to conclude that "...1979 has proved to be...a superb s t a r t to 
MK's f i r s t serioiis attempt to achieve miiLti-level representation from 
Pa r i s h Councils to the European Parliament".-^^ 
However, 1979 proved to be not the s t a r t but rather the higji 
point of Mebyon Kemow's e l e c t o r a l performance, the 1980s witnessing 
decline a t the Westminster l e v e l and a f a i l u r e on Mebyon Kemow*s 
part to contest the European Parliamentary E l e c t i o n i n 1984 - despite 
the f a c t that i t had been instnimental i n forcing a Boundary 
Commission Inquiry i n t o the Cornwall and Plymouth EPC i n the 
preceding November. Such decline and f a i l u r e was, as noted above, to 
some extent a function of the f a i l u r e of Devolution i n Scotland and 
Wales and the consequent decline i n that period of the S c o t t i s h 
National Party and P l a i d Cymru, with C e l t i c nationalism no longer 
enjoying the limelight of B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l debate and media 
coverage. L o c a l l y , however, i t was a l s o a r e s u l t of severe 
organisational d i f f i c u l t i e s encountered by Mebyon Kemow. These 
rel a t e d to the broad i n a b i l i t y to develop a proper e l e c t o r a l 
strategy, along with attendent f i n a n c i a l constraint, but they a l s o 
resulted from an increasing confusion and turmoil within the 
n a t i o n a l i s t community i t s e l f . 
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Uncertainty i n the n a t i o n a l i s t camp had been evident as e a r l y 
as 1970, at the time of Mebyon Kemow's i n i t i a l decision to intervene 
i n Parliamentary e l e c t i o n s . Most obviously, those l o c a l MPs who had 
e a r l i e r joined MK, approving of i t s pressure group role and seeing i t 
as a useful basis for developing t h e i r own " l o c a l i s t " or "Cornish" 
image, had been placed i n a rather ambivalent position, Peter 
B e s s e l l offered to resign from MK, but David Mudd a c t u a l l y joined the 
movement at t h i s time - i n the process of s t e a l i n g much of the 
n a t i o n a l i s t thunder i n the Falmouth-Cambome constituency he was 
intent upon contesting as a Conservative. Mebyon Kemow*s position 
was s i m i l a r l y ambivalent. On the one hand i t had hoped to r e t a i n i t s 
old pressure group i d e n t i t y , appealing across p a r t y - l i n e s to a broad 
spectrum of " p a t r i o t i c " opinion i n Comwall ( a t a c t i c that had 
already won i t considerable c r e d i b i l i t y ) but on the other adopting a 
vigorous and overtly n a t i o n a l i s t stance, d i r e c t l y opposing and 
competing with the London-based p a r t i e s and claiming common cause 
with P l a i d Cymru and the Scottish National party. These two 
approaches were by no means compatible, and while Mebyon Kemow 
alienated many of i t s former supporters through i t s new, increasingly 
aggressive p a r t y - p o l i t i c a l s t y l e of nationalism, so i t f a i l e d to 
s a t i s f y some of i t s more r a d i c a l members who had hoped to shed 
completely the pressure group image. 
As e a r l y as January 1969 G. Harris, the Vice-Chairman of the 
Li b e r a l Party Association i n Redmth and Camborne, had resigned from 
Mebyon Kemow over i t s increasing " p o l i t i c i s a t i o n " But for others 
MK's " p o l i t i c i s a t i o n " did not go f a r enough, and at the 1969 Annual 
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General Meeting of Mebyon Kemow there was c r i t i c i s m from "A small 
minority determined to impose i t s s o - c a l l e d 'Progressive' views..."^^ 
on the movement. t h i s l e d d i r e c t l y to the establishment of the 
short-lived Cornish National Party (not to be confused with the l a t e r 
Cornish Nationalist Party) by a group of former Mebyon Kemow members 
who were determined to seek "Commonwealth member status" for 
Comwall. This, as they explained i n t h e i r p o l i c y document Comwall-
Forward with Confidence, would mean c o n s t i t u t i o n a l independence on 
the l i n e s of that sought for Scotland by the Sco t t i s h National Party, 
a more extreme demand than Meb3ron Kemow's "self-government i n 
domestic a f f a i r s " . A l t h o i i g h the Cornish National Party proved 
unable to coninand much support and disappeared quickly from the 
active p o l i t i c a l scene, with any d i s t i n c t i v e features that i t may 
have enjoyed being s w i f t l y usurped by Mebyon Kemow's incr e a s i n g l y 
aggressive stance, a dangerous precendent had been s e t . I n the years 
ahead, as Mebjran Kemow f a l t e r e d i n the development of i t s e l e c t o r a l 
strategy and as tension between the older "pressure group" wing and 
the more " p o l i t i c i s e d " r a d i c a l s grew, so the propensity for the 
creation of dis s i d e n t , break-away groups was enhanced. 
For some, the Cornish Branch of the C e l t i c League was an 
al t e r n a t i v e channel for t h e i r energies. Formed i n 1961 with the 
intention of co-ordinating C e l t i c nationalism i n the B r i t i s h , I r i s h 
and French States, and pursuing a Pan-Celtic ideology (which was 
outlined by P. Berresford E l l i s i n h i s The Creed of the C e l t i c 
Revolution^^), the League formed branches i n each of the C e l t i c 
countries and i n Cornwall encouraged n a t i o n a l i s t s to see the Cornish 
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s i t u a t i o n i n an i n t e r - C e l t i c context. Others, however, sougjit a more 
d i s t i n c t l y Cornish approach and a number, uncertain of the benefits 
of Mebyon Kemow having moved from pressure group to p o l i t i c a l i>arty 
and disappointed by i t s Incoherent e l e c t o r a l strategy, considered 
that a more imaginative campaign would bring greater rewards. 
Accordingly, i n 1974 a group of a c t i v i s t s sought to restore 
Cornwall's ancient Stannary (or Tinners') Parliament. Although the 
Parliament had not met since the eighteenth century, i t s not 
inconsiderable powers s t i l l existed, at l e a s t i n theory, and those 
supporting i t s restoration argued that the Stannary afforded Cornwall 
s i g n i f i c a n t independence from Westminster. Their case was stated 
somewhat l e s s than p l a i n l y i n pseudo-legal language i n the f i r s t 
i s sue of the Cornish Stannary Gazette i n Janiiary 1975, published by 
these latter-day "Stannators" who - i n the face of o f f i c i a l 
d i s i n t e r e s t - decided to reconvene the Stannary Parliament 
u n i l a t e r a l l y . ^ TMs new Stannary movement created considerable 
i n t e r e s t and c u r i o s i t y within Cornwall, but i t was not successful i n 
winning any general c r e d i b i l i t y or widespread support. I t was, 
however, to prove a considerable thorn i n the side of the Nirex 
organisation which, i n attempting to explore an abandoned quarry s i t e 
to determine i t s s u i t a b i l i t y for the disposal of nuclear waste, was 
thwarted by "tinners" who invoked ancient Stannary Law to "bound" for 
themselves the land i n question. Equally, i t formed a s i g n i f i c a n t 
focus for anti-Community Charge a c t i v i s t s i n Cornwall i n 1989, 
arguing that the " P o l l Tax" was contrary to Stannary Law and 
therefore i l l e g a l i n Cornwall. 
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A perhaps more s i g n i f i c a n t event was the formation i n 1975 of 
the Cornish N a t i o n a l i s t Party by a group of dis a f f e c t e d Mebyon Kemow 
members under the leadership of Dr James Whetter. As editor of 
Cornish Nation Dr Whetter had attempted the further " p o l i t i c i s a t i o n " 
of Mebyon Kemow, i n p a r t i c u l a r advocating the extension of the 
party's p o l i c y on self-government to embrace "...the formation of a 
C e l t i c Federation of Nations, of E i r e , Scotland, Wales, Kemow, I s l e 
of Man, Brittetny"^^ and drawing comparisons between the I r i s h 
s i t u a t i o n and conditions that obtained i n Comwall. His m i l i t a n t , 
party^-political nationalism was r e s i s t e d by elements of the Mebyon 
Kemow leadership, however, and Dr Whetter was dismayed by the 
f a i l u r e i n 1974 to b u i l d upon the e a r l i e r intervention i n Falmouth-
Cambome. Having fought two s o l i t a r y and rather f r u i t l e s s b a t t l e s i n 
Truro during the 1974 General E l e c t i o n , Dr Whetter and h i s siipporters 
broke away, a statement i n the Coimish N a t i o n a l i s t Party's journal 
Cornish Banner i n June 1975 declaring that Mebyon Kemow was "...not 
equipped to become a po s i t i v e n a t i o n a l i s t movement...".^^ Although 
promising at f i r s t a more c l e a r l y p o l i t i c a l approach and an a l l -
embracing e l e c t o r a l strategy, the behaviour of the Cornish 
Nationalist Party i n the 1970s and 80s i n f a c t resembled that of 
Mebyon Kemow to a remarkable degree. This included ad hoc and 
unsuccessful interventions i n elections a t the Parliamentary, County 
and D i s t r i c t l e v e l s , together with an intervention i n the Comwall 
and Plymouth EPC i n 1984 when the Cornish Nationalist Party achieved 
1,892 votes. Hie one area of policy where the CNP did vary noticably 
from MK was i n the f i e l d of European r e l a t i o n s , where the CNP from 
i t s beginning proved a vigorously pro-European organisation, 
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a f f i l i a t i n g i t s e l f with the European F e d e r a l i s t Party and forging 
l i n k s with like-minded n a t i o n a l i s t and r e g i o n a l i s t groups i n Europe. 
As the Cornish Banner explained i n November 1988: 
...from an e a r l y date we saw that one of the objectives of the 
CNP shoiiLd be the attainment of regional status for Cornwall 
both within the B r i t i s h system and the European organisation i n 
the future... . The operation of the si n g l e European Act i n 
1992 may w e l l present the European regions with a great 
opportunity f or progress. 
This fragmentation of the Cornish national movement in t o 
severa l competing but e l e c t o r a l l y r e l a t i v e l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t groupings 
had a number of consequences. One response was an attempt at "bridge 
building" i n a bid to bring the disparate elements of the movement 
together to at l e a s t agree a common set of objectives. A sho r t - l i v e d 
Cornish Congress ended i n acrimony, but i n 1979 there was a more 
serious and enduring attempt (encouraged i n i t i a l l y by the Cornish 
Guardian newspaper) at the creation of a Cornish Assembly which not 
only brought together MK and the CNP but appealed to a wide range of 
other organisations and individuals, inclxiding members of other 
p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . The Cornish Assembly s t y l e d i t s e l f "A non-party 
p o l i t i c a l forum and organisation, founded...for the protection of 
Comwall and Cornish character and i d e n t i t y " . A n d - as well as 
providing that forum and bringing together as many Cornish groups as 
possible - the Assembly considered that i t s fundamental aim was 
"...to r e t a i n within Cornwall a l l e x i s t i n g powers and to campaign f o r 
the return of powers of administration and decision which would be 
- 369 
better exercised from within C o r n w a l l " . H o w e v e r , despite i t s 
i n i t i a l promise, the Cornish Assembly proved an unwieldy and 
sometimes grudging a l l i a n c e of disparate i n t e r e s t groups, without an 
ef f e c t i v e organisational base to turn resolutions i n t o a c t i o n and 
without the means to gain the continuing attention and confidence of 
the Cornish population. Although the Assembly survived, i t was as a 
small and i n e f f e c t u a l body - adding to rather than overcoming the 
fragmentation of the Cornish national movement. 
A more su c c e s s f u l strategy was that of the more loosely defined 
and loosely stmctxired Cowethas Flamank group. Cowethas Flamank 
emerged during the debate that attended the publicaiton of the Maud 
report i n 1970 \jhich recommended, amongst other things, the removal 
of part of South East Comwall from the control of Comwall County 
Council and i t s placement instead i n an expanded Plymouth authority. 
John F l e e t , a founding member, expressed the hope that Cowethas 
Flamank could provide a support service to Mebyon Kemow i n i t s 
opposition to the Maud Report and i n other areas as "...a kind of 
Mebyon Kemow Bow Group or Fabian S o c i e t y . . a b l e to undertake 
sophisticated reserach and produce new ideas as w e l l as providing 
s e c r e t a r i a l and organisational support. As F l e e t explained, "The 
Group i s bound by the ru l e s of Mebjron Kemow and i s subject to the 
general d i r e c t i o n of i t s executive". By 1971, having " f e l t i t s 
fe e t " i n the successful Cornish opposition to Maud, Cowethas Flamank 
announced that i t was "...anxious to inaugurate a s e r i e s of 
comprehensive economic, s o c i a l and environmental studies for the 
whole of Comwall..."5^ and i n February 1972 i t launched i t s own 
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magazine, Kevren. However, by t h i s time Cowethas Flamank was already 
voicing serious misgivings about the effectiveness of Mebyon Kemow 
as a p o l i t i c a l organisation, with Kevren detecting within MK "...an 
unhappy malaise...a general lack of confidence..."^^ and, l a t e r , 
complaining that "Unfortunately, our o f f e r s and suggestions have so 
fa r e i t h e r been ignored or dismissed out of hand...".^^ 
There was thereafter a subtle but very d e f i n i t e attempt by 
Cowethas Flamank to distnace i t s e l f from i t s parent body. 
Increasingly, Cowethas Flamank described i t s e l f not as an i n t e g r a l 
part of MK but rather as an independent group which believed that 
"...Cornwall stnads i n need of a strong popular movement such as 
Mebyon K e m o w " . I n time even that explanation was dropped from 
Kevren and other Cowethas Flamank publications, and by the e a r l y 
1980s Cowethas Flamank had s u c c e s s f u l l y disassociated i t s e l f from 
Mebyon Kemow. This lent an even greater freedom of action to the 
group, and from t h i s emerged Cowethas Flamank's c e n t r a l r o l e i n the 
establishment of the standing Conference on Cornwall which, following 
i t s successful inauguration a t Perranporth i n May 1983, developed as 
an independent Cornish i n s t i t u t i o n i n i t s own r i g h t . As a biannual 
conference, the Conference on Conrwall proved a f a r more successful 
forum for the discussion of Cornish a f f a i r s than the Cornish Assembly 
had ever been. More p a r t i c u l a r l y , i t develox)ed a genius f or the 
spawning of act i o n groups which - having been formed at the 
Conference - would go away to pursue t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r f i e l d s of 
endeavour and then report t h e i r progress to future meetings of the 
Conference. I n t h i s way, the Conference s e t up working p a r t i e s on 
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i s s u e s as disparate as devolution and education (the l a t t e r leading 
to the publication of a book Cornish Studies For Schools^^), while 
new bodies such as Skeusow (the Cornish f i l m and t e l e v i s i o n group), 
the Cornish Music Guild, the Cornish L i t e r a r y Guild, Cornish 
Alternatives to the Structure Plan, the Cornish Bureau of European 
Relations, and the Campaign For A Cornish (Euro) Constituency were 
a l l bom from Conference a c t i v i t y . Within t h i s d i v e r s i t y of a c t i v i t y 
the Conference had a l s o secured the p a r t i c i p a t i o n and co-operation of 
the various fragments of the Cornish national movement, and had been 
successful i n bringing that movement to a wider public. 
A l e s s constructive and rather s i n i s t e r reaction to the 
e l e c t o r a l f a i l u r e and fragmentation of the n a t i o n a l i s t movement was 
the emergence of the shadowy "An Gof" group which was allegedly 
responsible f o r two bomb explosions i n Cornwall i n the e a r l y 1980s, 
and which may or may not have been responsible for the spate of "An 
Gof" daubings on railway bridges and the l i k e . F r u s t r a t i o n a t the 
apparent powerlessness of con s t i t u t i o n a l nationalism was apparent i n 
the foimdation of the tiny Free Cornwall organisation, which saw 
i t s e l f as the vanguard of the Cornish movement and intended by a 
policy of c r i t i c i s m and prodding to "ginger-xip" the e x i s t i n g p a r t i e s . 
I t s c y n i c a l , s a t i r i c a l and sometimes waspish magazine, a l s o e n t i t l e d 
Free Cornwall, was i t s e l f a manifestation of another element of the 
fragpientation, the plethora of "underground" fringe journals (mostly 
shortlived) such as An Weryn, Qwyn ha Du, An Kenethlor, Cornish 
Voice, and a t l e a s t two c a l l e d Kemow, along with the more su c c e s s f u l 
a l l - C o m i s h language An Gannas. 
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I n the face of such fragmentation, Mebyon Kemow i n the l a t e 
1970s and e a r l y 1980s attempted to re - a s s e r t i t s leadership of the 
Cornish national movement, and t h i s may a l s o help to explain i t s 
su r p r i s i n g l y high p r o f i l e i n the various e l e c t i o n s of 1979. Be that 
as i t may, Mebyon Kemow reacted to the fragmentation by adopting an 
even more decidedly " p o l i t i c i s e d " posture, i t s policy discussion 
booklet i n 1976 offerin g a vigorously n a t i o n a l i s t c r i t i q u e of the: 
...spurious doctrine of English regionalism that would include 
us as a part of a South-West En g l i s h region.. .(which) 
represents not decentralisation and a recognition of national 
r i g h t s for Comwall but an attempt to r e t a i n c e n t r a l power by a 
minimum d i s p e r s a l to i t s agents into powerful regional 
strongpoints... . On every i s s u e we are t o l d that we are an 
English County, a part of an Eng l i s h Region, and the answer 
always means more B i g l i s h exploitation and even l e s s Cornish 
well-being.. .Cornwall was a Coimtry, i t i s a Country and w i l l 
be a Country as long as there are Cornish people who a s s e r t 
t h e i r h i s t o r i c nationhood. 
Nonetheless, there continued to be those who sought to e s t a b l i s h a 
yet more ov e r t l y p o l i t i c a l stance, with Mebyon Kemow shorn f i n a l l y 
of i t s pressure group image and with a n a t i o n a l i s t ideology and 
programme c l e a r l y and unequivocally a r t i c u l a t e d . This debate was 
resolved a t length with the production of a new constitution - i n 
which MK*s party p o l i t i c a l r o l e was enshrined - with Wight i n 1981 
concluding that " I t seems c l e a r that MK i s only now completing the 
t r a n s i t i o n from a pressure group to a p o l i t i c a l party". 
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Inevitably, the l e s s ideologically-committed f e l t compromised within 
such an arrangement and, as Gwyn ha Du (MK's new p o l i t i c a l journal) 
admitted i n 1980, "...out o f the confusion has emerged a slimmer, 
battered and p a r t l y d i s c r e d i t e d p a r t y " . I t was, however, a 
"...party...poised on the edge of i t s best opportunity for years...a 
chance to adopt a set of p o l i c i e s and t a c t i c s (for)...vmiting and 
p o l i t i c i s i n g the party". 
I n f a c t , Mebyon Kemow was i n 1980 entering a period of 
decline. C r i t i c s i n Q^ /yn ha Du and Cornish Nation continued to 
protest that Mebyon Kemow's decision to forsake i t s pressure group 
role and embrace instead the faction-fighting of party p o l i t i c s had 
been a c r u c i a l e r r o r of s t r a t e g y . B u t opponents of t h i s view 
responded with the argument that the r e l a t i v e f a i l t i r e of Ifebyon 
Kemow was not so much a function of s t r a t e g i c error but rather a 
r e f l e c t i o n of the f a c t that Cornish nationalism had f a i l e d to 
e s t a b l i s h and elucidate a c l e a r and genuinely n a t i o n a l i s t philosophy. 
According to t h i s view, the apparent v a c c i l a t i o n s and contradictions 
i n Mebyon Kemow's behaviour had resulted from the fac t that i t s 
a c t i v i s t s had been " j j a t r i o t s " rather than true n a t i o n a l i s t s , t h e i r 
ideology too narrow and too ill-formed to constmct s u c c e s s f u l l y a 
f u l l y developed n a t i o n a l i s t paradigm and an attendent, i n t e l l e c t u a l l y 
coherent p o l i t i c a l programne. Deacon summarised t h i s approach with 
the argument that ".. .althougji adopting the terminology of 
nationalism, e s p e c i a l l y i n the l a t e 60s and p a r t l y under the 
influence of Scotland and Wales, the Cornish movement has not 
ac t u a l l y evolved a coherent v i s i o n of Cornish n a t i o n a l i s m . . . " . ^ 
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Deacon's conclusion appeared a danroing indictment of the 
Cornish national movement, a movement which despite twenty or more 
years of increasing "politicisation" s t i l l lacked a core of 
politically-aware and ideologically-committed nationalists, a 
movement s t i l l unsure of i t s strategy and objectives, poorly 
organised, and habitually gauche and naive i n i t s attempts to enter 
the arena of p o l i t i c a l activity. Indeed, much of this criticism was 
jii s t i f i e d - as i s demonstrated above - but such stark judgement 
failed to recognise the real extent of the "politicisation" of the 
Cornish "Revival" i n the years after the Second World War, Moreover, 
such a view did not acknowledge or appreciate that the most profound 
infltience of this "politicisation" lay outside the confines of the 
act i v i t i e s and electoral performance of Mebyon Kemow, the Cornish 
Nationalist Party and the other groups. 
Of course, the most extraordinary feature of the emergence and 
influence of Jtebyon Kemow (and the others) was the very fact that i t 
had happened at a l l . This, as Lee noted, was i n i t s e l f enough to 
mark the p o l i t i c a l experience of Cornwall off from that of English 
counties and to suggest the existence of an autonomous p o l i t i c a l 
culture i n which the articulation of separate identity and a sense of 
anti-metropolitanism was of underlying significance.^^ This too, as 
Thomas had n o t e d , w a s a specific feature of the post-war era, 
hinting at the emergence of Cornish p o l i t i c s from i t s pre-war 
"fossilization" and indicating a re-assessment within the Cornish 
"Revival" which had led to a re-interpretation i n p o l i t i c a l terms of 
i t s broad objectives. That re-assessment and re-interpretation had 
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been facilitated, as argued earlier, by the "rehabilitation" of 
indiistrial Cornwall within the ideology of the "Revival" - prompting 
a new-found concern for the condition of modem Cornwall - but i t was 
also precipitated and popularised by the socio-economic changes of 
the post-war era* The planned "Overspill" schemes of the 1960s were 
the heralds of "branch factory" regional planning and of 
"counterurbanisation", and the emergence of Cornish nationalism was 
therefore a response to (indeed, a part of) the condition of "Third 
Peripheralisra". 
However, the appearance of Cornish nationalism was but one 
feature of the emergence of Cornish p o l i t i c s from i t s earlier 
"fossilization" and of the new "politicisation" of the Cornish 
"Revival". Both these phenomena had wide ranging effects upon 
Cornish p o l i t i c a l culture and activity, reaching beyond the boimds of 
the nationalist parties, and i t i s therefore misleading to attempt to 
judge the extent of their influence and impact by examining the 
fortunes of the nationalists i n isolation. Instead, to ty to achieve 
a more balanced and more comprehensive understanding of the effects 
of these phenomena, i t i s important to examine the nature of 
p o l i t i c a l change i n Cornwall as a whole in the post-war era and to 
identify the extent that i t was "different" from that which obtained 
in &igland« 
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CHAPTER 10 
THE NEW POLITICS OF THE PERIPHERY 
At f i r s t glance, the relative electoral failvure of Mebyon 
Kemow and the Cornish Nationalist Party, along with their apparent 
inability to construct a comprehensive nationalist philosophy, migjit 
suggest that their impact upon the Cornish p o l i t i c a l scene was only 
marginal and that the "politicisation" of the "Revival" - from which 
the nationalists had sprung - had had only a minimal effect upon 
Cornish p o l i t i c a l activity. Further examination, however, reveals 
that the r e a l i t y i s quite the reverse. In fact, the "politicisation" 
of the Cornish "Revival" had been the precipitating impetus which -
i n response to the new conditions of "Third Peripheralism" - had 
forced Cornish politics out of i t s e a r l i e r "fossilization". This had 
led not only to the preoccupations and electoral invervention of the 
nationalist groups, but was manifested too i n a much broader range of 
po l i t i c a l activity i n Cornwall. Stemming directly from the 
"Revivalists'" reinterpretation of their objectives i n p o l i t i c a l 
terms, with i t s emphasis upon the defence and promotion of ethnic 
identity, was a new concern for the p o l i t i c a l "acconmodation" of 
Cornwall. This was a concern which not only motivated the 
nationalist groups but which came, i n various circumstances, to 
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affect the whole spectrum of p o l i t i c a l opinion and ac t i v i t y i n 
Cornwall and which, on specific occasions, dominated p o l i t i c a l 
debate. Added to this was an increasingly sophisticated and incisive 
critique of those policies that had led to the creation of the 
"branch factory" economy and "counterurbanisation", voiced i n i t i a l l y 
by the nationalist groups but soon embraced by a series of highly 
articulate and well-informed pressure groups. And, l a s t l y , there was 
the impact of a l l this upon the existing p o l i t i c a l party structure in 
Cornwall i n which an already distinctive Cornish p o l i t i c a l culture 
was enhanced as i t responded to the new conditions of "TMrd 
Periperalism". 
In the era of "Second Peripheralism", when Cornwall enjoyed a 
self-confident sense of identity based upon the strength of i t s 
industrial prowess, the symbols of Cornwall's p o l i t i c a l 
"accommodation" (most notably the Duchy and the Stannary) were seen 
as outmoded and unnecessary and were allowed, even encouraged to 
decline or metamorphose. Although the creation of Cornwall County 
Council and the new diocese of Truro were i n some respects new 
symbols of p o l i t i c a l "accommodation" (although they did not lend an 
identity i n any way distinctive form that of an English county), the 
passing of industrial prowess had l e f t Cornwall largely bereft of any 
symbolic means of expressing or asserting i t s sense of identity. In 
the inter-war period the "Revivalists" had reacted to this situation 
in their appeal to the pre-industrial ciiLture of Celtic-Catholic 
Cornwall. This had meant reviving the Cornish language, promoting 
the use of the Cornish flag, and emphasising the specifically 
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"Celtic" aspects of the Cornish inheritance (such as Celtic 
haiography). I t had also required the "invention" of tradition (a l a 
Hobsbawm and Ranger^) i n those areas where nothing suitable existed 
already i n the genuinely authentic hist o r i c a l baggage. In this way a 
Gorseth, complete with Bardic ceremony, was "revived"; and the k i l t 
was "reintroduced" on the basis that i t was a Celtic form of dress 
and therefore appropriate to Cornwall. Even the revival of the 
language was subject to a similar process, with Robert Morton Nance 
pooling the resources from surviving Cornish of different eras to 
construct a vocabulary, orthography and grammar i n a Unified form, 
employing i n the process various assumptions and accretions and loans 
from Breton and Welsh decided at his discretion. 
In the post-war era this search for cultxiral symbolism 
continued apace. A Cornish National Tartan was introduced to 
complement the k i l t , organisations such as the Celtic Congress and 
Kemow Pan-Celtic strove to rebuild Conrwall's links with the Celtic 
world (securing, for example, Cornwall's participation i n Celtic 
e 
festivals such as those in Killamey i n Ireland and Lorient in 
Brittany), Cornish towns and villages clamoured to "twin" with 
similar conmunities in Brittany, and folk dance and music enthusiasts 
formed groups such as Cam Kemewek with a distinctly "Celtic" 
flavour. Cornish wrestling, which was indeed a real survival from 
ancient times, was also put on an "inter-Celtic" footing as Cornish-
Breton contests were arranged. ^fost importantly, i n the wake of 
fierce c r i t i c i s m of Nance's Unified Cornish (condemned by Price as a 
mutant "Comic"^), language enthusiasts were at pains to modify 
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revived Cornish i n a manner that would make i t more academically 
acceptable. The Cornish Language Board ( s e t up i n 1967 to administer 
the language r e v i v a l ^ ) i n 1986 adopted George's revised "phonemic" 
Cornish, a more i n t e r n a l l y consistent and academically rigorous 
system than Nance's but with an orthography which was a l s o 
"invented".^ S l a v i s h adherence to the system's "phonemic" r u l e s 
threw up some unusual r e s u l t s , however, such as the recasting of the 
fa m i l i a r Cornish word chy ( a house) as " t j i " and the obscure 
r e s p e l l i n g of otherwise f a m i l i a r Cornish placenames. Other Cornish 
speakers, therefore, were attracted the the a l t e r n a t i v e " T r a d i t i o n a l " 
or "Late" Cornish expounded i n i t s fundamental form by Gendall and 
(more moderabely) by Lyon, i n which the language was s p e l t and 
constructed i n a form c l o s e l y resembling that i n which i t had l a s t 
been spoken n a t u r a l l y . ^ Although t h i s version was not approved by 
the Language Board, i t nonetheless found some support i n academic 
c i r c l e s . ^ 
Disconcerting though t h i s confusion was to those who a c t u a l l y 
wished to study or learn the language, the important f a c t was that 
there was a language r e v i v a l a t a l l . Once again, rather l i k e the 
plai n f a c t of the existence of Mebyon Kemow, i t was - as the 
" p o l i t i c i s e d " " R e v i v a l i s t s " had intended i t to be - a powerful symbol 
of "difference". I t was, for example, a passport to Cornwall's 
inclusion i n books d e t a i l i n g the "minorities" of Western Europe, and 
i t even afforded Cornwall a place on the European Bureau For Lesser 
Used Languages.^ I n a balanced assessment of the si g n i f i c a n c e of 
language r e v i v a l , Thomas commented that: 
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...Revived Cornish, as to i t s s p e l l i n g , an increasing part of 
i t s vocabulary, and most of i t s pronounciation, cannot be 
regarded as genuine, and t h i s i s why i t i s viewed with such 
suspicion and reserve by almost a l l C e l t i c i s t s . . , . This does 
not amount to f a i l u r e . t h e achievement of Henry Jenner, Robert 
Morton Nance, and t h e i r contemporaries, was the establishment 
of a sense of Comishness, of national consciousness...had t h i s 
o v e r a l l Cornish Revival not been attempted, and accomplished, 
i t would by now be quite impossible to construct the p a r t i c u l a r 
platform on which the l i n g u i s t i c , c u l t u r a l , n a t i o n a l i s t i c , and 
environmental movements i n Cornwall a l l perform.^ 
Indeed, amongst i t s consequences could be counted the I n s t i t u t e of 
Cornish Studies (funded j o i n t l y by Cornwall County Council and the 
University of Exeter), which was founded i n 1972 with Thomas as i t s 
Director. 
As Thomas intimated, i t was but a short step from the symbols 
of c u l t u r a l "accommodation" to those of p o l i t i c a l "accommodation". 
This too was recognised by the postwar " R e v i v a l i s t s " and an 
important t a c t i c was to press for the use of the Cornish language on 
public road signs, such as "welcome" notices at the entrances to 
towns. The Gorseth had already s u c c e s s f u l l y arranged for the 
erection of b i - l i n g u a l "Comwall-Kemow" signs a t the border, and i n 
a t e s t case i n 1988-89 the Liskeard Chamber of Commerce was able to 
force the Department of Transport to acknowledge o f f i c i a l l y the 
legitimate use of the Cornish language on road signs.^ This to some 
degree involved "governmental recognition" of the language and was 
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therefore "accommodation" of Cornwall's "difference". Likewise, a 
campaign to achieve o f f i c i a l status for the Cornish f l a g came to 
f r u i t i o n i n 1985 when Cornwall County Council decided that i t should 
be flown alongside the Union f l a g at County H a l l i n T r u r o . I n 
s i m i l a r fashion, the celebration of St Piran's Day (March 5th) as 
"Cornwall's National Day" received increasing recognition, a l b e i t at 
u n o f f i c i a l l e v e l s , i n the 1970s and 80s, while "Trelawny" continued 
to be regarded as the "Cornish National Anthem" - a status which was 
s t i l l further enhanced by i t s presentation and use as such by 
Cornwall Rugby Football Union i n 1989 during Cornwall's progress to 
the County Championship F i n a l at Twickenham. 
Having effected the " r e h a b i l i t a t i o n " of i n d u s t r i a l Cornwall 
within t h e i r ideology, the post-war " R e v i v a l i s t s " were aware that i t 
was necessary to construct a bridge between the somewhat exclusive 
" C e l t i c " culture that they had embraced hitherto and the more 
widespread popular culture based on Methodism, Rugby Football, male 
voice choirs, brass bands and the l i k e . Not only would t h i s broaden 
the potential appeal of the "Revival" but a l s o i t would create the 
necessary c r e d i b i l i t y and momentum to win p o l i t i c a l "accommodation". 
That the " R e v i v a l i s t s " had achieved some success i n t h i s endeavour 
was evident by 1989, when the t h i r d "Eisteddfod" aroused considerable 
enthusiasm throughout Cornwall and proved to be an amicable a l l i a n c e 
of " C e l t i c " and "popular" Cornish culture, with events ranging from 
the Gorseth's Bardic ceremony and Cornish language r e c i t a t i o n s to 
brass band and choir competitions. Most noticeably i t was manifested 
i n the behaviour of the enormous Cornish crowd ("Trelawny's Army", as 
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i t was dubbed by the press) of some 20-25,000 at Twickenham at the 
RFU F i n a l i n A p r i l 1989. The Independent newspaper considered that 
"Twenty thousand Comishmen used the great ground for a statement, i f 
not of C e l t i c nationhood, then at l e a s t of t h e i r d i s t i n c t i d e n t i t y " ^ ^ 
and admitted that "...the 20,000 had been an astonishing sight, 
f l o u r i s h i n g the Cornish flag...and bedecked i n Comish rugby's black 
and a m b e r " . T h e Guardian explained that "Like the Welsh, the 
Comish take the view that rugby and community are the same thing", 
with the opinion that i f the F i n a l "...proved anything, i t was that 
the l u s t y s p i r i t of national independence i s a l i v e and f l o u r i s h i n g i n 
the undeclared Republic of C o r n w a l l " . C o n t i n u i n g such p o l i t i c a l 
a l l u s i o n s , the Comish Times f e l t that the occasion was "...more 
reminiscent of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l . . .".''•^  
The d i s t i n c t i o n between the symbols of c u l t u r a l "accommodation" 
and those of p o l i t i c a l "accommodation" was s i m i l a r l y blurred i n the 
campaign, which was at i t s height i n the l a t e r 1960s and e a r l y 1970s, 
to achieve a postage stamp for Cornwall. Following the introduction 
of regional issues by the Post Office of stamps for England, Wales, 
Scotland and Northem Ireland (and against the background of the 
existence of separate stamps for the various Channel Islands and the 
I s l e of Man), John Nott attempted unsuccessfully to press for a 
Comish stamp when i n March 1967 he asked the Postmaster General i n 
Parliament i f "...he w i l l give consideration to the production of a 
Comish stamp, Comwall being the only C e l t i c country i n the United 
Kingdom which i s without i t s own postage s t a m p " . S u b s e q u e n t l y , 
Mebyon Kemow produced i t s own booklet e n t i t l e d A Stamp For Comwall 
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i n which the case for Cornwall was expounded at some length, although 
without a v a i l . 
The postage stamp question was a t root a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l issue 
with p o l i t i c a l luiplications of some considerable importance, 
r e f l e c t i n g a determination to secure a form of p o l i t i c a l 
"accommodation" for Cornwall which would confirm a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
i d e n t i t y d i s t i n c t from that of j u s t another English county. This 
explained i n part the b r i e f enthusiasm i n the mid-1970s for the 
attempts to revive the ancient Cornish Stannary Parliament, a 
somewhat bi z a r r e event which nonetheless did much to highlight 
Cornwall's unusual c o n s t i t u t i o n a l h i s t o r y and the fa c t that the 
Stannary l e g i s l a t i o n remained i n t a c t on the Statute Book as an 
i n t e g r a l part of the B r i t i s h Constitution. A more considered attempt 
at elucidating Cornwall's const i t u t i o n a l heritage i n the i n t e r e s t s of 
e f f e c t i n g renewed p o l i t i c a l "accommodation" was the Cowethas Flamank 
report The Detectable Duchy, published i n 1986, which showed that 
h i s t o r i c a l l y the government of Cornwall was vested i n the Duchy of 
Cornwall and argued that the d i s t i n c t i o n between County and Duchy -
today taken so much for granted - was i n fa c t a r e s u l t of a 
nineteenth century reinterpretation of the Duchy's r o l e . ^ ^ Indeed, 
the Kilbrandon Commission on the Constitution addressed i t s e l f to the 
position of the Duchy, and i n i t s recommendations stated that: 
The creation of the Duchy of Cornwall.. .established a s p e c i a l 
and enduring r e l a t i o n s h i p between Cornwall and the Crown. Use 
of the designation on a l l appropriate occasions would serve to 
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recognise both t h i s s p e c i a l r elationship and the t e r r i t o r i a l 
i n t e g r i t y of Cornwall... .^^ 
The Kilbrandon recommendations did not extend as f a r as the 
advocacy for Cornwall of a devolutionary assembly on the l i n e s of 
those proposed for Scotland and Wales, but nonetheless they had 
recognised the existence of a sp e c i a l Cornish c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i d e n t i t y 
and had indeed proposed that more emphasis be placed upon i t . The 
Kilbrandon Commission had a l s o proved an important opportunity for 
Cornish groups to sta t e t h e i r case for Cornwall's p o l i t i c a l 
"accommodation". Both the Cornish Branch of the C e l t i c League and 
the Cornish National Party submitted evidence to the Commission, and 
i n a lengthy memorandum Mebyon Kemow sought "...a r e - d e f i n i t i o n of 
Cornwall's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l status i n such a way as to set Cornwall 
apart from the English counties and provide a b a s i s for d i f f e r e n t i a l 
treatment". Following the publication of the Kilbrandon 
recommendations, with t h e i r proposals for Scotland and Wales and 
their limited but encouraging words on Cornwall, a r t i c u l a t i o n of the 
Comish case was perpetioated by Cowethas Flamank (then s t i l l 
associated with Mebyon Kemow) with the publication i n 197A of i t s 
report Toward s Se 1 f-Covemmen t i n which i t explained that "The 
Kilbrandon Report controversy provides us with a heaven-sent 
opportunity to press the claim of Comwall"^^ and concluded that 
"...Cornwall should demand her own devolutionary Comish Parliament 
with administrative, l e g i s l a t i v e and executive powers a t l e a s t equal 
to those already proposed for Scotland". 
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Significantly, the case for the p o l i t i c a l "accommodation" of 
Cornwall siibmitted to Kilbrandon included not only the nationalist 
demand for decentralisation and devolution but also a concern for the 
t e r r i t o r i a l integrity of Cornwall. This was recognised and 
acknowledged by the Commission's Report, noting with some sympathy 
the concern of Cornwall that " . . . i t s traditional boundaries shall be 
r e s p e c t e d " . T h e concern for the t e r r i t o r i a l integrity of Cornwall 
had various facets, including h o s t i l i t y to units of administration or 
planning (such as the South West Economic Planning Council) which 
merged Cornwall in a larger South West and were managed in Bristol or 
other centres east of the Tamar, opposition to the creation of 
entities such as the Devon and Cornwall Constabulary or South West 
Water i n which previously existing Cornish bodies lost their 
identities, and criticism of the a c t i v i t i e s of public u t i l i t i e s whose 
sub-regions exhibited "border blurring" in that they cut across or 
did not recognise the Tamar b o u n d a r y . A t the time of Kilbrandon, 
however, the fundamental preoccupation was with the perceived 
expansionist designs of Plymouth and their apparent threat to the 
integrity of Cornwall County Council, an issue that had dominated the 
local debate on local government re-organisation i n the wake of the 
Redcliffe-Maud Report i n 1969. 
In fact, the Redcliffe-Maud debate had been anticipated more 
than two decades earlier with the publication of the Abercrombie 
Report i n 1943 (a blueprint for the reconstruction of Plymouth) which 
i n 1946 led Plymouth City Council to propose to the Local Government 
Boundary COTmission that i t take over a significant section of South 
- 389 -
East Comwall, As Cornwall County Council's centenary history has 
put i t , the result was that "The battle to keep the invader at bay 
and preserve intact the County of Comwall has been waged since the 
Second World War".^^ Under the determined leadership of Colonel Sir 
Edward Bolitho, Comwall defeated the proposal, only to find i t re-
emerge twenty years later as part of the Redcliffe-Maud proposals for 
local government reform. Amongst these proposals was the creation of 
Plymouth as a "unitary authority", composed of the c i t y i t s e l f along 
with acquisitions from both South West Devon and South East Comwall. 
Once again, Comwall opposed the move. Not only did Mebyon Kemow 
mount i t s own campaign, accusing the Redcliffe-Maud Commission of 
"Disregarding Cornwall's identity as a Celtic nation...",^^ but the 
County Council - this time under the singleminded leadership of 
Alderman K.G. Foster - fought the proposals as a fundamental matter 
of principle. Indeed, as a fundamental matter of principle the 
concem to preserve the t e r r i t o r i a l integrity of Cornwall - the most 
basic level of p o l i t i c a l "accanmodation" - won widespread support 
across Cornwall, an indication that such sentiment was by no means 
confined to the nationalist groups and a demonstration of the extent 
to which the "politicised" objective to defend and promote the 
Comish identity had permeated Comish society. According to one 
objector to the proposals: 
...the Tamar has come to acquire a symbolic, almost mystical 
significance for Comishraen...for countless thousands of them 
i t has stood - and stands - as the place of parting or return. 
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the end or the beginning of home.., . I t i s Celtic land that 
i s at stake. 
The then Labour Government accepted the Redcliffe-Maud 
proposals and indicated i t s intention to introduce legislation to 
reorganise local government i n the fashion advocated by the Report. 
However, after the General Election of 1970 the incoming 
Conservatives carried out their own review of local government, which 
offered conclusions s i g n i f i c a l l y different from those of Redcliffe-
Maud. The resiilt was that the Cornish border was to be preserved at 
the Tamar. Plymouth responded to this change of plan with i t s own 
"Tamarside" proposals, i n which Plymouth would become focus of a new 
"Tamarside" county with, as before, some component t e r r i t o r y drawn 
from Cornwall. Although these "Tamarside" proposals were not adopted 
for the B i l l at i t s second reading, the Department of the Environment 
nevertheless capitulated to renewed Plymouth demands for further 
"Tamarside" discussions. In the words of the Council i t s e l f , 
"Cornwall County Council countered by mobilizing again a l l interests 
i n the threatened parts of Cornwall and indeed from the whole of 
Cornwall...K.G- Foster...never ceased to lead strenuously the defence 
of Cornwall.,.".Convinced of the strength and unanimity of 
Cornish opinion, the Government f i n a l l y rejected "Tamarside" and by 
the summer of 1972 Cornwall's t e r r i t o r i a l integrity was assured. 
Nonetheless, the Council later reflected upon the ensuing legislation 
which did rob many counties of their t e r r i t o r y or identities, and 
with some r e l i e f observed that "Cornwall has been luckier, thanks 
largely to the stubbornness and determination of Comishmen past, and 
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s t i l l retains most of the Tamar as the barrier to invasion from 
England".-^^ Significantly, i n another of i t s publicaitons the 
Council could also reflect that "...Cornwall i s administratively ' i n ' 
England, but i s not 'of* England. Culturally the River Tamar i s a 
national boundary...".^^ 
In similar s p i r i t , there was a move within Cornwall County 
Council i n 1987 for Cornwall to seek i t s own Secretary of State on 
the lines of those admitted already for Scotland, Wales, and Northern 
Ireland. Fearing that what i t considered to be a unique mix of 
Cornish socio-economic problems was not recognised su f f i c i e n t l y at 
Westminster, and mindful of apparent threats to the Cornish identity, 
the Council's Planning and Einployment Committee passed a 
recommendation to the f u l l Council that i t should demand a Minister 
for Cornwall.-^^ The f u l l Council, however, declined to proceed with 
the suggestion, and what would have been a controversial and almost 
revolutionary demand for p o l i t i c a l "accommodation" within the British 
State was shelved almost as soon as i t had been proposed. But, once 
again, the significant feature was not that the scheme should have 
failed to come to f r u i t i o n , but rather that the idea had arisen at 
a l l and received serious consideration at o f f i c i a l levels. 
A more sustained campaign for Cornwall's p o l i t i c a l 
"accommodation", but this time within the structure of the European 
Community rather than the Bri t i s h State, was the demand that Cornwall 
should constitute a European Parliamentary Constituency (EPC) i n i t s 
own right in elections for the European Parliament. In preparation 
for the f i r s t direct elections to the European Parliament i n 1979, 
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the several Boundary Commissions within the United Kingdom had been 
tasked with the creation of EPCs, the size and shape of which were to 
be determined fundamentally by a concern for electoral parity between 
constituencies. The electorate of Cornwall was deemed too small, 
therefore, for Cornwall to exist as an EPC i n i t s own r i g j i t , and 
consequently i t s numbers were boosted by the addition of Plymouth and 
the creation of a j o i n t constituency. In the aftermath of the 
Redcliffe-Maud battles, this decision seemed strangely peverse within 
Cornwall, and the objections to the Boundary Commission for England's 
reconmendations were dominated by those from Cornwall. These 
objections were led, as i n the case of Redcliffe-Maud, by Cornwall 
County Council and once again there was a general mobilization of 
Cornish opinion. A l l six Cornish Distri c t Councils objected to the 
reconmendations, as did a majority of Cornish MPs, with David 
Penhaligon making an impassioned speech i n the Conmons i n defence of 
the Tamar border and the demand for a Cornish EPC. Incredibly, i n 
England a mere 18 Parish Councils objected to the recommendations, 
\jhlle i n Cornwall alone there were objections to the proposed 
Cornwall and Plymouth EPC from no less than 76 Parish Councils. 
Despite the strength of the Cornish objections, the Cornwall 
and Plymouth EPC was enshrined i n the ensuing legislation. 
Dissatisfaction with this state of affairs was expressed to some 
extent i n Mebyon Kemow's very credible performance i n the following 
European Parliamentary Election i n June 1979 (when i t won some ten 
per cent of the Cornish v o t e ^ ) , and i n 1983 when a peti t i o n of sosoe 
600 Cornish electors (organised by Mebyon Kemow) forced the Boundary 
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Commission to hold a Public Inquiry into i t s proposed Cornwall and 
Plymouth EPC for the 1984 election. At that Inquiry, held i n 
Plymouth i n November 1983, a wide range of Cornish objectors argued 
that Cornwall alone should constitute an EPC by virtue of the fact 
that (under European legislation) the Cornish were one of the 
"Peoples" of Europe and should be represented therein, and that 
because (under British legislation) Cornwall attracted certain 
"special geographical considerations" i t was possible to create a 
Cornish EPC with an electorate below the parity quota. The Assistant 
Commissioner ^^o presided at the Inquiry rejected these submissions 
out of hand, however, thus perpetuating the j o i n t EPC.^ ^ A somewhat 
dazed Mebyon Kemow failed even to f i e l d a candidate i n the election 
i n the following June. 
In 1988 the debate was renewed with a vigour which outstripped 
even that of 1983, however, with formal objections to the Boundary 
Commission's proposals for the 1989 election coming from both North 
Cornwall District Council and a petition of almost 1,000 Cornish 
electors, and with the Commission once again forced to hold a Local 
Inquiry. This time a Campaign For A Cornish Constituency was set up 
to mobilize and co-ordinate Cornish opinion, and i n a sta r t l i n g 
performance i t won the support of Cornwall County Council, a l l the 
Dist r i c t authorities, a majority of Cornish MPs, and scores of Parish 
Councils and other Cornish organisations and individuals. At the 
same time, i t i n i t i a t e d and sustained an unprecedented level of 
debate on the issue i n the local press, most especially the Western 
Morning News newspaper. The Public Inquiry was held at Bodmin i n 
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July 1988 amidst widespread p u b l i c i t y , the Telegraph explaining that 
"Many Cornish detest the EEC constituency i n which they l i v e . . . " ^ ^ 
and declaring that "Regionalist fervour w i l l clash with Government 
plans.,.Cornwall.,is demanding i t s own voice i n B r u s s e l s " . I t 
noted, too, that an Early Day Motion i n Parliament - which had 
attracted the support of Cornish MPs, along with those from Plaid 
Cymru and the Scottish National Party - had also called for a 
Cornwall EPC. 
Again i t was argued at the Inquiry that the Cornish were one of 
the h i s t o r i c "Peoples" of Europe, but with rather more sophisticated 
evidence this time which showed that the B r i t i s h Government had 
already ide n t i f i e d the constituent English, Welsh, Scottish, and 
Northern I r i s h as "Peoples" by allocating to each nation i t s own 
Boundary Commission and by ensxiring that no EPC compromised any of 
their national borders. The Cornish, i t was argued, should be 
allowed the same degree of "acconmodation" as these other "Peoples". 
In addition, the Campaign For A Cornish Constituency and many other 
objectors made much of the European Parliamentary Act of 1978 which 
stated that "The electorate for any European constituency shall be as 
near the electoral quota as i s reasonably practicable having regard, 
where appropriate, to special geographical considerations".^^ The 
electoral quota announced by the Boundary Commission i n 1988 was 
552,234, The combined Cornwall and Plymouth EPC produced an 
electorate of 542,A71 - s l i g h t l y smaller than the quota - while a 
Cornwall-only EPC would produce an electorate of 361,477, well below 
the quota. However, i t was argued that such a Cornwall EPC would be 
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d i r e c t l y comparable with the Highlands and Islands of Scotland EPC, 
which had approximately 310,000 electors and had been created as a 
result of "special geographical considerations", and with Northern 
Ireland which returned three Members of the European Parliament for a 
t o t a l electorate of about 1,080,000 (ie 360,000 electors per MEP). 
Once again the claim for the p o l i t i c a l "accommodation" of Cornwall 
was made against the background of similar treatment being afforded 
already to other components of the "Celtic fringe". 
In presenting the case for "special geographical con-
siderations" relating to Cornwall, the Campaign For A Cornish 
Constituency and other objectors i d e n t i f i e d areas of physical, 
h i s t o r i c a l , economic, and p o l i t i c a l geography where they considered 
that the Cornish experience was unique. The j o i n t EPC was seen as 
having had deleterious effects upon the Cornish economy as well as 
compromising Cornwall's t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y , with funds which might 
otherwise have gone to Cornwall i n their entirety being shared with 
an already re l a t i v e l y prosperous Plymouth, and with the view from 
Brussels of Cornwall's special socio-economic problems being f a t a l l y 
obscured by the l i n k with Plymouth. I t was argued, too, that as 
Cornwall had consistently opposed the j o i n t EPC, and that as Cornwall 
was i n 1988 the only area to force a Public Inquiry, the democratic 
w i l l of the Cornish people was i n i t s e l f a "special geographical 
consideration" of some importance. 
From the myriad evidence presented by the various bodies at the 
1988 Public Inquiry emerged one re-occurring central strand; that 
Cornwall should be afforded p o l i t i c a l "accommodation" on the strength 
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of i t s special identi t y . Feock Parish Council, for example, asserted 
that "Cornwall i s not a part of England... , I t i s separately 
iden t i f i e d i n Royal Charters and on early maps. Like Scotland, Wales 
and Ireland, i t s early peoples are of Celtic o r i g i n and i t s ancient 
language i s akin to Welsh and Breton".^-^ North Cornwall D i s t r i c t 
Council added that "...to travel to Cornwall brings one beyond the 
bounds of the commonplace into practically another country,"^^ and 
Kerrier D i s t r i c t Council insisted that "...Cornish culture i s 
dist i n c t from the rest of England and i n dire need of special 
treatment on the same basis as other national groups within the 
European Community...".^^ Cornwall County Council i t s e l f summarised 
this sentiment by explaining that: 
Such feelings of loyalty are of a very different order from 
most counties i n England. Indeed, Cornwall i s almost an island 
with natural boundaries fixed by the coastline. I t i s largely 
isolated from the rest of the country. I t has a strong 
separate identity with i t s own history, traditions, customs, 
language and ( t o some degree) law and in s t i t u t i o n s . Many of 
these attributes are firmly rooted i n i t s Celtic past. I t 
seems anomalous that such a community should not have i t s own 
separate voice i n the European Parliament.^ 
The Assistant Commissioner who presided at thi s Inquiry, 
however, was also unconvinced by this and the attendent arguments and 
recommended that the Cornwall and Plymouth EPC be perpetuated. 
Nonetheless, i n marked contrast to his colleague*s uncompromising 
stand i n 1983, he did recognise that there were "special geographical 
- 397 -
considerations" i n re l a t i o n to Cornwall, even though he did not feel 
i t "appropriate" to have regard to such "considerations" i n reaching 
his judgement. He admitted that: 
I t i s to be recalled also that together with the County Council 
of Cornwall, the views from other democratically elected bodies 
were v i r t u a l l y unanimous i n their opposition. I n the result my 
view i s that there i s a strong likelihood that the sentiments 
expressed at the Inquiry upon matters of history, culture, 
language, and other emblems of "separateness" would be shared 
by enough people i n Cornwall to make this "geographical 
consideration", a consideration of weight. 
Similarly, the Assistant Commissioner acknowledged a "...de facto ( i f 
not de jure) joinder with E n g l a n d " , a phrase which served to 
suggest that i n his view Cornwall was fundamentally not a part of 
England and that, i n theory at least, a degree of Cornish 
constitutional independence s t i l l obtained. Thus although he was 
unable to reconroend Cornwall's p o l i t i c a l "accommodation" within 
Europe as an EPC i n i t s own r i g h t , his judgement nonetheless 
contained "accommodating" observations of considerable significance, 
a point not lost on the Campaign For A Cornish Constituency (which 
published a detailed critique of the Assistant Commissioner's Report, 
h i ^ i g h t i n g the alleged inconsistencies of i t s conclusions^^) or on 
Matthew Taylor (Penhaligon's successor) who fought a spirited 
rearguard action on the issue i n Parliament. 
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The demand for a Cornwall-only EPC i n many ways epitomised the 
Cornish experience of "accommodation" i n the post-war era. I t was by 
no means confined to the nationalist groups and was a genuine 
expression of widespread Cornish opinion with, as i n other issues, 
the support of Cornwall County Council. Although i t was not 
successful i n achieving any innovation i n terms of p o l i t i c a l 
"accommodation" i t had nonetheless, l i k e other campaigns, i d e n t i f i e d 
a general concern for the t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y and id e n t i t y of 
Cornwall, and - as i n the Kilbrandon debate - had won at least some 
" o f f i c i a l " recognition of a special constitutional position for 
Cornwall within the B r i t i s h State. This i n i t s e l f represented a 
degree of p o l i t i c a l "accommodation", and the fact that the battle had 
been fought at a l l reflected the considerable success of the post-war 
"Revivalists" i n projecting the defence and promotion of ethnic 
ide n t i t y i n p o l i t i c a l terms. The search for renewed p o l i t i c a l 
"accommodation", indeed, had emerged as a principal distinguishing 
featiire of Cornish p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y as i t arose from i t s earlier 
paralysis i n this era of "Third peripheralism". IJhen, i n the late 
1980s, devolution re-emerged as an item on the B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l 
agenda, i t was no accident or surprise when l e t t e r s i n the local 
press suggested that Cornwall might learn from Scotland's Govan by-
election experience, or - f o r that matter - when the Guardian 
leader argued that, 
...devolution has become an issue once again, not because a 
bunch of bearded chaps i n Hebden Bridge think i t i s a good 
idea, but because the regions (London as much as Cornwall or 
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Tyneside) and nations (Northern Ireland as much as Scotland or 
Wales) of Br i t a i n are not properly enfranchised under the 
existing system. 
In p a r a l l e l with t h i s concern for p o l i t i c a l "accommodation" was 
the growing c r i t i c i s m of the socio-economic policies and trends that 
had led to the new condition of "Third Peripheralism". These emerged 
i n i t i a l l y i n the guise of anti-Overspill campaigns, at f i r s t glance 
merely ethnic protest against immigration but - on closer analysis -
critiques of socio-economic policy too. Mebyon Kemow, i n 1971 
through i t s journal Cornish Nation, for example, pointed to what i t 
saw as the economic di s t i n c t i o n between Cornwall and England, 
alleging too an ethnic division of labour and wealth within Cornwall 
i t s e l f : 
...the economic disparity of the *Two Nations*, Kemow and 
England, i s l i k e l y to grow i n the future. Wage levels are 
unlikely to catch up with those i n England, more and more young 
Cornish w i l l have to leave their land to f i n d employment, the 
coastal areas w i l l increasingly be bought up by the English, 
Comish farms w i l l be taken over by newcomers and the land 
exploited for short-term p r o f i t s while the heavy work, the 
economic drudgery w i l l continue to be done by Comish people 
l i v i n g i n the i n t e r i o r i n the poorer housing d i s t r i c t s . Only 
when we have control of our own economy.. . w i l l i t be planned 
with local needs and requirements i n mind and a proper balance 
of extractive, manufacturing and other industry achieved. 
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In this analysis emerged issues - low wages, "counterurbanisation", 
exploitation, housing, "local needs" - which would characterise the 
debate on socio-economic policy as i t developed. As early as June 
1972, one contributer to Cornish Nation pointed to the fa i l u r e of 
central government regional planning policy i n Cornwall, arguing 
that: 
Regional Planning...in relation to Cornwall, has been misguided 
and ineffectual i n conception, organisation and achievement. 
I t has done l i t t l e to attack the underlying problems and many 
of the council's ( i e SWEPC's) assumptions have been positively 
dangerous i n that they have posed threats to both the unity and 
character of Cornwall, 
Such c r i t i c i s m was not confined to the nationalists, however, 
and one significant commentary on the Cornish situation was that 
offered by the p o l i t i c a l economist J.C. Banks, Banks, i n his Federal 
Britai n , was i n many respects ahead of his time. He was amongst the 
f i r s t to question the myth of the homogeneous state (the "Unionist 
Myth", as he termed i t ) i n both p o l i t i c a l and economic terms, and he 
foresaw accurately both the devolution debate and the entry of 
Britain into the European Community with i t s wider implications for a 
"Europe of the R e g i o n s " . I n a l l t h i s . Banks argued that Cornwall 
had a special place i n the analysis- Noting the wholesale closure of 
Cornish railways, the fa i l u r e of the campaign to achieve a Cornish 
university, and the fact that the Cornish Development Area was run 
from Bristol (despite the fact that Bristol was nearer to London than 
i t was to Penzance), he warned that "Nor has the Economic Planning 
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Council for the South-West (Sl^EPC) been more discerning than 
Whitehall i n i t s dealings with this outlying c o u n t y " . H e 
questioned the socio-economic assumptions of "Overspill", drew 
attention to Cornwall's "blighted character " but " . . . i t s potential 
for development given the right l e a d e r s h i p " , a n d concluded that -
i n a system where economic planning was devolved to the regions -
Cornwall should be defined as such a region i n i t s own r i g h t . Here, 
of course, Banks had located the tangential point of contact between 
the critique of socio-economic policies and the demand for p o l i t i c a l 
"accommodation", an intimation that i n practice the two would often 
proceed hand-in-hand i n p o l i t i c a l debate within Cornwall. 
Later, i n 1983 at the f i r s t Conference on Cornwall at 
Perranporth, Banks developed the concept of "Cornwall as a Region" i i i 
economic terms, using demographic and economic s t a t i s t i c s to compare 
Cornwall with regions within Europe (Zeeland, Saarland, Luxembourg, 
Iceland - each one i n varying degrees responsible for i t s own 
economic planning p o l i c i e s ) . C h o s e n for their s i m i l a r i t i e s i n 
terras of popxolation size and density, these regions nevertheless 
showed sharp contrast with Cornwall i n areas such as unemployment, 
industry, earnings, and gross domestic product per head. In 
unemployment, for example, Cornwall had i n 1979 "...twelve tijnes the 
unemployment rate of Iceland, three times that of Luxembourg, a t h i r d 
more than the average for the UK... . In fact, unemployment i n 1979 
was higher i n Cornwall than i n no fewer than 29 out of the 52 
s t a t i s t i c a l areas of the...EEC."^^ Similarly, "Cornwall emerges as 
the least industrialised of a l l the areas under review, even compared 
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with distant I c e l a n d " . G r o s s domestic product i n 1979 " . . . i n 
Saarland and Zeeland i s nearly half as much again as i t i s i n 
Cornwall, with Luxembourg and Icelend having a small edge on even 
these levels...",^^ with further comparisons showing that "Cornwall 
i s seen as eighth from the bottom i n this league of EEC regions and 
small States. The other seven were the two parts of Ireland and fi v e 
provincial groupings i n the I t a l i a n s o u t h " . T o Banks, such data 
was prima facie evidence of the f a i l u r e of central government 
Regional Planning i n relation to Cornwall, a cue for c r i t i c i s m and 
action from within Cornwall. 
The essential issue here, of coxirse, i s not whether Banks' 
analysis was va l i d or not, but rather the fact that he was 
encouraging a debate based upon the presumed shortcomings of Regional 
Development policies. Such debate was evident i n the a c t i v i t i e s of 
the Cornwall Conservation Forum, a pressure group which was launched 
amidst great excitement and publicity i n 1972 ("World Environmental 
Year", as Wight noted"^) with the broad aim of co-ordinating and 
providing a platform for individuals and organisations working for 
the best interests of Cornwall. Although the Forum had apparently 
run out of energy by the late 1970s, and vanished very quickly 
thereafter from the public scene, i t made a considerable impact 
during i t s re l a t i v e l y short l i f e . Most importantly, the Forum i n 
1974 published i t s Cornwall's C h o i c e , a terse reposte to SWEPC's A 
Strategic Settlement Pattern for the South West^^ which had also been 
produced i n 1974 and outlined the conventional wisdom i n terms of 
Regional Planning, i n particular the regional aid/population increase 
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nexus. The Forum countered that Regional Planning had been of no 
value to Cornwall, and that regional aid was neither necessary nor 
desirable for Cornwall: "Regional Aid cannot be said to improve 
earnings or to s i g n i f i c a n t l y reduce unemployment... i f Cornwall' s 
Development Area status were abolished the existing population would 
not be adversely affected."^^ Indeed, the Forum argued that regional 
aid, through i t s attendant encouragement of in-migration, would 
actually exacerbate problems of employment while the economic 
a c t i v i t y that i t did manage to create would be of a f r a g i l e and 
unstable "branch factory" nature. In t h i s , the Forum anticipated the 
later work of Perry, and was surprisingly accurate i n i t s 
projections for Cornish society and economy i n the 1970s and 80s. 
By the mid-1970s, therefore, the inherent d i f f i c u l t i e s and 
weaknesses of the Cornish socio-economic framework i n the era of 
"Third Peripheralism" were already becoming apparent. The foundation 
of the Cornwall Industrial Development Association i n 1974 was i n 
part a reaction to t h i s , i t s policy document The Economy of 
Comwall^^ - published i n 1977 - advocating that, instead of 
encouraging new firms to come to Cornwall from elsewhere, economic 
development strategy should focus upon indixstries and companies 
already located within Cornwall. This woxild involve import 
substitution, more local processing, and an increased level of self -
sufficiency. Like the Cornwall Conservation Forum, CIDA warned 
against the dangers of creating a "branch factory" economy, and i t 
was similarly dismissive of central government Regional Planning 
policy: 
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I f the view of Cornwall, as seen from London, i s that of a 
colony whose raw materials and labour are to be exploited for 
the relative well-being of a non-productive central 
bureaucracy, while at the same time maintaining the appearance 
of raising regional incomes, then the regional policies of 
successive governments begins to make some sense... 
The highly-charged, overtly p o l i t i c a l nature of such an attack 
revealed a deep-seated anti-metropolitanism within CIDA, a view also 
articulated i n i t s "...expressions of the feelings of alienation from 
remote decision-making".^^ But, as Wight noted, CIDA's members and 
supporters were by no means tradi t i o n a l Cornish nationalists^^ (there 
seemed, for example, to be l i t t l e or no overlap i n membership with 
Mebyon Kemow). Paradoxically, however, their behavio\ir and 
attitudes reflected - indeed, were a part of - the emergence of 
Cornish p o l i t i c s from i t s "fos s i l i z a t i o n " and the enhancement of a 
dis t i n c t Cornish p o l i t i c a l cxilture through the growth of a n t i -
metropolitanism. 
Despite this movement of opinion, the planners of Cornwall 
County Council remained locked firmly i n t o their conventional 
wisdoms, and CIDA, for example, was disappointed when the County 
Structure Plan^^ emerged with l i t t l e signs of CIDA influence ( i t had 
not, f o r instance, taken up the idea of a Cornwall Development 
Bureau^^) and with a strategy s t i l l aimed at the encouragement of 
industry and population growth from across the Tamar. Thereafter, 
crit i c i s m of socio-economic policy and planning was increasingly 
directed at the County planners, who were seen as the w i l l i n g tools 
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of central government's deleterious Regional Aid policies. Perry's 
analysis^^ of "counterurbanisation" contained e x p l i c i t c r i t i c i s m of 
the Structure Plan, and (as shown i n Chapter 8) the shortcomings and 
failures of the County strategy were themselves demonstrated and 
admitted i n the F i r s t Alteration of the Plan i n 1987. But instead of 
a search for a fundamentally different approach, the First Alteration 
sought only to build upon the salvagable parts of the orig i n a l Plan 
with a strategy "...much more based on housing and population factors 
rather than employment factors". This represented the f u l l 
manifestation of "Third Peripheralism" and prompted widespread 
cr i t i c i s m and disquiet, not only from nationalist groups but also 
(indeed rather more forcefully) from new pressure groups that had 
arisen i n response to the situation. Although i t was the " t i n 
c r i s i s " of 1986, when the government was persuaded f i n a l l y to advance 
funds to keep the Cornish mines (except, Geevor, which i t declined to 
support) open i n the aftermath of the collapse of world t i n prices, 
which caught the popular imagination outside of Cornwall, i t was i n 
fact the a c t i v i t i e s of Cornish Alternatives to the Structure Plan and 
the Cornish Social and Economic Research Group which offered the most 
powerful and sustained critiques of the socio-economic situation i n 
Cornwall. 
CASP was formed i n 1987 as a direct response to the First 
Alteration. I n publications such as Cornwall: A Breathing Space and 
Local Needs Policy,CASP attacked the conventional planning wisdoms 
and advanced instead i t s own "Arguments for radical c h a n g e " . I n a 
perceptive assessment of Cornwall's recent history, CASP recognised 
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that "The decline of mining and the post-war repopulation aimed at 
re v i t a l i s i n g the Cornish economy set Cornwall's economic scenario 
somewhat apart from the general National p i c t u r e " T h i s , argued 
CASP, meant that Coimwall had acquired a highly distinctive set of 
socio-economic problems which required novel and local solutions. In 
particular, CASP argued for an end to in-migration and the process of 
"counterurbanisation", pleading for a "breathing space" to "Enable 
communities which have expanded over the l a s t 25 years to consolidate 
and absorb their new residents into the social fabric and 
structures". ^ In an attack upon the F i r s t Alteration, CASP asserted 
that "The concept that population growth w i l l inevitably bring about 
a stimulation of the local economy can be seen to be wrong"^^ and 
that "The argument that increased provision of housing w i l l s t a b i l i s e 
prices and enable local people to compete in the market i s spurious. 
I t ignores r e a l i t i e s such as high unemployment and low wages". 
Instead, argued CASP, there should be a genuine local needs housing 
policy, complemented by an industrial development policy which would 
draw upon internal resources and not be reliant upon outside 
investment of the "branch factory" type. This would require, too, an 
attack on "...the psychological barrier that tourism i s the central 
plank of the Cornish e c o n o m y " . S i g n i f i c a n t l y , i n a manner that 
bore witness to the degree to which Cornish p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y had by 
now moved from i t s "fossilization" and paralysis, CASP emphasised 
that Cornwall should continue to "...attack i t s own sense of 
inferi o r i t y and, i n aspiring to self-reliance, demand a radical 
change in the way i t i s regarded by Central Government". 
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In one sense CASP was successful i n i t s l a s t aim, for i t 
mobilized such widespread opposition to the F i r s t Alteration that 
indecision became apparent within the County Council (but an attempt 
by some councillors to reject the F i r s t Alteration was defeated) and, 
more importantly, the Department of the Environment held an 
Examination i n Public to inquire into the numerous objections. As 
the West Briton explained, i t would then be up to the Secretary of 
State to decide eventually " . . . i f the proposed level of housing i s 
appropriate for Cornwall i n light of the County Council's assessment 
of population, household formation and housing demand",bearing i n 
mind such considerations as "local needs", environmental constraints, 
and employment opportunities. 
Operating i n tandem and often i n close co-operation with CASP 
was the Cornish Social and Economic Research Group (COSERG). 
Although also concerned with the F i r s t Alteration, COSERG worked to 
an even wider brief, addressing social and economic issues at the 
broadest levels and with a parallel interest i n their cultural and 
p o l i t i c a l consequences. COSERG insisted that "Various economic and 
social forces are combining to marginalise us - soon we w i l l be 
strangers i n our own land"^^ and, i n the b e l i e f that "...the f i r s t 
step needed i n order to r e s i s t these forces i s to identify them",^^ 
i t published a report i n 1987 entitled The Cornish Community: 
Reclaiming Our D e s t i n y . T h i s proved to be the precursor of a 
fully-fledged book, published at the end of 1988 by the COSERG team 
(Deacon, George, and Perry) entitled Cornwall at the Crossroads^^ i n 
which the condition of Cornish peripherality i n the post-war era was 
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examined at length. Contrasting the apparent success of 
"development" - i t s ".•.marinas, luxury yachts and millionaires' 
QQ 
playgrounds..."°° - with the "...subnerged Cornwall that refuses to 
on 
go away,.,"- of homelessness, unemployment and low pay, COSERG 
identified a "hidden agenda" which had motivated planners at both 
central government and County leve l . This agenda was based upon the 
key assumptions that Cornwall was remote, that Cornwall and i t s 
people suffered from backwardness, that Cornwall was too small to be 
"viable" i n i t s own right, and that the principal economic role of 
Cornwall was to provide a "playground" for people from elsewhere. 
This had led, argued the COSERG team, to the planners' insistence 
that a l l must "...accept, without question, that Cornwall must be 
developed and, i n the process, effectively ignore i t s distinctive-
ness, i t s coniminities and i t s identity". 90 
In particular, Cornwall at the Crossroads attacked the strategy 
based upon population growth and the attraction of new firms from 
outside, highlighting the admission of failure of that strategy 
contained i n the F i r s t Alteration but also c r i t i c i s i n g the F i r s t 
Alteration for i t s e l f f a i l i n g to come up with anything new. I t was, 
said COSERG, "A plan without a s t r a t e g y " . L i k e CASP, COSERG argued 
instead for a new and radical strategy, claiming that the f i r s t step 
was to replace the planners' conventional assumptions of Cornwall's 
"weaknesses" with a new set that emphasised "strengths". In this, 
COSERG postxilated that i t was the South East that was remote from 
Cornwall (and not vice versa) and that i n fact Cornwall was 
geographically well placed to construct maritime links with Europe 
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and the wider world* Equally, COSERG argued that Cornwall should be 
freed from the constraints of Regional Planning, building up i t s 
indigenous intellectual infrastructure and stenroing the loss of 
young, dynamic Cornish people. "Smallness", insisted COSERG, was i n 
fact a distinct advantage, something that was increasingly sought i n 
the modem world, something to cherish and not to throw away i n the 
pursuit of "bigness". Again l i k e CASP, COSERG called for a 
"breathing space" i n population growth, arguing for a "two-tier" 
housing market i n which there would be a "Cornish weighting" in 
favour of "local needs". A Cornish Development Agency was also 
necessary, i t was claimed, to control development i n such a way that 
optimised the use of internal resources and benefitted the existing 
community. 
Cornwall at the Crossroads concluded with a demand for "More 
power to Cornwall", for "Only decentralisation of authority can 
enable us to realise our opportunities".^^ Here again was the 
meeting point of the critiques of Regional Planning and the demands 
for renewed p o l i t i c a l "accommodation", a synthesis which represented 
the quintessential nature of Cornish p o l i t i c a l reaction to the socio-
economic condition of "Third Peripheralism". I t was, indeed, the 
fundamental p o l i t i c a l component of "Third Peripheralism", marking the 
emergence of Cornish p o l i t i c s from i t s "fossilization", shaking off 
the old paralysis to i n s i s t that the p o l i t i c a l process should 
"...maintain and then strengthen the confidence of the Cornish 
identity"^"^ and "Ensure that factors of ethnicity and identity are 
positive and creative factors in the planning process i n Cornwall". 
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In articulating the critiques of Regional Planning, CASP and 
COSERG had to a considerable degree absorbed (even eclipsed) the 
earlier role of the nationalist groups, which had proved 
organisationally ill-equipped to tackle the necessary specialist 
research and conceptual model-construction. This was not so much a 
criticism of the nationalist groups, but rather evidence of the 
extent to which concern for the condition of modem Cornwall had 
spread far beyond the confines of the nationalists. Once again the 
success of the "politicisation" of the "Revivalists" was emphasised, 
revealing once more i t s all-pervading influence upon Cornish 
p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y and i t s underlying p o l i t i c a l culture. 
Inevitably, this influence was f e l t i n other areas of p o l i t i c a l 
a c t i v i t y i n Cornwall, especially within the existing p o l i t i c a l 
parties. As noted i n Chapter 8, Cornish p o l i t i c s had failed to 
participate i n the great "Re-alignment" of the inter-war years, with 
the intervention of Labour severely retarded and with the principal 
contest continuing to be between Liberals and Conservatives. Cornish 
p o l i t i c s i n that era was also, like the rest of Cornish society, i n a 
state of paralysis, of "fossilization". The Conservatives proved the 
main beneficiaries of this paralysis but with the Liberals retaining 
their identity as the "Cornish" party through their continued 
adherence to l o c a l i s t attitudes (especially Methodism), and with 
Labour f a i l i n g to make much headway except i n Falmouth-Penryn under 
the energetic influence of A.L. Rowse. In the immediate aftermath of 
the war, there was some l i t t l e evidence of apparent change. In the 
1945 General Election, North Cornwall was won by the Liberals, St 
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Ives by the National Liberals, Truro and Bodmin by the Conservatives, 
and with Labour taking the newly-created seat of Falmouth-Camborne in 
i t s first-ever victory i n Cornwall, the local man (Harold Hayman) 
building upon Rowse's important ground work and benefitting from the 
UK-wide surge to Labour, Hayman was able to retain his seat despite 
the general swing against Labour i n the 1950 General Election, with 
the Liberals losing North Cornwall to the Conservatives, and with the 
other Cornish seats remaining i n Tory hands (although St Ives was 
s t i l l held by the theoretically d i s t i n c t National Liberal Party, i t 
was by now to a l l intents and purposes within the Tory fold). This 
set a pattern that was reproduced exactly i n General Elections for a 
decade, in 1951, 1955, and 1959. To the casual observer, the Cornish 
p o l i t i c a l scene exhibited slow but perceptable movement, the features 
of note being the apparent decline of the Liberals and the relative 
success of Labour (in Falmouth-Camborne at l e a s t ) , an indication 
perhaps that Cornish p o l i t i c s was being eased at l a s t from i t s 
"fossilized" paralysis and moving towards greater conformity with the 
"Re-alignment" elsewhere.95 
However, such superficial observation belied the complexity and 
re a l i t y of the situation. Given the socio-economic condition of 
post-war Cornwall, that Labour did not make even greater impact ( i n 
1945 especially) was a clue to continuing Cornish p o l i t i c a l 
distinctiveness. Although without a Cornish seat i n Parliament for 
the entire 1950s and early 60s, the Liberals nonetheless remained the 
effective opposition i n Cornwall (except Falmouth-Camborne). As 
Bogdanor noted, Cornwall was one of the few areas where the Liberals 
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remained highly active and contested a majority of seats in a period 
which represented the nadir of their fortunes elsewhere. Indeed, at 
a time when Liberal support was s t i l l declining i n most parts of 
B r i t a i n , t h e r e was i n the early 1960s something of a Liberal 
revival in Cornwall, manifested i n the 1964 General Election when 
Peter Bessell won Bodmin and later in 1966 when Bessell held Bodmin 
and John Pardoe won North Cornwall. Thereafter, bolstered by Liberal 
revival i n the rest of Britain, the Liberals were confirmed in their 
role as the main opposition party i n Cornwall, with Labour f a i l i n g to 
build upon i t s early post-war breakthrough. Indeed, Labour lost 
Falmouth-Camborne to the Conservatives in 1970, and experienced a 
continuing decline in electoral support i n Cornwall. But despite the 
inherent strength of the Liberal Party (for example, with 7,000 
members in North Cornwall where Liberal a c t i v i t y "...was on a 
spectacularly energetic s c a l e " , a n d with 3,000 members i n Bodmin in 
1970^^), Liberal electoral performance tended to be v o l a t i l e . Bodmin 
was lost to the Conservatives i n 1970, to be regained i n February 
1974 and then lost again i n the October, while in North Cornwall the 
Conservative candidate - Gerry Neale - successfully mobilized the 
"second homes" vote and managed to oust Pardoe i n 1979. Meanwhile, 
however, Penhaligon had won Truro for the Liberals i n February 1974, 
consolidating his position in the October and i n 1979.^^ Following 
his untimely death, he was replaced in Truro i n a by-election in 1987 
by the Liberal Matthew Taylor. 
In the post-war era, then, the Cornish p o l i t i c a l scene 
continued to be dominated by the Conservative-Liberal contest. Early 
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indications of a Labour breakthrough and a Liberal decline were 
deceptive, the longer-term experience demonstrating the re-assertion 
of Liberal performance and the dwindling of Labour's support. In 
matching this to the experience of the United Kingdom as a whole, Lee 
had demonstrated that Cornish p o l i t i c s remained highly distinctive i n 
this period. To obtain a measurement of gross diffences i n party 
competition between Cornwall and the rest of Britain, Lee employed 
the technique developed by Miller to calculate the difference between 
the multi-party outcome i n one area and another. Miller's method 
(the "MD formula") produced a measure of voting deviation ("MD") 
between one area and another - a measure of zero, for example, would 
indicate that voting patterns were identical between the two.^^ 
Ehiploying this method, comparisons had been made between the other 
parts of the United Kingdom and England. In this way for example, 
scores of % MD for the 1979 General Election were: X^ales - 15, 
Scotland - 17, and Northern Ireland (where there i s a greatly 
different mix of parties) - 74. Having made the proviso that an 
exaggerative effect may have been introduced by the small number of 
constituencies involved, Lee proceeded to calculate the % MD score 
for Cornwall against England for each General Election between 1922 
and 1987 (Fig 28). As Lee concluded: 
The remarkable features of this gross measure of deviation are 
f i r s t l y i t s size and secondly i t s relative consistency over 
time. Variations range from 15.54% (1970) to 29.03% (1966) i f 
the elections of 1931 and 1935 are discounted as having fewer 
than five contests i n Cornwall. In both size and consistency 
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Cornwall-
Year % MD England 
1922 17.87* 
1923 26.45 
1924 23.86 
1929 19.05 
1931 ' 31.79** 
1935 27.54* 
1945 23.32 
1950 24.41 
1951 22.02 
1955 18.12 
1959 20.76 
1964 23.34 
1966 29.03 
1970 20.44 
1974(F) 18.83 
1974(0) 18.80 
1979 19.04 
1983 16.23 
1987 16.37 
* 4 contests 
** 3 contests 
Fig 28. Measure of voting deviation (MD) 
Cornwall - England 
Source: Adrian Lee, "The Persistence of Difference? 
Electoral Change i n Cornwall", unpublished paper 
presented to P o l i t i c a l Studies Association Annual 
Conference, Plymouth Polytechnic, 1988, p3. 
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the deviations compare with those found by Miller for Wales for 
a selection of elections. In no year does the average for 
Cornwall f a l l below the Welsh: in a l l others i t i s above, and 
from 1959-1966 substantially so.^^^ 
Lee's findings confirmed an apparent continuity between the 
inter-war and post-war periods. Not surprisingly, Lee explained that 
the main deviation was produced by the variation i n the respective 
strengths of the Labour and Liberal Parties (Figs 29 & 30). But he 
also noted that while the Conservative Party had always performed 
marginally above i t s general English lev e l , i t s performance was 
nonetheless at a substantially lower level than one would expect for 
a group of constituences f a l l i n g as they do with on exception into 
the CACl Cluster 31 - "Agricultural areas". The exception was 
FaLnouth-Cambome, which i s in Cluster 24 - "Small manufacturing 
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towns with rural hinterlands".^^ Commenting upon this Conservative 
"under-performance", Lee considered that "...although the party has 
dominated the county's parliamentary representation i n the post-war 
period...it could be argued that the party's share of the vote has 
reached a ceiling level from which l i t t l e deviation has been 
experienced.".^^^"^ Interestingly, the decline i n Liberal variation 
from 1970 onwards indicated not only a similar ceiling but more 
importantly the growth of third party (Liberal-SDP) support within 
England: "Put another way, since 1970 rural England in this respect 
has come to more closely resemble C o r n w a l l " . W h e t h e r this new-
found similarity i s l i k e l y to endure or even further develop i s a 
matter of conjecture, but i f the June 1989 European Parliamentary 
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Year CON /, LAB / o L I B / . OTH 
1922* 45.6 9.6 42.8 2.0 
1923 41.8 2.6 55.6 0.0 
1924 48.8 9.4 41.8 0.0 
1929 36.5 17.9 42.4 3.2 
1931** 43.1 13.8 38.6 4.5 
1935*** 46.8 15.8 37.0 0.4 
1945 42.1 25.2 32.6 0.2 
1950 44,5 28.9 26.6 o.c 
1951 50.6 32.5 17.0 0.0 
1955 48.7 29.7 21.6 0.0 
1959 44.2 26.4 29.4 0.0 
1964 41.3 25.0 33.5 0.2 
1966 41.5 26.7 31.8 0.0 
1970 48.0 23.7 27.8 0.5 
1974(F) 41.9 18.9 38.8 0.4 
1974(0) 43.8 19.6 36.4 0.2 
1979 51-.3 12.9 33.1 2.7 
1983 49.4 9.0 40.3 1.3 
1987 47.3 12.8 39.8 0.1 
Average for 4 c o n s t i t u e n c i e s (Cornwall North 
Average for 3 c o n s t i t u e n c i e s (Bodmin (LIB) & 
unopposed) 
& St. Ives 
(NLIB) unopposed) 
Average for 4 c o n s t i t u e n c i e s (St. Ives (NLIB) unopposed) 
Fig 29. 
N.B. 
Source: 
Electoral Support i n Cornwall: Five constituency 
average 
In 1951 the Liberals contested only three 
constituencies. 
Adrian Lee, 1988, p5. 
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Fig 30. 
GEI^ERAL 
ELECTION 
YEAR 
1945 
1950 
1951 
1955 
1959 
196A 
1966 
1970 
1974 Feb 
1974 Oct 
1979 
1983 
1987 
Cornwall - Variations i n party support against 
English average 1945-1987 
CON 
+1.9 
+0.7 
+1.8 
-1.7 
-5.7 
-2.8 
-1.2 
-0.4 
+1.7 
+4.9 
+4.1 
+3.4 
+1.1 
LAB 
-23.3 
-17.3 
-16.3 
-17.1 
-17.2 
-18.5 
-21.3 
-19.6 
-18.7 
-20.5 
-23.8 
-18.0 
-16.7 
* Represents effects of MK's intervention 
Source: Adrian Lee, 1988, p6. 
LIB 
+23.2 
+17.2 
+14.7 
+19.0 
+23.1 
+24.4 
+22.8 
+21.2 
+18.8 
+16.2 
+18.2 
+13.9 
+16.0 
OTHER 
-1.7 
-0.6 
-0.1 
-0.2 
-0.2 
-0.1 
-0.3 
-1.2 
-1.8 
-0.6 
+1.5* 
+0.5* 
-0.4 
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Elections may be taken as an indicator, their results suggest already 
a renewed divergence between Cornwall and rural England. In the wake 
of the Alliance collapse, the Social and Liberal Democrats faired 
disastrously i n much of naral England, apparently losing much of 
their traditional support to the newly-emergent Green Party (eg i n 
the Devon EPC the Greens - who came second - achieved 53,220 votes, 
the SLD 23,306, and the SDP 7,806), but i n Cornwall (and Plymouth) 
the SLD achieved i t s best result i n Britain, challenging the 
victorious Conservatives' 88,376 votes with a very credible 68,559 
and with the Greens appearing i n fourth place with 24,581 votes. 
Labour failure. Liberal tenacity and Conservative "under-
performance" were therefore the major features of Cornish electoral 
experience i n the post-war era, an experience which was highly 
distinctive - even when set against ostensibly comparable rural 
Ehglish areas. The ITN Election Factbook i n 1987 admitted that "The 
further one proceeds towards Cornwall, the less 'English* the 
ambience, and the le s s firm the Tory grip",^^^ while Curtice and 
Steed - i n their examination of regional changes i n the 1987 General 
Election - found i t diffic x i l t to categorise Cornwall i n the 
NorthA?est-South/East divide that they were attempting to identify, 
COTplaining of: "...the Devon and Cornwall subregion which does not 
f i t easily into either of these broad divisions and which we have 
consequently set aside i n the analysis...".^^^ Clearly, Cornwall 
remained p o l i t i c a l l y distinct i n several respects, and certainly the 
experience of the late 1940s and 50s had not been one of movement 
towards greater conformity with the "Re-alignment" elsewhere. 
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This, as Lee's s t a t i s t i c s had already indicated, suggested a 
high degree of continuity from the pre-war era. And yet, there were 
changes i n the post-war period i n the nature of Cornish p o l i t i c s , 
manifested only subtly at electoral levels but i n fact profoundly 
affecting the conduct of local p o l i t i c s and serving to enhance what 
was already a distinctive Cornish p o l i t i c a l culture. There was 
indeed a movement from "fossilization", from paralysis - not towards 
conformity, but towards a style of p o l i t i c s in which a n t i -
metropolitanism became a major determinant of a c t i v i t y . This, 
inevitably, was a l l i e d to the increasing demands for the renewed 
p o l i t i c a l "accommodation" of Cornwall and to the increasingly 
vociferous critiques of Regional Planning. I t also indicated the 
impact of Cornish nationalism upon the wider p o l i t i c a l scene where, 
as Andy Smith wrote, "Though an essentially powerless and s p l i t 
force, i t has retained a powerful influence on politicians of the 
main national p a r t i e s " , I n terms of public opinion, the effects 
were not d i f f i c u l t to gauge, the B r i t i s h Election Survey i n 1970 
getting 57.7 per cent agreement i n Cornwall to the proposition 
",,.t?iat Government i s too centralised in London"^*^^ (as opposed to 
36.8 per cent i n the South West and 35.1 per cent in Britain as a 
whole), and i n 1974 receiving 66.7 per cent agreement to the notion 
that i t i s "...'very' or ' f a i r l y ' important that Goverment should 
decentralise power"^^*^ (as opposed to 43.1 per cent i n the South West 
and 49.9 i n Britain). 
As Bogdanor noted, the Liberals were receptive to the claims of 
Cornish anti-metropolitanism as they emerged i n the post-war era,^^^ 
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Deacon wrote that the "Liberals were much more successful i n 
purve3d.ng an image of local patriotism i n Cornwall than in Scotland 
and Wales...", and Andy Smith has asserted that " . . . i t i s the 
Democrats, or the old Liberals which have most effectively stolen the 
nationalists' c l o t h e s " . C e r t a i n l y , i t was not entirely co-
incidental that the r i s e of anti-metropolitan sentiment i n the 1960s 
occurred against the background of the revival of Liberal fortunes in 
Cornwall, most notably the victory of Bessell i n Bodmin i n 1964 and 
that of Pardoe i n North Cornwall i n 1966. Both men were careful to 
join Mebyon Kemow, and indeed to publicly proclaim their membership, 
in 1967 declaring that "...the Cornish people have the same right to 
control their country, i t s economy and i t s p o l i t i c a l future, as the 
other C e l t i c peoples of Scotland and W a l e s " . W h e n , i n 1968, the 
Liberal Party document Power to the Provinces failed to specify a 
separate regional status for Cornwall, there were howls of 
disapproval from Cornish Liberals, with the Liberal leader 
intervening hastily to give assurances that "Cornwall would have the 
right to become a province of i t s own".^^^ 
The Liberal Party was, of course, well placed to assume the 
mantle of Cornish anti-metropolitanism. In Britain as a whole, the 
Liberals had become progressively the party of the C e l t i c periphery, 
adopting an early commitment to "Home Rule A l l Round" and attuning 
i t s e l f to the particular needs and concerns of peripheral Britain. 
In Cornwall specifically, the Liberal Party had always embraced 
"Cornish" issues and was firmly entrenched as the party of the 
Cornish radicalism, i n particular the radical tradition wedded to 
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Cornish Methodism. Hayden^^^ demonstrated that the Cornish Liberal-
Methodist l i n k had survived into the post-war era, and Hearl 
suggested that i t was no co-incidence that the Liberal "heartland" of 
central and North Cornwall - where the Liberals had performed 
especially, well i n recent decades - was also the "heartland" of 
modem Cornish Methodism^^^ (and, one might add, the former 
"heartland" of the sp e c i f i c a l l y Cornish Bible Christian Connexion, 
one of Methodism's constituent sec t s ) • The Liberals, then, remained 
closely identified with Cornwall during the period of paralysis, so 
that when (Ornish p o l i t i c s emerged from i t s " f o s s i l i z a t i o n " i n the 
new era of "Third Peripheralism", the Liberal Party especially was 
able to respond to the new "politicisation" of the "Revival", the new 
anti-roetropolitanism with i t s demands for p o l i t i c a l "accommodation" 
and the critiques of central government "Regional Planning" policies. 
Nowhere was this more apparent than i n Truro constituency 
during the time that David Penhaligon was i t s MP, from h i s election 
i n February 1974 un t i l his death i n December 1986.^^^ Penhaligon 
employed h i s obviously Cornish ambience and accent to good effect, 
both i n appealing to the Cornish "ethnic" vote and i n projecting h i s 
views convincingly as being those of the average Comishman or 
Cornish woman. He embraced a l l the d i s t i n c t l y Cornish issues of his 
period with enthusiasm - seeking a devolutionary assembly for 
Cornwall when others were proposed for Scotland and Wales, opposing 
Plymouth "expansionism" and demanding a Cornwall-only European 
Parliamentary Constituency, championing the cause of the Cornish 
mines during the " t i n c r i s i s " . The nationalists hailed him as a 
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"Cornish Hero".^^^ Michael Williams, a Liberal a c t i v i s t i n North 
Cornwall, considered that Penhaligon displayed ".•.firm conmitment to 
the Cornish c a u s e " , a n d that he was "A reforming radical, with 
something of the Cornish nationalist i n him..."^^^ who ".•.spoke for 
Cornwall with the same C e l t i c s p i r i t that the young Llojrd George 
spoke for W a l e s " . A f t e r Penhaligon's death, the Western MominR 
News lamented the loss of the "...man who was regarded everywhere as 
the voice of C o r n w a l l " . I n c r e d i b l y , his memorial service i n Truro 
Cathedral was listened to on Radio Cornwall by an estimated 100,000 
people. 
Penhaligon's death l e f t something of a vacuum i n Cornish 
p o l i t i c s , with other Cornish politicians clamouring to assume his 
role and to demonstrate their commitment to Cornwall and to the 
s p i r i t of anti-metropolitanism. As Smith noted wryly, "Never was the 
nationalist influence more transparent than at the Tuxro by-election 
when each main candidate strained to prove h i s Cornish credentials, 
even though i t was quite clear none had a complete set".^^^ Nick St 
Aubyn, the Conservative, stressed h i s descent from an ancient Cornish 
family, and Londoner John King - for Labour - had f l i r t e d with Mebyon 
Kemow, learnt the Cornish language, and worn the Cornish tartan i n 
an effort to acquire a veneer of Comishness. But the seat was won 
by Matthew Taylor, Penhaligon's protege, who proceeded to articulate 
Cornish concerns at Westminster, most notably during the European 
Constituency debate when he presented a detailed critique of the 
Assistant Commissioner's report and called on Parliament to 
"...reject what the Boundary Connnission says and recognise the 
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backing given...for the distinct identity and voice that Cornwall 
d e m a n d s " . L i k e w i s e , Taylor was at pains to highlight Cornwall's 
special socio-economic condition, claiming that Cornwall was the 
poorest county i n Britain and one of the poorest regions i n Europe: 
...the general sketch that people l i k e to draw of the north-
south divide between the economically wealthy and the poor 
areas of the country i s no more than a caricature. In Cornwall 
the figures for poverty and joblessness regularly compete with 
those i n the midlands and north-east. Cornwall i s the poorest 
county i n the country and has one of the lowest GNPs i n Europe. 
I t s poverty, which i s unexpected i n the south...is combined 
with house prices that compete almost with the south-east. 
In similar vein, Paul Tyler - br i e f l y Liberal MP for Bodmin 
during 1974 - had embraced Cornish issues, claiming descent from no 
less a personage than Bishop Jonathan Trewlawny himself .^^^ As the 
Social and Liberal Democrat candidate for the 1989 European 
Parliamentary Elections, Tyler also lent h i s support to the c a l l s for 
a Cornwall-only EPC and, i n a further demonstration of hi s concern 
for the p o l i t i c a l "accommodaiton" of Cornwall, claimed that alleged 
Conservative plans to abolish County Councils posed a severe threat 
to the t e r r i t o r i a l integrity and identity of C o r n w a l l . L i b e r a l 
commitment to Cornwall's integrity, however, came under suspicion 
during the period of i t s Alliance with the Social Democratic Party. 
The identification of the SDP leader, Dr David Owen, with the City of 
Plymouth m i ^ t have been enough to ring alarm bells i n Cornwall, but 
more significant was the SDP's 1983 "green paper" on regional 
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government which advocated the creation of a unified Devon and 
Cornwall authority. As Stanyer observed, "Cornwall and Devon might 
well have lost their identities in their new joint regional 
g o v e r n m e n t " . I n the prelude to the 1987 General election, the 
Liberals in South East Cornwall found i t p o l i t i c to announce that 
"The Alliance w i l l r e s i s t moves by Plymouth to take over parts of 
East Cornwall. Not only are Cornish members of the Alliance against 
this, but Dr Owen has also spoken out against moves by Plymouth into 
Cornwall".^-^^^ Although i n West Cornwall i n particular (where for a 
short time former Mebyon Kemow National Chairman Len Truran was a 
leading SDP member) the SDP attempted some identification with 
Cornish issues, the formation of the SLD and i t s estrangement from Dr 
Owen's minority SDP was an opportunity for the new Liberal Democrats 
to assert their Cornish credentials, reminding the electorate that 
"Cornwall enjoys an enviable tradition of radical and progressive 
p o l i t i c s , " ^ ^ ^ of which they were the inheritors. 
Indeed, the Guardian noted in September 1988^^^ that the North 
Cornwall branch of the Social and Liberal Democrats was the largest 
SLD branch i n Britain, and i n the 1989 European Parliamentary 
Elections Tyler's campaign adopted an almost nationalist tone, 
exhorting voters to "Put Cornwall F i r s t " , a photograph i n the eve-of-
poll Cornish Voice l e a f l e t depicting Tyler (along with Matthew Taylor 
and Annette Penhaligon) at Twickenham sporting a "Trelawny's Second 
Invasion" sweat-shirt and holding a Cornish flag!^^-^ This helped 
Tyler to deflect a potentially strong performance by the Mebyon 
Kemow candidate, Colin Lawry (who had produced an impressive and 
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comprehensive election manifesto, The Cornish Answer^-^). MK i n fact 
achieving a poor 4,224 votes as i t s potential supporters switched 
their allegiance to either the SLD or the Greens.^-^^ 
The Conservative Party i n Cornwall was never as obviously 
"Cornish" as i t s Liberal r i v a l s , notwithstanding i t s parti a l 
inheritance of the local Liberal Unionist and National Liberal 
traditions, but i t too was able to respond to the new anti -
metropolitanisra, albeit i n a more ad hoc manner. John Nott, as 
Conservative MP for St Ives, was quick to rea l i s e the electoral 
appeal of anti-metropolitanism, lending support to the Cornish stamp 
campaign and attacking the Redliffe-Maud proposals with the retort 
that " I can see no reason why Cornwall, with i t s own traditions and 
culture, should not form the nucleus of one such authority and retain 
i t s separate identity" !^^^ Later, i n 1975 Nott responded to the 
Cowethas Flamank report Towards Self-Govemment, explaining that "My 
own view i s not radically different from your own conclusion...1 have 
always been i n favour of a far greater degree of devolution to the 
Cornish people".^"^^ This was a sentiment echoed in neighbouring 
Falmouth-Camborne by David Mudd, who wrote that " . . . I recognise the 
validity of much of the Report*s case and feel that, on balance. 
Crown Dependency status i s the most r e a l i s t i c goal",^^^ arguing that 
Cornwall should enjoy the same degree of autonomy as that afforded to 
the I s l e of Man. 
Mudd, indeed, proved the most successful Conservative proponent 
of anti-metropolitanism, joining Mebyon Kemow as part of his 
campaign to win Falmouth-Camborne from Labour, as a journalist 
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writing a number of popular books on Cornish themes to demonstrate 
his intimate knowledge of and affection for Cornwall,^-^^ distancing 
himself formally from the Parliamentary Conservative Party during the 
"ti n c r i s i s " , and warning of the dangers of what he saw as Thatcher 
centralism. He perceived, he said, an aloofness and arrogance of 
government which was resented by the Cornish electorate: "They are 
told of the magical 'national prosperity*, but can see l i t t l e of i t 
i n Cornwall and are only aware of an obscenely rosy glow emanating 
from the fat-cats of the South East".^^^ Similarly, i n the European 
Constituency debate he distanced himself from the government's 
support for the proposed Cornwall and Pl)miouth EPC, arguing instead 
that Cornwall should have i t s own constituency. Mudd's 
independence of thought and action was f a c i l i t a t e d by hi s confirmed 
"back-bench" status in the Commons, which allowed him the luxury of 
unswerving cormiitment to Cornish issues, affording i n turn a high 
degree of "ad hominen" support from the electorate. The Cornish 
propensity to lend "ad hominen" support had been apparent i n the case 
of David Penhaligon, but i t was also noticeable i n Bodmin (later 
South East Cornwall) where Robert Hicks had built up a strong 
personal following and was also prepared to c r i t i c i s e h i s party on 
Cornish issues* Hicks was one of only a few Conservative MPs widely 
tipped to follow Brocklebank-Fowler into the SDP during i t s heady 
days, but he remained within the Tory fold.^^^ He lent support, 
however, to the Cornwall Industrial Development Association, and -
li k e Mudd - was increasingly prepared in the late 1980s to c r i t i c i s e 
what he considered an over-authoritarian and doctrinaire 
government.^^-^ At the European level, the apparently beleagured MEP 
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(Christopher Beazley) had i n 1988 and 1989 to counter the onslaught 
of the Campaign For A Cornish Constituency and, especially, Paxil 
Tyler by vigorously publicising h i s support for a Petition to the 
European Parliament i n Support of Cornwall's Heritage and Culture 
prepared by the Cornish Bureau for European Relations (COBER).^^^ 
Not a l l Conservative MPs possessed the style of Mudd and Hicks, 
however, and Piers Dixon - the s i t t i n g Conservative who was defeated 
by Penhaligon i n 1974 - was one who failed to develop the necessary 
rapport with the Cornish electorate (despite h i s production of a 
l i t t l e book on Cornish surnames!^^^). I t was Labour candidates, 
however, who consistently found i t difficxilt to present themselves i n 
a "Cornish" light. The great exception was Harold Hayman i n 
Falmouth-Camborne, a local man acknowledged for his independence of 
thought within the Labour Party, generally characterised as a right-
winger. But after h i s death he was replaced by John Dunwoody, \fho 
conceived p o l i t i c s i n a ri g i d l y UK-wide framework (refusing, indeed, 
to recognise Cornwall's C e l t i c identity-*-^^), and who was defeated by 
the enthusiastically l o c a l i s t Mudd i n 1970. Latterly, Labour has 
become much more aware of the need for a Cornish image, a requirement 
not lost on John King i n his efforts i n Truro constituency and i n h i s 
broader determination to bring a Cornish dimension to Labour 
po l i t i c s , and with Paul Clarke i n South East Cornwall i n the 1987 
General Election tximing to Cornish issues as a means to try to make 
headway against that constittiency's formidable Conservative and 
Liberal m a c h i n e s . M o r e generally, frustration at Labour's failure ; 
to advance i n a region of obvious relative poverty was voiced in 
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Dal ton's Turn Left At Land's End in 1987 where he noted "The need for 
Cornwall Coianty Council Labour Group to do more...And...to raise the 
public and media profile of trade unionism in Cornwall."^^^ 
Labour's failure to capitalise upon the new an t i -
metropolitanism was, of course, also a function of the party's 
position (or rather lack of position) within Cornish p o l i t i c a l 
culture over a much longer period of time. Similarly, the 
Conservatives' consistent electoral "under achievement" was not 
necessarily a measure of their less successful adoption of anti-
metropolitanism (vis a v i s the Liberals) but also reflected the 
underlying differences between Cornwall and the ostensibly similar 
English rural areas with which she was being compared. These 
differences were obviously socio-economic in part, reflecting 
Cornwall's peripheral status, but they were also differences in 
p o l i t i c a l culture. As to the strength of this p o l i t i c a l culture, i t 
i s interesting to note - as Lee has done - that the massive i n -
migration (much of i t from South East England) had not benefitted the 
Conservatives to the extent that one might have expected, 
This 
perhaps demonstrates the power of the Cornish p o l i t i c a l culture to 
assimilate newcomers. The actual mechanism of assimilation i s more 
problematical, but an explanation might l i e i n the strength of the 
Liberals (now Liberal Democrats) and hence their c r e d i b i l i t y and 
attraction to former Conservatives who find themselves isolated from 
their former Tory heartland. Having moved to Cornwall from the South 
^ East, newcomers appreciate their distance from the centres of 
economic and p o l i t i c a l power, at the same perceiving that a Liberal 
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vote i s not "wasted" i n the way that i t might have been at home. 
They vote accordingly, perhaps. 
Be that as i t may, the enduring strength of Cornish p o l i t i c a l 
culture was evident i n another facet of local p o l i t i c s , namely at the 
Couffity and other levels of local government. Here Cornwall had 
developed an "Independent" tradition, i n which local p o l i t i c s were 
seen as divorced from and irrelevant to national p o l i t i c s , there 
being therefore no place for party-political conflict at local 
government l e v e l . This, of course, reflected Bulpitt's thesis of the 
estrangement of local from central government (with the former 
essentially non-politicised) and i t was significant that local 
government had been introduced and developed during the period of 
Cornwall's p o l i t i c a l paralysis. Cornwall's "Independent" tradition, 
therefore, was largely a reflection and product of that paralysis. 
Specifically, i t represented Cornish isolation from mainstream 
Br i t i s h p o l i t i c s , and locally i t meant an understanding between 
Liberals and Liberal Unionists at County level which was expressed i n 
the eschewing of party labels. In the f i r s t County Council of 1889, 
for example, the Chairman had been a Liberal Unionists and his Vice a 
Liberal - an attempt to achieve an a p o l i t i c a l balance - and 
thereafter local elections were fought on a non-partisan basis, with 
candidates offering themselves as "Independents".^^^ Indeed, such 
was the level of "de-politicisation" achieved, that habitually a 
majority of local government seats were uncontested, with candidates 
having already gained some form of local consensus and being returned 
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unopposed. This certainly helped to portray the image of a p o l i t i c a l 
system i n paralysis! 
As Lee has shown i n some d e t a i l , this state of a f f a i r s 
persisted well into the post-war era.^^^ In 1973, i n the f i r s t 
elections fought within the reformed Local Government structure, the 
only Counties to f a l l under the control of "Independents" were 
Cornwall, the I s l e of Wight, Dyfed, Gwynedd, and Powys (each of which 
exhibited "peripheral" characteristics).^^-^ As recently as 1977 a 
f u l l 55 per cent of seats on Cornwall County Council were f i l l e d 
througih unopposed returns, and although this figure had fallen to 21 
per cent by 1985 i t was s t i l l the highest proportion of any Comty. 
The number of "Independents" both standing and being returned was 
eroded, so that i n the r e t i r i n g Council i n 1989 there were 26 
"Independents" amongst a total of 78 councillors ( i e 33.3 per cent). 
Nonetheless, the "Independent" tradition has survived (24 were 
returned i n 1989) and indeed during 1988 and 1989 "Independent" 
candidates began to campaign i n concert, holding an "Independents' 
Pgy.fil54 discuss their role and advertising their determination to 
"Keep Cornwall Independent...in the long standing Cornish 
tradition...".^55 
Superficially, the erosion of the "unopposed" and "Independent" 
traditions might have suggested the demise of a disti n c t i v e l y Cornish 
p o l i t i c a l cxilture at local government leve l , but i n fact the pattern 
of party-political contestation that developed was i n i t s e l f highly 
distinctive. As Lee explained, "The contrast between Cornwall and 
other counties, even near neigjibouring ones such as Devon, Dorset and 
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Somerset, i s m a r k e d " . I n s t e a d of the standard Conservative v. 
Labour v. Liberal/SDP contest encountered elsewhere, the pattern i n 
Cornwall was often l e s s coherent, the great majority of contestations 
taking place between only two candidates, and with the pattern of 
contestation changing markedly even i n specific seats between one 
election and the next. Added to this was the paradox that 
contestation also marked emergence from p o l i t i c a l paralysis, with the 
new imperatives of anti-metropolitanisra manifesting themselves at 
local government le v e l . I t was no co-incideence that one of the 
f i r s t significant (and successful) "party p o l i t i c a l " interventions 
was by Mebyon Kemow i n St Day i n 1967, nor was i t surprising that 
the resurgant Liberals - with their efforts to embrace "Comishness" 
- shoiild have set the pace i n forcing c o n t e s t a t i o n . L o c a l 
government, then, had become "politicised" against the* background of 
a more wide ranging change i n Cornish p o l i t i c s that had resulted from 
the "politicisation" of the Cornish "Revival", particularly during 
the 1980s when the Cornish Liberals/Liberal Democrats could portray 
themselves as the defenders of Cornwall against a supposedly 
centralist. Conservative government. This was especially noticeable 
i n the 1989 County elections where, i n contrast to Devon and Somerset 
where the Conservatives won control, the Liberal Democrats increased 
their representation i n Cornwall, with the County Council continuing 
to be run i n effect by an alliance of SLD and Independents. 
This, then, was further evidence not only of continuing 
"difference", between the p o l i t i c s of Cornwall and England, but indeed 
of the enhancement of Cornish p o l i t i c a l culture i n the post-war era. 
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This i t s e l f represented the emergence of Cornish p o l i t i c s from i t s 
"fossilized" paralysis i n response to and as a part of the "Third 
Peripheralism" (the new socio-economic conditions and the 
"politicisation" of the "Revival") that had arisen, a phenomenon 
manifested not only i n the birth of the nationalist groups but also 
i n a new anti-metropolitanism (the demand for "accommodation", the 
critiques of Regional planning) that had affected party p o l i t i c a l 
a c t i v i t y i n Cornwall. Taken together, these disparate strands of 
p o l i t i c a l behavioxir combined to produce a highly distinctive Cornish 
p o l i t i c a l profile i n the years after the Second World War, con-
stituting i n effect the new po l i t i c s of "Third Peripheralism". 
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CONCLUSION 
This study has sought to investigate the condition of modem 
Cornwall, adopting a model and strategy of analysis postulated by 
Rokkan and Urwin, and emplo3nLng an hi s t o r i c a l inquiry to support the 
view that Cornwall's experience can be explained i n terms of phases 
of peripherality, derived from Tarrow's assertion that i n the 
relation between centre and periphery there was an ori g i n a l or "Older 
Peripheralism" of t e r r i t o r i a l and cultural i s o l a t i o n to which was 
added, i n the era of industrialization, a "Second Peripheralism" of 
economic and social marginality. Noting that the events of the 1960s 
and 1970s i n Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and - to a lesser 
extent - the North of England had led academic commentators to 
abandon the conventional wisdom of the "homogeneous state" and to 
search for new explanations of the newly-apparent diversity within 
the United Kingdom, this study has shown that Cornwall too exhibited 
behavioural differences over the same period and which also attracted 
attempts at academic explanation. It-> has been argued that such 
explanation must be sought within the analyses of state formation 
within the B r i t i s h Isles and within Western Europe generally, 
accepting Rokkan and Urwin*s typology and placing Cornwall within 
their framework as one of the Celtic-Atlantic peripheries of the 
West. Within t h i s , the United Kingdom i s seen as a highly 
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"monocephalic" state, with p o l i t i c a l and socio-economic power vested 
i n i t s "lowland" centre i n South East England and with Cornwall 
characterised as part of the "Inner Periphery" of the "highland" 
zone, i n modem times attracting only the minimum of p o l i t i c a l 
"accommodation". 
From this analysis, Cornwall's status as a periphery emerges 
strongly, with important "constants of peripherality" which served to 
perpetuate elements of that status from one h i s t o r i c a l phase to 
another. But of overriding importance i n determining the 
characteristics of peripherality i n any one phase was, i t has been 
argued, the changing relationship between centre and periphery over 
time. Here Tarrow's assertion has been adapted, extended and 
refined. An "Older Peripheral ism", i n which Celtic-Catholic Comwall 
was indeed t e r r i t o r i a l l y and c u l t u r a l l y isolated, has indeed been 
ide n t i f i e d , and the processes by which that condition was eroded and 
f i n a l l y destroyed have been examined. I n the same way, the era of 
"Second Peripheralism" has been analysed i n considerable d e t a i l , 
demonstrating how i t was that despite the apparent technological 
advance i n Comwall, the Cornish experience of industrialisation was 
i n fact over-specialised, imperfect and incomplete. This led, as has 
been argued, to early industrial collapse and consequent economic, 
social and p o l i t i c a l paralysis, the condition that exemplified 
"Second Peripheralism" i n i t s most matured manifestation. 
In a development of Tarrow's concept i t has been argued also, 
however, that the post-war era - with a changing centre-periphery 
relationship based upon central government Regional Development 
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policies - witnessed an emergence from the paralysis of later "Second 
Peripheralism" and the establishment of rapid social, economic and 
p o l i t i c a l change i n what was a new era of "Third Peripheralism". 
Although this phase exhibited many stark contrasts when compared to 
that which had gone before, i t nonetheless continued to mark the 
Cornish experience apart from that of the English "centre", with 
features ranging from the process of "counterurbanisation" to the 
rise of p o l i t i c a l nationalism serving to highlight Cornwall's 
continuing distinctiveness. 
The experience of modem Cornwall, then, has been at root one 
of industrial change, from the rise and f a l l of technological prowess 
to the emergence of the post-war "branch factory" economy, the 
determining factor i n this the changing nature of peripherality. I t 
was thi s experience which moulded the distinctive social, economic 
and p o l i t i c a l i d e n t i t y of modem Cornwall, shaping and emphasising 
the differences between the Cornish "periphery" and the English 
"centre" (and even neighbouring Devon), and placing Comwall firmly 
within the "multi-national" diversity of the B r i t i s h State. 
Peripherality i s thus an important determinant of id e n t i t y - i n 
Comwall, but also by implication within other elements of the United 
Kingdom's "multi-national" diversity. The detailed elucidation of 
the experience of modem Comwall contained within this study, 
therefore, not only contributes towards the f u l l e r elaboration of the 
B r i t i s h diversity but also furnishes a method of inquiry (with i t s 
emphasis upon phases of peripherality) which - i f applied equally to 
other components of the State - might shed yet further l i g h t upon the 
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nature of that diversity. Indeed, the model may have yet wider 
ap p l i c a b i l i t y for the analysis and understanding of Western European 
states as a whole, the examination of Cornwall forming a case study 
whose significance extends far beyond the Tamar border. 
Finally, given that i t i s the condition of peripherality that 
has ensured the perpetuation of Cornwall's separate id e n t i t y , one 
must refl e c t that the price of distinctiveness has been so often 
econanic hardship and deprivation, and that the changing nature of 
peripherality has brought so often i n i t s wake trauma and upheaval. 
But this i s no less true f o r the Scots-Irish Ulster f o l k , for the 
crofters of Barra or Skye, the Welsh-speakers of Gwynedd, the coal-
miners of Lanark and Fife or Glamorgan and Gwent...in the f i n a l 
analysis, the extraordinary diversity, appalling inequalities, and 
enduring fascination of these islands are a function of the dynamic 
relationship between centre and periphery. 
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